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INTRODUCTION
A growing phenomenon of this shrinking world is that the clear-cut
distinction between 'national', 'transnational' and 'global' environmental
problems is fast disappearing in the international legal community.2 The
depletion of the ozone layer is in this respect a typical example: no single
state's activity will be responsible for potential adverse effects caused by
ozone decreases, and most states have only a minimal role in both the
production and the consumption of ozone-depleting chemicals (= 'ozone
depleters').3 The actions of those states that do produce or consume on a
large scale potentially affect all states in the international community.
Ozone is an allotrope of oxygen, made up of three atoms of oxygen
(O3). It is formed when the molecule of the stable form of oxygen (O2) is
split by ultraviolet radiation or electrical discharge.4 Ozone is mainly
found in two regions of the atmosphere, the stratosphere (approximately
from ten to fifty kilometres above the Earth's surface, with a peak
concentration at twenty kilometres) and the troposphere5 (which extends
from the Earth's surface up to about ten kilometres). About ninety per cent
of protective ozone - the blue, pungent-smelling gas - is concentrated in
the stratospheric area (= the 'ozone layer' or 'ozone shield'). The strong
consensus of the international community is that certain man-made
chemicals are destroying the stratospheric ozone layer, which protects the
Earth from harmful UV-B. from the Sun (= 'ozone depletion'),6 though
there still exists uncertainty on some issues.7
2 On 'international environmental law' see among others P. Birnie and A. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, (1992); P. Sands, Principles of International
Environmental Law, (1995); A. Kiss, Droit international de I'environment, (1989) or
English edition, A. Kiss and D. Shelton, International Environmental Law, (1991); G.
Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International
Law', 1 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1990) pp. 3-33; P. H. Sand, 'UNCED and the Development of
International Environmental Law', 3 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1992) pp. 3-17. As to policy (and
legal) issues see A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury, The International Politics of the
Environment, (1992); L. K. Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: Emergence
and Dimensions, 2nd edn. (1990).
5 On the definitions of production/'consumption' of O.D.Ss. see Chapter IIl(III.B.l-2).
4 See Dictionary of the Environment, (1994) pp. 155-56.
5 At the ground level, ozone is simply 'bad': it can cause serious adverse effects
including eye, nose and respiratory problems in humans and animals, damage plants,
field crops, and forests and cause detrimental effects to many materials.
6 In 1974 Drs. F. Sherwood Rowland and Molina from California University published a
scientific paper demonstrating how C.F.Cs. destroy ozone in the stratosphere
('Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: chlorine atom-catalysed destruction of
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Introduction
According to many experimental studies of plants and animals, and
clinical studies of humans, health and environmental effects resulting
from decreases in ozone include increased rates of skin cancer and eye
cataracts; changes in the immune system in a dose and wavelength
dependent fashion; damage to crops such as soya beans; and decreases in
phytoplankton in the marine food chain.8 Further, it is well known that,
as a result of damage to the stratospheric ozone layer, a continent-sized
'ozone hole' has formed over the Southern hemisphere (the 'Antarctic
Ozone Hole').9
The leading cause of ozone depletion has proven to be
chlorofluorocarbons ('C.F.Cs.'), which were commonly used in air
conditioners, refrigerators, foams, solvents and other C.F.Cs. related
products. C.F.Cs. were first invented in 1928 by E. I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company ('DuPont') and General Motors chemists who were looking for a
non toxic heat transfer fluid for refrigeration. Other ozone-depleting
substances that are believed to be destroying the stratospheric ozone layer
include halons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons ('H.C.F.Cs.'), carbon
tetrachloride ('CCl-r), methyl chloroform or 1,1,1-trichloroethane
('C2H3CI3'), hydrobromofluorocarbons ('H.B.F.Cs') and methyl bromide
('CH3Br'). Chemicals such as C.F.Cs., halons and H.C.F.Cs. can contribute to
global warming.10
As its title already indicates, this doctoral thesis is about
international law for the protection of the ozone layer. It will analyse the
international legal ozone regime established by the 1985 Vienna
Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer as amended/adjusted
(see Appendixes I-II). The treaty regime - regulating the above-mentioned
chemicals - is the first international institutional mechanism designed to
address a global environmental problem.
ozone' in 249 Nature, 28 June 1974, pp. 810-12). Their hypothesis first received a
great deal of skepticism.
^ See Chapter III(III.C.2.b) below.
8 See U.N.E.P. 'Environmental Effects of Ozone Depletion: 1991 Update, Panel Report
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer Under the Auspices of UNEP', (November 1991); U.N.E.P. 'Environmental Effects
of Ozone Depletion: 1994 Assessment, Pursuant to Article 6 of the Montreal Protocol;
R. D. Bojkov, The Changing Ozone Layer, (U.N.E.P./W.M.O. 1995) p. 19.
0 See e.g. R. D. Bojkov, The Changing Ozone Layer, (U.N.E.P./W.M.O. 1995) pp. 11 et
seq.
10 See e.g. the U.N.E.P. Action on 03zone, (1989) p. 5.
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In comparison to other M.E.A. regimes such as the 1989 Basel
Convention,11 there is a relatively large amount of material including
articles12 and several books13 devoted to studies of the ozone layer regime,
particularly on the earlier versions of the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol.
My Ph.D. dissertation is indebted partly to these attempts made by the
international legal and/or political scholars. However, to my knowledge, a
comprehensive and detailed analysis of the international legal ozone layer
regime still remains to be seen. Moreover, some parts of the treaty regime
has been strangely neglected. For example, (i) the 1985 Vienna Ozone
Layer Convention - as a fundamental legal basis of the Protocol regime -
has not been fully examined;14 (ii) the literature upon the 'dynamic'
Montreal Protocol adjusted four times is already outdated;15 (iii) little is
known about the national implementation and enforcement of the ozone
11 28 I.L.M. (1989) p. 657, reprinted in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, Basic Documents on
International Law and the Environment, (1995) p. 322. The Convention entered into
force on 5 May 1992. For a comprehensive review see K. Kummer, International
Management ofHazardous Wastes, (1995).
12 There is a voluminous literature on the ozone negotiation. On the legal literature
see footnotes below. In the context of international political science see among others
P. Haas, 'Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect
Stratospheric Ozone', 46 International Organisations (1992) p. 187.
13 Among others see in particular R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in
Safeguarding the Planet, (enlarged edition, 1998): the author was formerly the chief
U.S. negotiator for the ozone treaties. From the perspectives from international
political science see e.g. K. T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global
Environmental Cooperation (1994); I. H. Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric
Change, (1995).
14 See e.g. P. H. Sand, 'The Vienna Convention is Adopted', 27 Environment (June
1985) pp. 19-23; I. Rummel-Bulska, 'The Protection of the Ozone Layer under the
Global Framework Convention' in J. G. Lammers (eds.), Transboundary Air Pollution,
(1986) pp. 281-97; idem, 'Recent Developments relating to the Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer' Yearbook of the Association of Attenders and
Alumni of the Hague Academy of International Law (1984/85/86) pp. 115-25; S. M.
Williams, 'A Historical Background of the Chlorofluorocarbon Ozone Depletion Theory
and its Legal Implications' in Lammers (eds.) Transboundary Air Pollution, (1986) pp.
267-80.
15 See J. Brunnee, Acid Rain and Ozone Layer Depletion: International Law &
Regulation, (1988); P. M. Lawrence, 'International Legal Regulation of the Ozone Layer:
Some Problems of Implementation', 2 J.E.L. (1990) pp. 17-52; J. W. Kindt and S. P.
Menefee, 'The Vexing Problem of Ozone Depletion in International Environmental Law
and Policy', 24 Texas I.L.J. (1989) pp. 261-93; A. M. Capretta, 'The Future's So Bright,
I Gotta Wear Shades: Future Impacts of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer', 29 Virginia J.I.L. (1988) pp. 211-48; D. Caron, 'La
Protection de la Couche d'Ozone Stratospherique et la Structure de TActivite
Normative Internationale en Matiere d'Environment', A.F.D.I. (1990); D. Bryk, 'The
Montreal Protocol and Recent Developments to Protect the Ozone Layer', 15 Harvard
E.L.R. (1991) pp. 275-98; J. Tripp, 'The UNEP Montreal Protocol: Industrial and
Developing Countries Sharing the Responsibility for Protecting the Stratospheric
Ozone Layer', 20 N.Y.U.J.I.L.P. (1988) pp. 733-52.
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layer treaties; (iv) surprisingly, few studies have so far made of the
Montreal Protocol's Non-Compliance Procedure;16 and (v) the Montreal
Protocol's Multilateral Fund has not been fully researched by international
lawyers,17 although this financial institution is deeply associated with
compliance by a growing number of developing countries. Finally and
more fundamentally, (vi) the concept of 'international legal regimes' -
'international legal regimes for the environment' in particular- has not
been clarified, despite the fact that the term is so frequently used in the
literature of international law (e.g. 'the ozone regime'/'the L.R.T.A.P.
regime').
Ideally, international environmental regimes - such as the technical
ozone layer treaties18 - must be analysed in their entireties as highly
specialised legal systems in the sphere of international law.19 Partial legal
studies of international treaty regimes are often misleading, indeed.20
The contents of the doctoral thesis are as follows.
Part I (i.e. Chapter I), which will prove helpful as an introduction to
the ozone layer regime, analyses international legal regimes for the
environment, focusing on their relationship with law-making/developing,
international environmental co-operation, 'soft enforcement' of treaty by
internal international institutions, and finally, non-governmental
organisations. In this part, the international regime for ozone will be
conceptually characterised as the 'self-contained' environmental regime,
having erga omnes character in the field of general international law.
16 See M. Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the
Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol', 3 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1992) pp. 123-62. See also D.
Victor's The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's Non-
Compliance Procedure (1996), focusing on practical - but not on 'legal' - aspects of the
procedure.
17 See e.g. R. Bowser, 'History of the Montreal Protocol's Ozone Fund', 20 l.E.R.
(November 1991); E. R. DeSombre and J. Kauffman, 'The Montreal Protocol Multilateral
Fund; Partial Success Story' in R. Keohane and M. Levy (eds.) Institutions for
Environmental Aid (1996) pp. 89-126.
18 For instance, the U.N.E.P. emphasised in its general report that the drafters of the
ozone convention 'must include technical and scientific experts including modellers
and persons with extensive knowledge of the socio-economic impacts of different
strategies for reducing CFC production and use' (UNEP/WG.69/3 ('Toward a Ozone
Convention: A Look at Some Issue', para. 55).
19 However, being autonomous legal regimes does not necessarily mean that they
deviate from established principles/rules of general public international law (for a
discussion see Chapter I below).
20 See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. xvi.
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Part II (composed of Chapters II & III) is devoted to the detailed legal
analysis of the international treaties for the protection of the ozone layer.
Chapter II examines the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention in the
context of modern international law of the environment: it addressed, for
example, the precautionary environmental 'principle'/approach and the
common concern of (hu)mankind. Chapter III deals with (i) the gradual
development or internationalisation of O.D.S. regulatory measures under
the 1987 Montreal Protocol and (ii) national implementation and
enforcement of the ozone treaties. To understand the real operation of the
ozone layer regime, a great number of conference documents or reports
prepared by the U.N.E.P. Secretariat will be used here.21
Part III (i.e. Chapter IV) discusses extensively the relationship
between Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol and the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law
regime. It will be established that - viewed in its entirety - the Montreal
Protocol's Article 4 trade restrictions seem to be compatible with the
stringent trade rules of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. economic law. Some issues in
Part III are, of course, closely analysed by international trade lawyers.22
This Chapter, however, includes detailed studies of Article 4 provisions as
amended (Section II) and the relationship between M.E.As.' dispute
settlement mechanisms (Montreal N.C.P. in particular) and the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. dispute settlement system (Section IV(B)).
Part IV (composed of Chapters V & VI) examines the compliance
system of the international ozone layer regime, which can be considered
as, to borrow A. Chayes and A. H. Chayes's phrase, 'a managerial model of
compliance' relying on a co-operative approach, rather than as a
traditional enforcement model'.23 In Chapter V, the dispute
avoidance/settlement system of the Ozone Layer Protocol, i.e. the Non-
Compliance Procedure and the functions of the internal treaty organs are
21 The full study of scientific/technical aspects of the Protocol's control measures
lies outside the scope of this legal thesis, however. See in detail R. Benedick, Ozone
Diplomacy, (1998).
22 See among others E. U. Petersmann, 'International Trade Law and International
Environmental Law - Prevention, and Settlement of International Disputes in GATT', 27
J.W.T. (1993) pp. 43-81; W. Lang, 'Les mesures commercials au service de la
protection de l'environment', R.G.D.l.P. (1995) pp. 555-56 esp.; J. Cameron and J.
Robinson, 'The Use of Trade Provisions in International Environmental Agreements and
Their Compatibility with GATT', 2 Y.bk.l.E.L. (1991) pp. 3-30; R. Twum-Barima and L.
B. Campbell, Protecting the Ozone Layer through Trade Measures: Reconciling the
Trade Provisions of the Montreal Protocol and the Rules of the GATT, (U.N.E.P./1994);
T. Schoenbaum, 'Agora: Trade and Environment', 86 A.J.I.L. (1992) p. 700.
23 See A. Chayes and A. H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with
International Regulatory Agreements, (1995).
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closely examined. Chapter VI then investigates the Financial Mechanism
of the Montreal Protocol, including the Multilateral Fund that was newly
established in June 1990.
Part V, Conclusions,(i.e. Chapter VII) is intended as an (provisional)
evaluation of the 'dynamic' international legal regime for the protection of







I. A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF 'INTERNATIONAL REGIMES'
In 1990, one international political/legal scholar, Thomas Gehring,
concluded that:
'international environmental regimes go far beyond treaty law as such. For a defined
issue-area, they are international institutions comprising both an accepted body of
normative prescriptions and an organised process for the making and application of
these prescriptions. Given the successful integration of these two elements,
international regimes turn out to be comparatively autonomous sectoral legal
systemsJ
Perhaps the highly specialised environmental regime that has
framed the legally-binding regulation of ozone-depleting chemicals will
also be characterised as such a 'sectoral legal system' in international
environmental relations. Yet, an often-voiced concern by international
lawyers is that such a sectoral legal system in a given issue-area - founded
on a multilateral treaty - may still coexist with the system of modern
international law, even though its regime institutions have successfully
'internalised' the making and application of law.2 I have much to say about
the 'comparatively autonomous sectoral ozone regime' in the existing
international legal system.
The principal purpose of the present doctoral thesis is to contribute to a
better understanding of the international ozone treaties through the study
of the so-called 'regimes' within the discipline of public international law.
More specifically, we are concerned with a close analysis of the treaty-
based co-operative/regulatory ozone regime and its 'self-contained'
implementation mechanisms at the international level.
1 T. Gehring, 'International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal Systems',
1 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1990) p. 56 (emphasis added).
2 See M. Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the
Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol', 3 Y.bk.I.E.L (1992) pp. 123-62.
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At present the term 'international regimes' is frequently used in the
literature of both modern international law and international relations. 3
For many of regime theorists, international regimes - as legal norm-
creating institutions - may normally be established not only by formal
multilateral treaties but also by other non-binding legal instruments
including 'soft law'.4 From this perspective, Professor Eckart Klein's
traditional regime-definition that strictly requires first of all a formal
treaty seems to be too narrow.5 My intention here is not necessarily to
stick to the so-called 'legal formalism' or 'legalism'.6
In the political context of international relations studies,
international regimes are generally defined as 'a set of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'.7
5 As regards differences between international law and international relations, see M.
Sorensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law, (1968) pp. 1-8 esp.; A. Hurrell,
'International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach' in V.
Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations, (1992) pp. 54-57.
4 In the latter case, it is particularly difficult to identify the precise moment when
regime-formation occurs in international relations. See footnote no. 7 below.
5 Defined as (i) a treaty between States or States and international organisations
regulating the status of an area such as high seas or outer space, (ii) a general interest
underlying the regulation, and (iii) the regime which endows the area with the general
status erga omnes. See E. Klein, 'International Regimes' in 9 E.P.l.L. (1986) pp. 202 et
seq. Cf. L. F. E. Goldie, 'Special Regimes and Pre-emptive Activities in International
Law', 11 I.C.L.Q. (1962) pp. 698-99 esp., noting that regimes provide the 'ideal
conditions for the early growth of the law'.
6 For a discussion of legalism, see e.g. J. N. Shklar, Legalism, (1964).
7 S. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables' in idem (ed.), International Regimes, (1983) pp. 1-22. For a critical
argument of international relations theories see A. Hurrell, 'International Society and
the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach' in V. Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and
International Relations, (1992) pp. 57-71. Cf. S. Murase, 'Perspectives from
International Economic Law on Transnational Environmental Issues', 253 Hague
Recueil (1995) pp. 299-300. See also T. Gehring 'International Environmental
Regimes', 1 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1990) p. 37 (footnote 16), arguing that regime theorists does
not fully deal with the impact of decision-making procedure and the relationship
between normative and decision-making elements. In an attempt to improve the most
frequently cited international regime definition provided by S. Krasner, some authors
further argue, for instance, that regimes could be 'the organising concepts for softer,
nonbinding agreements that embody cross-national intentions on particular issues',
and they are also 'created and operated primarily through mechanisms of negotiation'.
See B. I. Spector, G. Sjostedt, and I. W. Zartman (eds.), Negotiating International
Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), (1994) pp. 3-4 (emphasis added). In addition, Osherenko and
Young define international regimes as 'social institutions composed of agreed-upon
principles, norms, and decision-making procedures that govern the interactions of
actors in specific issue areas'. See G. Osherenko and O. Young, Polar Politics: Creating
International Environmental Regimes, (1993) pp. 1 et seq.
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In brief, they are 'international institutions for the governance of limited
issue-areas'.8
Although examples of such regimes in international
political/economic relations may be multiplied indefinitely, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ('G.A.T.T.')9 - serviced by an ad hoc GA.T.T.
Secretariat in Geneva having uncertain treaty status10 - can be regarded as
the prototype.11 The G.A.T.T., which is widely regarded as an international
institution governing international trade relations, was originally
intended to be only a provisional free-trade agreement until the
establishment of the International Trade Organisation (i.e. 'I.T.O.').12 In
other words, the "G.A.T.T." was applied through the Protocol of Provisional
Application (i.e. 'P.P.A.'),13 from 1 January 1948, essentially as a treaty
obligation under public international law.14 Although the W.T.O. trade
regime has taken over the old G.A.T.T. regime, technically speaking, the
8 T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) p. 15. But see also Y. Yamamoto,
'International Regimes: Search for Governance without Government', 95 Japanese
Journal of International Law & Policy, (1996) pp. 6-9 esp. On the concept of
'governance' see O. R. Young, 'Global Governance: Toward a Theory of Decentralised
World Order' in idem (ed.), Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the
Environmental Experience, (1997) pp. 273-99; V. Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and
International Relations, (1992) pp. 392-94.
9 See Chapter IV(lll) below.
111 See W. J. Davey, 'The WTO/GATT Trading System: An Overview' in Handbook of
GATT, pp. 14-15. See also J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law & Policy of
International Economic Relations, 2nd edn. (1997) p. 42, noting 'technically as a kind
of a "leased group, whereby the GATT reimbursed" the 1C1TO for the costs of the
secretariat'. Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995) pp. 5-6 (Japanese).
11 See T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regime, (1992) pp. 29 et seq. & many other
school-text books on international politics. The G.A.T.T. contained no explicit
provisions for setting up any institutions. On the legal status of the G.A.T.T. see A.
Kotera, 'The International Legal Status of the G.A.T.T.', Trade Journal, no. 2 (1990) pp.
39-45 (Japanese).
12 The l.T.O. Charter never entered into force.
18 The Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, October 30 1947, T.l.A.S. no. 1700. See J. H. Jackson, The World Trading
System: Law & Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edn. (1997) pp. 39-41.
The 23 members of the Preparatory Committee of the U.N.E.S.C. signed the General
Agreement as an interim measure, and the G.A.T.T. then entered into force in January
1948 with 23 founding contracting members, including China, France, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The G.A.T.T. 1994 does not include this Protocol (see
further Chapter IV(III) below).
14 For further details see Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995) Chapter 1(2) &
its footnote no. 25 (Japanese); R. E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade
Diplomacy, (1975). See also D. W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, 4th
edn. (1982) p. 117, noting that 'This [i.e. G.A.T.T.] is . . . more an international treaty
than an international organisation'. On the W.T.O. institutional structure see e.g. W.
j. Davey, 'The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview' in Handbook ofGATT,
pp. 12-16 esp.
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original version of the G.A.T.T. treaty still continues to exist as an
international agreement (see Chapter IV(III.A) below).15
In the international legal system that still lacks a centralised
authority, the basic administrative function of regimes will be to organise
partly 'unorganised international society',16 consisting of sovereign states
as territorially organised units. The building of such legal/political
regimes has been taking place not only in the territorial dimension but
also in non-territorial and functional areas, e.g. global environmental
protection such as ozone, human rights protection, arms control and the
globalization of multilateral trade. In so far as environmental regimes are
concerned, their crucial role would be to strictly regulate previously
'unregulated areas' of international environmental relations. In many
case studies of environmental regimes,17 actors involved in the
establishment and operation of environmental regimes are sovereign
states or nations, international organisations in general, political organs of
treaty regimes, non-governmental organisations, potentially affected
industries, individuals and so forth.
In order to understand the legal significance of the ozone regime,
for the present purposes, we shall focus on international regimes formally
based on multilateral treaties. Unlike a mere political regime (i.e. non-
binding instruments), the creation of a treaty regime can introduce more
reliable rules and norms to legally regulate the activities or behaviour of
state and non-state actors in need of internationally agreed regulations or
standards in a given issue-area of international relations.
International legal or treaty regimes are founded on the principle of
good faith (bona fides),^ which is the natural law concept of international
15 In this respect see E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System,
(1997) pp. 50-51.
16 On the concept of 'international society' see G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of
International Law, 5th edn. (1967) pp. 8-15 esp. Cf. A. Hurrell, 'International Society
and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach' in V. Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory
and International Relations, (1992) pp. 62 et seq.
17 See e.g. O. R. Young and G. Osherenko 'Testing Theories of Regime Formation:
Finding from a Large Collaborative Research Project' in V. Rittberger (ed.), Regime
Theory and International Relations, (1992) pp. 223-51. See also the political/legal
literature mentioned in a footnote no. 7.
16 See S. Murase, 'Perspectives from International Economic Law on Transnational
Environmental Issues', 253 Hague Recueil (1995) pp. 417-18; idem, 'Kokusai Funsou
ni okeru "Singiseizitsu no Kinou', ('The Principle of Good Faith in the Implementation
of International Obligations: The Function of Complaint Procedures in the Framework
of International Regimes'), 38 Sophia University Law Review, (1995) pp. 189-221
(Japanese). See J. F. O'Connor, Good Faith in International Law, (1991) p. 124,
defining the principle of good faith as a 'fundamental principle from which the rule
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law regarded as an 'implicit provision' of all treaty regimes.19 The legal
principle is politically important in securing international co-operation
between states in the existing international system. In the Nuclear Tests
case, the International Court of Justice ('I.C.J.') held that:
One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal
obligations, whatever their sources, is the principle of good faith. Trust and
confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in particular in an age when
this co-operation in many fields becoming increasingly essential.^9
Further, in the W.H.O. and Egypt case, the International Court of Justice
stated, in the advisory opinion relating to the transfer of the W.H.O.
Regional Office from the territory of Egypt, that:
'the paramount consideration both for the Organisation and the host State in every case
must be their clear obligation to co-operate in good faith to promote the objectives and
purposes of the Organisation as expressed in its Constitution'.21
More recently, in Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), the International Court of Justice noted that:
'Article 26 [of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] combines two
elements, which are of equal importance. It provides that "Every Treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". This
latter element, in the Court's view, implies that, in this case, it is the purpose of the
pacta sunt servanda and other legal rules distinctively and directly related to
honesty, fairness and reasonableness are derived, and the application of these rules is
determined at any particular time by the compelling standards of honesty, fairness
and reasonableness prevailing in the international community at that time'. See also
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 26); the 1986 Convention
on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between
International Organisations (Article 26).
19 A. D'Amato, 'Good Faith', 9 E.P.I.L. (1986) pp. 107-09.
119 The Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v France and New Zealand v France), l.C.J.
Reports, 1974, p. 268, para. 46 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the binding
character of unilateral declaration, see, in particular, D. Kennedy, 'The Sources of
International Law', 2 A.U.J.I.L.P. (1987) pp. 48 et seq.; H. E. Chodosh, 'Neither Treaty
nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law', 26 Texas I.L.J. (1991)
pp. 122-24.
2! Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt.
I.L.R. 1982, p. 480, para. 49 (emphasis added), cited in S. Murase, 'Perspectives from
International Economic Law on Transnational Environmental Issues', 253 Hague
Recueil (1995) p. 418.
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Treaty, and the intentions of the parties in concluding it, which should prevail over
its literal application. The principle of good faith obliges the Parties to apply it in a
reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realised'.2 2
Good faith is something more than a mere ethical or political principle.
These statements by the International Court of Justice are indicative of the
philosophical view that the legal principle of good faith within
international legal regimes will help maintain not 'blind' but mutual trust
between regimes' state actors.23 Under international treaty regimes states
are thus expected to behave rationally at least. Non-compliance in 'bad
faith' with obligations of treaty regimes would lead to the collapse of their
legal systems.24
*
Section 11 of this Chapter is devoted to the in-depth analysis of
international environmental regimes in the field of international law: it
first considers international legal regimes for the environment in general,
and then discusses the link between these regimes and (i) the law-making
and developing of international co-operation or regulatory regimes of
environmental regulation, (ii) the institutionalisation of international
environmental co-operation, (iii) 'soft enforcement' of international
environmental obligations and (iv) non-governmental organisations or
institutions. Section III then examines the legal character of sectoral legal
systems or 'self-contained regimes' in international law.
22 See Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), para.
142; A. E. Boyle, 'The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case', 8 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1997, forthcoming).
23 On the functions of the legal principle good faith in the W.T.O. regime see in
particular T. Cottier and K. N. Schefer, 'Non-Violation Complaints in WTO/GATT
Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future' in E. U. Petersmann (ed.), International
Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, (1997) pp. 167-70 & Section V.
24 See M. Virally, 'Review Essay: Good Faith in Public International Law', 77 A.J.I.L.
(1983) pp. 130-34; A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, (1986) p. 157.
Cf. B. O. lluyomade, 'The Scope and Content of a Complaint of Abuse of Right in
International Law', 16 Harvard I.L.J. (1975) pp. 50-51.
It is important to note that the principal source of non-compliance is not
wilful disobedience but the lack of capability or clarity or priority. See A. Chayes
and A. H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory
Agreements, (1995).
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II. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES IN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS
In the context of environmental protection, Thomas Gehring defines
international regimes as certain 'regulations' developed in a supreme
organ of a treaty regime, governing a defined areas of international
environmental relations.25 In a similar vein, Dr. L. Jurgielewicz identifies
international environmental regimes as the development of legal
regulations ('normative expectations') by both state and non-state actors
through collective decision-making, governing a specific issue area and
creating a legal obligation among the actors.26 Gehring lays special
emphasis on the legislative function played by a Conference of the Parties
or an equitable internal organ within a special treaty regime: such a
political organ often enjoys considerable independence and it is (only)
within the framework of international regimes that authoritative decisions
are formally adopted (see Chapter II(III.D.2)).27 On the other hand,
Jurgielewicz's regime definition appears to come close to those of regime
theorists of international relations studies.28
The reason I first referred to these regime-definitions by two
international lawyers is to show that international environmental regimes
in many instances consist of legal regulations or standards. The standards
or regulations established by regulatory regimes fall in the category of
'legal norms' having a relatively high degree of formality.29 As Professor
25 See T. Gehring, 'International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectral Legal
Systems', 1 Y.bk.l.E.L. (1990) p. 36.
26 L. Jurgielewicz, 'Global Environmental Change and International Law', (Ph.D. thesis,
London University, 1994) pp. 157-58.
27 It is noticable in this context that the Consultative Meeting of the Parties to the
Antarctic Treaty regime and its 'special' Meetings have steadily developed later
international treaties to regulate the conservation of marine living resources, mineral
resources, and so forth. See the 1959 Antarctic Treaty (Article 9); the 1972 Antarctic
Seals Convention; the 1980 Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention
('C.C.A.M.L.R.'); the 1988 Antarctic Mineral Resources Convention ('C.R.A.M.R.A.'); the
1991 Antarctic Environment Protocol. See e.g. P. Sands, Principles of International
Environmental Law, (1995) pp. 522-34.
28 See regime-definitions in footnote no. 7 above.
29 A. Chayes and A. N. Chayes, The New Sovereignty, (1995) pp. 115-18. Cf. R.
Higgins, 'The Role of Resolutions of International Organisations in the Process of
Creating Norms in the International System' in W. E. Butler (ed.), International Law
and the International System, (1987) p. 21, defining a norm as 'an authoritative
provision of law that continues to command significant community expectations as to
its contemporary validity and which may be appropriately invoked and applied in the
particular factual context'.
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P. Birnie suggests, international regulations are meant to be a 'legal
process since it implies an attempt to govern behaviour by the setting of
rules and standards and the promulgation of principles'.30 As far as very
detailed legally-binding standards are concerned, however, it may be true
that an environmental regime as a body of 'international environmental
law' seems alien to general public international law or customary
international law.31 Such environmental regulations will include the so-
called 'ecostandards', emission standards of N.Ox., 'consumption'/production
of C.F.Cs. and O.D.Ss. and other related instruments. They are generally
annexed to the treaty texts and further adjusted by the highest treaty organ
in accordance with developments in related scientific and technical
knowledge. Usually, these treaty-based international standards themselves
are not capable of being customary international law for environmental
protection.32 For a number of reasons, they must therefore be supervised
by internally specialised international agencies or institutions, rather
than by formal judicial institutions for legal settlement (see Section III(C)
below & Chapters III and V in particular).
In this particular respect, these treaty regimes are correctly
understood as international regulatory regimes for the environment (i.e.
international 'standard-setting treaties'). International regulatory
regimes are designed to facilitate and consolidate the legal protection of
international community interests as well as those of individual states. It is
natural that such global regulatory regimes are based on international co¬
operation among developed and developing nations, international
institutions, non-governmental and scientific institutions, industry and
other non-state actors. In this way, they are defined as international co¬
operation regimes established specifically for the purposes of safeguarding
the common interests of the international community as a whole.33 The
30 P. Birnie, 'International Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future
Needs', in A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury, The International Politics of the Environment,
(1992) p. 51 (emphasis added).
31 I. Brownlie, 'A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental
Protection, 13 N.R.J. (1979) pp. 179-89. Under the international case-law, the Trail
Smelter arbitration still remains the only international adjudication in the field of
air pollution. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 33 A.J.l.L. (1939)
p. 33; 35 A.J.l.L. (1941) p. 648; j. E. Reid, 'The Trail Smelter Dispute', C.Y.bk.l.L.
(1963) pp. 213-29.
32 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) pp. 12-13
esp. See M. Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance', 3 Y.bk.l.E.L. (1992),
arguing that detailed international standards have less than formal legal status.
33 In this respect some international co-operation regimes would fall into the category
of the regimes that 'endow the areas the general status erga omnes (see Klein's
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terminology is used here to accentuate the growing importance of high
levels of international co-operation between Northern industrialised and
Southern industrialising countries in modern international environmental
relations (see Section III(B) below).
International environmental regulations and legal rules can be
defined as, in W. Lang's phrase, 'primary elements' or substantive
'regimes'34 of multilateral environment treaties. For example, Articles 2
and 3 of the Montreal Ozone Protocol and Articles 3, 4 and Articles 7 and 8 of
the 1989 Basel Convention35 can be regarded as such substantive
provisions of international environmental regimes. As we shall see later,
international diplomatic negotiations on 'primary elements' of
environmental treaties are usually protracted and difficult.36 In addition,
the legal dynamics of regulatory regimes will be characterised by further
elaboration of precise binding international regulations and detailed rules
or practices by 'internal' treaty organs such as the Conference/Meeting of
the Parties.37 Yet, this is only after the adoption of respective treaty
regimes.38
The international regulatory/co-operative regimes would also in
many instances need procedural provisions relating to (i) obligations of
prior notification and consultation in the context of environmental
hazard,36* (ii) obligations to notify46* and consult46 in the case of accidents
regime-definitions in footnote no. 5 above). It would be possible to argue that the
ozone layer presently enjoys such a general status in general international law (see
Chapter 11(111.B) above).
34 See W. Lang, 'Diplomacy and International Environmental Law-Making: Some
Observations', 3 Y.bk.l.E.L. (1992) pp. 114-15.
35 28 l.L.M. (1989) p. 657, reprinted in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, Basic Documents on
International Law and the Environment, (1995) p. 322. The Convention entered into
force on 5 May 1992.
36 In the context of the ozone regime see Chapter II(II) and Chapter III(II & IV) below.
37 On the functions of the Conference of the Parties to M.E.As. see J. Werksman, 'The
Conference of the Parties to Environmental Treaties' in idem (ed.), Greening
International Institutions, (1996) pp. 55-68.
38 See J. Werksman, 'The Conference of the Parties to Environmental Treaties' in idem
(ed.), Greening International Institutions, (1996) pp. 56-57. In the context of the
ozone regime see Chapter III(IV)) esp.
36* See the 1986 Early Notification Convention; the 1986 I.A.E.A. Assistance
Convention; the 1983 Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and France
Concerning Exchange of Information in the Event of Emergencies Occurring in One of
the Two States which could have Radiological Consequences for the Other State.
46 For example, the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Article 198); the 1972 M.A.R.P.O.L. Convention
(Article 8(4)); the 1976 Barcelona Convention (Article 9(2)). See also the Corfu
Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 4.
46 See e.g. the 1972 London Dumping Convention (Article V(2)); the 1974 Nordic
Environmental Protection Convention (Article 11); the 1979 Geneva Convention
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or emergencies capable of causing transfrontier harm in general, (iii)
environmental impact assessment ('E.I.A.')42 and (iv) global
environmental monitoring of treaty compliance43 in general. They can be
defined as 'secondary elements' of environment protection agreements. In
logic and practice, such procedural 'regimes'44 themselves are not
necessarily 'dynamic' in character, but they are absolutely indispensable
for the development of substantive provisions of international legal
regimes. In other words, procedural regimes are therefore contributory to
the above-mentioned 'dynamics' and maintenance of international co¬
operative/regulatory regimes in international law.
In the light of their environment-related purposes, the dynamic of a
regulatory aspect of international environmental regimes (i.e. the
developments of substantive provisions) is noteworthy. As T. Gehring
argues,45 it is now undeniably one of the distinctive and unique
characteristics of evolving regimes in international environmental
relations. However, we as international lawyers must not forget that they
nevertheless do co-exist with the system of general public international
(Articles 5 & 8); the 1978 U.N.E.P. Draft Principles (Principle 7); the 1986 W.C.E.D.
Legal Principles (Article 17); and the 1992 Rio Declaration (Principle 19). See also
the Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 24 l.L.R. 1957, p. 101; the Fisheries
Jurisdiction cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland), I.C.J. Reports, 1974, p. 3. As to the
continental shelf see e.g. the 1989 Kuwait Protocol concerning Marine Pollution
Resulting from Exploitation and Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf;
the 1981 U.N.E.P. Principles Concerning the Environment Related to Offshore Drilling
and Mining within the Limits of National Jurisdiction. In addition, the principle of
'prior informed consent' ('P.I.C.') would be included in this category.
43 Early examples include the 1978 U.N.E.P. Draft Principles of Conduct; the 1985
A.S.E.A.N. Agreement (Article 14); the 1982 World Charter for Nature; the 1985 E.C.
Environmental Assessment Directive; the 1982 U.N.E.P. Conclusions of the Study on
the Legal Aspects Concerning the Environment related to Offshore Mining and Drilling
within the Limits of National Jurisdiction; the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Article 206). On
E.I.A. see in particular P. Sands and J. Werksman, 'Procedural Aspects of
International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Citizen;s Rights' in K.
Ginther (eds.), Sustainable Development and Good Governance, (1995) pp. 187-96; G.
Wandesforde-Smith, 'Environmental Impact Assessment' in M. Bothe (ed.), Trends in
Environmental Policy and Law, (1980) pp. 101-29; N. A. Robinson, 'International
Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment', 19 Boston College Environmental Affairs
Law Review (1992) pp. 591-610; S. Minami, 'The Development of International
Environmental Law and E.I.A.', 115 Hitotsubashi Law Review (1996) pp. 190-208
(Japanese).
43 See Section III(C) below.
44 Yet it must be noted that, as with the doctrine of 'estoppel' (by 'representation') as
a general principle of international law (see e.g. the Temple case) or of local remedies
(see e.g. the Phosphates in Morocco case), the distinction between such 'procedural
regimes' and 'substantive regimes' in international law is not necessarily clear-cut.
See C. F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, (1990) pp. 347-50.
45 See Section I above.
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law and other specialised treaty regimes for various political and/or
economic purposes (e.g. the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. regime),46 even though such
international environmental regimes often do have a comparatively
autonomous 'self-contained' character in international law.
Further, we also need to take account of national implementation of
environmental agreements, simply because it is crucial for the successful
implementation of regimes.47 In this respect, it is noteworthy that many
environmental agreements, including the 1985 Vienna Ozone
Convention,48 required their parties to adopt domestic measures and
national implementation strategies.49
III. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Law-Making of International Co-operation Regimes of
Environmental Regulation
As stated earlier, international environmental regimes coming within the
scope of the present legal study are created/maintained by formal
multilateral treaties between states (i.e. conventions, treaties, accords,
agreements and supplementing protocols).
International law can be developed from the following sources, i.e.
the above-mentioned international conventions, whether general or
particular; international custom; general principles of law, and as
secondary sources, judicial decisions and the teaching of the most highly
qualified publicists.50 In the sphere of global environmental protection,
as L. Giindling contends, international treaty law is of special importance
46 On the compatibility of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law regime and environmental
treaty regimes see in detail Chapter IV below.
47 On this point see A. Hurrell, 'International Society and the Study of Regimes: A
Reflective Approach' in V. Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations,
(1992) pp. 69-71: Chapter III, Part B on the national implementation and enforcement
of the international ozone treaties.
48 Article 2(2).
49 Notable examples are the 1992 Climate Change Convention (Article 4(2.a)): the
1992 Biodiversity Convention (Article 6): the 1989 Basel Convention (Article 9(5)):
the 1985 A.S.E.A.N. Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(Articles 1 and 2): the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. (Articles VIII. 1-2 and 7 esp.).
50 See in particular P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment,
(1992), Chapter 1; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th edn. (1990),
Chapter I; A. Kiss, Droit international de 1'environment, (1989) Chapitre II; S. Oda
(eds.), Modern International Law, (1986) Chapter 4 (Japanese); Y. Onuma (ed.), Inter-
Civilisation Law: Cases & Materials, (1996) Chapter 2 (Japanese); S. Yamamoto,
International Law, (1994) Chapter 3 (Japanese); D. Kennedy, 'The Sources of
International Law', 2 A.U.J.l.L.P. (1987) pp. 1-96.
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because it is by multilateral treaties that the necessary environmental
obligations can be formulated in a sufficiently clear and systematic
manner.51 However, it is very likely that, in view of the level of economic
and political integration of the present international community, states
would hesitate to adopt a comprehensive single agreement that will deal
with 'all aspects' of a given issue-area of international environmental
relations.52
A growing number of environmental regimes are based upon
multilateral umbrella/framework conventions and/or subsequent
implementing protocols. They include: the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer
Convention and its Montreal Protocol; the 1979 L.R.T.A.P. Convention
adopted under the auspices of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe
('U.N.E.C.E.') and its five Protocols;55 the 1992 Climate Change Convention54
and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; U.N.E.P. Regional Sea Conventions and their
supplementing protocols;55 and, arguably, the international waste regime
5* L. Gundling, 'Environment, International Protection', 5 E.P.I.L. (1986) pp. 122 et
seq. See also P. C. Szasz, 'International Norm-Making' in E. B. Weiss, Environmental
Change and International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions, (1992) pp. 41-62 esp.
52 It is probably true that the existing environment treaty law is therefore
fragmentary and unsystematic: unlike the global 'Constitution for the Oceans' (i.e. the
1982 U.N.C.L.O.S.), there does not exist a 'Convention on the Law of Global Air', as was
suggested in the 1989 Ottawa Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts on the Protection of
the Atmosphere. See P. H. Sands, 'UNCED and the Development of International
Environmental Law', 3 Y.bk.l.E.L. (1992) p. 7.
55 The 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, 18 l.L.M. (1979)
p. 1442; the 1984 Protocol on Long-term Financing of a Co-operative Programme for
Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe
('E.M.E.P.'), 27 I.L.M. (1988) p. 701; the 1985 Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur
Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes, 27 I.L.M. (1988) p. 707; the 1988 Protocol
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary
Fluxes, 28 I.L.M. (1989) p. 212; the 1991 Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions
of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes, 31 I.L.M. (1992) p.
573; the 1994 Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, 33 I.L.M. (1994) p.
1542. On the effectiveness of the L.R.T.A.P. regime see J. Wettestad, 'Acid Lessons?
LRTAP Implementation and Effectiveness', 7 G.E.C. (1997) pp. 235-49.
54 Text in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, Basic Documents on International Law and the
Environment, (1995) p. 252.
55 The U.N.E.P. Regional Sea Conventions include the 1976 Barcelona Convention for
the Mediterranean and Protocols (15 I.L.M. (1976) p. 290) supplemented by the 1980
Athens Protocol and the 1982 Geneva Protocol; the 1978 Kuwait Convention and
Protocol (17 I.L.M. (1978) p. 511) and the 1989/90 Protocols; the 1981 Abidjan
Convention and Protocol (20 I.L.M. (1981) p. 746) supplemented by the 1981 Protocol;
the 1981 Lima Convention and Agreement supplemented by 1981/83/89 Protocols; the
1982 Jeddah Convention and the 1992 Protocol; the 1983 Cartagena Convention and
Protocol (22 I.L.M. (1983) p. 221) and the 1983/90 Protocols; the 1985 Nairobi
Convention and Protocols; the 1986 Noumea Convention and Protocols (26 I.L.M. (1987)
p. 38). Many of these treaty texts can be found in P. H. Sand, Marine Environment Law
in the UNEP, (1988).
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of the 1989 Basel Convention. On many occasions, they incorporated
certain elements of non-binding 'soft law' instruments produced
beforehand by negotiating state actors.56 After the adoption of a treaty,
the highest treaty institution within the respective regime would also
generate not only 'hard law' but also internal 'soft law' such as decisions or
resolutions or recommendations that lack formal binding force.57
One of the major reasons to rely on framework conventions-
implementing protocols - and international 'soft law' - is that their law-
creating/developing techniques generally correspond to economic,
political and social realities of the decentralised international legal
community of nearly two hundred states. In addition, even in a situation of
scientific uncertainty, certain positive action must be taken by states to
prevent serious or virtually irreversible environmental damage (e.g. ozone
depletion). In short, these legal instruments can provide a flexible law-
creating/developing process in international environmental relations.
More concretely, by using these techniques, state actors can tackle
controversial or complicated global environmental issues collectively at a
time when they are in reality still hesitant in restricting their freedom of
action.
In this respect, it cannot be denied that traditional customary
international law rules and their law-making methods do not necessarily
recognise the urgency of the need for efficient international co-operation
and regulatory regimes for the environment: customary law requires state
practice in the international community combined with an opinio juris,
and usually evolves over a relatively long period.5^ In a somewhat
56 Especially worthy of reference would be the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on Human
Environment (see Chapter II(III.C.l) below); the 1982 World Charter for Nature; the
1975 Mediterranean Action Plan ('M.A.P.'); the 1985/87 Cairo Guidelines and
Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes; and the
1989 Helsinki Declaration which preceded the 1990 Revision of the Montreal Ozone
Protocol (see Part A of Chapter III(IV.B)) below).
57 As will be described in chapters below, internal 'soft law' adopted by the Ozone
Meeting of the Parties (i.e. 'Ozone Decisions') has formed an important part of the
international regulatory regime. Under the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. regime, a total of 190 non-
binding recommendations made by the Conference of the Parties - interpreting and
elaborating its legal text - have shaped the international regime in a manner barely
foreseeable at the time of its adoption. See P. H. Sand, 'Whither CITES? The Evolution
of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of Trade and Environment', 8 E.J.l.L. (1997) p.
35.
5& But see e.g. the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. the Netherlands), I.C.J. Reports, 1969, para.
73, noting that 'it might be that, even without the passage of any considerable period
of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention might
suffice of itself . . .'; the Libya v. Malta case, I.C.J. Reports, 1985, pp. 29-30; the
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different context, a comprehensive set of rules/principles contained in the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties59 by itself cannot provide
flexible guidelines to quickly 'reach' international treaty regimes relating
to global environmental protection. A 'new law-making technique' is
needed here.60











Nicaragua case (Merits: Nicaragua v. United States), I.C.J. Reports, 1986, p. 98. See
also B. Cheng, 'United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International
Customary Law?', Indian J.I.L. pp. 23 et seq.; P. C. Szasz, 'International Norm-Making'
in E. B. Weiss, Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges and
Dimensions, (1992) pp. 66-69.
59 8 I.L.M. (1969) p. 679; 63 A.J.I.L. (1969) p. 875, entered into force in 1980. See in
particular I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd edn. (1984).
Y. Ogawa, The Law of Treaties, (1989, Japanese).
60 See J. I. Charney, 'Universal International Law', A.J.I.L. 87(1993) p. 543, noting
that 'Rather than state practice and opinio juris, multilateral forums often play a
central role in the creation and shaping of contemporary international law'. On the
role of such 'multilateral forums' in the development of the ozone protection regime,
see Chapters II(II), 111(11), V(II) & VI(II) esp.
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As sketched here (Diagram no. I), in the first phase, framework
conventions^! lay down international substantive obligations only in
general and broad terms for hesitant states to take appropriate measures or
enact 'all practicable measures': this is in effect the confirmation of the
rule of international 'due diligence' (see Chapter II(III.C.l)).62 However,
as with the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention (Articles 2-5) and the 1979
Geneva L.R.T.A.P. Convention (Articles 3-9), framework convention
regimes commonly furnish the institutional basis for future international
environmental co-operation in scientific research, systematic observation,
information exchange and so on.63 For this purpose, Secretariats for
environmental conventions typically have important functions as groups
of technical experts (see Chapter II(III.D.3)). In the second phase, based on
improved or changing scientific knowledge and technical data, protocols
or subsequent treaties and/or annexes then set detailed legally-binding
international standards or regulations (e.g. emission standards) that will
give practical content to the vague rule of customary law, 'due diligence'.
In the light of any newly emerging scientific evidence, if the need arises,
Conferences/Meetings of the Contracting Parties established by
convention/protocol regimes are to take further necessary measures on a
regular basis (see Chapter II(III.D.2)). As regards this point, a
revolutionary simplified majority voting procedure established by the
Montreal Protocol is particularly noteworthy (see Chapter III(III.C).
It should also be pointed out that, since the framework convention
sets the fundamental basis on which supplementary protocols are built, no
one may become a party to protocols unless they become a contracting
party to the original convention regime. 64 In addition, any party which
6! In a report entitled 'Towards an Ozone Convention', the U.N.E.P. Working Group
defined a framework convention as 'an agreement by the signatories to a common
objective; an agreement to co-operate in research , monitoring and exchange of
information; and an expression of intent to effect future agreements for specific
actions toward controls and other measures' (UNEP/WG.69/3, 31 December 1981, p.
10)
62 But the 1992 Climate Change Convention introduces certain emission reduction
targets (Article 4(2.a-b)).
63 On this point see A. E. Boyle, 'The Principle of Co-operation: the Environment', in
A. V. Lowe and Warbrick (eds.),The United Nations and the Principles of International
Law, (1994) p. 131, suggesting that 'the inability to agree co-operative solutions,
unless evidence of bad faith, is not itself a breach of international law.
64 See the Vienna Ozone Convention (Article 16(1)). The close connection between a
convention and expected protocols was emphasised throughout the Vienna Convention
negotiation. See also the 1987 Montreal Protocol (Article 14); the Biodiversity
Convention (Article 32(1)); the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Article 17(4)); the 1976 Barcelona Convention (Article 23). Cf. Article 32(2) of the
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withdraws from the convention is therefore considered as also having
withdrawn from any protocol to which it is a contracting party.® This co¬
operative and solid relationship between the convention and implementing
protocols/annexes forms a united and 'complete' international regulatory
regime, which will impose uniform international obligations of protocols
on contracting parties. Additionally, this would also exclude different legal
interpretations of its environmental treaty provisions.®
In the final place, it must be added that the eventual results of the
framework convention approach are not necessarily always symbolic or
'lowest-common-denominator international agreements', as is often argued
by some critical commentators.® Rather, a framework convention should
be correctly understood as a necessary 'framework' of a solid legal regime
for further international environmental co-operation. In many cases,
subsequent scientific investigation prosecuted by 'internal' and/or
'external' regime institutions verifies further international co-operation
in a given issue area, and new scientific discovery would help adopt future
implementing protocols and/or annexes and other legal instruments.68
Turning to 'soft law',® the legal terminology is somewhat
controversial since the rules of law are considered in general only to be
Biodiversity Convention stating that parties have the right to participate in the
meetings of the parties to that protocol. Certainly, whether a party to an original
convention ratify the implementing agreements or not depends upon herself.
68 See e.g. the 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention (Article 19(4)); the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
(Article 27(3)).
66 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that the 'context' for
the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty includes 'any agreements relating to the
treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty, added to its preamble and annexes' (Article 31(a) para. 2).
® See e.g. L. Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective
International Agreements, (1992) p.32.
68 In the context of the ozone regime see Chapter III(IV) below.
6" For the analysis of international 'soft law', see in particular P. Birnie and A. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, (1992) pp. 26-30 esp.; P.-M. Dupuy, 'Soft law
and International Law of the Environment', in 12 Michigan J.I.L. (1990) pp. 420-435;
G. Wesierski, 'A Framework for Understanding Soft Law', 30 McGill L.J. (1984) pp. 37-
88; M. Koskenniemi, 'Comment on the Paper by Antonia Handler Chayes, Aram Cheyes
and Ronald B. Michell' in W. Lang, Sustainable Development and International Law,
(1995) pp. 94-96; C. M. Chinkin, 'The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change
in International Law', 38 I.C.L.Q, (1989) pp. 850-66; O. Schachter, 'Recent Trends in
International Law Making', 12 A.Y.bk.I.L. (1988-89) pp. 11 et seq.; P. W. Birnie, 'Legal
Techniques of Settling Disputes: The "Soft Settlement" Approach', in Butler,
Perestroika and International Law, (1990) pp. 183 et seq.; M. Fitzmaurice,
'International Environmental Law as a Special Field', in 25 N.Y.bk.I.L. (1994) pp. 199-
201; 'A Hard Look at Soft Law', in Pro.A.S.I.L. 82nd Annual Meeting,(1988) pp. 371-
95. See also S. Murase, 'The Changing Views on the Sources of International Law', 25
Rikkyo Review of Law and Politics, (1985) pp. 81-111.
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compulsory or legally binding: that is to say, such legal rules must always
be 'hard law' as such. Strictly speaking, the term international 'soft law'
may therefore be misleading. 'Soft law' instruments can be considered at
best as 'pa.ra.-d.roit', 'per-droit' or 'pre-droit'J0 In the present doctoral
thesis, I will use the legal term 'soft law' to refer to legally non-binding
instruments which thus do not fall into the categories of sources referred
to in Article 38(l)(c) of the I.C.J. Statute, namely, 'Resolutions' or 'Decisions'
and 'Declarations' by international organisations and conferences, non-
binding international standards, code of conduct, standard of conduct,
gentlemen's agreement, and other non-binding agreements including
political principles and goals.
International 'soft law' creates an expectation of future
international environmental co-operation.71 In political terms,
international 'soft law' instruments - less than formal legal status - could
contribute to reinforcing certain 'expectations' shared by state actors
and/or the international community.72 'Soft law' can produce certain
'legal' effects or norms without formal national ratification. In this sense,
an international 'soft law' approach possesses indirect but immediate
practical value to the multilateral and global law-creating/developing
process.
B. The Institutionalisation of International Environmental Co-operation
The effectiveness of and compliance with international regimes for the
environment depend upon the corresponding degree of environmental co¬
operation among states, international organisations ('I.G.Os.'), non¬
governmental and scientific organisations ('N.G.Os.'), industry and
individual citizens. The meaning of the term 'international co-operation' -
that has never been defined by international treaties73 - can be defined
here as the internationally co-ordinated (collective) actions taken by
governmental/non-governmental regime actors in a given issue-area of
international environmental relations.74 Thus, the concept of
711 See O. Schacther, 'Recent Trends in International Law Making', 12 Australian
Y.bk.I.L. (1988-89) p. 12.
71 In the context of the ozone regime see Chapter II(II.B.l) below.
72 As suggested earlier, 'soft law' instruments could produce regimes (see a footnote
no. 7 above).
73 See R. Wolfrum, 'International Law of Co-operation', 9 E.P.l.L. (1986) p. 193.
74 Cf. P. T. Stoll, 'The International Environmental Law of Cooperation' in R. Wolfrum,
Enforcing Environmental Standards, (1996) pp. 41-43, distinguishing 'a law on
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'international co-operation' introduced here in the context of a regime
analysis is much broader than the procedural obligations of notification,
consultation and E.I.A. in international law (see Section II above). All of
the governmental or non-governmental actors are involved in the
creation/development of international environmental regimes: a
substantial number of environment-related treaties are adopted within the
framework of international institutions as 'catalysts' (e.g. the U.N.E.P. and
the International Maritime Organisation ('I.M.O.')); scientific evidence
readily piled up by individual scientists and their scientific institutions
helps facilitate the further developments of highly technical regimes; in
order to restrict economic activities that affect the environment, many
governments have formed certain forms of partnership with their
industries (e.g. voluntary agreements and various economic
instruments).75 This means at the same time that the realisation of the so-
called 'sustainable development'76 will thus depend upon their
environmental efforts. The principle has gained wide recognition in
general public international law of the environment.77 For the present
purpose, however, we are concerned here with international co-operation
among governmental actors.
In order to achieve their environmental objectives and purposes,
depending upon a specific issue area, international regimes must
accommodate universal or wider participation from both developed and
developing countries.78 The growing role of developing state actors in
cooperation' and 'law ofcooperation'. See also H. Milner, 'International Theories of Co¬
operation Among Nations: Strengths & Weaknesses', 44 World Politics (1995) pp. 466-
96.
75 In the context of the ozone regime see Part B of Chapter III below.
76 The Brundtland Report defined the term as 'development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs' (The W.C.E.D., Our Common Future, (1987) p. 43. See Rio Principle 27, stating
that 'State and people shall cooperate in good faith and in a spirit of partnership. . . in
the future development of international law in the field of sustainable development'.
For an extensive discussion see e.g. W. Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and
International Law, (1995); K. Ginther (eds.), Sustainable Development and Good
Governance, (1995). Y. Takamura, 'The Concept of Sustainable Development and
Environmental Interests' in Y. Otani, The Concept of Common Interests and
International Law, (1993) pp. 361-90.
77 See separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry attached to the l.C.J.'s
Gabclkovo-Nagymaros Case, (Hungary/Slovakia), reproduced in U.N.E.P. (eds.),
Compendium of Summaries ofJudicial Decisions in Environment Related Cases, (1997)
pp. 199-243.
78 For instance, due largely to its low number of ratifications and a shortage of funds,
the 1979 Bonn Convention with later 'AGREEMENTS' could not provide an effective
international co-operative regime for protection of endangered migratory species. See
P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) pp. 470-75; S.
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establishing and maintaining regime institutions reflects the present
importance of global environmental co-operation.79 The following
paragraphs will show that modern international treaty law for the
environment has introduced relatively new legal and economic
instruments to foster global environmental co-operation in securing both
participation and compliance.80
In the first place, as incentives for states' participation,
international environmental regimes often contain economic sanctions
within their legal instruments.81 They include restrictions of foreign
trade with non-parties to a treaty and/or non-complying non-party states
(the Montreal Protocol (Article 4); the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. (Article 5);82 the 1989
Basel Convention (Article 4(5)). For instance, as will be discussed in
Chapter IV below, Article 4 of the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol requires
parties to strictly restrict international trade in ozone-depleting chemicals
with non-complying non-parties to the Protocol.
It cannot be denied that these international trade mechanisms are
virtually certain legal tools for promoting 'compulsory' international co¬
operation in protecting the environment. Perhaps this is indicative of the
political aspect of international (environmental) regimes that tends to
reflect the economic/political interests of the powerful states, even though
their environmental objectives would be adequately justified.88 In another
Lyster, 'The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (The
'Bonn Convention'), 29 N.R.J. (1989) pp. 979-1000.
79 However, for a variety of reasons, the interest of environmental protection collides
with other societal interests - an economic one in particular - and the necessary
decisions often involve 'value judgements' as such. See L. Giindling, 'Environment,
International Protection', 9 E.P.I.L. (1986) p. 122.
80 Subjects selected in this section are limited largely to legal instruments concerned
directly with 'international environmental co-operation' (see Section II above): for a
comprehensive review see in particular P. H. Sand, 'International Economic
Instruments for Sustainable Development: Sticks, Carrots and Games', 26 Indian J.I.L.
(1996) pp. 1-16.
81 See generally R. Wolfrum (ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic
Mechanisms as Viable Means?, (1996); K. Kummer, 'Providing Incentives to Comply
with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Alternative to Sanctions?', European
Environmental Law Review, (October 1994) pp. 256-63.
82 12 I.L.M. (1973) p. 1055, entered into force in July 1975. For the text amended in
1979 see P. Birnie and A. Boyle, Basic Documents on International Law and the
Environment, (1995) p. 415.
88 See PRESS/TE019 ('WTO Symposium on Trade, Environment and Sustainable
Development', July 1997), noting that some participants (presumably including
delegations from developing states) felt that 'trade measures in MEAs were
inappropriate, reflecting the power of industrialised countries over developing
countries'. See also E. A. Nadelmann, 'Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of
Norms in International Society', 44 International Organisations (1990) pp. 480, 511-
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case, it is said that the creation of the post-war regime for human rights
depended fundamentally on the particular values and interests of the
Western states including the United States.84
International community pressure exercised by non-governmental
institutions upon a particular government may in certain situations
encourage its universal participation in international co-operation
regimes.85 However, in most cases, these global sanctions are not
sufficient to entice developing states into joining international regulatory
regimes for the global environment.86
In the second place, international environmental regimes therefore
commonly provide (general or detailed) provisions for capacity-building
for developing countries.87 The objective of capacity-building is to build
up the long-term capacity of aid receiving countries to comply with legal
obligations of particular environmental regimes. As will be described in
Chapter VI below, these provisions are designed especially for (i) bilateral,
regional and/or international financial assistance such as 'internal'
treaty-based fund (e.g. the Montreal Multilateral Fund, i.e. 'M.L.F.'), (ii)
international technology transfer, (iii) institutional strengthening, and
(iv) further development of aid-receiving states' environmental
awareness. In this connection, the Global Environmental Facility
24, arguing that the international drug control regime has reflected the predominance
of the United States and European States in creating norms of selecting uses of
psychoactive substances. In other words, criminal laws of these dominant States have
currently served as models of the drug control regime.
84 A. Hurrell, 'International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach'
in V. Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and international Relations, (1992) p. 66.
85 It is reported that, in the case of the C.I.T.E.S., 'A major factor influencing the
decision of many countries to become Party to CITES is the pressure that stems from
adverse publicity about illegal or harmful wildlife trade and about the morality of
animals in the large-scale pet trade' (cited in P. H. Sand [ed.] The Effectiveness of
International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Existing Legal Instruments,
(1992) p. 81).
86 Concerning this point, it is worth noting that, before the adoption of the 1987
version of the Montreal Ozone Protocol, only a few developing countries decided to
become contracting parties to the 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention regime. See Chapter
VI(II.A) below. See also P. H. Sand (ed.), The Effectiveness of International
Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Existing Legal Instruments, (1992) pp. 10-
11.
87 See A. E. Boyle, 'Comment on the Paper by Diana Ponce-Nava', in W. Lang,
Sustainable Development and International Law, (1995) p. 138, suggesting that at the
present time these special treaty provisions for developing countries have been
regarded as prerequisites or the 'price of participation'. See also P. H. Sand, 'Trust for
the Earth: New International Financial Mechanisms for Sustainable Development', in
W. Lang, ibid. pp. 167-83.
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('G.E.F.'),88 which is jointly administered by the World Bank, the U.N.D.P.
and the U.N.E.P., will also strengthen the operation of environmental
regimes in the fields of ozone protection, global warming, biodiversity and
pollution of international waters.89
In the third place, just like the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol,
international environmental regimes often contain special provisions for
the sake of international equity. They will include 'grace periods' delaying
implementation of treaty law,90 the above-mentioned provisions for
capacity-building and other compliance-related provisions peculiar to
individual environmental regimes.91 Their underlying philosophy will be
the 'principle' of common-but-differentiated responsibility that claims the
common responsibility of developed/developing nations for the protection
of the environment, whilst such responsibility should be equitably
differentiated in accordance with each state's contribution to the
environmental damage and its level of economic development (see Chapter
111(111.E.3) below). The 1992 U.N. Climate Change Convention (Article 3(1))
and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Article 10) explicitly refer to this new
'principle' or approach. Furthermore, in some exceptional cases, regime
institutions' decision-making mechanisms are also designed for
international equity considerations: under the ozone regime, decisions on
adjustments are to be taken by a two thirds majority vote of the contracting
parties representing a majority of both developed and developing countries
(Article 2(9)(c) of the Montreal Protocol).92 The composition of the
Executive Committee of the M.L.F. also reflects the important role of
international equity (see Chapter VI(III.B.l)).
C. 'Soft Enforcement' of Treaty: Implementation of and Compliance with
Legal Obligations of International Environmental Regimes
International law of the environment is not a matter of either preventive
rules or reparative rules: in many respects, both international legal
88 For the text of the G.E.F. restructured in 1994, see 33 t.L.M. (1994) p. 1273,
reproduced in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, Basic Documents on International Law and the
Environment, (1995) p. 666. On the G.E.F. see Chapter VI(III.C) below.
89 See Chapter VI(III.C) below.
90 See Chapter III(III.E) below.
9^ This third category of provisions are not necessarily concerned with the special
situation of developing countries, however. In the context of the ozone regime see
Chapter III(HI).
92 See Chapter III(III.C) below.
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instruments are needed as a united living organism. Yet, in the present
study, I would like to lay special emphasis on the point that a growing
number of international environmental regimes are founded to a lesser or
greater extent on the principle of preventive action - represented by
Stockholm Principle 21 (Rio Principle 2)93 - and the precautionary
'principle' of international environmental law.
The precautionary environmental 'principle' - that is, in my view,
still closely related to the principle of preventive action - means, in short,
that certain preventive measures to protect the environment should be
taken even before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear
scientific evidence (see further Chapter II(III.C) below). The compelling
reasons to rely on legal regulations of preventive character will be as
follows: (i) some environmental damage (typically ozone depletion) might
be irreversible; (ii) it would be less costly to prevent an environmental
degradation than to restore the environment afterwards; (iii) it is difficult
- though not impossible - to link environmental harm to a particular
economic activity or a particular industrial installation. By relying mainly
on the comprehensive package of internationally co-ordinated preventive
rules, regime members thus aim to protect the environment, and at the
same time they could successfully avoid anticipated environmental disputes
in a given issue-area of international environmental relations.
International supervision of treaty-based regulatory measures by
internally specialised institutions94 will be characterised as 'soft
enforcement' of environmental treaties.95 Unlike judicial tribunals that
are essentially confrontational and bilateral (e.g. the I.C.J.), mechanisms
for dispute avoidance/settlement within environmental regimes are
multilateral in character: instead of international adjudication based on
95 For a discussion see Chapter II(III.C.l) below.
94 For the present purpose, treaty organs or agencies such as the Meetings of the
Parties, treaty Secretariat and technical Committees will be properly called 'internal
international institutions'. In a strict sense they are different from 'international
organisations of universal character' such as the United Nations and its various
specialised agencies. See the 1975 Vienna Convention on the Relationship of States in
Their Relations with International Organisations of a Universal Character (Article
1(1.2)). Unlike these internal treaty organs in general, it is established that the
United Nations and its subsidiary agencies have certain international legal
personality. See the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations case, (Advisory Opinion), I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 174; the Certain Expenses of
the United Nations Case, I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 151.
95 See O. Yoshida, "'Soft Enforcement" of Treaty: The Montreal Non-Compliance
Procedure and the Functions of the Internal International Institutions', 9 Colorado
J.I.E.L.P. (1998, forthcoming).
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existing rules/principles of international law, international supervision or
control - such as environmental reporting/monitoring, fact-finding and
research, data or information collection and inspection - is increasingly
used for compliance control of treaty regime rules.96 In this particular
context, it should be emphasised, as Professor Alan E. Boyle says, that:
'The absence of any provision for institutional supervision or regulation is. . . . often a
sign that the treaty in question is ineffective and leads to obsolescence'."
Because of strict limitations of state sovereignty, international
environmental regimes rely mainly on intergovernmental compliance
monitoring 98 through some forms of data collection including statistics
indicating the extent of government/private activity in a given issue-area
of international environmental relations, notification of adoption of
relevant domestic legislation, and detailed regulations and national specific
programmes.99 Yet self-reporting or its data-analysis is the only first step
toward successful international supervision, simply because it is a kind of
'early warning system'100 for non-compliance problems. Under the 1973
C.I.T.E.S. regime, the Standing Committee has frequently recommended all
parties to collectively apply sanctions against non-complying states and in
a point of fact, that procedure was used regarding several non-compliance
cases.101 In the sense that such dispute avoidance/settlement systems are
operated by 'internal' treaty organs consisting of government
representatives, 'soft enforcement' of regime rules is rather political in
96 See e.g. P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) pp.
166 et seq.
" A. E. Boyle, 'Saving the World? Implementation and Enforcement of International
Environmental Law Through International Institutions', 3 J.E.L. (1991) p. 232. But see
also idem, 'Remedying Harm to International Common Spaces and Resources:
Compensation and Other Approaches', in Harm to the Environment, (1997) pp. 84-100.
98 A. Chayes and A. H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International
Regulatory Agreements, (1995) Chapter 7. See also G. Handl, 'Controlling
Implementation of and Compliance with International Environmental Commitments: The
Rocky Road from Rio', 5 Colorado J.I.E.L.P. (1994) pp. 305-31; K. Schariew, 'Promoting
Compliance with International Environmental Legal Standards: Reflections on
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms', 2 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1991) pp. 31-52.
99 M. J. Peterson, 'International Organisations and the Implementation of
Environmental Regimes' in O. Young (ed.), Global Governance, (1997) pp. 125-26. See
also Chapter V(VII.A.l) below.
100 A. Chayes and A. H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International
Regulatory Agreements, (1995) p. 155.
101 See Article XIV(l); P. H. Sand, 'Whither CITES? The Evolution of a Treaty Regime
in the Borderland of Trade and Environment', 8 E.J.I.L. (1997) pp. 38-40.
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nature. However, it should not be forgotten that impartial technical
experts of internal regime organs (e.g. the U.N.E.P. Secretariat) are also
involved in the multilateral 'enforcement' process.
A conspicuous example of highly institutionalised negotiation for an
environmental dispute avoidance/settlement system is a formal non¬
compliance procedure ('N.C.P.') of the Montreal Protocol, which comes close
to international conciliation.102 In earlier stages, the breach of binding
but detailed legal regulations (e.g. Article 2 control measures for
C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss.) and other disputes arising under the treaty regime are to be
dealt with by 'internal' technical organs of the N.C.P. Ultimately, hardened
non-compliance cases would then be addressed by the highest treaty organ,
the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol. The Montreal Protocol type of
the N.C.P. is revolutionary in the sense that many international regimes
for the environment have no provisions that explicitly promote further
compliance and also penalise 'intentional' non-compliance arising from
'bad faith'. However, it must be added that non-compliance should be best
addressed on a case-by-case basis, depending upon its reasons and length:
in a case that a party still remains non-compliant with treaty obligations
after the N.C.P. had been used, there is a slight possibility that traditional
mechanisms for dispute settlement would be invoked by the parties to a
treaty regime.103 This opens up the possibility of making the
'comparatively autonomous' ozone regime less 'self-contained' legal system
in general public international law.104
It was decided that the Conference of the Parties to the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol to the U.N. Climate Change Convention shall approve, at its First
Session, 'appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to
determine and to address cases of non-compliance. . . . including through
the development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account
the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance' (Article 18).
Any non-compliance procedures/mechanisms under this article entailing
binding consequences must be adopted by means of an amendment to the
102 See Chapter V(VI) below. Cf. the N.C.P. of the 1994 Oslo Sulphur Protocol in
EB.Air/WG.5/CPR. 13.
103 In most cases, dispute settlement procedures within international co-operative
regimes of the environment are only optional for contracting parties, and are therefore
not implemented on a compulsory basis. For instance, the 1985 Vienna Ozone
Convention provides for optional use of the I.C.J, or arbitration over a dispute
regarding treaty interpretation and application; in a case where the parties have
accepted no procedure (or a different one), they are then obliged to submit the dispute
to international conciliation (see Chapter II(III.D.4) below).
104 See Section IV below.
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Kyoto Protocol - in other words, ordinary 'decisions' by the regular
Conference of the Parties to the Protocol - adopted through its internal
Rules of Procedure - are not sufficient in this context.105
Just like the Montreal N.C.P. regime, how this dispute
avoidance/settlement system will develop is a matter of great interest.
D. Non-Governmental Organizations (N.G.Os.) as International Legal
Regime Actors
There is a general recognition that international co-operation between
government actors would not be sufficient to protect the global
environment. Not only U.N.-based international organs but also 'internal'
treaty institutions within regimes are mostly political meeting places in
which traditional state actors still play dominant roles. As a marked trend,
however, non-governmental organisations ('N.G.Os.') - that are not
endowed with 'international' legal personality106 - are now involved in the
process of international environmental regime-building and
maintenance. In general, environmental N.G.Os. aim to advance their
particular purposes in a defined issue-area of international environmental
relations through means available to them. Of course, it is not necessary
for N.G.O. entities that are in principle free from governmental control to
look after and to safeguard narrowly defined 'national interests' as such,
whether political, economic or social. Their influence over regimes' state
actors will depends upon the available financial/human resources and
technical skills required (e.g. bargaining, legal or scientific) on the
particular occasion.
N.G.Os. generally include public interest and private voluntary
organisations, professional associations, academic institutions, industry or
105 In this respect, the binding force of ozone decisions is unclear (but presumably
'non-binding' in most cases). For an extensive discussion see Chapter V(IV.B.3.b).
106 Defined as capacity to bear rights/duties under international law. Yet N.G.Os.
often do have legal personality in national legal systems (e.g. the United States of
America), regional legal systems of the European Union and the Nordic Community.
See P. Sands, 'The Environment, Community and International Law', 30 Harvard I.L.J.
(1989) pp. 412-15.
1017 See in general H. H.-K. Rechenberg, 'Non-Governmental Organisations', 9 E.P.I.L.
(1986) pp. 276-82; P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment,
(1992) pp. 76 et seq.; P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, (1995)
pp. 94 et seq.; idem, 'The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in Enforcing
International Environmental Law' in W. E. Butler (ed.), Perestroika and International
Law, (1990) pp. 61-81; S. Bilderbeek, Biodiversity and International Law, (1992) pp.
162 et seq.
26
International Legal Regimes for the Environment
trade associations and private companies and so forth.108 According to D.
Tolbert, 'environmental N.G.Os.' in particular can be divided into three
categories, namely, (i) public interests N.G.Os. (e.g. Greenpeace
International, World Wide Fund for Nature), (ii) scientific N.G.Os. (e.g. the
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
('I.U.C.N.')), and (iii) the so-called 'think tanks' (e.g. the International Law
Association ('I.L.A.'), the World Committee on Environment and
Development ('W.C.E.D.')).100 With regard to the principal functions of
environmental N.G.Os., they:
(i) identify and choose environmental problems which they are going to support;
(ii) mobilise and organise international public opinions by formulating and
disseminating information on the environment to the public and governments;
(iii) monitor compliance with international obligation at national and/or international
level;
(iv) participate in international environmental negotiations; in many cases N.G.Os. as
official 'observers'110 or 'advisory experts' or equivalent status enjoy access to
meetings of supreme organs or committees (and subsidiary agencies) of treaty regimes
in international law;111 and finally,
(v) often engage in the drafting of international environmental treaties and in setting
international standards or 'norms'.11 ^
It is worth mentioning that there are many cases where N.G.Os. are
allowed to participate as observers in institutions within environmental
108 See L. A. Kimball, 'The Role of NGOs in the Implementation of the 1982 LOS
Convention', in A. Soon (ed.), Implementation of the Lawof the Sea Convention Through
International Institutions, (1990) p. 141.
100D. Tolbert, 'Global Climate Change and the Role of International Non-Governmental
Organisations', in R. Churchill and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and Global
Climate Change, (1991) pp. 96-97. He also suggests that a crucial criterion for judging
whether an organisation is an 'N.G.O.' or not may depend on the organisation's
independence from specific governmental control.
110 As to the definition of 'observers', see H. G. Schermers, 'International
Organisations, Observer Status' 5 E.P.I.L. (1983) pp. 151-52.
111 See e.g. M. Bothe, 'Compliance Control beyond Diplomacy: The Role of Non-
Governmental Actors, 27/4 E.P.L. (1997) pp. 293-97.
1 See D. Tolbert, 'Global Climate Change and the Role of International Environmental
Organisations', in R. Churchill and D. Freestone, International Law and Global Climate
Change, (1991) p. 98. Worthy of special mention will be that the International Union
for the Conservation of Nature ('I.U.C.N.') framed early draft articles of the 1971
Ramsar Convention, the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention.
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treaty regimes: the 1971 Ramsar Convention (Article 7(1)),113 the 1972
World Heritage Convention (Article 8(3)),114 the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. (Article
11(7)), and the 1979 Bonn Convention (Article 7(9)).115 Added to these, the
1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic116 inserted provisions that do not discriminate against
N.G.Os. and other I.G.Os. (Article 11(1-3)). Yet most M.E.A.s. and their rules
of procedure usually do not provide for a specific role of N.G.Os.117
Provided they have a really expert knowledge and could represent
community interests, in my view, they should be allowed to participate in
decision-making processes through treaty regimes' specialised internal
institutions.118
In addition, brief mention should be made of N.G.Os.' role in securing
compliance with international environmental regimes. Under the C.I.T.E.S.
regime, environmental N.G.Os. such as the Wildlife Trade Monitoring Unit
in Cambridge ('W.T.M.U.') and the Trade Records Analysis of Flora and
Fauna in Commerce ('T.R.A.F.F.I.C.') considerably help the C.I.T.E.S.
Secretariat in monitoring compliance with the treaty.119 In the case of the
international waste regime of the 1989 Basel Convention, N.G.Os. such as
Greenpeace International have assumed important roles as 'watchdogs' in
tracking hazardous wastes exports and in alerting possible importing
countries.120 Further, under the 1992 Biodiversity Convention regime,
supplementary information by environmental N.G.Os. would be important
113 11 I.L.M. (1972) p. 963, entered into force on 21 December 1975. The amended
text is reproduced in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, Basic Documents on International Law
and the Environment, (1995) p. 447.
114 11 I.L.M. (1972) p. 1358, reproduced in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law
and the Environment, (1995) p. 375.
113 19 I.L.M. (1980) p. 15, entered into force on 1 November 1983. The text is
reproduced in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, Basic Documents on International Law of the
Environment, (1995) p. 433.
116 32 I.L.M. (1993) p. 1068.
117 See K. Schariew, 'Promoting Compliance with International Environmental Legal
Standards: Reflections on Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms', 2 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1991)
p. 49.
118 On the role of industry in the process of negotiating treaty regimes see M. Bothe,
'The Evaluation of Enforcement Mechanisms in International Environmental Law' in R.
Wolfrum (ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards, (1996) p. 18.
110 See P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) p. 477;
K. Ishibashi, 'Tasukokukan Kankyou Zyouyaku no Zissi ni okeru "Kantoku" mataha
"Zyunshukantoku" Mekanizumu no Zikkousei" (The Effectiveness of 'Supervision' or
'Compliance Control' in the Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Treaties),
15/2 Kagawa Hogaku (1995) p. 100.
120 G. Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to
International Law', 1 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1990) p. 18.
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since the legal regime still does not have any treaty provision for
independent monitoring and inspection.121
In the present case of the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol, N.G.Os. are
allowed to participate in the regular Meeting of the Parties (see Appendix
V),122 meetings of the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund123 and
meetings of the Open-Ended Working Group established by Decision 1/5 of
the Meeting of the Parties.124 Though N.G.Os. are not currently allowed to
participate in meetings of the Implementation Committee of the N.C.P.
regime, under the Montreal N.C.P., N.G.Os. could potentially play active roles
as international/domestic pressure groups to help enforce international
legal rules.125
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF THE 'SELF-CONTAINED' REGIME FOR
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES:
ENSURING UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE
Any international regime established by multilateral treaty law is directly
or indirectly based to a greater or lesser extent on the existing system of
general public international law. In this restricted sense, the term 'self-
contained regimes' in international law incurs a certain contradiction in
terms.126 Nonetheless, the reason I dare to discuss 'self-contained regimes'
is that they seem to indicate the distinctive character of the international
legal regime for the protection of the ozone layer.
Historically, the term 'self-contained regime' was first used by the
International Court of Justice in the Teheran Etostages case.127 Then,
121 See A. E. Boyle, 'The Convention on Biodiversity', in L. Campiglio (eds.),
Environment after Rio, (1994) p. 125.
122 Article 11(5). At the Ninth Meeting of the Parties, Greenpeace International and
the Alliance for Responsible C.F.C. Policy were granted the 1997 Ozone Awards among
other 21 individuals and organisations. See UNEP.OzL.Pro.9/12, para. 24.
123 Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Executive Committee. For a
discussion see Chapter VI(V.D) below.
124 See relevant Articles 6 and 11 of the Montreal Protocol.
125 See Chapter V(IV.B.2.b) below. For an extensive discussion see O. Yoshida and A.
Sakota, 'The Role of N.G.Os. in the International Legal Regime for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer' in The Japanese Society for Human-Environment Related Problems (ed.),
N.G.Os. and Global Environmental Problems, (October 1998, Japan E.P.A., Japanese).
126 In a dictionary 'self-contained' is defined as 'something complete and separate
and does not need help or resources from outside' (Collins Cobuild English Dictionary,
1987).
127 The United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case, I.C.J. Reports,
1980, p. 40, para. 86 esp. See also R. Yamamoto, 'An Observation on the Self-Contained
Regimes in International Law', 93 Japanese Journal of International Law & Policy
(1994) pp. 36-38 (Japanese).
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Special Rapporteur Professor W. Riphagen later developed the concept in
the I.L.C. Draft Article on State Responsibility, but he did not intend the
term to have a different meaning from that given by the International
Court of Justice.128 'Self-contained' international regimes are discussed so
far specifically in the context of the law of state responsibility: special
treaty regimes of 'self-contained' character often preclude legal recourse
to normal countermeasures in general international law, and in principle,
these treaty regimes as 'self-contained' legal systems practically apply
their own legal remedies.
In the final section of his article 'Self-Contained Regimes', Professor
B. Simma concludes that 'the adoption of "self-contained regimes" is to be
welcomed if these leges speciales increase the effectiveness of the primary
rules concerned and introduce procedures and collective decisions'.129
This is an important point to note because there are many international
law instruments that are well drafted, but in reality are never put into
operation (= 'sleeping treaties'). Simma provides three major examples of
such 'self-contained' regimes,180 that is to say, (i) diplomatic law, (ii) the
law of the European Community181 and (iii) human rights treaties.
P. J. Kuyper argues that the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law regime also has
certain aspects of such a 'self-contained legal system', which could be
observed in, for example, treaty interpretation, the exhaustion of local
remedies, state responsibility and the law of remedies.182 Under the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. system, as Professor Yuji Iwasawa suggests, it is generally
agreed that the parties must first use the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. dispute settlement
system as a 'special' settlement regime in international law; only if the
legal mechanism proves ineffective, G.A.T.T./W.T.O. members then may take
'appropriate' countermeasures in accordance with general international
128 L. A. N. M. Barnhoorn, 'Diplomatic Law and Unilateral Remedies', 25 N.Y.bk.I.L.
(1994) p 69.
129 B. Simma, 'Self-Contained Regimes', 16 N.Y.bk.I.L. (1985) p. 135.
180 B. Simma, 'Self-Contained Regimes', 16 N.Y.bk.I.L. (1985) pp. 111-36. This would
also means that 'self-contained' regimes is to be 'welcomed' if they can ensure high-
compliance by participating parties.
181 See Cases 90-91/63 Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom of
Belgium, E.C.R. (1964) p. 631; Case 232/78 Commission v. French Republic ('Mutton
and Lamb'), E.C.R. (1979-8) p. 2379.
182 Article XXIII of the G.A.T.T. law and new Article XXIII of the 1994 Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Dispute Settlement of the Uruguay Round. See
also e.g. P. J. Kuyper, 'The Law of GATT as a Special Field of International Law', 25
N.Y.bk.I.L. (1994) pp. 227-57. For supporting evidence see also Y. Iwasawa, WTO
Dispute Settlement (1995) Chapter III pp. 54-55, its footnote no. 89-90 esp. & pp. 158
et seq. (Japanese).
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law - which must be properly authorised by the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. members,
however.133
The Montreal Protocol regime - which contains an internal quasi-
judicial system of the non-compliance procedure ('N.C.P.') - is the first
multilateral environmental treaty that is labelled as a 'self-contained' legal
system in the primary sense that the dispute settlement regime noticeably
deviates from established principles and rules of general law.134 As was
already mentioned in Section I above, in a different context, T. Gehring
called the ozone regime a 'comparatively autonomous sectoral legal system'.
If 'self-contained' treaty regimes mean special regimes which
maintains their legal rules totally separate from established
principles/rules of general public international law or the law of state
responsibility, in a strict sense, the international regime for the ozone
layer is by no means 'self-contained' as such. The point to observe is that
the international ozone layer regime has certain 'substantive' and/or
'procedural' rules that are relatively independent of - or deviate to some
extent from - such principles/rules of general international law or
traditional customary law. There is no categorical answer to such a
debatable question whether the international ozone layer regime is 'self-
contained' or not. Rather, this should be decided on a case-by-case basis,
depending upon a specific situation. As the subsequent chapters will show,
such legal deviation of the ozone layer regime must be correctly measured
not only by general international law but by evolving principles of
international environmental law including the precautionary
environmental 'principle'/approach (see Chapter V(VII) in particular).
It is tentatively suggested that the 'self-contained' legal character of
the international legal regime for the protection of the ozone layer can be
characterised by the following four points.
In the first place, the law of state responsibility or international
liability in the context of ozone depletion seems to be only of doubtful
utility. Since no single state's activities are responsible for 'adverse
effects' caused by ozone loss, and most of the states have only a minimal
role in both the production and the consumption of C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss., it is
therefore impossible to establish a sufficient link of causation or causality
between stratospheric ozone-depleting activities of particular states or
133 See e.g. Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995) pp. 159 et seq. (Japanese).
134 See M. Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance?', 3 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1992)
pp. 123-62.
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private individuals and companies (i.e. a culpable act) and potential direct
injury to individual states (e.g. deteriorating human health or economic
loss) that might have been caused potentially by ozone loss or depletion. 135
This clearly means that since such 'injured states' - if any - cannot acquire
standing to bring international claims, accordingly, individual states
cannot have recourse to such inter-state claims even against one of the
largest producers and consumers of C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss. In this respect, the legal
character of the international regulatory regime for the ozone layer is
essentially different from that of other environmental regimes, e.g. the
international waste regime of the 1989 Basel Convention - because
breaches of legal rules regarding the international control of
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes normally affect only two or
three states, not only the compensation for the victims, but also the
application of the 'polluter pays principle'136 developed by the O.E.C.D.
would be presumably possible.137
A potentially alternative approach, the notion of actio popularis (or
actio communis ) - which is often controversial even in national legal
systems - has not however been recognised by general public
international law.338 since third parties (such as environmental N.G.Os.)
do not have such standing before international tribunals, they cannot seek
'preventive relief, even if it is scientifically considered that actual damage
or harm to the global environment has been taking place.
135 see e.g. a. Kiss, Droit international de 1'environment, (1991) pp. 106 et seq.; H.
Thierry (eds.), Droit international public, (1986) pp. 637-38.
136 on the polluter pays principle see in particular A. E. Boyle, 'Economic Growth and
Protection of the Environment: The Impact of International Law and Policy', in idem
(ed.), Environmental Regulation and Economic Growth, (1994) pp. 179 et seq.; idem,
'Making the Polluter Pay? Alternative to State Responsibility in the Allocation of
Transboundary Environmental Costs' in F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi (ed.) International
responsibility for Environmental Harm, (1991) pp. 363-79.; S. E. Gaines, 'The
Polluter-pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental Ethos', 26 Texas
I.L.J. (1991) pp. 436-96.
137 See K. Kumnier International Management ofHazardous Wastes, (1995) p. 36.
!38 jn South West Africa cases (Second Phase), the I.C.J, decided that 'although a
right of this kind may be known to certain municipal systems of law, it is not known to
international law as it stands at present: nor is the Court able to regard it as imposed
by "general principles of law" referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1(c), of its Statute'.
See I.C.J. Reports, 1966, p. 47; C. Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law,
(1987), pp. 212-14; B. Bollecker-Stern, Le prejudice dans la theorie de la
responsabilite internationale, (1973) pp. 21-22. But Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion of 8 July, 1996), 35 I.L.M. pp. 809 & 1343
(1996); Matheson, M., 'The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons', 91 A.J.I.L. (1997) pp. 417-35. It is said that the request
by the General Assembly originated early in political ideas pushed by N.G.Os. (see
dissenting opinion of Judge Oda, Part I).
32
International Legal Regimes for the Environment
Of course, it is also important to consider that under Article 19(3.d) of
the I.L.C. Draft Articles on State Responsibility,139 massive pollution of the
atmosphere or sea is categorised as a 'international crime': in this context
all states will be 'injured states' with standing. The depletion of the ozone
layer as the 'common concern of mankind'140 will be a strong candidate in
this context. However, as a practical matter, it is still difficult to see what
kind of legal value such a designation would have in the present
international legal community: obviously, normal judicial remedies such as
compensation are largely unthinkable.141
Arguably, as Oscar Schachter suggests,142 the global protection of
the ozone layer would be included in the general category of international
obligations erga omnes - 'opposable to, valid against, "all the world", i.e. all
other legal persons, irrespective of consent on the part of those thus
affected'.143 If this is so, the international ozone layer regime will fall into
Professor Klein's classic regime-definition: he argues that 'In any case
international regimes always purport to have effect on third States'.I44
In its judgement on the Barcelona Traction case delivered in
February 1970, the I.C.J, stated that:145
139 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 37 I.L.M. (1998) p. 440.
140 See Chapter II(II.B).
141 A. E. Boyle, 'Remedying Harm to International Common Spaces and Resources:
Compensation and Other Approaches; in Harm to the Environment, (1997) pp. 93-94: P.
Birnie 'International Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs',
in A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury (eds.) The International Politics of the Environment,
(1992) pp. 81-82.
142 See International Law in Theory and Practice, (1991) p. 381,
143 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th edn. (1990) p. xlvii. See
in general J. Frowein, 'Obligations Erga Omnes', 3 E.P.I.L. (1995) pp. 757-59. For a
comprehensive review see M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga
Omnes, (1997). Dr. Ragazzi offers five common elements helpful in evaluating
candidates of obligations erga omnes (see ibid. pp. 215-16)
144 See footnote no. 5 above.
145 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited Case (Belgium v Spain:
Second Phase) I.C.J. Reports, 1970, p. 3. Cf. I.C.J.'s controversial South West Africa
decision of 1966, I.C.J. Reports, 1966, p. 6.
See also the East Timore case, 34 I.L.M. (1995) para. 29, saying that 'In the
Court's [I.C.J.'s] view, Portugal's view that the right of peoples to self-determination,
as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes
character is irreproachable. ... it is one of the essential principles of contemporary
international law'. On a unilateral undertaking erga omnes see Nuclear Tests cases,
I.C.J. Rep. (1974) pp. 265-67 & pp. 469-71; M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International
Obligations Erga Omnes, (1997) pp. 174-75.
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'[33] ... an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another
State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their nature the former are the concern
of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations ergaomnes'. [34] Such
obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing
of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning
the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the
body of general international law. . . others are conferred by international
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character'.
As we shall see, the international ozone layer regime has gradually
assumed the erga omnes character in general public international law. For
example, more than 160 states (of which nearly 110 are developing
countries) are now parties to the Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Ozone
Layer Convention (see Appendixes III-IV);146 though the Montreal
Protocol's Article 4 trade restrictions seem to run against the traditional
maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt3 47 these trade provisions are
never formally challenged by any states including parties to the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law; moreover, even non-parties to the Protocol regime
regularly submit required technical data on C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss. to the U.N.E.P.
Ozone Secretariat148 and; the ozone layer is now given the evolving legal
status of 'common concern of mankind ('C.C.M.').149 It may safely be
assumed that both parties and non-parties - i.e. virtually all states - are
acting in the interests of the (hu)mankind, the international protection of
146 only twenty-five U.N. members are non-parties to the Protocol.
147 'Third states cannot be bound by treaty obligations without their consent' (the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Articles 34-38)). Cf. R. Wolfrum,
'Purposes and Principles of International Environmental Law', 33 G.Y.bk.I.L. (1990) p.
329.
148 See Chapter V(VII.l) below. See e.g. Decision IV/17C; Decisions 111/16 & IV/17(1)
regarding data reports on the Montreal Protocol's Article 4. It is suggested that,
because of the fear that Article 4 trade measures may conflict with the GATT law,
data-reporting requirements on that Article was not included in the 1987 original
text. See further Chapter V(VII.A.3) below.
14^ One possible interpretation of the C.C.M. is that it creates international
obligations erga omnes. See A. E. Boyle, 'International Law and the Protection of the
Global Atmosphere: Concepts, Categories and Principles' in R. Churchill and D.
Freestone (eds.), International Law and Global Climate Change, (1991) p. 12. See
further Chapter IIl(III.B).
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the stratospheric ozone layer.150 As Jonathan I. Charney says, it will be
true that 'If the community responds strongly in favour of universal
application, no obstacle to such a choice can be found in the constitutional
foundation of the international legal system'.151 However, even if the
ozone treaty regime has created intended general legal effects of an erga
omnes nature as regards ozone-depleting activities, the remedies available
in case of their breach would be, again, severely limited.152
In the second place, with regard to dispute avoidance/settlement
procedure of the Montreal N.C.P., as M. Koskenniemi argued, 'non¬
compliance' - thus implying that the violated international obligation is
not necessarily legally binding153 - can ultimately result in (collective)
suspension of rights and privileges under the Ozone Layer Protocol 'in
accordance with the applicable rules of international law concerning the
suspension of the operation of a Treaty'. This cannot be taken for granted,
because the new procedure eliminates the determination of breach of
treaty or 'wrongful act' from the beginning.154
It is important to note, however, that the commencement of the
N.C.P. operation is not founded on the traditional system of state
responsibility for environmental damage or the establishment of standing
to bring inter-state claims. In this respect, the Montreal N.C.P. - as an
internally instituted dispute settlement system consistent with the
'consensus building of communication within an international regime' I55
- can be characterised as an unprecedented procedural mechanism that is
designed to effectively 'operate' or 'enforce' erga omnes (i.e. the global
protection of the ozone layer).156 Paradoxically speaking, the ozone layer
150 In this respect see R. J. Dupuy, 'Humanity and the Environment', 2 Colorado
J.I.E.L.P. (1991) p. 2, arguing that international obligations erga omnes are especially
concerned with respect for the rights of man and the environment.
151 'Universal International Law', 87 A.J.I.L. (1993) p. 550. It is also important to
notice that the Montreal Protocol introduced a revolutionary simplified majority
voting procedure under Article 2(9): adjustments are binding all the parties (see in
detail Chapter 111(111.C) below).
152 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) p. 157.
153 See footnote no. 32 above.
154 The meaning of 'non-compliance' may be seen as a grey area of the ozone regime
(see Chapter V(III) below).
155 See T. Gehring, 'International Environmental Regimes', 1 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1990), p. 37;
Chapter V below.
156 Cf. T. Usuki, 'The Development of Dispute Settlement Procedures in Global
Environmental Conventions' in International Law for Dispute Settlement: Essays in
Celebration ofJudge S. Oda's Seventieth Birthday, (1997) pp. 182-83 (Japanese).
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regime needed a 'self-contained' dispute avoidance/settlement system to
implement international obligations erga omnes.
Under the Montreal N.C.P., the legal rules of binding control
measures in Article 2 (and Article 5) are supervised by special and
'internal' implementation mechanisms (see further Part IV composed of
Chapters V and VI below). As for ozone treaty disputes over highly
technical issues, traditional settlement mechanisms thus in effect seem out
of place.157 On most occasions, it will be only after the N.C.P. regime is
'exhausted' that traditional dispute settlement mechanisms provided for in
Article 11 of the Vienna Ozone Convention (i.e. the use of the international
tribunals such as the I.C.J, and arbitration: see Chapter III(III.D.4)) would
be invoked by the contracting parties to the Protocol. Yet such 'soft
enforcement' of treaty obligations158 should be correctly understood as
'supplementary' to these traditional legal settlement procedures. In other
words, international supervision or control by political treaty organs is not
meant to readily 'supplant' or 'replace' the final resort still available to the
parties to the Montreal Protocol regime.159
In the third place, after the adoption of the 1987 Montreal Protocol,
'internal' political institutions established by the regulatory treaty regime
(i.e. the Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol in particular)160
has successfully 'internalised' the making and application of the ozone
treaty rules: at present the international legal ozone regime whose highest
treaty organs have adopted more than 200 hundred Decisions161 appears to
have its own international jurisprudence. In relation to treaty
interpretation, the 1991 Third Ozone Meeting of the Parties decided that it
could make/interpret its legal ozone rules as it prefers: 'the responsibility
for legal interpretation of the Protocol ultimately rests with the Parties
themselves' (Decision IV/5(5)).162 Further, it must be noted that the legal
character of ozone-oriented 'Decisions' adopted by the Meeting of the
Parties has often caused legal conflicts with established principles and
157 See Chapter V(VII) on 'the Montreal N.C.P. in practice' below.
158 See Section III(C) above and Chapter V(VII) below.
159 On the relationship between Article 11 dispute settlement mechanisms and the
Montreal N.C.P. see Chapter V(llI.B) below.
160 As with its Protocol, the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention regime has its own
supreme institution, i.e the Conference of the Parties (see Chapter III(III.D.2)).
161 See U.N.E.P. Handbook for the International Treaties for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, 4th edn. (1996) Section 2.3 and other later decisions contained in
reports of the 1996/1997 Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol.
162 See further Chapter V(IV.B.3.b) below.
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rules of public/private international law and other generally accepted
treaty regime rules such as those contained in G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law (see
further Chapter IV below).
It must be added however that, if the need arises, the ozone regime
reaffirms established principles of international law: to take a simple
example, in its Thirteenth Meeting, the Implementation Committee of the
Montreal N.C.P. requested the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat to seek clarification
from the Legal Council of the United Nations on the status of new states
emerging out of the former Soviet Union and their succession to
international treaties like the Montreal Protocol.163
In the fourth place, the Montreal Ozone Protocol regime has
somewhat controversial trade-related provisions within its Article 4 that
have caused legal conflicts with another 'self-contained legal system' of
the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law. This view is supported in academic discussion
(see further Part III composed of Chapter IV below). However, it is
interesting that dispute settlement systems of both the international
regulatory ozone regime and the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. have not been invoked by
contracting parties to these multilateral agreements.164
In the following chapters below, these 'self-contained' aspects of the
international regime for the ozone layer - having erga omnes character -
will be extensively discussed in the broad context of the system of rules or
principles of international environmental law and general public
international law.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A supra-national law-making/developing institution for the global
environment (i.e. supranational government) is unlikely to emerge from
the existing international system. International environmental regimes
(i.e. not global environmental regimes) within specific issue-areas of
environmental relations are practical alternatives to the 'highest human
institution' for the environment, political, legal and social.
163 uNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/13/3, para. 8(b). In the Seventh Ozone Layer Meeting held
in 1995, the Russian Federation in non-compliance with the Montreal Protocol argued
that the collapse of the former Soviet Union constituted an event of a fundamental
change in circumstances. For a discussion see further Chapter V(VII.B. 1) below.
164 In this respect see reports of meetings of the W.T.O. Committee on Trade and
Environment ('C.T.E.'), e.g. PRESS/TE021 (19 December 1997). See also Chapter
IV(IV.B).
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An individual international regime for the environment acquires,
depending upon the issue-area and subject matter, its own characteristics.
As discussed in the previous section, the international legal regime for
ozone has several 'self-contained' aspects or autonomous character in the
system of international law. In any case, the creation of international
legal regimes by itself is not an ultimate goal, and it is a means employed
by I.G.Os. (and N.G.Os.) to achieve their environmental, economic, social
and/or political objectives. This might mean that, in certain exceptional
cases, the stated purposes and objectives of international environmental
regimes might be achieved at the sacrifice of 'strict consistency'165 in
general public international law.
Yet it is important to bear in mind that any international legal
regime is commonly founded on generally accepted guiding principles of
international law, including the legal principle of good faith (bona fides).
Many modern treaty regimes for the environment - some of which are
established by the framework-implementing protocol approach - now
specifically endorse not only customary rules of the environment but also
the evolving precautionary 'principle' of international environmental
law. In addition, international regulatory regimes also have 'internal'
institutions for internationally co-ordinated environmental actions. As a
strategy for ensuring close co-operation and greater compliance, these
regimes contain within their legal frameworks collective economic
sanctions, capacity-building instruments, international equity
considerations, and so forth.
The effective combination of the fragmented sectoral regimes
consisting of these legal 'sticks' and 'carrots' would ultimately help
establish a mass of environmental regimes for the promotion of
'sustainable development', although this will depend upon efforts made by
state and non-state regime actors in the international community.
165 Certainly it will be legal regimes' law-makers (e.g. states, highest treaty organs)
who must ensure such consistency.
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*
Needless to say, international legal regimes are only limited guarantees of
environmental protection: the same thing could be true of the present
ozone regime. However, it is still necessary to ask to what extent
international regimes in a given issue-area of environmental relations can
legally guarantee protection of the environment such as ozone.
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PART II
THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER
CHAPTER II
THE 1985 VIENNA CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
THE OZONE LAYER AND PRINCIPLES OF
MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
(hereafter, the 'Vienna Ozone Layer Convention') 1 is a 'framework' law¬
making treaty (see Chapter I(III.A) above), which itself contains no
specific legal standards or regulations for C.F.Cs. at the international level.
Since the adoption of the 1987 Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol that contains
not only control provisions for C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss. but also strong supervisory
and implementation mechanisms, the 'umbrella' Convention regime has
been given only a secondary role.2 Despite its evident weaknesses,
however, it is still important to remember that the 1985 Vienna Ozone
Convention has been one of the first international environmental
agreements to give an indication of the precautionary environmental
'principle'/approach, and at the same time the treaty laid the legal basis for
the Montreal Protocol regime. In a period of grave scientific uncertainty
about ozone depletion, the Vienna Convention was a politically acceptable
international co-operation regime for participating states in the context of
C.F.C. regulation and further scientific research.
In Chapter II, we are concerned with the framework Ozone Layer
Convention. Section II first describes briefly national regulatory measures
prior to the adoption of the 1985 Convention, focusing on the United States
of America that belonged to the so-called 'Toronto Group' (i.e. the United
States, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, New Zealand, Australia
and Switzerland)3 and the European Community ('E.C.'). Then, by using
1 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March, 1985. 26 I.L.M.
(1987) p. 1529, reprinted in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, Basic Documents on International
law of the Environment, (1995) p. 211; U.N.E.P. Handbook for the International
Treaties for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 4th edn. (1996) p. 3.
2 But see Decision 1/3 of the Conference of the Parties saying that 'the Convention is
the most appropriate instrument for harmonizing the policies and strategies on
research'.
3 Named after the group's first meeting in Toronto (see R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy,
(1998) p. 42). However, the Group called themselves the 'Friends of the Protocol'. See
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conference documents, it analyses the protracted Convention negotiation,
i.e. the first stage of the international regime building.4 Section III, which
is devoted to the detailed analysis of the Vienna Ozone Convention,
considers the meaning of 'adverse effects' (section A); the legal status of
the ozone layer (section B); the relationship between the evolving
precautionary 'principle'/approach and the international ozone regime
(section C) and: basic provisions of the Convention (section D) - including
'General Obligations' (Article 2), the role of the Conference of the Parties
(Article 6) and the dispute settlement procedures (Article 11).
II. THE NEGOTIATION OF THE 1985 VIENNA OZONE LAYER CONVENTION
The negotiation of the Vienna Convention regime formally started in
January 1982 within the framework of the United Nations Environmental
Programme (the 'U.N.E.P.'). Under the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working
Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration of a Global
Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer established by
the U.N.E.P. Governing Council in May 1981,5 participating states
considered proposals not only on a global framework ozone convention but
also a supplementary (separate) protocol of a highly technical nature
containing specific control measures for specified C.F.Cs.6 The 1985
Convention negotiation process was rather tedious and laborious because of
a divisive confrontation between the Toronto Group and the European
Community. Moreover, a number of scientific uncertainties about ozone
depletion (i.e. its cause/effects) continued throughout the Vienna
Convention negotiation. The drafting of the Convention and its
annexes/protocols was therefore very difficult. However, the U.N.
Environmental Programme and its former Executive Director, Dr. Mostafa
Tolba, did what could be done to cope with such a challenging situation and
participating governmental/non-governmental actors succeeded in
agreeing on international environmental efforts for the protection of the
ozone layer.
E. A. Parson, 'Protecting the Ozone Layer' in P. M. Haas (eds.) Institutions for the
Earth, (1993) footnote no. 31.
4 The second and third phases are (ii) from Vienna to Montreal (1986-1987) and (iii)
the post-Montreal period (1988-1997). For a discussion see Part A of Chapter III(II)
below.
5 Decision 9/13B adopted on May 26 1981.
6 However, from its Third Session, the Working Group decided to focus on discussions
on an expected framework ozone convention.
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The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
was signed on 22 March 1985 by twenty states plus the E.C. Commission. It
entered into force on 22 September 1988.7 By May 1998, 166 countries had
ratified the Vienna Ozone Convention, including most of the major
C.F.C./O.D.S. producers and consumers in the international community (see
Appendix III).
A. National/Regional Regulation of Major chlorofluorocarbons (C.F.Cs.)
Before discussing the Vienna Convention negotiation, it may be helpful to
describe briefly earlier ozone regulations at the national/regional levels.
In negotiating specific contents of expected ozone treaties including
annexes and protocols, participating states naturally supported regulatory
measures that would reflect their own domestic or regional ozone
legislation.
The United States, which was the largest producer/consumer of
C.F.Cs., held about forty per cent of the international market share of C.F.Cs.
in 1976. Thus it was only natural that such a manufacturing country took
an initiative in legally restricting the use of C.F.Cs. at the domestic level. In
January 1975, the Council on Environmental Quality and the Federal
Council for Science and Technology jointly established the Federal
Interagency Task Force on Inadvertent Modification of the Stratosphere
('I.M.O.S.'). In addition, a special Federal Action was undertaken in order to
restrict uses of C.F.C.-ll and C.F.C.-12.8 Further, in August 1977 the U.S.
Clean Air Act Amendment ('C.A.A.A.') relating to the protection of the
stratospheric ozone layer was passed by Congress.9 In 1978 it also
unilaterally banned C.F.C. use as a propellant in non-essential aerosols (e.g.
deodorants, polishes, hair lacquer and paint). By that time, adequate
substitutes for most propellant uses of C.F.Cs. were already securable. The
domestic market for spray cans containing C.F.Cs. had dramatically fallen
by almost two-thirds owing to American citizens' consideration of the
potential environmental impact of these ozone-depleting substances.10 At
the time of the adoption of the global ozone framework convention, the
7 Seven states and governmental and non-governmental Organizations participated in
the meeting as observers. See 'Final Act of the Conference', paras 4-5.
8 See UNEP/WG.69/8, para. 14 and its footnote no. 14.
9 See also Part B of Chapter III(Il.A.l).
R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 27-28.
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United States backed by its industries aimed to internationalise such
domestic regulations that limited the aerosol use of C.F.Cs. only .
Mention should also be made of the fact that the U.S. Environment
Protection Agency ('E.P.A.') was sued in 1984 by an environmental N.G.O.,
the Natural Resources Defence Council ('N.R.D.C.').11 What the plaintiff
organisation insisted in the suit was that the U.S.E.P.A. had not fully
implemented its legal obligations based on Section 157(b) of the C.A.A.A.
The N.R.D.C. further demanded that a schedule be established for a decision
on the control of C.F.Cs.12 Perhaps it may be possible to argue that the
prominent leadership of the United States during the formation of the
ozone regime was strengthened by such environmental movement at the
domestic level.
Following the example of the United States, Sweden (in 1979) and
Norway (in 1980) formed similar domestic ozone policies in order to
implement C.F.C. can bans.13 In 1980 Canada also banned three main C.F.C.
products, namely, hair spray, deodorant and antiperspirant. In addition,
the Netherlands imposed labelling requirements for C.F.C. aerosol
containers upon its industry.
The attitude of the European Community - which was in 1976
responsible for thirty-four per cent of the international sales of C.F.Cs. -
contrasted remarkably with that of the United States and other above-
mentioned countries belonging to the Toronto Group.
The position of the Community was substantially influenced by the
European chemical industry that relied heavily on C.F.C. technologies (e.g.
the U.K.-based Imperial Chemical Industries).14 For instance, the European
industry had insisted that C.F.C. substitutes were unthinkable and the
regulation of the use of C.F.Cs. - as seen in the United States - might create
unemployment among its workers.13 Though Holland proposed in 1977 a
measure requiring the labelling of spray cans containing C.F.Cs., the
European Community emphatically rejected this proposal.16 Likewise, a
11 The N.R.D.C. participated in the First/Second/Fourth Ozone Meeting of the Parties
(see Appendix VI).
12 See R. M. Seaver, 'Stratospheric Ozone Protection: IR Theory and the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer', 6 Environmental Politics (1997)
p. 55.
13 These two countries are non-producing and importing countries of C.F.Cs.
14 N. Heigh, 'The European Community and International Environmental Policy,' 3
International Environmental Affairs, (1991) pp. 160-178.
13 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 25.
16 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 25.
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Community-wide C.F.C. aerosol ban led by West Germany was rejected in
1979 by other member states.17
With regard to its regional C.F.C. regulation, the European
Community adopted in 1978 a Council Resolution on the use of C.F.Cs.^ The
regulation required the member states 'to present the research which they
had carried out into the effects of C.F.Cs. on man and the environment, and
to co-operate on a Community basis so that the research could be planned
and the results made available'. In 1980 the Council of the E.C. further
adopted Decision 80/372,1^ which set an immediate freeze on production
'capacity' - i.e. not to enlarge but maintain C.F.C.-11 and C.F.C.-12 production
facilities, without restricting the actual production of C.F.Cs., and a
provision for a 30 per cent reduction compared to the 1976 level of the use
of C.F.Cs. in aerosols by the end of 1981.20 The Decision also required the
E.C. to develop 'the best practicable technologies' in order to limit emissions
in refrigeration, solvent and foam plastics sectors. Furthermore, in 1982
the Council adopted the Decision in order to consolidate the previous
measures already taken in 1980. The decision required the member states to
apply precautionary measures to the other sectors using C.F.Cs., such as
synthetic foam, refrigeration and solvents as well as aerosol use of C.F.Cs.21
Finally, in 1980, Japan - whose negotiating position was largely
similar to that of the European Community - publicly declared in the O.E.C.D.
its readiness to control C.F.C. production (C.F.C.-11 and C.F.C.-12 in
particular) and aerosol uses.22 Since then, the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry ('M.I.T.I.') has provided its industry with
related administrative guidance.23
12 See further ibid. p. 24.
1 3 Council Regulation of 30 May 1978 on Chlorofluorocarbons in the Environment, O.J.
No. C133 (7 June) p. 1.
19 Decision 80/372 of 26 March 1980 Concerning Chlorofluorocarbons in the
Environment, O.J. No. 90 (3 April) p. 45.
2® But this reduction level had already been achieved by the beginning of 1980.
21 Decision 82/795 of 15 November 1982 on the Consolidation of Precautionary
Measures Concerning Chlorofluocarbons in the Environment, in O.J. No. 329 (25
November) p. 29.
22 H. Goto, 'The Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer', 69 Environmental
Studies (1988) pp. 25-26 (Japanese).
23 On national ozone laws and regulations in Japan see Part B of Chapter 111(11.A.4).
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B. The Vienna Convention Negotiation within the U.N.E.P.
(1) The International Regime-Building from 1977 to 1980
The creation of the 1985 Vienna Convention regime (and the 1987 Montreal
Protocol regime) was a major test of U.N.E.P.'s effectiveness in its catalytic
role in the progressive development of international environmental law.
As we shall see, we may say that the U.N.E.P. succeeded in passing this
painstaking test.24
At the international level, the U.N.E.P. first convened in 1977 an
international meeting of scientists, with representatives from thirty-three
states and the European Community to draft 'the World Plan of Action on
the Ozone Layer'.25 The Ozone Layer Action Plan was to be implemented by
international institutions such as the World Meteorological Organisation
('W.M.O.')26 and the World Health Organisation ('W.H.O.'),27 along with the
U.N.E.P. as a catalyst, national governments and non-governmental
organisations. At the same time, the U.N.E.P. Co-ordinating Committee on
the Ozone Layer (U.N.E.P. 'C.C.O.L.') was established to make periodic
scientific assessments relating to the state of potential ozone depletion.28
This newly established scientific institute undertook most of the research
on ozone depletion.29 The U.N.E.P. C.C.O.L. was independent of
governments, and mainly funded by the U.N.E.P. and environmental
N.G.Os.30 Yet the Committee was not given any power to provide policy
recommendations.
24 See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 6, noting that 'UNEP went far
beyond a traditional secretariat function: it was a model for effective multilateral
action'.
28 See Decision 65/IV of the U.N.E.P. Governing Council. See also proceedings,
UNEP/WG.7/25 in Biswas (ed.), The Ozone Layer: Proceedings of the Meeting ofExperts
Designated by Governments, International Nongovernmental Organizations on the
Ozone Layer Organised by the United Nations Environmental Programme in Washington
DC, 1-9 March 1977.
29 Established in 1878, U.N. specialised agency since 1950. See in general D. W.
Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, 4th edn. (1982) pp. 115-16.
27 Established in 1948, U.N. specialised agency. See generally ibid. p. 114.
28 See U.N.E.P. Governing Council Decision 84/C(V) of 25 May 1977 (A/32/25); M. K.
Tolba (eds.) The World Environment 1972-1992: Two Decades of Challenge, (1992) p.
51.
29 On the C.C.O.L. see UNEP/WG. 7/25/Rev. 1; UNEP/WG.69/5, paras. 6-7. The C.C.O.L.
was annually convened until 1985.
89 On the other hand, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Framework
Convention on the Climate Change ('I.N.C.') - which is the main body carrying out
research on climate change - consists chiefly of government representatives. In the
end the U.N.E.P. and the W.M.O. were forced to give up their control over the Climate
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In April 1980, at its Eighth Session, the U.N.E.P. Governing Council
adopted the W.M.O./U.N.E.P. Principles that called for reductions in the
production of two major C.F.Cs. (i.e. C.F.C.-ll and C.F.C.-12) plus a production
capacity cap.31 The Principles also asked for the development of scientific
research and techniques in order to avoid further ozone depletion.3^
Subsequently, the U.N.E.P. Governing Council adopted Decision 9/13B of 26
May 1981 that argued for 'the desirability of initiating work aimed at the
elaboration of a global framework convention which would cover
monitoring, scientific research and the development of best available and
economically feasible technologies'.33 Under this decision the U.N.E.P.
Governing Council therefore decided to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group
of Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration of a Framework
Convention. The decision also requested the U.N.E.P. Executive Director 'to
ensure that in the work so initiated, all relevant information and related
work under way in other forums, as well as the results of any discussions
on this subject at the Ad Hoc Meeting of Senior Government Officials
Experts in Environmental Law are taken into account' and to 'invite the Co¬
ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer, as part of its activities under its
mandate' .34
The 'Montevideo Meeting' held in Uruguay in November 1981
endorsed Decision 9/13B and selected the protection of the ozone layer as a
'major subject area' for which guidelines, principles or agreements should
be developed.33 The meeting also adopted an objective, a strategy and
Change Convention negotiation (see the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 45/212, 21
December 1990). On the I.N.C. see e.g. S. Nilsson and D. Pitt, Protecting the
Atmosphere: The Climate Change Convention and its Context, (1994) pp. 15-17. See
also I. Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change, (1995) p. 91, saying that
'the decision of "where" to conduct the science was political, and it had implications
for the subsequent international political'.
31 Decision 8/7B of 29 April 1980 (A/35/25). The Nordic countries took initiative in
adopting the decision. See P. H. Sand, 'The Vienna Convention is Adopted', 27
Environment, (1985) p. 40.
3^ See 6 E.P.L. (1980) p. 101. Principle VI of Weather Modification Provisions
embodies Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.
33 Decision 9/13B(a) and (b) in UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 1.
3^ Additionally, the Executive Director was also requested to (i) contribute to the
work of the ad hoc working group and to (ii) compile all relevant information,
including statistical and technical data, on implementation of the recommendations
contained in decision 8/7B of 29th April 1980, in particular that relating to the
reduction in the use of chlorofluorocarbons 11 and 12, as well as to production
capacity on the basis of an agreed definition.
33 For further details of the Montevideo Programme see Timoshenko, 'Development and
Periodic Review of Environmental Law in the 1990s: UNEP Programmatic Approach' in
A. Kiss (ed.) A Law for the Environment, (1994) pp. 17-20.
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elements of strategy and specific recommendation for initial action
concerning this subject matter. The recommendations suggested -
highlighting the need for the catalytic role of the U.N.E.P. - that the
environmental institution 'should continue to strengthen its co-ordinating
role as regards research, monitoring and assessment of the ozone layer, in
particular through the C.C.O.L. mechanism, and expand the dissemination of
information on the problems of the stratospheric ozone layer'.
In this meeting, the delegations of Finland, Sweden and Switzerland
tabled 'Draft Recommendations' on an expected framework convention for
the protection of the ozone layer. 36 The Draft Recommendation stated that
the legal framework should 'be sufficiently flexible to be easily adaptable
to changing circumstances as new scientific evidence becomes
available'.37 The Recommendations also suggested that (i) the framework
should be provided by an original convention and (ii) the specific
measures - which are internationally agreed and shall be nationally
enforced - are to be laid out in the annex(es) that may be amended
whenever need be without disturbing the functioning of the basic
structure.38 This early proposal text therefore gave an important
indication of a flexible approach adopted later in the 1985 Vienna Ozone
Layer Convention.39 Yet, the 1981 Montevideo Meeting did not adopt the
Nordic Recommendation.40
(2) The Discussions at the Ad HocWorking Group (1982-1985)
From 1982 to 1985, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of four sessions
consisting of seven meetings among the fifty participants and eleven
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations.44 It was quite
30 'Draft Recommendations on Legal Aspects and Elements of a Global Framework
Convention for the Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer' in Report of the Ad Hoc
Meeting ofSenior Government Officials Expert in Environmental Law, UNEP/GC.10/3,
Appendix II.
37 UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2/Annex/Appendix II, para. 2, cited in T. Gehring, Dynamic
International Regimes, (1994) p. 202.
38 These are based on the Nordic proposal and statements made at the First Session of
the Working Group held in Stockholm in January 1982 (UNEP/WG.69/CPR.2).
39 In this respect see T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) p. 202.
40 UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2, para. 38, cited in T. Gehring, Dynamic International
Regimes, (1994) p. 202.
44 UNEP/IG. 53/4. First Session (20-28 January 1982, Stockholm); Second Session
(first part: 10-17 December 1982, Geneva), (second part: 11-15 April 1983, Geneva);
Third Session, (first part: 17-21 October 1983, Geneva), (second part: 16-20 January
1984, Vienna) and; Fourth Session, (first part: 22-26 October 1984, Geneva), (second
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difficult to agree on the specific contents of the framework ozone
convention, detailed annexes and implementing technical protocols.4^
During the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the 1985 Vienna
Convention, the Toronto Group insisted on the need for C.F.C. emission
reductions focused on non-essential uses of these chemicals in spray cans
with a possible capacity cap (i.e. the 'multi-option approach'). On the other
hand, the European Community preferred C.F.C. production capacity
limitation (i.e. the 'single-option approach'). Because of the different
strategic positions, participating states finally decided to adopt a framework
ozone convention only.
In January 1982, the U.N.E.P. convened the First Session of the
Working Group in Stockholm at the invitation of the Swedish
government.43 All members of the United Nations were invited to the
meeting of this Session: this represents the fact that ozone depletion was
truly regarded as global in nature.
For the First Session, the delegations of Finland, Norway and
Sweden44 and the U.N.E.P. Secretariat45 prepared draft texts of a global
ozone convention. The Nordic countries' ambitious proposal - whose
contents are largely similar to the previous text submitted at the 1981
Montevideo Meeting - addressed several important aspects including
Fundamental Obligations' (article l);46 'co-operation' (article 2);
information exchange (article 3); national report (article 4); technology
transfer (article 5); institutional structures (articles 7-9); dispute
settlement (article 10) and a simplified amendment procedure (articles 12
and 13). In short, the Nordic proposal already reflected the fundamental
structure of the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention. Its flexible approach
combining a framework convention with annexes and/or protocols was
part: 21-25 January 1985, Geneva). See UNEP/IG.53/4 para. 10, noting that the
following governments provided financial support and/or meeting facilities for the
sessions: Austria, Canada, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United States.
4 2 See among others R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) Chapters 4-8.
43 See UNEP/WG.69/10.
44 'Draft International Convention for the Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer:
Text submitted by the delegations of Finland, Norway and Sweden', (UNEP/WG.69/3).
45 See 'Draft International Convention for the Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone
Layer', (UNEP/WG.69/3/Add.l), containing a preamble only.
4^ It reads that 'The parties shall limit, reduce and prevent activities under their
jurisdiction or control which have or are likely to have adverse effects upon the
stratospheric ozone layer'. See also comments by participating experts in
UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 20.
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generally supported by the Toronto Group and the European Community. 47
However, the debatable issues on the relationship between the convention
and annexes and/or protocols was not settled yet (note: in the Nordic
proposal, annexes containing C.F.C. controls are to form integral parts of
the ozone convention). In addition, at this session, there was agreement
that there should be internal regime institutions such as the conference of
the parties as a major decision-maker and a treaty secretariat (by the
U.N.E.P.) having administrative functions,^ and some provisions on ozone
dispute settlement.49.
The Working Group considered such a flexible approach would be
necessary 'in order to allow the accommodation of changing scientific
knowledge and policy alternatives as they became available'.50 The
Working Group agreed to draw up a framework convention to be
supplemented by annexes and/or protocols that would contain provisions
aimed at controlling specific types of actions or substances. It also
recommended that the U.N.E.P. Secretariat should prepare a new draft text
for its Second Session.51 This preparation proceeded on the basis of the
analysis of the following international treaties: the U.N. Charter; the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the 1972 Stockholm Declaration;
the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S.; framework conventions/protocols of U.N.E.P. Regional
Seas Programmes;5^ the 1973 M.A.R.P.O.L.; the 1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P.
Convention; the 1973 C.I.T.E.S.; Principles on Shared Natural Resources
(UNEP/IG.12/2), the draft convention submitted by Finland, Norway and
Sweden (UNEP/WG.69/3) and other relevant treaties.53
Subsequently, in the first part of the Second Session held in January
1983, a number of delegations - influenced by scientific uncertainties -
cautioned against 'moving too rapidly' since that would eventually lead to
417 See T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) p. 206. .
48 UNEP/WG.69/10, paras 21, 24 and 25.
49 For a discussion see UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 25. The 1979 Geneva Convention
(Article 13), the draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Article 279), the U.N. Charter
(Article 33), the 1972 London Dumping Convention (Article 10) were mentioned as
possible models in the context of ozone layer protection.
50 UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 10. See also ibid., para. 26.
51 See the draft convention in UNEP/WG.78/2.
53 The most successful example is seen in the Mediterranean. The 1976 Barcelona
Convention and its two Protocols were signed and ratified by many countries in this
region. The 1980 Athen Protocol addresses land-based and airborne sources
pollution, but most of the agreements related marine environment avoid these
problems. See P. H. Sand, Marine Environment Law in the UNEP, (1988) ix-xxvi, eps.
53 See UNEP/WG.78/2, para. 8.
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an 'ill-conceived convention'.54 There was also disagreement as to
whether technical annexes or protocols should be developed
simultaneously with the convention.55
In the second part of the Second Session held in April 1983, Sweden,
on behalf of the Nordic countries, introduced a revised new text, namely, a
proposal annex concerning measures to control/limit/reduce C.F.C.
emission and use (the 'Nordic Annex').56 In response to this ambiguous
proposal, a number of delegations including the European Community,
Japan and the former Soviet Union suggested that such a proposal could
only be regarded as one of the options for an expected protocol, since its
contents were of a regulatory nature.57 In this respect, the United
Kingdom expert made a general reservation regarding the need for
annexes and/or protocols.58
In the subsequent first part of the Third Session of the Working
Group, Sweden noted that the proposed draft annex may be discussed as a
proposal for a future ozone protocol.59 In this context the United States,
which was initially critical of this Nordic proposal text, indicated support
for an integral protocol to the convention concerning non-essential
aerosol uses of C.F.Cs.60 In addition, though the number itself was very
small, several developing countries participated in this meeting. They
insisted on the need for transfer of environmentally sound technology in
order to ease anticipated serious economic burdens.61 It was stressed at the
first part of the Third Session that more extensive participation from
developing countries was desirable to ensure that the ozone convention
was universal in scope.62
In the heated confrontation between the United States, Canada, and
the Scandinavian countries and the European Community, the second
54 UNEP/WG.78/8, para. 9.
55 Ibid., para. 10.
56 UNEP/WG.78/11. See also relevant statements in UNEP/WG.78/13, paras. 17-22.
57 See UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.l. But see also comments developing countries that are
generally supportive of this Nordic proposal (the Central African Republic, Djibouti,
Kenya and Sri Lanka) in UNEP/WG.94/4/Add.2.
58UNEP/WG.78/13, para. 16. The UK later withdrew this reservation (UNEP/WG.94/5),
para. 8.
59 See the draft text in UNEP/WG.94/4 or in UNEP/WG.78/13, Annex III.
60 UNEP/WG.94/5, para 9.
61 10 E.P.L. (1983) p. 35.
62 11 E.P.L. (1983) p. 58.
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revised draft convention63 and protocols64 were discussed in 1983, the
third draft convention in January 1984,65 the revised second draft protocol
in January 1984,66 the fourth revised convention containing draft
technical annexes67 and the fourth revised draft protocol in March 1985.68
By the beginning of the first part of the Fourth Session of the Working
Group held in January 1984, the draft ozone convention had been virtually
finalised.69
(3) Negotiating an Ozone Protocol for Controlling C.F.Cs.
In respect of the much disputed protocol(s) to the convention, at the second
meeting of the Fourth Session of the Working Group held in January 1985,
the Toronto Group introduced a flexible 'multi-option approach' consisting
of four options from which each party to the convention may choose
preferable one.70 It was argued, for example, that the approach would
'enable countries in widely differing circumstances to accept the protocol
and would also reward past action by governments to reduce C.F.C. use'.71
An uncompromising response from the European Community was,
however, that the 'so-called multi-option approach would still amount to a
ban on use of C.F.Cs. in aerosols and did not imply any effort on the part of
those countries to limit C.F.C. production': the Community thus concluded
that 'his proposal constituted a truly global approach to the problem of






68 See UNEP/IG.53/4, Annex III.
69 Most articles in the fourth draft convention (UNEP/WG.94/11) remained unchanged.
70 See UNEP/IG.53/4, Annex II, paras. 17 et seq. Options (1) & (2) commonly
concerned only with a staged reduction of the total annual use/exports of C.F.Cs. in
aerosols. The Option (3) addressed total production capacity for C.F.Cs. regardless of
their use did not exceed the total production capacity at the entry into force of the
protocol. The Option IV addressed a reduction of the total annual use of C.F.Cs. of only
20 %. See in detail J. G. Lammers, 'Efforts to Develop a Protocol on
Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer', 1
Hague Y.bk.I.L. (1988) pp. 227-30.
71 UNEP/IG.53/4, Annex II, para. 17.
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production but also for reductions in the use of C.F.Cs. in the aerosol sector
and for measures in the non-aerosol sector'.72
As one expert pointed out in this meeting held at the last stage, both
of the major approaches had some shortcomings and future elaboration was
required: 'All CFC emissions, and not only those originating from aerosols,
should be reduced'.73 The underlying problem of this expected article 2 on
control measures is expressed best by Johan G. Lammers: 'neither proposal
embodied a set of interrelated rules covering all elements which are vital
for effective CFCs control mechanism, i.e. production, use, import, export
and emission of all CFCs'.7^
(4) 'The Vienna Ozone Layer Convention is Adopted'
After the Fourth Session of the Working Group, the draft convention was
finally adopted and signed on 22 March 1985 by twenty states and the E.E.C.
In the end, the fifth draft protocol on C.F.Cs. prepared by the Working
Group73 was not adopted in spite of diplomatic missions and an informal
meeting at the absolute edge of the 1985 Vienna Conference.
Under Article 1(6) of the Vienna Ozone Layer Convention, for the
first time, the European Community was allowed to become party to a 'mixed
international agreement' (i.e. both the Community and its member states
are party to it) as a 'regional economic integration organisation' without
any of its member states being required to do so.76 It is pointed out that
this was the E.C. Commission's legal/political strategy to gain greater
competence within the European Community; such an international treaty
clause potentially allows the E.C. Commission to propose Community
72 UNEP/IG.53/4, Annex II, para. 31. See also discussions in the first part of the
Fourth Session in UNEP/WG.l 10/4, Section V.
73 UNEP/IG.53/4, Annex II, para. 25.
74 J. G. Lammers, 'Efforts to Develop a Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna
Convention of the Ozone Layer, 1 Hague Y.bk.I.L. (1988) p. 231 (emphasis added).
73 'Fifth Revised Draft Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons' (UNEP/IG.53/3).
76 Defined as 'an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region which
has competence in respect of matters governed by the Convention or its protocols and
has been duly authorised, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify,
accept, approve or accede to the instruments concerned'. On the conditions see Article
13(2). This definition is based on earlier relevant provisions regarding signature,
ratification, acceptance or approval and accession by such an organization, including
Article 1 of Annex IX of the U.N.C.L.O.S. See 'Texts Relating to Final Clause' in
UNEP/WG.94/5/Add.l. See also Article 2(8) of the Montreal Ozone Protocol and Part
A of Chapter 111(111.D).
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legislation to regionally implement the framework ozone convention and
expected protocols.77
The Vienna Conference for the Protection of the Ozone Layer adopted
a Resolution that urged 'all States and regional integration organisations,
pending entry into force of a protocol, to control their emissions of CFCs,
inter alia in aerosols, by any means at their disposal, including controls on
production or use, to the maximum extent possible'.78 The Resolution also
required the Working Group to continue work on a protocol that would
address 'both short and long term strategies to control equitably global
production, emissions and use of CFCs', taking into account the special
situation of developing countries and new scientific evidence.79
A series of negotiations of the protocol to the Vienna Ozone
Convention formally started in December 1986, again within the
framework of the U.N. Environment Programme (see Chapter III(II)
below).
III. THE 1985 VIENNA CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
THE OZONE LAYER
We can now turn to the basic provisions of the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer
Convention. As is the case with the 1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P., the operational
parts of the 'framework' Convention are specifically designed for
facilitating international environmental co-operation in scientific
research and the exchange of information. However, the Convention also
contains several important evolving rules and principles of international
law for environmental protection.
As with its Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol (Article 18), the Vienna
Convention totally excludes reservations with a view to maintaining the
universality of the international ozone regime (Article 18).80
77 See M. Jachtenfuchs, 'The European Community and the Protection of the Ozone
Layer', 28 C.M.S. (1990) p. 263.
78 Resolution 2(6).
79 Resolution 2(1).
89 However, it should be noted that even if reservations are completely excluded from
treaties, states can still enter 'political statements' or 'interpretative declarations'.
For the definition of interpretative declarations see LLC. Yearbook, (1966-11) pp.
189-90; A. D. McRae, 'The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations', 49 B.Y.bk.l.L.
(1978) p. 155.
54
The 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention and International Environmental Law
A. The Definition of 'Adverse Effects' Caused by Ozone Depletion
(1) The Limited Scope of the Term 'Air Pollution' in Regional Treaties
According to the textbooks of environmental science, ozone depletion is
generally included in the category of air pollution such as global warming
caused by C.O.2 emissions.**1 Yet, as seemingly a minor difference in
wording, the term 'pollution' **2 - contained in the 1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P.
Convention (Article 1) or the 1991 Canada/United States Air Quality
Agreement (Article 1(1-2))83 - cannot fully explain the global nature of
potential 'adverse effects' posed by ozone depletion. To take an example of
acid rain, the most obvious pollutants of the atmosphere (e.g. sulphur
dioxide and oxides of nitrogen) are being transported over long distances
and, as a result, these substances cause transboundary adverse effects on
the environment. In this general context, the term 'transboundary
pollution' illustrates short range, regional or bilateral environmental
harm or damage. On the other hand, ozone depletion shows the emergence
of a different kind of 'pollution' within the ecosystem: the 'adverse effects'
in the context of ozone depletion cannot be clearly divided according to
national territorial boundaries (see Introduction & Chapter I(IV) above).
Just as the concept of 'pollution' cannot address environmental disasters
happening within an individual state, it cannot deal adequately with
'pollution' within the global environment.
But the definitions of both 'pollution' and 'adverse effects' contained
in environmental agreements are helpful in determining the 'threshold'
beyond which environmental damage might entail state liability.84
(2) Adverse Effects Caused by Ozone Depletion
The technical term 'adverse effects' is defined in the Convention text as,
inter alia, 'changes in the physical environment or biota, including
81 See e.g. D. M. Elsom, Atmospheric Pollution, (1992) Chapter 1.
8^ The concepts of 'pollution' are controversial: its meaning will depend largely on
each treaty's context. The full study of the definition of 'pollution' lies outside the
scope of this thesis. For a discussion see P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law
and the Environment, (1992) pp. 101-02. See also A. L. Springer, The International
Law of Pollution, (1983) Chapter 3, pp. 63-88, defining 'pollution' mainly as 'a
particular level of environmental change that is legally significant because of the
nature and degree of injury that does or can result to important human interests'.
83 30 I.L.M. (1991) p. 676. Cf. the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Article 1(4)).
84 P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (1995) p. 634.
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changes in climate, which have significant deleterious effects on human
health or on the composition, resilience and productivity of natural and
managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to mankind'8^ This definition -
which is based on a text prepared by technical experts -86 is used here to
accurately define negative impacts of ozone depletion that must be
mitigated by international environmental co-operation.87 As indicated in
the Introduction above, ozone loss could lead to increases in solar
ultraviolet radiation (U.V.-B.) with detrimental biological effects such as
additional cases of skin cancer and eye cataracts, reduced growth of crop
plants sensitive to U.V.-B. and other commercially important materials.
Moreover, although its environmental adverse effects are long-distance
and only cumulatively harmful (i.e. not immediate or apparent), the
depletion of the ozone layer is virtually irreparable. The definition
further recognises that some C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss. could probably contribute to
global atmospheric warming. It is also important to notice that it contains
a broad meaning capable of covering human rights protection (i.e. the
right to life and a healthy environment).88
B. The Legal Status of the Ozone Layer in General International Law
'The ozone layer is located in the atmosphere at an attitude ranging between 1- and 50
km. The question arises of what its legal status is'.8^
88 Article 1. The relevant draft provision, as proposed by the U.N.E.P. Secretariat,
read as follows; "'Adverse effects" means changes in the physical environment or
biota, including changes in climate, which are, taken over-all, deleterious to human
health or to the composition, resilience and productivity of natural and managed
ecosystems' (UNEP/WG.78/2), p. 8. Cf. the 1979 L.R.T.A.P. defining the environment
as 'agriculture, forestry, materials, aquatic and other natural ecosystems and
visibility' (Article 7(d)); the 1992 Climate Change Convention (Article 1(1)), placing
effects on 'the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health' after
deleterious effects on the environment, and inserting the term 'human (health and)
welfare'.
86 UNEP/78/2, p. 8.
87 See UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 20, noting that the need to precisely define the term was
stressed during the First Session .
88 On the role of human rights law in environmental protection see A. E. Boyle and M.
Anderson (eds.), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, (1996).
8^ Statements by the U.N.E.P. Secretariat in its report 'Some Observations on the
Preparation of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Stratospheric
Ozone Layer' (UNEP/WG.69/8), para. 29. The U.N.E.P. Secretariat did not define the
legal status of the ozone layer. By referring to the 1979 L.R.T.A.P., the Secretariat
simply emphasised the importance of scientific and technological co-operation (ibid.,
para. 35).
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At the outset it must be noticed that in the present case of ozone depletion -
unlike the utilisation of the living resources of the High Seas or the deep
seabed - what matters in the international community has been not 'equal
access' or 'freedom' of the stratospheric ozone layer as an internationalised
public territory, but potential 'adverse effects' (see Introduction & section
A above) that would be produced by gradual ozone loss. Indeed, it is true
that human history has been a long story about man's allocation and
exploitation or 'regulation' of (renewable/non-renewable) natural
resources, and not a 'moralised story' of environmental conservation or
protection. It can easily be assumed that there will be few customary
international law rules based on state practice concerning the possible
'utilisation' of the ozone layer as 'physical' res communis omnium for any
specific commercial purposes.
However, it will be very strange to think that the stratospheric
ozone layer - which states formally decided to protect by international
legal instruments - does not have any specific legal status in international
law.
(1) National Jurisdiction over the Ozone Layer
As a matter of a academic legal argument, it is possible to geographically
divide state jurisdiction over the ozone layer.90
In theory, national jurisdiction extends only to the portion of the
ozone layer that lies directly above the territory and territorial sea of any
particular state.91 In this respect, the 1944 Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation illustrates the established legal principle of
exclusive state sovereignty over (i) the airspace above its territory and (ii)
the territorial sea.92 Yet air space above (i) the high sea,93 (ii) the
continental shelf,94 (iii) the Exclusive Economic Zone ('E.E.Z.')95 and (iv)
90 P. M. Lawrence, "International Legal Regulation for Protection of the Ozone Layer',
2 J.E.L. (1990) pp. 21-22;
91 See the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civic Aviation (Articles 1 & 15),
15 U.N.T.S. p. 295; the 1958 Convention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
(Article 2); the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Article 2).
92 Articles 1 and 2; the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Article 2(2)). See also the 1919
Convention on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, (Paris 13 October 1919), 11 L.N.T.S.
p. 173.
93 See the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Article 87).
94 See the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Article 78(2)).
95 See the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Articles 55 and 58)
57
The 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention and International Environmental Law
Antarctica96 must be considered as outside of the sovereignty of any
individual state - that is to say, must be considered as 'common property' in
international law.
However, even if state jurisdiction concerned is clarified to some
extent, as a practical matter, such an academic argument appears to be
utterly fruitless. First, in a strict sense, the ozone layer is by no means
'exploitable shared natural resources'97 as such (e.g. an international
river, fish, and other aquatic life), and not subject to the obligation of
equitable utilisation that is seen as a customary international law rule.98
Second, ozone depletion simply ignores the traditional notion of artificial
geographic boundaries between sovereign states.99 Hence, it cannot be
denied that the legal concept of 'shared natural resources'100- which is
embodied in bilateral or regional environmental treaty agreements such as
the 1979 L.R.T.A.P. Convention, U.N.E.P. Regional Sea Agreements and
international 'soft law' instruments101 - would not particularly apply in
the present international regulatory regime for the ozone layer.
In a somewhat different context the same can be said of the more
ambitious but controversial legal concept of the 'common heritage of
mankind' ('C.H.M.')102 employed in the 1979 Moon Treaty and in the 1982
U.N.C.L.O.S. The concept of the C.H.M. is concerned with the international
'management' of certain (shared) natural resources or areas, including (i)
the deep sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of the present national
96 See the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.
97 See N. Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties,
(1997) defining the term 'natural resources' as 'supplies drawn from natural wealth
which may be either renewable or non-renewable and which can be used to satisfy the
needs of human beings and other living species'.
98 But see P. Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) p.
398, pointing out that under the regional treaty of the 1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P. the
Parties seem to treat the European air mass as a shared resources.
99 See Section A and Introduction above.
100 On this concept see e.g. A. E. Boyle, 'International Law and the Protection of the
Global Atmosphere: Concepts, Categories and Principles' in R. Churchill and D.
Freestone (eds.) International Law and Global Climate Change, (1991) p. 8 esp.
101 See e.g. the 1988 Toronto Conference 'The Changing Atmosphere', Conference
Statement (reprinted in 5 A.U.J.I.L.P. (1990) pp. 515 et seq.; the 1989 Ottawa
Conference of Legal and Policy Experts, Statement of the Meeting of Legal and Policy
Experts (reprinted in 5 A.U.J.l.L.P. (1990) p. 528).
102 On this concept see e.g. P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the
Environment, (1992) pp. 120-22.
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jurisdiction,103 (ii) outer space104 and arguably (iii) Antarctica.105 For
instance, the International Sea Bed Authority ('I.S.B.A.') - as a means of
achieving 'distributive justice' - is a certain form of international marine
co-operation in the exploration, conservation and use of the area
concerned.100
Ozone cannot be described as the C.H.M. because of the following
reasons: (i) areas to which the notion of the C.H.M. can be applied seem
rather limited; (ii) the C.H.M. is associated with 'conservation',107 but in the
context of resources;108 (hi) the idea of the C.H.M. is originally intended to
internationalise ownership of natural resources (i.e. 'international
management')100 and;(iv) the C.H.M. was employed neither in the Ozone
Layer Convention nor modern environmental treaties including the 1992
Climate Change Convention and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention.110
(2) The Ozone Layer as 'Common Concern of Mankind (or Humankind)'
Under the legal text of the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention, the 'ozone
layer' is defined as the 'layer of atmospheric ozone above the planetary
boundary layer' (i.e. ozone in the upper troposphere and the stratosphere
103 The U.N.C.L.O.S. (Articles 133, 136 & 137).
104 See U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of 13 December 1963; the
1967 Outer Space Treaty (Article 1); the 1979 Moon Treaty (Article 1(1), Article 3(1),
Article 4(1) & Article 11).
105 See the Preamble of the 1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, stating that 'the
development of a comprehensive regime for the protection of the Antarctic
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems is in the interest of mankind as
a whole'. See also P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment,
(1992) p. 121; P. Sands (eds.) The Antarctic Environment and International Law,
(1992) Chapters 12-13.
100 On the I.S.B.A. see R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, (1983) pp.
182-88; S. Yamamoto, International Law, (1994) pp. 439-42; P. Birnie and A. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, (1992) pp. 171-75.
107 The 1980 C.C.A.M.L.R. (Article 11(3)); the 1958 High Seas Conservation Convention
(Article 2). See also 1986 W.C.E.D. Principles (para, (i)) in P. Sands, Principles of
International Environmental Law, (1995) p. 203.
108 J. Brunnee, 'A Conceptual Framework for an International Forests Convention' in
Canadian Council on International Law Conseil (ed.) Global Forests and International
Environmental Law, (1996) p. 56.
100 See A. E. Boyle, 'The Rio Convention on Biological Diversity' in C. Redgwell and M.
Bowman (eds.) International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity, (1995)
p. 40. For instance, Article 4 of the Moon Treaty emphasises co-operation in
enterprises concerning the moon and other celestial bodies. See P. Malanczuk, 'Space
Law as a Branch of International Law', 25 N.Y.bk.I.L. (1994) p. 172.
110 Ibid.; P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) p.
121.
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that acts to filter out U.V.-B.).111 This definition is based on a report by an
informal technical working group suggesting that it is consistent with the
definition by the U.N.E.P. C.C.O.L. and moreover avoids conflicts with the
1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P. Convention that concerns boundary layer
pollution.112 It indicates that 'ozone' in this environmental treaty regime
means the planet's only natural sun screen 'stratospheric ozone layer' or
'ozone shield', and thus not 'ground-level ozone'.113 We may say therefore
that this legal definition of the ozone regime seems to treat the protective
ozone layer as a global unity having no national boundaries.114 As M. N.
Shaw says, the area defined thus constitutes 'a distinctive unit with an
identity of its own irrespective of national sovereignty or shared resources
claims'.115
In the light of the recent development of international
environmental regimes, though the legal texts of neither the 1985 Ozone
Layer Convention nor the Montreal Protocol refers to this new legal
term,116 it will be logical to treat the ozone layer as having the
international legal status of the 'common concern of (hu)mankind'
('C.C.M.'). The C.C.M. should be rightly observed as something more than a
vague political principle or declaration. According to Professor A. E. Boyle,
a common concern (of (hu)mankind) implies that 'the international
community has both a legitimate interest in resources of global
significance and a common responsibility to assist in their protection'.117
111 Article 1(1), (emphasis added). Thus, the 'ozone layer' does not necessarily
belong to a particular part of the atmosphere. See a discussion at the Second Session of
the Working Group in UNEP/WG.78/13, para. 24. An corresponding article 1 in an
earlier draft convention reads that "'The ozone layer" means the total ozone above the
earth's surface, most of which is found in the stratosphere' (UNEP/WG.78/8, Annex I).
112 See UNEP/WG.78/13, Annex IV, para. 2.
113 See Introduction above.
114 See P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (1992) p. 391.
115 M. N. Shaw, International Law, 4th edn. (1997) p. 610.
116 On this point see J. Brunnee, 'A Conceptual Framework for an International
Forests Convention: Customary Law and Emerging Principles', in Canadian Council of
International Law, Global Forests and International Environmental Law, (1996)
footnote no. 98, saying that 'It may be speculated that, were the convention [the 1985
Vienna Convention] to be adopted today, it would declare the depletion of the ozone
layer a "common concern of humankind'".
117 A. E. Boyle, 'Remedying Harm to International Common Spaces and Resources:
Compensation and Other Approaches', in Harm to the Environment: The Right to
Compensation and the Assessment ofDamages, (1997) p. 86. On this legal concept see
also idem, 'International Law and Protection of the Global Atmosphere: Concepts,
Categories and Principles', in R. Churchill and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law
and Global Climate Change, (1991); J. Werksman, 'Consolidating Governance of the
Global Commons: Insights from the Global Environmental Facility', 6 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1995)
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Similar to the concept of the the C.C.M. is also intended to conserve
the environment (e.g. the ozone layer) for the interests of future
generations.
The legal concept of the C.C.M. was first used by U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 43/5 3.118 It was then incorporated into two modern
multilateral environmental agreements, namely, the 1992 Climate Change
Convention regime and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention regime. The
Preamble of the Climate Change Convention states that 'change in the
Earth's climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of
mankind'.119 This seems to favour the idea that all states in the
international community - irrespective of whether injured or not - share
equally the international common legal interests in preventing potential
adverse effects caused by global climate change. In this respect, it seems
possible to argue that this comparatively new legal concept, the C.C.M., is to
an important extent concerned with the notion of international obligations
erga omnes - i.e. 'obligations owed to the international community as a
whole' - introduced by the International Court of Justice in its judgement
on the Barcelona Traction case (see Chapter I(IV) above). 1-0 Perhaps the
same may be said of a norm of jus cogens in international law. Yet, as was
discussed, the legal consequences that would flow from the concept of
international obligations erga omnes or jus cogens in the context of ozone
protection are undeniably unclear.121
In summary, the ozone layer as 'common concern of mankind' therefore
belongs to all states and to mankind as a whole. This means that all states
presently have a legal duty to adequately protect the ozone layer from
ozone-depleting economic activities. Yet it must be said at the same time
that this norm-creating legal concept in public international law is still
pp. 40-44; A. Kiss, 'La notion de patrimoine commun de l'humanite' in 175 Hague
Recueil (198211) Chapitre 1 esp.; idem, 'Common Concern of Mankind', 27/4 E.P.L.
(1997) pp. 244-47.
118 Text in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, Basic Documents on International Law and the
Environment, (1995) p. 248.
119 Cf. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty (Preamble); The 1946 International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling (Preamble).
129 The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited Case (Belgium v Spain:
Second Phase) I.C.J. Reports, (1970) p. 3. See F. L. Kirgis, 'Standing to Challenge
Human Endeavours That Could Change the Climate', 84 A.J.I.L. (1990) p. 527; P. Birnie
and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) p. 156.
121 See Chapter I(IV) above.
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premature and its future implications for the international community and
for individual states have yet to be developed.122
C. The Vienna Ozone Layer Convention and the 'Principle' of the
Precautionary Approach in Modern International Law of the
Environment
'If and when a global convention for the protection of the ozone layer came into force,
it would represent a major break-through in international environmental co-operation,
in the sense that the world community would have declared its determination to take
action before a serious global environmental threat materialized, i.e. preventive global
action instead of the remedial action taken hitherto'.1"
*
The international ozone regime has been based on the precautionary
environmental 'principle'/approach124 that is seen as a gradual and
marked development or an effective modification of Principle 21 of the
1972 Stockholm Declaration. As we shall see, the concept of a
precautionary approach would not emerge as a 'new legal principle'
without the existence or elaboration of this old customary norm in
international environmental law.
(1) The Vienna Ozone Convention and Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration
The Vienna Ozone Convention, just like the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Article 194(2)),
1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P. (Preamble), the 1992 Biodiversity Convention
122 See J. Werksman, 'Consolidating Governance of the Global Commons: Insights from
the Global Environmental Facility', 6 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1995) p. 41, rightly observing that
'Such designation [the common concern of humankind] alone does not change the nature
of legal rights and duties associated with the designated area or resource'. The same
opinion is expressed by F. Biermann, Saving the Atmosphere: International Law,
Developing Countries and Air Pollution (1995) p. 15.
12^ Opening statement by the Swedish Minister for Agriculture and the Environment
at the First Session of the Working Group in UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 3 (emphasis
original).
124 See e.g. UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 para. 60, noting that 'A number of representatives
said that the precautionary principle, which had been a cornerstone of the ozone
regime from the outset, should continue to be applied as Parties addressed ongoing
threat to the ozone layer. For a discussion see also Section C(2.b) below.
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(Article 3) and the 1992 Climate Change Convention (Preamble), contains a
specific reference to Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment: 125
'States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environment policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction'. 12^
Stockholm Principle 21 (= Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration)127 is an
expression of the 'principle of preventive action' or sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas : in general, it requires states to take certain positive
and preventive action and at the same time, it fixes a 'threshold'128 of
transboundary environmental harm that will be unacceptable. Although
Principle 21 is widely regarded as a rule of customary international law,129
in the view of some authors such as M. Koskenniemi, it is often seen as a
'process-definition' that indicates relevant values but leaves the
determination of their normative impact into further process. 130
128 For a discussion of Principle 21 see among others P. Birnie and A. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, (1992) pp. 90 et seq.; N. Schrijver, Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, (1997) pp. 125-28 & its footnote
no. 15.
126 fjrst draft convention also addresses this principle (UNEP/WG.69/3/Add.l).
See also the commentary of a draft convention saying that 'obligation to protect the
ozone layer is indirectly embodies in principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration'
(UNEP/WG.78/2, p. 7).
127 But Stockholm Principle 21 was slightly modified by Rio Principle 21 containing
the words 'and developmental [policies]'. See P. Sands, 'International Law in the Field
of Sustainable Development', 66 B.Y.bk.I.L. (1995) pp. 342-43, suggesting such
modification 'does not materially change its meaning and effect'..
128 On its definition see K. Sachariew, 'The Definition of Thresholds of Tolerance for
Transboundary Environment Injury under International Law: Development and Present
Status', 37 N.l.L.R. (1990) pp. 193-206.
129 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) pp. 89 et
seq.; A. Kiss, Droit international de l'environment, (1989) pp. 80 et seq.; P. Sands,
Principles of International Environmental Law, (1995) pp. 190 et seq.; R. J. Dupuy,
'Humanity and the Environment', 2 Colorado J.I.E.L.P. (1991) p. 203. See also I.C.J.'s
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 35 I.L.M. (1996) paras. 29-30. Cf. O. Schachter,
International Law in Theory and Practice, (1991) p. 364, arguing that Principle 21 has
not become a customary law.
!30 M. Koskenniemi, 'Peaceful Settlement of Environmental Disputes', 60 Nordic J.I.L.
(1991) p. 76.
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However, it should be noted that the essential element of this
Principle is that states have the 'responsibility'131 to take certain
preventive measures in order to protect the 'environment' (i.e. not
'territory'). In this sense, Principle 21 is something more than a mere
principle of good neighbourliness or bon voisinage,.^2 and it is concerned
to some extent with ozone having a C.C.M. character. At present it is
regarded as including the high seas and the airspace above them, the deep
seabed, outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies, and Antarctica. 133
Principle 21 that is now seen in the Preamble of the Convention was
originally inserted into both article 1 of the draft ozone convention
submitted by the delegations of Finland/Norway/Sweden,134 and article 2
of the draft conventions prepared by the U.N.E.P. Secretariat. 133 Those
earlier proposals lacked adequate support from some states because of the
reason that they are likely to entail obligations that might exceed their
capacities.136 Unlike its operative treaty provisions, the Preamble itself
does not establish binding legal obligations and therefore the Principle in
question can be seen as an informative guide not only to determining the
object and purpose of the Convention but also to interpreting the meaning
of these particular provisions. 137 Yet Principle 21 is supported by Article
2(2)(b) of 'General Obligations' of the present text of the Ozone Convention
(see section D(l) below).
This widely supported Principle 21 by itself is unlikely to provide a
workable legal approach to address the depletion of the ozone layer. To
131 In the context of Principles 21/22 and the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Article 235),
'responsibility' means the obligation to protect and conserve the environment, while
'liability' suggests the obligation to compensate for environmental damage. Cf. The
I.L.C.'s definition on 'responsibility' and 'liability' in 'International Liability for the
Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International law'. See also A. E.
Boyle, 'State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of
Acts Not Prohibited by International law: A Necessary Distinction?', 39 I.C.L.Q.
(1990) pp. 8-10 esp.
!32 por further details of this principle, see e.g. M. Gavouneil, Pollution from
Offshore Installations, (1995) pp. 82-84.
!33 p_ Bimie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) pp. 90 et
seq.; R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 'Form of International Responsibility for Environmental
Harm', in Francioni and Scovazzi, International Responsibility for Environmental
Harm, (1991) pp. 28 et seq.; G. Handl, 'State Liability for Accidental Transboundary
Environmental Damage by Private Persons', 74 A.J.I.L. (1980) pp. 528-29.
134 'Fundamental Obligation' (Article 1) in Draft International Convention for the
Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer, (UNEP/WG.69/3).
!35 Alternatives 1 & 2 of Article 2 in 'General Obligation' in UNEP/WG.78/2.
136 gee UNEP/WG.78/8, para. 8, reporting that a number of delegations expressed a
strong preference for weaker 'alternative 3'.
!37 J, Sinclair, The Vienna Convention for the Law of Treaties, (1984) pp. 127 et seq.
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begin with, it is important to notice that the origin of the rule is derived
from or based on the frequently cited international case law, the Trail
Smelter Arbitration (1938 & 1941). The tribunal directly addressed state
liability for transboundary air pollution and it supported responsibility for
wrongful acts for breach of such obligations, and not for lawful acts. 138 jn
this context, as Professor G. Handl observed, it may not be denied that
'Principle 21 can only be understood as referring to material damage alone,
and that it thus confirms that material damage is the precondition for a
state's responsibility arising out of an activity lawful per se'.139 This
remark can be borne out by the fact that many delegates, in the
preparatory works for Stockholm Principle 21, endorsed the view that
responsibility for environmental harm should be solely based on a state's
negligence, but not on the forms of liability for lawful acts. 1^ Therefore,
it may be assumed that states' responsibility in the context of customary
international law arises only if the breach of specific primary obligation
exists. Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration recognised this crucial
point141 - nevertheless liability schemes for lawful acts have been poorly
developed over the past three decades. The same thing may be said of the
concept of objective responsibility for wrongful acts.142
The above review will show that, although many international
environmental treaties including the Vienna Ozone Layer Convention
^38 [n the Trail Smelter case, the tribunal declared that; '. . . no State has a right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in
or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of
serious consequences and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence
(emphasis added)'.
G. Handl, 'Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution', in
69 A.J.I.L. (1975) p. 67 (emphasis added) and its footnote 103; idem, 'Balancing of
Interests and International Liability for the Pollution of International Watercourses:
Customary Principles of Law Revisited', 13 C.Y.bk.I.L. (1975) pp. 160 et seq.; idem,
'State Liability for Accidental Transboundary Environmental Damage by Private
Persons', 74 A.J.I.L. (1980) pp. 535 et seq.
14^ See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/PC. 12, Annex II, p. 15. See also R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi,
'The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States',
35 G.Y.bk.I.L. (1992) p. 38; G. Lang, 'Balancing Interests and International Liability
for Pollution of International Watercourses: Customary Principles of Law Revised', 13
C.Y.bk.I.L. (1975) pp. 160 et seq.
141 'States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas
beyond their jurisdiction'.
142 But see K. Rummer, International Management of Hazardous Wastes, (1995) pp.
215-16 & its footnotes 14, 16. See also P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and
the Environment, (1992) pp. 142 et seq. Cf. L. F. E. Goldie, 'Liability for Damage and
the Progressive Development of International Law', 14 I.C.L.Q, (1965) pp. 1189-1264.
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incorporated Principle 21, it ultimately proved that in a sense their
primary aim was to establish obligations of prevention limited by the rule
of 'due diligence'. 143 -phe legal terminology of due diligence can be
generally defined as 'necessary and practicable measures' i.e. an
expression of good environmental conduct.I44 It is commonly accepted
that states are not responsible for environmental damage unless it results
from a lack of international due diligence, l4^ Perhaps its advantages (=
flexibility) are reflected in the following three points:
(i) the effectiveness of different environmental control measures concerning the
severity of the threat;
(ii) considerations for the various levels of national economic developments (e.g.
resources available to developed/developing countries) ^4^ and;
(iii) approaches toward the different nature of the specific activity.!4^
Its flexibility means at the same time its serious disadvantages, e.g. the lack
of 'clear' and 'reliable' guidance for state actors and its industries in
relation to specific environmental legislation and administrative controls.
Accordingly, under these conditions it is very likely that states/industries
143 See the Alabama Claims Arbitration, 1872, Moore International Arbitration, vol.
1, pp. 495-682; the Hostages in Iran case, I.C.J. Reports, pp. 29-33; the Corfu Channel
case, I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 3. R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 'The Due Diligence Rule and the
Nature of the International Responsibility of States', 35 G.Y.bk.I.L. (1992) pp. 9-51;
idem, 'Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental Harm', in F. Francioni
and T. Scovazzi, International Responsibility for Environmental Harm, (1991) pp. 15-
35; A. E. Boyle, 'Nuclear Energy and International Law: An Environmental
Perspective', B.Y.bk.l.L, (1989) pp. 272-73 and its footnote no. 109.
144 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992), pp. 92-94
and its footnotes: A. E. Boyle, 'Nuclear Energy and International Law: An
Environmental Perspective', in B.Y.bk.l.L. (1989) pp. 272 esp.
14-5 -phe ruje 0f 'due diligence' has been applied particularly to (i) the security of
aliens and representatives of foreign states, (ii) the security of foreign states and (iii)
the conservation of the environment. See R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 'The Due Diligence and
the Nature of the International Responsibility of States', 35 G.Y.bk.I.L. (1992) pp. 22
et seq.
146 As far as the resources available to the states are concerned, considerable
controversy could arise as to the question of the standard of national treatment and an
'international minimum standard' or 'a moral standard for civilised states'. For a
discussion see I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (1990) pp. 523-28;
D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 4th edn. (1991) pp. 493-34.
Disagreement about this subject partly lead to the failure of the 1930 Hague
Codification Conference and Garcia Amador's attempt at the I.L.C. on the subject of
state responsibility (1956-1961). I.L.C.'s present draft articles seem to avoid this
issue, though it deals with 'due diligence' in Article 23 of its Draft Articles.
147 gee u.N.E.P. 'International Due Diligence' (informal note for the Executive
Director's Advisory Group on Banking and the Environment, October 1993).
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should naturally follow 'agreed-upon minimum international
environmental standards' (e.g. those contained in the International
Standards Organisation ('I.S.O.'),148 the World Health Organisation ('W.H.O.')
and the International Maritime Organisation ('I.M.O.')).149 Further, in the
field of environmental protection, sometimes scientific uncertainty makes
the concept of due diligence more complicated and difficult for
states/industries to apply on a particular occasion.
In the context of international ozone protection, the customary law
rule of international due diligence cannot form dependable standards for
production/'consumption' of ozone-depleting chemicals such as C.F.Cs. This
point is illustrated in the Chernobyl disaster: although it may be assumed
that Principle 21 could be applicable to this type of transboundary
environmental harm, it was in reality difficult to show a failure of due
diligence in the absence of binding international standards that regulate
national nuclear activities. 150
In summary, the customary rule of due diligence only requires states to
take appropriate measures or make every effort in accordance with the
means at their disposal and capabilities. In other words, the rule leaves too
much discretion and offers no clear guideline or specific standards.151
14^ On the functions of standards/rules (e.g. the I.S.O. 14000) see N. Roht-Arriaza,
'Private Voluntary Standard-Setting, the International Organisation for
Standardisation, and International Environmental Lawmaking', 6 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1995) pp.
107-63.
149 See U.N.E.P. 'International Due Diligence', (information note for the Executive
Director's Advisory Group on Banking and the Environment, October 1993). See also
A. E. Boyle, 'Nuclear Energy and International Law: An Environmental Perspective', in
B.Y.bk.I.L. (1989) pp. 272-73.
1 511 But this may be done in the above-mentioned Trail Smelter Case.
The former Soviet Union was not a party to both the 1960 Paris Convention and
the 1963 Vienna Convention. See ibid., pp. 272-73; idem, 'Chernobyl and the
Development of International Environmental Law', in W. E. Butler, Control Over
Compliance With International Law, (1991) pp. 203-119; P. Sands, 'The Environment,
Community and International Law', 30 Harv.I.L.J. (1989) pp. 401 et seq.
151 Seen in this way, it is quite understandable that Principle 24 of the Stockholm
Declaration provides that 'Co-operation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements
or other appropriate means is essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce and
eliminate adverse environmental effects'.
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(2) The Vienna Ozone Layer Convention and the Precautionary
Environmental 'Principle': The Emergence of a New Approach
(a) International Environmental Co-operation: Developments Subsequent
to the Adoption of Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration152
As was discussed above, Principle 21 suggests that states have the
responsibility to take certain preventive measures to protect the
environment, even though the meaning of 'responsibility' is not
necessarily clear. In addition, even if this rule is seen only as a 'process-
definition' of environmental treaties (see section (1) above), it is likely that
such a general legal norm could have facilitated further international co¬
operation on various aspects of environmental protection and
developments of its application. 153
It should be noted that early references to 'preventive measures' can
be seen in many legal instruments: they include several principles of the
Final Declaration of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, 154 the 1975 Final Act
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 1982 Nairobi
Declaration adopted by the U.N.E.P. Governing Council (No. 9) and the 1982
World Charter for Nature. I55 Moreover, it can be possible to argue that in
certain cases the customary rule has inevitably entailed procedural
obligations to co-operate in protecting the human environment:^5^
examples will include (i) obligations of prior notification and consultation
in the context of environmental hazard,l5^ (ii) obligations to notify l5^ and
152 See generally M. N. Shaw, International Law, 4th edn. (1997) pp. 600-07.
155 See R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 'Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental
Harm' in F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi, InternationaI Responsibility for Environmental
Harm, (1991) pp. 28-9.
15^ Conservation of Natural Resources for Present and Future Generations (Principle
2); Maintenance of the Capacity of the Earth to Produce Vital Renewable Resources
(Principle 3); Non-Exhaustion of Non-Renewable Resources (Principle 5).
155 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 37/7. The Charter provides that 'Activities
which are likely to cause irreversible damage to nature shall be avoided' (No. 11(a)),
and 'Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be preceded
by an exhaustive examination' (No. 11(b)).
15^ See e.g. A. E. Boyle, 'Nuclear Energy and International Law: An Environmental
Perspective', in B.Y.bk.I.L. (1989) pp. 278-87 esp.; A. Kiss, 'Nouvelles tendances en
droit international de l'environnement' 16 G.Y.bk.I.L. p. 246; A. E. Utton,
'International Environmental Law and Consultation Mechanisms', 12 Columbia J.T.L.
(1973) pp. 56-72; P. N. Okowa, 'Procedural Obligations in International Environmental
Agreements', 67 B.Y.bk.I.L. (1996) pp. 275-336.
15^ Examples include the 1986 Early Notification Convention and the 1986 I.A.E.A.
Assistance Convention (see further Chapter I footnote no. 39).
15 & See Chapter 1 footnote no. 40.
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consult!59 jn case Qf accidents or emergencies capable of causing
transfrontier harm in general, and (iii) environmental impact assessment
('E.I.A.').160 This will mean that the so-called 'Principle 20' of the 1972
Stockholm Declaration prepared by the Working Group - which could not
get final approval, however -161- was now widely supported by modern
international environment treaties containing these procedural
obligations.
In so far as environmental impact assessment shows a foreseeable
risk, the problems of the rule of due diligence will be partly mitigated.
However, we should note that it is usually difficult to build up consensual
scientific knowledge in most environmental problems. This is an
important fact to stress: during the formation of scientific consensus in the
international community, the environment is increasingly polluted, and
sometimes we may be going 'beyond the limits' of the physical
environment, although not intending to do so.162
(b) The Precautionary Environmental 'Principle'/Approach
Under the condition that the customary international law rule of 'due
diligence' secures little promise for environmental protection, a radical
idea has gradually emerged from the customary rule of Principle 21 - i.e.
even when there does exist lack of scientific proof of the cause and effect
relationship, certain preventive measures to protect the environment
159 see e.g. the 1972 London Dumping Convention (Article V(2)); the 1974 Nordic
Environmental Protection Convention (Article ll);the 1979 Geneva Convention (Article
5 & 8). See further Chapter I footnote no. 41.
160 gee e.g. the 1978 U.N.E.P. Draft Principles of Conduct; the 1985 A.S.E.A.N.
Agreement (Article 14); the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (Article 206). See further Chapter 1
footnote no. 42.
161 ft reads 'Each State has the duty to undertake international consultations before
proceeding with activities which may damage to the environment of another State or to
the environment of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. A State having
reason to believe that the activities of another State may cause damage to its
environment or to the environment of area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
may request international consultations concerning the envisaged activities'. See
UN.Doc.A/CONF.48/PC/WG.I (II)/CRP.4( 1972), p. 2, cited in L. B. Sohn, 'The Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment', 14 Harvard l.L.J. (1973), p. 497. For
conflicting opinions, see ibid. pp. 496 et seq.
162 see pj. pp Meadows, D. L. Meadows and J. Randers, Beyond the Limits: Global
Collapse or a Sustainable Future, (1992), dealing with potential 'overshoot' caused by
human society.
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should be taken. This is the so-called precautionary (environmental)
'principle' or approach. 163
It is widely agreed that the 1987 Ministerial Declaration of the
Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea
(London Declaration) is the first agreement that explicitly formulated the
precautionary principle. It reads:
'. . . in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most
dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require
action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been
established by absolutely clear scientific evidence' (Paragraph VII).1^4
The 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention, for the first time, made
reference to the term 'precautionary measures' taken at national and
international level for the protection of the ozone layer (Preamble).^
Although there was already general agreement at the First Session of the
Working Group held in 1982 in Stockholm that 'precautionary action is
necessary for the sake of man and the environment',166 perhaps not
surprisingly, the wording 'precautionary' was bracketed in earlier draft
framework conventions.
The introduction of 'precautionary measures' mentioned above is a
remarkable development in international environmental law.
International environmental treaties adopted before the 1985 Ozone Layer
Convention - for instance, the 1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P. - only claimed the
recognition of the existence of 'possible adverse effects' of transboundary
163 from among a considerable literature on this 'principle' see D. Freestone and A.
Hey, 'Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle' in D. Freestone and H.
Hey (eds.), Precautionary Principle and International Law, (1996) pp. 3-15; J.
Cameron, 'The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law', in
O'Riordan and Cameron (eds.) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle, (1994) pp.
276 et seq.; P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) pp.
97-98; G. Handle, 'Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to
International Law', 1 Y.bk.l.E.L. (1990) pp. 20-24. Perhaps it may also be possible to
argue that the principle was deprived from the German law, Vorsorgeprinzip. See D.
Freestone, 'The Precautionary Principle' in R. Churchill and D. Freestone,
International Law and Global Climate Change, (1991) p. 21.
164 See Y. van der Mensbrugghe, 'Legal Status of International North Sea Conference
Declarations', 5 I.J.E.C.L (1990) pp. 15-22.
1(55 '['his terminology is first found in the Alternative 1 of 'General Obligations' of the
second revised draft convention. (Second Revised Draft Convention for the Protection of
the Ozone Layer, (UNEP/WG.94/3).
166 UNEP/WG.69/10, para. 9.
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air pollution in the short/long term (Preamble). 167 as p Birnie and A.
Boyle say, the Ozone Layer Convention is therefore one of the first
international treaties that perceived the need for precautionary action
without full scientific certainty: 168 in the middle of 1980 serious scientific
difficulties about the theory of ozone-depletion remained unsolved, and
there was not sufficient scientific consensus; until 1985 no scientific
observation of the actual ozone-loss was published, and; the Rowland-Molia
hypothesis suggested in 1974169 was not confirmed until 1988.
As we shall see in later chapters, it was the 1987 Montreal Ozone
Layer Protocol that actually achieved the precautionary
'principle'/approach by introducing specific control measures for
specified eight C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss. contained Annex A (see Chapter III(III.B.l)
below). The Preamble of the Montreal Protocol provides that the parties
are 'determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary
measures to control total emissions of substances that deplete it' (emphasis
added).
At present there is already enough cogent scientific evidence to
support Articles 2 and 5 control measures of the Montreal Protocol regime
(see Introduction above). In this more restricted sense, this regulatory
ozone regime may not be a precautionary treaty regime any more.170
However, it should be emphasised that scientific information for the
shaping of global environmental policy about ozone depletion will never
be perfect or accurate. 171 Thus it must continue to be strengthened (Note!:
skin cancer is still the only expected impact for which sufficient data and
information are available to make quantitative predictions).172
167 in this respect, it is probable that this pre-1980 position was partly influenced
not only by the political will of member states but also by scientific uncertainty on
the causes and effects of acid rain. See e.g. L. Giindling, 'Multilateral Co-operation of
States under the ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution' in C.
Flinterman, B. Kwiatkowska and J. Lammers (eds.) Transboundary Air Pollution,
(1986) p.20.
168 p Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) p. 406.
169 $ee Introduction above (footnote no. 5).
I7® On this point see J. Brunnee, 'Conceptual Framework for an International Forests
Convention: Customary Law and Emerging Principles' in Global Forests and
International Environmental Law, (1996) footnote no. 175, noting that 'only after
compelling evidence that depletion was in fact occurring emerged, were concrete
measures agreed to in the Montreal Protocol'.
171 For a discussion of the relationship between science and policy-making see in
particular J. Stonehouse and J. Mumford, Science, Risk Analysis and Environmental
Decisions, (U.N.E.P.'s Environment & Trade no. 5: 1994).
172 See statement by Dr. J. C. Van der Lean (Co-Chair of the Panel on Environmental
Effects of Ozone Depletion) at the 1997 Ninth Ozone Meeting of the Parties in
71
The 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention and International Environmental Law
The precautionary environmental 'principle'/approach is now
widely incorporated into a number of environmental law instruments
including Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration; the 1996 Protocol to the
London Dumping Convention (Articles 2, 3 and 4), the 1995 Straddling Fish
Stocks Convention (Article 6/Annex II),173 the Maastricht Treaty of the
European Union (Article 130(R)(2)), the Convention for the Protection of
the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (the O.S.P.A.R.
Convention: Preamble & Article 2(2)(a)), the 1992 Convention on the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Baltic Sea
Convention (Article 3(2)), the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes (Article 2(5)(a)), the
1992 Bamako Convention (Article 4(3)(f)), the 1992 Climate Change
Convention (Preamble), and perhaps arguably, Article 6 of the 1989 Basel
Convention (the Prior Informed Consent Procedure ('P.I.C.')).!7^
As noted by many commentators, though these multilateral
environmental treaties seem to accept the new approach, defining the
international legal 'principle' is not a easy task.375 Although I have space
for no more than an indication, the international legal status of this
'principle' in international law still remains undeniably ambiguous.37(3 as
some authors have suggested, there may be some cogent evidence to show
that the precautionary 'principle' has already become part of customary
UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, para. 32. See also statement by Co-Chair of the T.E.A.P. in
UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, para. 29, suggesting the need of financial resources for
monitoring and further research of ozone depletion.
As to the emergence of revisionism against ozone science see R. Benedick,
Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 226-28; F. Singer, 'Swedish Academy's Choice of
Honourees Signals That Ozone Politics Played a Role', The Scientist, (4 March 1996) p.
9, cited in ibid., p. 228.
I73 A/CONF.164/37 (8 September 1995). D. A. Balton, 'Strengthening the Law of the
Sea: The New Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Stocks', 27
O.D.I.L. (1996) pp. 125-51.
l7^ Other examples include: the 1988 C.R.A.M.R.A. (Article 4); the 1992 Biodiversity
Convention (Preamble); the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention (Article 3(2)); the 1992
Transboundary Watercourses Convention (Article 2(5)(a)); the 1992 O.S.P.A.R.,
Convention (Article 2(2)(a)); the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Article 130f).
See also I.C.J.'s Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 35 I.L.M. (1996) paras.
29-30.
I73 For an extensive discussion see P. Sands, Principles of International
Environmental Law, (1995) pp. 208-13; D. Freestone, 'The Precautionary Principle' in
D. Freestone and R. Churchill (eds.), International Law and Global Climate Change,
(1992); Freestone and Hey 'Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle' in
D. Freestone and E. Hey, Precautionary Principle and International Law, (1996) pp. 3-
15; L. Gundling, 'The Status in International Law of the Principle of Precautionary
Action', 5 I.J.E.C.L. (1990) pp. 25 et seq.
^76 For a discussion see e.g. L. Gundling, 'The Status in International Law of the
Principle of Precautionary Action', 5 I.J.E.C.J. (1990) pp. 23-30.
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international law of the environment, but it must be said that the
authenticity for that argument still remains uncertain. 177
In my view, this is hardly surprising, however.178 First, it should be
noticed that, despite a marked difference between the precautionary
'principle' or approach and the Stockholm Principle 21/Rio Principle 2, as
far as the former new approach is inherently based on the latter
customary rule, these two principles are still closely inter-related.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, what the precautionary approach
actually means will significantly depend on context, objective and the
nature of each environmental issue. For instance, the legal character of
the precautionary approach in the ozone regime intrinsically differs from
that of oceans and sea, water resources or hazardous activities that are
more closely concerned with the 'threshold' of environmental damage (see
Chapter I(IV)).
Regardless of its formal legal status in international law, in the
present international community of over 190 developed and developing
states, this evolving 'principle'/approach within modern environmental
treaty regimes would not be maintained by participating states unless
supported, to a greater or less extent, by legal instruments for
international environmental co-operation and global capacity-building
(see Chapter I(III.B)).
D. The Provisions of the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention
(1) The 'General Obligations': Legal Basis of the Montreal Ozone Protocol
'General Obligations', 'Fundamental Principles' or equivalent articles -
which are thus central to international environmental treaties - contain
contracting parties' legitimate expectations for development/maintenance
of the international regimes. In general, they are regimes' legal (and
political) guiding rules that address the rational behaviour of participating
states. Some general provisions in this kind of article may be regarded as
177 See e.g. J. Cameron and J. Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment', 14
B.C.I.C.L.R. (1991) pp. 34-52.
178 por Simiiar arguments see D. Freestone and Z. Makuch, 'The New International
Environmental Law of Fishries: The 1995 United Nations Straddling Stocks
Agreement', 7 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1996) p. 13, saying that "the precautionary principle may
not be such a radical departure from existing international principle'.
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confirmation of the legal rule of international due diligence^ ta^e
appropriate measures at least (see Section III(C.l) above).This means
that on most occasions these provisions may not gain clear or objective
meaning unless supported by other substantial treaty provisions and
specific environmental regulations for successful implementation of the
respective regimes.
Although the contents of such provisions depend largely on the
character of each environmental regime, they generally cover (i) the
control over activities within (and outside) national jurisdiction, (ii)
exchange of information relating to scientific/technical information and
data, (iii) financial/technical assistance and international transfer of
technology, and (iv) the general obligations to internationally co¬
operate. Good examples that include some or most of the above-
mentioned obligations are the 1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P. Convention (Article
2); the 1989 Basel Convention (Article 4); the 1991 Bamako Convention on
the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within
Africa (Article 4);182 the 1992 Biodiversity Convention (Article 3) 183- the
1992 Climate Change Convention (Article 3); the 1985 A.S.E.A.N. Agreement
(Article 1); the 1994 U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification in Those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification,
Particularly in Africa (Article 4).
The following content of 'General Obligations' of the Vienna Ozone
Convention (Article 2) is a product of constructive discussions, selected
from many 'Alternatives' in its draft texts revised several times (see Section
II(B. 1-2) above).
Responding to 'preventive measures' in the Preamble, Article 2
provides that the parties are to take appropriate measures to protect human
health and the environment against adverse effects resulting from related
179 cf. S. Kuwabara, The Legal Regime of the Protection of the Mediterranean against
Pollution from Land-Based Sources, (1984) p. 71.
180 gee e g Article 192 of the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. ('General Obligation'), providing that
'States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment' and Article
194 requiring them to use the 'best practicable means at their disposal and in
accordance with their capabilities'.
For a discussion of environmental co-operation see A. E. Boyle, 'The Principle of
Co-operation: the Environment' in V. Lowe and C. Warbrick (eds.), The United Nations
and the Principles of International Law: Essays in Memory of Michael Akehurst,
(1994) pp. 129-32.
182 30 I.L.M. (1991) p. 775.
188 But note that most of important principles seen in draft article 3 were moved up to
its 'Preamble' at the final stage of the negotiation.
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human activities (Article 2(1)). The phrase 'appropriate measures'
accurately reflects the nature of this framework environmental treaty. 184
Such measures must be based on relevant scientific and technical
considerations (Article 2(4)).185 jn accordance with the means at their
disposal and capabilities (Article 2(2)), the parties are to 'adopt appropriate
legislative or administrative measures'186 and to 'co-operate in
harmonising appropriate policies to control, limit, reduce or prevent
human activities under their jurisdiction or control' if these activities have
or are likely to have adverse environmental effects concerned with ozone
depletion (Article 2(2.b)). The parties may adopt domestic measures
'additional' to measures mentioned above in accordance with international
law (Article 2(3)).I87 Yet 'General Obligations' of the Ozone Convention do
not specifically deal with the special treatment of developing countries,
although Article 4(2) addresses such matters in the context of transfer of
environmentally sound technology. In this respect, unlike the 1985
Vienna Convention, the Montreal Protocol as amended/adjusted contains
strong provisions for the so-called 'Article 5 developing country' and
moreover it established the Multilateral Fund within the ozone regime (see
Chapter III(III.E) and Chapter VI below).
Article 2(2.a) requires the parties to co-operate through systematic
observations, research and information exchange to understand and assess
the relationship between human activities and ozone depletion. Such
obligations to globally co-operate are absolutely indispensable for
environmental framework conventions facing scientific uncertainty since
it would help to achieve relevant scientific breakthroughs (see Chapter
I(III.A) above).!88 This provision 2(2.a) is read together with Article 3
184 See H. Hohmann, Basic Documents of International Environmental Law, vol. II
(1992) p. 668, saying that Article 2(2) is a loophole for all - especially for
economically weaker states. The corresponding article of the 1974 Paris Convention
provides that the parties 'pledge themselves to take all possible steps to prevent
pollution of the sea' (Article 1) - this wording is comparatively stronger than that of
the Vienna Ozone Convention.
188 During the Session of the Working Group, one expert argued that it was possible to
interpret the phrase 'in accordance with the means at their disposal and their
capabilities' (Article 2(2)) as suggesting that the member states would not necessarily
enact any legislation in implementation of the Convention. UNEP/WG.94/10, p. 10.
186 On national ozone laws/regulations see Part B of Chapter III below.
187 In the third revised draft convention, the term 'stricter' was used instead of
'additional'. See UNEP/WG.94/8, p. 2.
188 The 1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P. also laid a basis for further co-operation in scientific
research, and it established a 'Co-operative Programme for the Monitoring and
Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (Article 9).
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('Research and Systematic Observation') and Article 4 ('Co-operation in the
Legal, Scientific and Technical Field'). Article 4(1) provides that the
parties are to facilitate and encourage the exchange of scientific,
technical, socio-economic, commercial and legal information relevant to
the Convention as elaborated in Annex II.
In order to adopt supplementing protocols/annexes, the parties are
required to co-operate in the formulation of agreed measures, procedures
and standards for the implementation of the Convention (Article 2(2.c)).190
(2) The Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Ozone Layer Convention
Regime
In many cases, just like other treaty regimes, modern international
environmental agreements establish independent intergovernmental
organs to ensure effective implementations of and compliance with their
legal commitments.191 These highest treaty organs - which provide
forums for continuous multilateral environmental negotiations - are called
by a variety of names such as the 'Conference of the Parties', the 'Meetings
of the Parties', the 'Executive Body', and so forth.192 They are usually
empowered to adopt amendments to conventions, implementing protocols
and/or related technical annexes, and additional international treaties,
technical annexes and legally non-binding recommendations or
resolutions (see Chapter III(III.C) below). These treaty bodies as main
1119 See Annex 2(2), providing that 'The Parties to the Convention, in deciding what
information is to be collected and exchanged, should take account the usefulness of the
information and the costs of obtaining it. The Parties further recognise that co¬
operation under this annex has to be consistent with national laws, regulations
practice regarding patents, trade secrets, and protection of confidential and
proprietary information'. This expresses the developed countries' view that patents
and intellectual property concerned with the protection of the ozone layer should be
guarded.
199 See Article 9. At the Third Session of the Working Group, it was agreed that the
adoption of any protocols should be by the Conference of the Parties rather than
diplomatic conference. See also UNEP/WG.94/3, commentary on article 9, saying
protocols should be adopted at an 'extraordinary' meeting.
191 See J. Werksman, 'The Conference of Parties to Environmental Treaties' in idem
(ed.), Greening International Institutions, (1996) pp. 55-68; A. E. Boyle, 'Saving the
World? Implementation and Enforcement of International Environmental Law through
International Institutions', 3 J.E.L. (1991) pp. 229-45.
192 Examples include the 'Conference of Parties' (the 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention,
the 1992 Climate Change Convention), the 'Executive Body' (the 1979 transboundary
Air Pollution Convention), and so on. Yet, supreme organs of international
organisations are called; 'Assembly' (I.C.A.O., I.M.O., W.H.O., O.A.U.); 'General
Conference' (I.A.E.A., I.L.O., U.N.E.S.C.O.); 'Conference' (F.A.O., O.A.S.), or; 'Congress'
(W.M.O., U.P.U.).
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sources of regime-dynamics thus often enjoy considerable legislative
autonomy.193 Further, they also provide forums for dispute
avoidance/settlement by discussion and negotiation or consultation. 194 As
was mentioned in Chapter I(III.D), N.G.Os. are widely allowed to participate
in the institutions' regular meetings.
The Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Ozone Layer Convention
as a legislative body is empowered to adopt (i) amendments to the
Convention, protocols and their annexes, (ii) protocols to the Convention,
and (iii) additional annexes to the Convention (Article 6(e-h)).195 with
regard to amendments of the Convention, only if all efforts at consensus
proved unsuccessful, adoption by a two-thirds majority vote is then allowed
as a last resort (Article 9(3)). This procedure applies to amendments to any
protocol, although in this case a two-thirds majority of the parties to the
protocol present and voting at the meeting is required (Article 9(4)).19£>
This procedure is also applicable to the adoption and amendment of annexes
to the Convention and protocols (Article 10(2)). Amendments adopted in
accordance with Article 9(3/4) mentioned above shall enter into force
between parties having accepted them (Article 9(5)).^ As for the Rules
of Procedure for the Conference of the Parties, they are substantially the
same as those for the Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol except
for Rules 1 and 2.198
193 See T. Gehring's regime-definition in Chapter I( II) above. See also J. Werksman,
op. cit. n. 187, p. 60, suggesting that these organs' decision-making procedures are
shaped by Stockholm Principle 21.
19^ See A. E. Boyle, 'Saving the World? Implementation and Enforcement of
International Environmental Law Through International Institutions', 3 J.E.L. (1991)
pp. 232-33. In the context of the N.C.P. see Chapter V(IV.B.3 & VII.B.2) below.
193 Annexes to the Convention or to any protocols are strictly restricted to scientific,
technical and administrative matters, but form an integral part of the Convention or of
such protocols. The amendment procedure mentioned above was a compromise reached
by mutual concession - many experts supported a two-third majority vote in both
cases, but others insisted on the necessity of a large majority vote or consensus.
UNEP/WG.94/10, para 24. See also 12 E.P.L. 'Draft Convention Not Finalised', (1984)
p. 10.
1911 See the Montreal Protocol (Article 2(9)(c-d)). Under the Montreal Ozone Layer
Protocol, both developed and developing countries have a 'veto power', and further
amendments can be easier to achieve than the Convention (see Chapter III below). Cf.
the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (Articles 15 & 17) and its Protocol
(Articles 20(3) & 21(4)).
1917 In contrast, the Conference of the Parties of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention does
not have such power to adopt binding amendments to annexes by majority decision¬
making (Article 29(4)). See A. E. Boyle, 'The Convention on Biodiversity', in L.
Campiglio, (1994) p. 126.
198 See Article 6(3)). Rules of Procedure in U.N.E.P., Handbook, 4th edn. (1996)
Section 1.5.
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The Conference of the Parties is also designed to fulfil many other
institutional functions: it reviews the scientific information concerned
with the destruction of the ozone layer (Article 6(4.b));199 promotes the
harmonisation of policies, strategies and measures to minimise the
omissions of ozone-depleting substances and make recommendations on
any other measures relating to the Convention (Article 6(4.c)) and adopts
programmes for research, systematic observations, scientific and
technological co-operation, the exchange of information and transfer of
technology and knowledge (Article 6(4.d)).200
In relation to co-operation with other international organisations,
the Conference of the Parties may ask for the services of the W.M.O., the
World Health Organisation ('W.H.O.'), and the U.N.E.P. C.C.O.L. relating to
scientific and systematic observation, etc. (Article 6(4.j)). Lastly, in
accordance with paragraph 4(i) of Article 6, the Conference of the Parties
has established internal treaty institutions such as the Trust Fund of the
Vienna Convention201 and the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties.202
(3) The U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat for the Vienna Convention and the
Montreal Protocol
The basic function of Secretariats for environment treaties is to help
implement multilateral agreements by co-ordinating and facilitating data
collection and information exchange and by giving certain technical
assistance for state parties (developing countries in particular).
Secretariats are usually required to compile information submitted by the
parties and prepare and distribute periodic summary reports.203 Generally
speaking, their authority is strictly limited, and they are not expected to
verify the information received by the parties.204
Initially the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat had carried out this function
on an interim basis (Article 7(2)), but it currently serves as a permanent
199 See also Article 5 and Decision 1/2 of the Conference of the Parties.
200 jhg basis of these provisions can be found in Institutional Arrangements for a
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, (UNEP/WG.78/4).
201 See Decision 1/9 of the Conference of the Parties and Terms of Reference for the
Trust Fund (Annex III).
202 See Decision 1/6 of the Conference of the Parties.
203 U.S. General Accounting Office ('G.A.O.'), International Environmental Agreements
are not Well Monitored, (January 1992), p. 29.
204 Ibid., pp. 29-30. But see also Chapter V(IV.B.l) below.
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basis.205 The U.N.E.P. disseminates a great deal of information concerning
the international ozone treaties, the science and technologies, government
policies, industry news, meetings and workshops, and training
programmes.206 The reason the U.N.E.P. in Nairobi (Kenya) is designated to
this post is that it possesses assessment programmes such as the Global
Environmental Monitoring System ('G.E.M.S.')207 for monitoring the
effectiveness of the provisions of the global convention and co-ordinating
international mechanisms such as the U.N.E.P.'s Co-ordinating Committee
on the Ozone Layer, and an Environmental Law Unit.20® Of course, another
advantage of the treaty secretariat co-located with this U.N. organ will be
that the creation of a new organ will not be necessary (i.e. those of
economy of staff and so forth).209
The U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat exercises some influence over the
compliance of the Ozone Layer Convention and the Montreal Protocol. In
general the Ozone Secretariat arranges for or services the Conference of
the Parties, the Meeting of the Parties, their committees, Bureaux, working
groups and assessment panels. It will also arrange for implementing the
decisions taken by these meetings. The Secretariat is to prepare reports
based on information received in accordance with treaty provisions (see
Chapter V(VII.A)), and ensure the necessary co-ordination with other
relevant international agencies (Article 7(1)). In this respect, the Ozone
Secretariat often represents the Convention/Protocol in the relevant
international bodies (e.g. the W.T.O. Committee on Trade &
Environment).210 As a subsidiary institution, the Secretariat also performs
other functions determined by the Conference of the Parties (Article 7(f)).
As we shall see, under the Montreal Protocol, the Ozone Secretariat havs
expanded its functions (Article 12) and it is now empowered to trigger the
Non-Compliance Procedure (see Chapter V(IV.B.l)).
Lastly, it should be noted that the Ozone Secretariat is to
communicate proposed amendments not only to the contracting parties but
also to the 'signatories' to the Convention for information (Article 9(2)).
205 gee Decision 1/8 of the Conference of the Parties.
206 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (.1998) p. 253; '"Ozone-Friendly" Computer
Programme Updated', Envirolink Environment News Service (24 April 1997).
207 thg g.E.M.S. is one of the first programmes established by the u.n.e.P. in 1970s.
See in detail e.g. M. K. Tolba (eds.) The World Environment 1972-1992: Two Decades of
Challenge, (1992) pp. 614-15.
208 UNEP/WG.78/4, para. 11-13.
209 UNEP/WG.78/4, para. 11-12.
210 See Chapter 1V(I.B) below.
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Although this procedure was - as discussed in the Third Session of the
Working Group - contrary to common treaty practice as embodied e.g. in
the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S., 211 recent environmental treaties widely follow such a
trend.212 Due to this formality by the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat, some
signatories - which are pending ratification - might decide to become new
contracting parties to the ozone layer regime.
(4) The Dispute Settlement Procedures under the Vienna Ozone Layer
Convention21^
Dispute settlement mechanisms of international treaty regimes usually
include (i) diplomatic means of dispute settlement - namely, negotiation or
consultation, mediation, and international conciliation, and/or (ii) legally
binding methods - namely, recourse to arbitration and tribunals at the
international level.214 The formal non-compliance procedure of the
Montreal Protocol can be regarded as a form of international conciliation
(see Chapter V(V.A)). Dispute settlement procedures within environmental
regimes are important for a variety of reasons, including the
interpretation or application of the treaty and preservation of the
integrity of the treaty.215 In most cases, dispute settlement procedures
within international environmental regimes are, however, only optional
for contracting parties and are not implemented on a compulsory basis.
The Vienna Ozone Convention follows the classical model of
providing a wide range of techniques to settle environmental disputes
arising between the parties. It provides for optional use of the
International Court of Justice or arbitration over a dispute regarding treaty
interpretation/application; in a case where the parties have accepted no
procedure (or a different one), they are then obliged to submit the dispute
to international conciliation.216 Perhaps it may be possible to argue that
211 UNEP/WG.94/10, para. 25. See also 12 E.P.L. 'Draft Convention Not Finalised',
(1984), p. 10.
212 The 1989 Basel Convention, (Article 17(2)), The 1992 Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Article 15 (2)), The 1992 Biodiversity Convention (Article 29(2)).
215 For a discussion of dispute settlement in environmental context, see Chapter V
below.
214 For a detailed analysis of dispute settlement procedures see e.g. United Nations,
Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between States, (1992) Chapter II
esp.
215 See A. E. Boyle 'Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Law of the Sea and the
Environment' (unpublished, 1996).
216 See Article 11; Chapter II below.
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the mere existence of such mechanisms is important.217 Yet, not
surprisingly, the procedures under the Ozone Convention have never so
far been invoked or used.
Article 11 of the Convention ('Settlement of Disputes') firstly states
that the parties concerned are to seek a solution through diplomatic
channels, i.e. negotiation (Article 11(1)). This is consistent with the view
that negotiation in general should be considered as the preferred way as
this is listed in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. Needless to say, its
primary objective is, first of all, to identify an existing problem and
moreover to define the issues.218 it is also widely recognised that the
essence of negotiation is to demonstrate considerable flexibility toward
political and economic problems. However, it must be added that such an
outcome often reflects power-relations between the states concerned.219
If negotiation proves ineffective, the parties concerned can seek
mediation through the intervention of a third party (Article 11(2)). If a
party has not accepted such compulsory dispute settlement procedures as
arbitration220 or/and the International Court of Justice (as a rule, most of
the parties reject such a compulsory jurisdiction), the Convention is
formally to endorse conciliation, which contains elements of both inquiry
and mediation (Article 11(4)). Based on the request of one of the parties
concerned, a conciliation commission will be established, and the
commission decides a final and recommendatory award (Article 11(5)). Just
like mediation, this is not legally binding and thus will be considered only
in good faith.221
These dispute settlement procedures in general apply to the
Protocol(s) concluded under the Convention (Article 11(6)). In this
respect, there exist some legal questions on the relationship between the
dispute settlement procedure of the Vienna Ozone Convention and the N.C.P.
217 i. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd. edn. (1984) p. 235.
It is still necessary to appreciate the deterrence effects of third party judicial
mechanisms. See further Chapter V below.
218 See O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, (1991) pp. 214-17.
2^° See e.g. J. G. Merrils, International Dispute Settlement, (1991) p. 24. In the
context of the G.A.T.T. see in particular Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1994)
pp. 36-38 (Japanese).
220 [n its First Meeting, the Conference of the Parties adopted the Arbitration
Procedure. See Decision 1/7: Annex II of the Report of the First Meeting, reprinted in
U.N.E.P. Handbook for the International Treaties for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
4th edn. (1996) pp. 75-77.
221 a. E. Boyle, 'Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Law of the Sea and the
Environment', 26 Thesaurus Acroasium (1996).
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of the Montreal Protocol.222 Theoretically speaking, the institutional
mechanisms of both ozone layer regimes might clash over how to respond
to 'ozone disputes' among the parties (see Chapter V(III.B) below).
Though there is no need to go into details about this political issue, in
spite of the fact that during the convention negotiation many Western
countries advocated procedures for the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, the United States firmly rejected this idea
because of the I.C.J.'s judgement in 1984 against the United States (the
Nicaragua Case). In the Final Act, the sixteen countries officially stated
that it was a truly regrettable decision.22^
IV. Assessment of the Vienna Convention Regime
Weaknesses of the key provisions of the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer
Convention will be the reflection of customary international law relating
to preventive actions, unsolved scientific uncertainty about ozone
depletion, and contracting parties' political will influenced by economic
considerations. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Convention did
not mention anything specific about reducing the use of C.F.Cs. or O.D.Ss.,
but merely listed in its Annex 1(4) specific substances only 'thought' to
have the potential to modify the ozone layer. The analysis above therefore
verifies the inevitable conclusion that the Vienna Ozone Convention
provided in effect a far from perfect solution to the depletion of the ozone
layer.
However, the framework ozone treaty, which presently includes
major C.F.C. producing/consuming nations, proved to be an initial step
toward creating a much stronger Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol
containing in its Article 2 (and Article 5) strong control measures for
O.D.Ss. It has therefore formed the legal basis for the 'dynamic'
international regime for the protection of the ozone layer.224
The following four points were given explicit emphasis in this
Chapter.
222 M. Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance?', 3 Y.bk.l.E.L. (1992)
Section IX.
223 See the Final Act to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
in 14/2/3 E.P.L. (1985) p. 71. See also P. H. Sand, 'The Vienna Convention is Adopted',
27 Environment, (1985) p.42.
224 See U.N.E.P., 'Vienna plus Ten - The Vienna Convention: 10 years of Achievement',
OzonAction, (special supplement, no. 3, November 1995).
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First, under the Convention regime, the ozone layer - 'above the
planetary boundary layer', i.e. not belonging to any particular part of the
global atmosphere - can be regarded as the 'common concern of mankind'
('C.C.M.') having erga omnes character. In this context, all states in the
international community have a legal duty to adequately protect the 'ozone
shield'.
Second, the Ozone Layer Convention claimed to implement Principle
21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and it, for the first time, made
reference to the term 'precautionary measures' in international
environmental law. As we have seen, a number of scientific uncertainties
regarding ozone depletion remained unresolved throughout the
Convention negotiations. Viewed against this background, we may say that
the Vienna Ozone Convention illustrated the precautionary
approach/'principle' and may have influenced to some extent subsequent
treaty making in the sphere of environmental protection.
Third, the Ozone Layer Convention established a relatively strong
institutional machinery for international supervision and control, i.e. the
Conference of the Parties. The Conference of the Parties to the Convention
is designed to ensure sound implementation of the international
environmental regime. Under Article 6, the highest internal organ within
the ozone regime enjoys considerable legislative autonomy. The
Convention also created the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat as a group of
technical experts in the field of ozone protection.
Finally, as with the 1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P. Convention, the Vienna
Convention has provided a framework for strengthening international
environmental co-operation in scientific research on ozone depletion and
related problems. The Ozone Layer Convention's stated purpose has been to
promote the exchange of information, research, and data on monitoring to
protect human health and the environment against activities that have an
adverse effect on the ozone later (Preamble). In this respect, the
contracting parties are specifically required to internationally co-operate
through systematic observations, research and information exchange to
understand and assess the link between human activities and ozone
depletion. As I emphasised, such legal obligations to internationally co¬
operate are absolutely indispensable for evolving environmental regimes
faced with scientific uncertainty (see Chapter I(III.A)).
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*
Having observed the 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention, we are now ready to
consider how the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol has remedied the
deficiencies of the framework/umbrella Convention.




THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CO¬
OPERATIVE AND REGULATORY REGIME FOR THE PROTECTION
OF THE STRATOSPHERIC OZONE LAYER
THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF O.D.S. REGULATORY MEASURES AND
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE OZONE TREATIES
PART A
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION TO
CONTROL O.D.Ss. IN THE MONTREAL OZONE PROTOCOL REGIME
I. INTRODUCTION
Absolutely indispensable for the precautionary ozone regime have been, as
addressed in Chapter II above, internationally accepted legal standards or
regulations to control chemicals which potentially deplete ozone in the
stratosphere. In relation to this point, we have already observed that
customary law rules of the environment cannot provide such satisfactory
international legal instruments for the preservation of the ozone layer,
even though this does not necessarily mean, however, that they have no
part to play.
A series of meetings and negotiations of the Protocol to the 1985
Vienna Ozone Convention - conducted in an Ad Hoc forum within the
framework of the U.N.E.P.1 - formally started in December 1986, and
concluded, in a remarkably brief period of time, in September 1987.
Perhaps not surprisingly, it was thus prior to the entry into force of the
Vienna Ozone Convention. 2
It is often said that the global ozone regime (the subsequent
implementing Protocol) supplies a working model for multilateral
negotiations of future environmental regimes: as Richard E. Benedick (the
chief U.S. negotiator for the ozone treaties) observed very truly, the
Montreal Ozone Protocol has been regarded as a prototype for an 'evolving
new form of international co-operation', particularly in its treatment of (i)
1 For the role of the U.N.E.P. in the development of environment treaties including
regional sea agreements, see Chapter I(III.A) above.
2 As stated earlier, the 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention entered into force on 22
September 1988.
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scientific uncertainty, (ii) commercial rivalries, (iii) economic incentives
to non-parties and (iv) North-South relations.3 In addition, to borrow
Gehring's phrase, the Protocol could have been characterised as a
'comparatively autonomous sectoral legal system'.4
At present, in Non-Article 5 developed countries, the most dangerous
specified O.D.Ss. (namely, C.F.Cs., halons, carbon tetrachloride and methyl
chloroform) have been phased out, and O.D.Ss.-related industry and
governments have established certain forms of co-operation or
partnership - such as binding or non-binding 'voluntary agreements' - for
mitigating ozone depletion. Added to this, some Article 5 developing
countries that have been given a ten year grace period are phasing out
major O.D.Ss. faster than legally required under the Montreal Protocol,5
whilst in some Article 5 nations 'consumption' of O.D.Ss. is, in fact, still
increasing. In the light of strong control provisions and actual state
practice, we may safely say that the Montreal Protocol regime has clearly
established the precautionary environmental 'principle',6 which was only
illustrated in the framework Convention regime.
In Chapter III, we shall be largely concerned with the discussions on
the substantive provisions for international control measures for specified
O.D.Ss. under the Montreal Protocol (i.e. Articles 2, 2A to 2H and 3 in
particular). Part A of the present chapter provides a legal (and political)
analysis of the historical evolution of the co-operative/regulatory ozone
treaty, focusing on the development of its control measures based on a
'percentage reduction approach'. However, since numerous attempts have
already been made by many commentators to explain the negotiation
3 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1991) pp. 3 et seq. (emphasis added).
4 See T. Gehring, 'International Environmental Regimes', 1 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1990) pp. 35-
56. For a discussion see also Chapter I(IV) esp. It has been pointed out that the basis
of such a regime is the so-called ecological epistemic community' defined as 'a
knowledge-based network of specialists who shared beliefs in cause-and-effect
relations, validity tests, and underlying principles values and pursued common policy
goals'. See P. M. Haas, 'Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to
Protect Stratospheric Ozone', 46 International Organisations, (1992) pp. 187-224.
5 At the Ninth Meeting of the Parties the U.N.E.P. Executive Director granted the
following 12 parties awards for 'exceptional efforts' to implement the Protocol:
Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines,
Singapore, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela. See UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, para. 7.
6 On this point see Chapter ll(III.C.b) above, dealing with the relationship between the
Montreal Protocol and the precautionary 'principle'/approach..
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process of the Montreal Protocol,7 for the present purposes, only basic
points in the history of the ozone protection regime are underlined.
Part B then deals with national implementation and enforcement of
the ozone treaties; obviously, national implementation of the treaties is
crucial for the successful implementation of the regulatory ozone regime.8
More concretely, Part A looks into the second and third phases of
ozone regime building, that is, (i) from Vienna to Montreal (1986-1987) and
(ii) the post-Montreal period (1988-1997).9 Phase II considers law-making
within the framework of the U.N.E.P., i.e. key Sessions of the Ad Hoc
Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts ('Vienna Group'), i.e. the
First Session of the Working Group (December 1986), the Second Session
(February 1987) and the Third Session (April 1987). Then, the final
international agreement in Montreal regarding control measures for
O.D.Ss. will be analysed.
Phase III briefly examines law-making within the institutional
structure of the international ozone regime. As will be argued below, the
Montreal Protocol is a constructively flexible legal instrument - owing to a
revolutionary decision-making procedure for adjustments, the regulatory
measures of the environmental regime could be periodically updated by the
Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, as the scientific evidence concerned
strengthens without having to be completely re-negotiated. The Section
thus deals with subsequent 'Decisions' or Revisions taken by the Ozone
Meeting, including the 1989 Helsinki Declaration, the 1990 London
Amendments and Adjustments, the 1992 Copenhagen Amendments and
Adjustments, the 1995 Vienna Adjustments and the 1997 Montreal
Amendments and Adjustments.
Naturally, the present chapter will also frequently refer to other
substantive legal issues concerning the Montreal Protocol, including trade
7 For a more detailed account of the ozone negotiations, see among others R. Benedick,
Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet, (1998); T. Gehring,
Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International Environmental
Governance, (1994) Part III (Chapters 5-7); K. T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses: Science and
Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation, (1994); P. Szell, 'Negotiations on the
Ozone Layer' in G. Sjostedt (ed.), International Environmental Negotiation, (1993) pp.
31-47; E. A. Parson, 'Protecting the Ozone Layer' in P. M. Pass (eds.), Institutions for
the Earth: Sources of Effective Environmental Protection, (1993) pp. 27-73. For a
discussion of the Sessions of the Working Group, see J. Lammers, 'Efforts to Develop a
Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer', 1 Hague Y.bk.I.L. (1988) pp. 225-69.
8 See Introduction for Part B below
9 The first stage of the ozone layer regime-building is the Vienna Convention
negotiation (see Chapter II(II.B) above).
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with non-parties (Article 4), the Non-Compliance Procedure (Article
8/Decisions) and the Montreal Protocol's Financial Mechanism, including
the Multilateral Fund and related technology transfer of O.D.Ss. (Articles 10
& 10A). However, their concrete details are to be properly analysed in the
subsequent chapters.
n. THEMONTREAL PROTOCOL NEGOTIATION: PREPARATION OF THE PROTOCOL
ON THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYERWITHIN THE U.N.E.P.
As with the case of the Vienna Convention (see Chapter II above), the main
actors of the negotiations of the Montreal Protocol were, again, the two
blocs of industrialised states - namely, the Toronto Group (i.e. the United
States, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Australia and
Switzerland), and the European Community, whose negotiating position was
generally supported by some other states including Japan and the former
Soviet Union.10 The Toronto Group supported a regulatory approach based
on a reduction of C.F.C. 'consumption' (strictly speaking, 'adjusted
production') while the European Community preferred to control their
C.F.C. production only.
A. The First Session of the Working Group
Six months after the conclusion of the 1985 Vienna Conference, the U.N.E.P.
decided to convene two informal workshops, in Rome in May 1986,and in
Leesburg, Virginia in September 1986.12
At the Leesburg workshop, for the first time, the representatives of
Japan and the former Soviet Union acknowledged that they would accept
the need for international ozone regulation. 13 Also for the first time,
environmental N.G.Os. participated in an international ozone negotiation as
observers.I4
10 See P. Szell, 'Negotiations on the Ozone Layer', in G. Sjostedt (ed.), International
Environmental Negotiation, (1993) p. 45, saying that 'In general, countries that
operated individually did not make a significant impact on the texts of the ozone
agreements' with an exception of the former Soviet Union.
11 UNEP/WG. 148/2; E.P.L. (1986) pp. 139-40. It is said that the meeting was a grave
disappointment and dominated by European industries. See R. Benedick, Ozone
Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 47-48.
12 UNEP/WG.148/2 Corr. 4 and UNEP/WG. 148/3.
13 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 49.
14 N.G.Os. include the World Resources Institute, the Sierra Club, Environmental
Defence Fund, the N.R.D.C. and the U.S.E.P.A. See 'Report of the Second Part of the
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Yet, 'conclusive scientific evidence' of ozone modification - this is an
unimpeachable source of legitimacy in any environmental regime - was
not readily provided. The existence of scientific uncertainty continued
after the adoption of the 1987 Montreal Protocol (see Section IV(A) below).
Thus, the European Community, Japan and their industry decided to
emphasise this crucial point.
Nevertheless, R. Benedick recollects that there was already 'a
growing general belief that some kind of international regime was
required, that past national positions would have to be modified, and that
every country would have to make concessions'.^ in fact, as will be
discussed below, the final text of the Protocol included certain kinds of
special environment treaty provisions for the European Community,16
Japan,17 the former U.S.S.R.18 and Article 5 developing countries.19
In December 1986, the First Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group of
Legal and Technical Experts for the Preparation of the Protocol on
Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer (the 'Vienna Group') was held in Geneva (Switzerland) in
accordance with U.N.E.P. Governing Council's Decision 13/18.20
At this session, the United States, Canada, the European Community
and the Nordic countries put forward the following different proposals.
The United States - which initially focused on aerosol restrictions21 -
proposed a near complete ban of O.D.Ss., including major C.F.Cs. and halons.
The U.S. proposal envisaged that emissions of these chemicals calculated on
the basis of 1986 levels were to be reduced in three steps, i.e. by 20 per cent,
50 per cent and 95 per cent in accordance with each target year.22 Because
such aggregate annual emissions or consumption of a country would be in
Workshop on the Control of CFCs', 08-12 September 1986, UNEP/WG.151/Background
2, Annex III.
18 Ibid. p. 49.
16 See Section III(D) below.
17 See Section III(B.3) below.
18 See Section I1I(B.4) below.
19 See Section I1I(E.2) below.
26 See UNEP/WG.151/L.4. (1-5 December, 1986). The Ad Hoc Working Group was
divided into two groups, that is, (i) an ad hoc scientific working group that
determines which ozone depleting substances should be included in the protocol for
regulation, and (ii) an ad hoc working group on legal and institutional matters that
considers the legal, institutional and financial aspects of the protocol. The second ad
hoc working group was to discuss on the Fifth Revised Draft Protocol on
Chlorofluorocarbons which had been prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group.
21 See Chapter II above.
22 UNEP/WG.151/L.4, para. 8.
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reality difficult to estimate, this proposal depended on the so-called
'adjusted production' approach (i.e. production, plus bulk imports, minus
bulk exports to parties, minus amount destroyed). 23 in other words, the
United States proposal addressed annual national emissions or
'consumption' levels of parties whose data would be readily obtainable. Of
course, it was clear that this U.S. proposal focused on the world's biggest
O.D.S. exporter, the European Community.24 The United States argued that
this legal formulation would (i) allow for free trade among the parties,25
(ii) provide a more equitable allocation (than control measures based
strictly on production)26 and (iii) address the issues of shared
responsibility.2 7
The United States proposal also contained provisions for an economic
incentive, i.e. international trade with non-parties that is designed to
ensure maximum participation in the expected protocol. 28 Similarly to the
existing provisions of Article 4, the U.S. proposal called for trade
restrictions on imports of controlled substances from non-parties, unless
they do not comply with the control measures and periodically offer
information about their compliance with the ozone treaty.29 However,
these proposals calling for trade restrictions were, as expected, bitterly
denounced by the United Kingdom and the European Commission through
the ozone negotiations.56 The United States proposal also had a provision
for the regular assessment and adjustments of O.D.S. control measures,
which later developed into a revolutionary procedure for future
adjustments.51 Prior to this meeting, the United States had already started
25 See U.S. proposal, UNEP/WG.l51/L2, Article 3; UNEP/WG.l67/2:11. For example,
if a country imported 6 kilograms of C.F.C.-ll, produced 100 kilograms of C.F.C.-ll,
and exported 20 kilograms of C.F.C.-l 1, its 'adjusted production' would be 86
kilograms (UNEP/WG.l67/CPR.4).
24 See T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) p. 237.
25 The United States argued that, by not penalising producer nations for exports to
other parties, it facilitated free trade and access to these chemicals consistent with
the responsibilities identified under the Protocol. See UNEP/WG.l67/CPR.4, p. 3.
26 UNEP/WG.l67/CPR. 1, p. 2. 'It [adjusted production] allocates an annual quota to
both producer and consumer nations, thus substantially broadening the number of
nations with access to CFCs and Halons'. See UNEP/WG.l 67/CPR.4, p. 3.
27 'By increasing the number of nations to include both producers and users, this
definition encourages more nations to be part of a unified effort to reduce the risks of
global pollution'. UNEP/WG.l 67/CPR.4, p. 3.
28 See UNEP/WG.l 51/L.2, Article V. See also UNEP/WG.l 67/CPR. 1.
29 See e.g. UNEP/WG.l67/CPR.7.
56 It was at Montreal in 1987 that compromises were finally reached. See R. Benedick,
Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 92.
51 See Section 11(C) below.
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its political strategies to mobilise support for this U.S. proposal by other
states.32
Canada, which also favoured a strong regulatory regime,33 took an
entirely different approach, however. In short, Canada advocated a
proposal that each state should be equally granted an entitlement to emit
within the 'global emission limit' ('G.E.L.')3^ in accordance with the so-
called 'national emission limits' ('N.E.Ls.').33 This proposal was based on the
ground that there would be a safe margin for the distribution of emissions
without causing irreversible harm to the ozone layer. As Gehring pointed
out, it thus structured a 'pollution rights approach' based on 'maximum
sustainable pollution',36 rather than placing the burden directly on
producers and emitters of O.D.Ss. Although this proposal could not find
favour with the United States and the European Community, it addressed all
potential 'ozone-modifying substances' ('O.M.Ss.'). In this limited sense, the
Canadian proposal went beyond the control measures devised by the United
States.
On the other hand, the European Community - strongly influenced
by its industry37 - countered these two elaborate proposals with its own
control measures based on a limitation of C.F.C. production. However, since
the European Community was one of the biggest net exporters of O.D.Ss., it
was virtually essential to put certain restrictions on the consumption of
C.F.Cs. and foreign trade in C.F.Cs.
32 See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 55.
33 See Chapter II(II.B) above.
3^ Defined as the total quantity of ozone modifying substances ('O.M.Ss.') weighed in
accordance with their ozone depleting potential whose release did not cause
irreversible harm to the ozone layer. See Article I, Draft Protocol on
Chlorofluorocarbons or Other Ozone-Depleting Substances , (Proposal Submitted by
Canada), (UNEP/WG.151/L.1, 29 October 1986). See also UNEP/WG.167/CPR.3.
33 This means the emission limit calculated using the G.E.L. and in accordance with
certain procedural mechanism. See ibid.
3^ See T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) p. 238. Canada once stated
'It [its approach] recognises the uncertainties which continues to exist regarding the
ozone depletion issue, for example smaller, less stringent, steps than are now
contemplated might be appropriate if the science does not continue to offer convincing
evidence of harm' (UNEP/WG.167/CRP.3, cited in ibid. p. 243).
37 Such a position of the European Community represented opinions of France, Italy
and the United Kingdom under considerable influence of their industries, namely,
Atochem, a subsidiary of Elf-Aquitaine (France), I.C.I., Europe's largest producer (the
United Kingdom), and Hoechst (Denmark). See e.g. N. Heigh, 'The European Community
and International Environmental Policy', 3 International Environmental Affairs,
(1991) p. 177. See also Chapter II( II.B) above.
Within the Community, however, West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and
Belgium supported a strong regulatory regime and therefore a respective position of
governments was not necessarily similar (see also Chapter II(II.A) above).
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Having rejected the control measures based on both emissions of
and use of C.F.Cs,, the European Community offered a proposal based on a
'staged approach' under which the future protocol would initially control
C.F.Cs. 11 and 12 - and possibly C.F.Cs. 113 and 114 - and then a definite time¬
table should be set down for a comprehensive review of the control
measures.38 This meant that, theoretically, the European Community would
reduce exports in order to maintain consumption of O.D.Ss. in its domestic
market, and a number of developing countries would then encourage their
own manufacture of C.F.Cs., without joining an expected regulatory
regime.39 As to foreign trade issues, the European Community merely
suggested that parties should study the feasibility of restrictions on
importation of the regulated substances from non-parties to the protocol.4^
As illustrated above, it was clear that, in comparison to those
proposals by the United States and Canada, the proposal(s) made by the
European Community were in reality severely weaker in (i) the contents of
chemicals to be controlled, (ii) the gradual reduction schedule, (iii) the
procedure for adjustments and (iv) an economic incentive.
It was natural that the Nordic countries - which were net C.F.C.
importing countries - supported a regulatory approach based on a
reduction of C.F.C. emissions.41 It can be easily assumed that, if a reduction
scheme based on the production approach were finally adopted, those C.F.C.
importing countries might potentially be discriminated against by major
C.F.C. producers. Consequently, the Nordic countries followed the U.S.
proposal, and they even offered stronger control measures for C.F.Cs.42
Finally, the former Soviet Union, for the first time, presented its
draft.43 The U.S.S.R. generally supported the above-mentioned Canadian
proposals that were based on the 'global emission limit'.44 Some other
participating countries, such as Australia, and developing countries -
represented by Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Kenya and Venezuela - were
38 UNEP/WG. 151 /L.4, para. 16.
39 For fuller details, see R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 79-82.
49 UNEP/151/CRP.5 cited in T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) p.
240. Without restrictions on trade with non-parties, it can be analysed that, in the
light of European scheme based on production, European C.F.C. industries could
externalise their production capacity in the territory of non-parties to the protocol.
41 See UNEP/WG.l 51/L.4, paras. 9 & 11.
42 See UNEP/WG.l51/CPR.2.
43 Other Eastern European countries did not regularly join the ozone negotiations.
44 See UNEP/WG. 151/CRP.10.
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initially neutral, but they later moved closer to the strong U.S. position.45
At the time of the adoption of the Protocol, less enthusiastic developing
countries did not dispute the validity of the scientific evidence.46
B. The Second Session of the Working Group
The Second Session of the Working Group was held in Vienna in February
1987. At this session four informal ad hoc working groups were
established;47 those Ad Hoc working groups addressed, respectively;
(i) the periodic review process and hierarchy of ozone-depleting substances;
(ii) the special needs of developing countries in respect of regulatory measures;
(iii) control measures of Article 11 of the future protocol, and;
(iv) trade issues.
However, the core subject of this session was still regulatory
measures of O.D.Ss. Nevertheless, no agreement was reached on whether
the 'adjusted production' formula or the production approach should be
regulated, nor on the drawing up of a specific time schedule for gradual
reductions of O.D.Ss. As to the question of the hierarchy of ozone-depleting
substances, the scientific working group listed C.F.C.-ll, C.F.C.-12, C.F.C.-22,
C.F.C.-113, C.F.C.-114, C.F.C.-115, halon-1211, halon-1301, methyl chloroform
(CH2H3Q.3) and carbon tetrachloride (CCI4). Although it was generally
agreed that C.F.C.-ll and C.F.C.-12 should be subject to future international
regulation, opinions divided on the question of other ozone-depleting
chemicals.
By this stage in the negotiations, the United States proposal based on
its 'adjusted production' approach had attracted considerable support from
the majority of participating states. Accordingly, Canada and the Nordic
countries finally decided to withdraw their own regulatory proposals
mentioned above.48
The European Community - just as in the First Session - sought to
control O.D.S. production only on the grounds of simplification of
45 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 69.
46 See K. T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses, (1994) p. 118.
47 See UNEP/WG.167/2, paras 9-10.
48 Yet negotiating positions of Japan and the U.S.S.R. were still 'enigmatic'. See R.
Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 70.
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procedures.49 In its discussion paper, the Community said that the concept
of 'adjusted production' is 'too complicated to be implemented effectively
and adds nothing to the protection of the environment'.50 It further
argued that some C.F.C. reduction could be a precautionary measure,
provided that industry has a suitable time in which to adjust.51 However,
this opposing argument was in practice unsound, simply because, as the
United States suggested, all three fundamental components of the 'adjusted
production' approach (i.e. (i) production, (ii) imports and (iii) exports)
were not necessarily difficult to analyse.
The United States and its allies brushed off the E.C.'s negative
suggestion. These countries insisted that controlling production of O.D.Ss.
only would invalidate the effectiveness of the future regulatory ozone
protocol, because, as stated above, production control alone would fail to
cover a number of countries that do not produce C.F.Cs. but consume these
chemicals. What is more, as the Toronto Group pointed out, it was also
obvious that the European Community was likely to make unreasonable
profits and hold advantages over C.F.C.-importing countries (developing
states in particular).5^
Though the Second Session of the Working Group could not settle
much controversy between the big two camps, it seemed apparent that
considerable pressure was eventually brought to bear on the European
Community to change its isolated position in the protocol negotiation
process.55 Nevertheless, it was still true that ozone disputes as to scientific
knowledge were not yet resolved.
As regards preferential treatment of developing countries whose
contribution toward the potential threat to the ozone was only slight, the
Working Group on developing countries noted that the 'element of equity"
in the context of regulatory measures would encourage more such
countries to adhere to the Protocol regime, and it would also facilitate
implementation of the ozone treaty obligations.54 However, since the
49 See ibid. p. 11. A representative of the Commission of European Communities
suggested that Article 9 of the Vienna Ozone Convention could justify its regulatory
approach (ibid.). See also discussion paper by the Commission (UNEP/WG.167/CPR.6).
50 UNEP/WG.167/CPR.6, para. 4.
51 Ibid. para. 7. In addition, it may be worth mentioning that the Community
suggested that 'We do not believe that scientific information available today justifies
the total phasing out of C.F.Cs. (ibid.).
51 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 81.
55 See T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) p. 246 and its footnote no.
162; R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998).
54 UNEP/WG. 167/2, p. 25.
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special needs of these countries in themselves could not be clearly
identified, at this phase, the Working Group could only provide rather
broad possible options on this issue to be subsequently analysed.55
In relation to economic sanctions to be applied to non-co-operating
nations, most experts emphasised the need to restrict imports from non¬
parties and to discourage movement of capital and facilities outside the
regulatory protocol area.56
C. Toward a Final Decision in Montreal in September 1987
In early April 1987, the U.N.E.P. Secretariat led by Dr. M. Tolba - an
Egyptian scientist - convened a scientific meeting of five modelling teams
in Wiirzburg, former West Germany (i.e. Ad Hoc Meeting to Compare Model
Assessment of the Ozone Layer).5?
The results and findings of the Wurzburg meeting had a 'decisive
impact' on the subsequent negotiations of the regulatory regime.58 In
spite of the fact that participating scientists used different computer
models to compare the predictable results of C.F.C. control strategies or
measures, those computer models clearly showed striking similarities: this
meant that serious ozone loss would continue to happen under the
regulatory measures proposed by the ozone negotiators. In addition,
participating scientists envisaged the need for controlling the main O.D.Ss.,
namely, C.F.C.-ll, C.F.C.-12, C.F.C.-113, C.F.C.-114 and C.F.C.-115, and halon-
1301 and halon-1211.5® The conclusions of the U.N.E.P. report on the
Wiirzburgh meeting were endorsed by an informal scientific group at the
Third Session of the Working Group.6®
By the Third Session, scientific certainty about ozone decreases was
thus finally confirmed.61 It was thus revealed, as the Executive Director
55 See UNEP/WG. 167/2, p. 29.
56 UNEP/WG.167/2, p. 14. See also a report of the Working Group on Trade Issues,
ibid. p. 22.
57 See UNEP/WG. 167/INF.l; UNEP/WG. 167/INF.l/Add. 1; UNEP/WG.172/2, pp. 2-3.
58 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 71.
5^ UNEP/WG.167/1NF.1. See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 78 et seq.
66 UNEP/WG.172/2, para. 10. However, the representative of Japan publicly stated
that 'it was regrettable that Japan had not been invited to the Ad Hoc scientific
meeting at Wiirzburg', and thus still emphasised scientific uncertainty. See
UNEP/WG. 172/2, para. 13.
61 However, this did not mean that such ozone decreases were concerned with man-
made C.F.C. emissions or human activities. See Section IV(A) below.
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said, that 'it was no longer possible to oppose action to regulate CFC releases
on the grounds of scientific dissent'62
The Third Session of the Working Group was held in April 1987 in
Geneva.63 During this session Dr. M. Tolba, for the first time, convened
informal meetings of chief delegations64 to address control measures for
O.D.Ss.65 As a result, the Executive Director produced the so-called
'Chairman's Personal Text',66 which subsequently came to serve as the
basis for subsequent ozone negotiations. The proposed text dealt with major
O.D.Ss. (C.F.C.-ll, -12, -113, -114, -115 and possibly halons) and it was fairly
similar to the proposal made by the United States.
The European Community decided to re-examine its strategic
position;67 although the Community still favoured the above-mentioned
production approach as the appropriate basis for simple calculation, it
tentatively accepted a freeze on imports, provided that European
Community members were treated as a 'single unit'.68 This was an
important fact to stress, because such a trade restriction on imports implies
that the European Community was ready to accept compromise with the
United States supported by many other countries.
In this meeting, as to the special treatment of developing countries,
Canada suggested that industrialising states be exempt from the provisions
of any agreement for a period of five years, or until their annual use of
C.F.Cs. reached 0.1 kg per capita.69
In the Revised Proposal for Reduction Formula, which was produced
as a result of the Third Meeting, the U.S. 'adjusted production' approach was
labelled as 'consumption', which is to be measured therefore as 'production,
62 See UNEP/WG. 172/2, p. 2 (emphasis added).
63 See UNEP/WG. 172/2. Out of thirty three participating governments, eleven were
developing countries.
64 The chief delegation heads who participated in the meetings were from Canada,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the former Soviet Union, the United States, the European
Commission, and Belgium, Denmark and the United Kingdom. The Executive Director
served as a representative of developing countries. See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy,
(1998) p. 72.
65 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 72.
66 See 'Text Prepared by the Executive Director After Consultation With A Small Sub-
Working Group of Heads of Delegations', (UNEP/WG.172/2: Article 11, Control
Measures in Annex).
67 UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 5; See also a proposal of the European Community in
UNEP/WG. 172/CRP.2.
68 See UNEP/WG. 172/2, para. 11. See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp.
94-97. The E.C. was allowed to jointly implement Article 2 control measures (see
further Section III(D) below).
69 UNEP/WG.172/2, p. 20 and its Annex. See also section B(2) below.
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plus imports, minus exports and minus quantities of the substances
destroyed by techniques approved by the Parties'. As we shall see, this
definition of 'consumption' has been incorporated in the Montreal Ozone
Protocol regime.70
In June 1987, the Informal Consultations toward the Elaboration of a
Protocol on the Control of C.F.Cs. to the Vienna Convention was held in
Brussels, and the European Environmental Bureau invited to the meetings
N.G.Os. from Europe and the United States. As a result of those meetings,
some progress was made on the reduction schedule for C.F.Cs. In addition,
immediately after those meetings, the Environmental Committee of the
European Parliament announced an 85 per cent reduction of C.F.C.
production and 'consumption' by 1997.71
In the light of the arguments developed in the Informal
Consultations, the Working Group drew up the Seventh Revised Draft
Protocol.72 Though the draft text still had to evade some questions that
should have been thrashed out long ago, at this final stage, it envisaged the
following regulatory measures;
(i) C.F.C.-11, C.F.C.-12, C.F.C.-l 13, C.F.C.-114, C.F.C.-115, halon-1211, halon-1301
should be regulated;
(ii) a freeze at 1986 levels of production and 'consumption' within one year after the
protocol entered into force;
(iii) 80% reduction of production and 'consumption' at 1986 levels within four years,
and;
(iii) 50% reduction of production and 'consumption' at 1986 levels within eight or ten
years.
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION OF SPECIFIED O.D.Ss.
UNDERTEIE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
A. The Final Agreement: Provisions of the Montreal Protocol
The diplomatic 'Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protocol on
Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer' was convened at the invitation of the Canadian government
70 Article 1(6).
7-* See M. Jachtenfuchs, 'The European Community and Protection of the Ozone Layer',
28 C.M.S. (1990) p. 266.
72 See UNEP/IG.79/3/Rev.l.
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from 14 to 16 September 1987 in Montreal. Fifty-eight states, the European
Community and five states in an observer status participated in the
conference, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer was finally adopted on 16 September 1987.73 The Protocol was
signed by twenty-six parties74 and then entered into force on 1 January
1989.
The 1987 version of the Protocol was adjusted/amended by the 1990
Second Meeting of the Parties, adjusted/amended by the 1992 Fourth
Meeting of the Parties, adjusted by the 1995 Seventh Meeting of the Parties
and further adjusted/amended by the 1997 Ninth Meeting of the Parties.75
At present the Protocol includes virtually all major developed countries and
most developing countries, including China and India.
Unlike the 1985 Vienna Convention that demonstrated only certain
general principles, the 1987 Montreal Protocol (and its subsequent
Amendments/Adjustments) contains specific targets in its substantive
provisions of Article 2. On the basis of a 'percentage reduction approach',
the Protocol sets specific quantitative limits both on the production and on
'consumption' of the so-called specified 'controlled ozone-depleting
substances'.7*5
With regard to other main treaty provisions, Article 7 of the
Protocol requires contracting parties to supply statistical data on each of
the controlled O.D.Ss. in technical Annexes to the Protocol.77 Article 4,
which is essentially based on U.S. proposals, is instituted in order to legally
control foreign trade in O.D.Ss. with non-parties to the Protocol.78 Article 5
is dedicated to the special situation of developing countries.79 In addition,
Article 9 of the Montreal Ozone Protocol calls for international co¬
operation in further promoting scientific research, development issues,
73 26 l.L.M. (1987) p. 1550; 17 E.P.L. (1987) p. 256.
74 Out of the 24 signatories, only 7 were developing countries, however.
75 See Section IV below. The London/Copenhagen Amendments have entered into force
with the ratification of twenty parties (see Section ill(C) below).
7,5 'Controlled substances' means a substance in Annexes A-E to the Protocol, whether
existing alone or in a mixture. It includes the isomers of any such substances, but
excludes any controlled substances or mixture which is in a manufactured product
other than container used for the transportation or storage of that substance. On the
definition of the 'controlled substances', see further Decisions 1/12A; IV/12.
77 See also Decision 1/11. Non-compliance with reporting requirements is a serious
problem (see Chapter V below). For instance, by the 19997 Ninth Ozone Meeting , only
43 parties out of 152 reported data for 1996 (Decision IX/11(2)).
78 See in detail Chapter IV(II.B) below.
79 See section E and Chapter Vl(III-IV) below.
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public awareness and exchange of scientific/technical information.80
Article 10 of the 1987 Protocol required participating parties to promote
technical assistance to the developing countries with a view to facilitating
their participation in and implementation of the control measures of O.D.Ss.
In this regard, as will be described, the 1990 Ozone Meeting decided to
establish the Financial Mechanism that includes the Multilateral Fund.81
Though the question of the Non-Compliance Procedure was not fully
addressed during the Montreal negotiations,82 the 1992 Copenhagen Ozone
Meeting formally adopted the new dispute avoidance/settlement procedure
as Annexes to the Protocol (see further Chapter V below).
In line with the Ozone Convention, parties to the Protocol may not
make any reservations to the Protocol's legal requirements (Article 18).
Yet, it is also important to notice that any party can withdraw at any time
after four years after a party's obligation to comply becomes operative.83
As for specialised treaty institutions, the Montreal Protocol
currently has (i) the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol as the highest
treaty organ, (ii) the Implementation Committee of the N.C.P., (iii) the
Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund, (iv) the U.N.E.P. Ozone
Secretariat in Nairobi/the Multilateral Fund Secretariat in Montreal and
(v) technical sub-committees such as the Technology and Environment
Assessment Panel ('T.E.A.P.').84 International institutions such as the
International Civil Aviation (I.C.A.O.)85 and the World Meteorological
Organisation (W.M.O.)86 are also working with the U.N.E.P.
80 In this respect, parties must also submit reports on summaries of such activities to
the Ozone Secretariat every two years (Article 9(3)). See Chapter V(VII.A.l) below.
81 In accordance with the London Amendments, Article 10 of the original Protocol was
then replaced by new Articles 10 and 10A. See further Chapter VI.
82 In this respect see R. Benedick, OzoneDiplomacy, (1998) p. 270, noting that 'As the
negotiator who introduced article 8, I can attest that it was consciously intended as a
laconic but important maker, not as a tactic'. See further Chapter V(I1) below.
83 See Article 19 and Decision II/6.
84 See Figure 15.1 in R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 221; Figure 2.1 in D.
Brack, International Trade and the Montreal Protocol, (1996) p. 24. On the T.E.A.P.
see Chapter V(lV.B.2.a) below. On the role of M.E.As.' subsidiary bodies see J.
Werksman, 'The Conference of Parties to Environmental Treaties' in idem, Greening
International Institutions, (1996) pp. 58-59.
88 See generally D. W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, 4th edn. (1982)
pp. 130-31. On the impact of aircraft engine emissions on ozone see U.N.E.P./W.M.O.,
Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion 1994, (W.M.O. Global Ozone Research and
Monitoring Project - Report no. 37) p. 15.
80 See Chapter II(II.B.l) above.
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B. International Control Measures for O.D.Ss.: Articles 2 & 3
The Montreal Protocol's Article 2 specifies precisely what level of reduction
in time is required for each O.D.S. (see Table I below). In addition, the
Protocol does not prevent parties from taking stronger regulatory action if
they wish to do so (Article 2(11)).
(1) The Substances Covered by the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol
In Montreal, it was decided to control five principal C.F.Cs. (i.e. C.F.C.-ll,
C.F.C.-12, C.F.C.-113, C.F.C.-114 and C.F.C.-115: Group I of Annex A) and three
halons (i.e. halon-1211, halon-1301 and halon-2402: Group II of Annex A).
These chemicals are widely considered to have high ozone-depleting
potential and the largest commercial significance. Perhaps it cannot be
denied that the now out-dated Protocol addresses only limited numbers of
O.D.Ss., though it paved the way for the negotiations of further amendments
and adjustments.87
As a result of subsequent treaty amendments by the regular Meeting
of the Parties,88 other fully halogenated C.F.Cs. (Article 2C/Group I of
Annex B), carbon tetrachloride (CC14: Article 2D/Group II of Annex B),
methyl chloroform or 1,1,1-trichloroethane (C2H3CI3: Article 2E/Group III
of Annex B), H.C.F.Cs. (Article 2F/Group I of Annex C), hydrobromofluoro
carbons (H.B.F.Cs.: Article 2G/Group II of Annex C) and methyl bromide
(CELsBr: Article 2H/Annex E) were added to the original text.89
Reduction schedules for these newly added substances are also
adjusted periodically by the Meeting of the Parties, as we shall see.90
(2) The Percentage Reduction Approach: 'Consumption' and Production
The Montreal Protocol has adopted a percentage reduction approach (a
calculated level of production/'consumption' of controlled O.D.Ss.: see Tables
I and II below). At the international (regional) level, this reduction
approach was first formally included in the out-dated 1985 Sulphur
87 See in detail Section IV(A) below.
88 See Section IV(C, D and F) below.
89 See Section IV and Tables 1 and II below.
90 See in detail Section IV(C, D, E and F) below.
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Protocol to the 1979 Geneva Convention (i.e. the Helsinki Protocol).91 Yet,
unlike the Montreal Protocol, the reduction rates of the Sulphur Protocols
related exclusively to 'emissions' of possible pollutants.92
As regards 'consumption',93 Article 2 of the 1987 Protocol as adopted
in Montreal required the parties to reduce the 1986 C.F.C. 'consumption'
level by 50 per cent by 1999, and to freeze the 'consumption' of halons at
the 1986 level by 1992. The production ^ of C.F.Cs. also follows the same
reduction scheme, except for the allowance of a 10 or 15 per cent increase
for the purpose of 'industrial rationalisation'95 between parties and/or for
satisfying the 'basic domestic needs'96 of developing countries.
By enabling such 'industrial rationalisation', under paragraph (5) of
Article 2, Non-Article 5 developed countries still may exceed their decided
production quotas - even after domestic phaseout - as long as such excess
goes to Article 5 low-volume-consuming countries. This is the transfer of
O.D.S. production, which may be seen as a limited form of joint
implementation.97 This treaty provision - proposed by the Canadian
government in Montreal - is also designed partly to prevent these Article 5
91 The Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes
by at least Thirty Per Cent, 27 I.L.M. (1988) p. 707. See J. Ebbesson, Compatibility of
International and National Environmental Law, (1996) p. 138. However, the Montreal
Protocol sets up uniform percentage reduction targets for the two categories of the
parties, i.e. Article 5 and Non-Article 5 countries.
92 In addition, the 1994 Sulphur Protocol - which is regional in scope - fixes specific
reduction rates for each contracting party.
95 For the purposes of the Montreal Protocol, Consumption = Production + Imports -
Exports (of controlled substances): Production = Production (of controlled substances)
- the amount destroyed by technologies - the amount used as feedback in the
manufacture of other chemicals. The amount recycled and reused is not be considered
(Article 1(5)). The definitions of both 'production' and 'consumption' are to be
discussed further in subsequent ozone meetings. On the definition of 'production', see
e.g. Decisions 1/12B; VI/10; V1I/10; VII/30. As to calculation of control levels see
section 3 below.
9^ Defined as 'the amount of controlled substances produced minus the amount
destroyed by technologies to be approved by the Parties and minus the amount
entirely used as feedstock in the manufacture of other chemicals. The amount
recycled and reused is not to be considered as "production"'.
95 Under Article 1(8), 'industrial rationalisation' is defined as 'the transfer of all or
a portion of the calculated level of production of one party to another, for the purpose
of achieving economic efficiencies or responding to anticipated shortfalls in supply as
a result of plant closures'.
96 See in detail Section 111(E) below.
97 See F. Yamin, 'The Use of Joint Implementation to increase Compliance with the
Climate Change Convention' in J. Werksman (eds.), Improving Compliance with
International Environmental Law, (1996) p. 229, endnote no. 1. In the context of the
E.C. see also section D below.
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industrialising nations from putting up new manufacturing facilities of
ODSs in these regions.98
The international base level (in this case, '1986') for calculating the
level of the freeze/subsequent O.D.S. reductions is important in order to
facilitate detailed comparison of the technical/scientific data in question
(see Table I below).99 The 1985/1994 Sulphur Protocols to the 1979 Geneva
Convention also refers to the year of reference (in the case of the 1994
Sulphur Protocol, the base year is 1980).
Although Article 2 of the Executive Directors' text prescribed an
'ultimate objective of . . . elimination' of O.D.Ss., at the request of the E.C.
Commission, this ambitious clause was then transferred to the 'less
authoritative' Preamble of the Protocol text.100 Further, the three-year
delayed freeze on the halons mentioned above was also the E.C.'s partial
success in the ozone diplomacy.101
(3) The Ozone-Depleting Potentials ('O.D.Ps.')
The chemicals in Annexes A-C and E of the Protocol are weighted in
accordance with their ozone-depleting potentials (O.D.Ps.) to calculate the
international base levels of both production and 'consumption'. In
common with the control measures, the O.D.Ps. are official estimates based
on existing knowledge, and therefore, they must be reviewed and revised
periodically.
Article 3 provides the detailed methods for calculating production
and consumption levels (e.g. production = multiplying annual production
of each O.D.S. by O.D.P., and adding together, for each such group, the
resulting figures). It is important to notice that, by calculating in this way,
parties can organise a highly flexible reduction schedule within each of
the classes of substances, e.g. C.F.Cs., halons and H.C.F.Cs. As far as they do
not exceed an O.D.P. limit, parties could use whatever combinations of
C.F.Cs. or O.D.Ss.
98 A. C. Aman, Jr., 'The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer'
in F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi (eds.), International Responsibility for Environmental
Harm, (1991) pp. 203-04.
99 See Article 3. As for the negotiation on the base year, see ibid., pp. 82-83.
100 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 87.
101 Ibid. p. 79.
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These provisions were inserted partly to accommodate Japan's
concern about controlling C.F.C.-113, that is much used for cleaning
electronic components.102
(4) The Special Situation of the Former U.S.S.R.
Regarding the special situation of the former U.S.S.R., it was also decided
that paragraph (6) of Article 2 - which allows parties that had facilities
under construction prior to signing of the Protocol (i.e. September 16,
1987) to add the production of such facilities to its 1986 production level -
should be inserted to accommodate the concerns of the former Soviet Union
that had a five-year plan for new C.F.Cs.-related plants.
It is argued that this concession created a potential loophole for the
former U.S.S.R.103
(5) Non-Compliance with the O.D.S. Control Measures: Compliance
Control104
International ozone disputes, having a 'group aspect', are essentially global
in character and therefore they would affect all states, rather than a
limited number of states.105 In early stages, anticipated non-compliance
with these detailed legal standards or regulations to control O.D.Ss. should
be dealt with by the specialised internal treaty institutions, i.e. the U.N.E.P.
Ozone Secretariat and the standing Implementation Committee of the N.C.P.
- and ultimately, the Ozone Meeting of the Parties as the highest treaty
organ within the regime.106 By using various compliance-management
techniques,107 they can organise community pressure on non-complying
countries. In this respect, the decision-making process of Decision VII/18
102 See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 78-79. See also B. M. Seaver,
'Stratospheric Ozone Protection: IR Theory and the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer', 6 Environmental Politics (1997) p. 39.
103 See C. B. Davidson, 'The Montreal Protocol: The First Step toward Protecting the
Global Ozone Layer', 20 N.Y.J.I.L. and Pol. (1988) pp. 814-15; R. Benedick, Ozone
Diplomacy, (1998) p. 83. The 1989 Ozone Meeting decided that this clause does not
allow an increase in production to be exported to non-parties. See Decision 12 G(b) in
UNEP/OzL.Pro. 1 /5, p. 19.
104 On 'compliance monitoring' see Chapter 1(111.C) above.
105 See Chapters I(IV) and V(I) esp.
106 Unlike judicial tribunals, their dispute settling/avoiding functions are of
conciliatory rather than adjudicative in character (see further Chapter V(V.A) below).
107 See Chapter I(III.C); A. Chayes and A. N. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance
with International Regulatory Agreements, (1995).
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as to Russia's non-compliance may illustrate the 'group aspect' of the N.C.P.
regime.108
However, it is also right to say that, depending upon the nature of
issues involved and reasons for such treaty non-compliance, non¬
compliance with the Protocol should be best addressed on a case-by-case
basis.109
C. The Internal Mechanisms for Amendments and Adjustments:
Strengthening the System of the International Control Measures
Just like the control measures for C.F.Cs., the adoption of a procedure for
the expected adjustments of O.D.Ss. was also subject to disagreement during
the negotiations of the international ozone regime.110 As a result of the
negotiations, however, the following agreement about the procedure -
which is unprecedented in international environmental treaty law - was
finally reached between the two giants, i.e. the Toronto Group states and
the European Community supported by the former Soviet Union.
As an initial step, paragraph 9(c) of Article 2 encourages parties to
make every effort to reach agreement by consensus. Yet, if all efforts at
consensus have been exhausted, decisions in question are then to be
adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the parties present and voting
representing a majority of both industrialised non-Article 5 and
industrialising Article 5 countries411 It is important that such decisions
on adjustments are binding on all state parties to the Protocol, even though
their contents may in reality be unacceptable to up to one-third of the
regime members (Article 2(9)(d)).112 This provision may thus indicate one
108 As we shall see in Chapter V(VII.B) below, the Montreal N.C.P. was first invoked in
1995 by the several countries of C.E.I.Ts., which are currently in non-compliance with
O.D.S. control measures of the Montreal Protocol.
109 Reasons for non-compliance would be, for example, lack of economic capability to
comply, careless mistakes, ambiguity of texts and even wilful treaty violations. See
further Chapter V below.
110 See T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) p. 225.
111 According to the 1990 London Amendment, the words 'representing at least fifty
per cent of the total consumption of the controlled substances of the Parties' were thus
deleted from paragraph 9(c) of Article 2 of the 1987 original version. On double
majority see P. Szell, 'Decision Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements',
26/5 E.P.L. (1996) p. 213.
Under the 1994 Sulphur Protocol, 'adjustments' must be adopted by consensus
and thus, unlike the Ozone Protocol, not by majority voting (Article 11(6)).
112 An international committee of legal experts hailed this procedure as a 'great
novelty in international environmental law', cited in R. Benedick Ozone Diplomacy,
(1991) p. 90. Cf. the 1994 Sulphur Protocol (Article 11), calling for consensus only;
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of the essential features of the ozone layer regime having erga omnes
character, i.e. a changing direction from individual sovereignty to
multilateralism.113 O.D.Ss., which are newly incorporated into the
regulatory Protocol text, are then subject to this simplified voting
procedure under Article 2(9).
As to assessment and review of control measures, Article 6 of the
Protocol requires parties to assess, at least every four years, the substantive
regulatory measures for O.D.Ss. on the basis of 'available scientific,
environmental, technical and economic information'.114 In the light of
such subsequent assessments, parties are to consider proposals for future
adjustments.
In practice, however, the 1990 London Adjustments, the 1992
Copenhagen Adjustments, the 1995 Vienna Adjustments and 1997 Montreal
Adjustments to the Protocol have all been adopted by consensus among the
parties and thus without resort to the above-mentioned revolutionary
simplified majority voting process. Yet this does not necessarily mean that
this procedure has no impact on the development of the ozone layer
regime. As Dr. J. Werksman says, it may be possible to argue that, 'the
majority voting provisions help to set the parameters of the Parties
expectations'.115 Such shared 'expectations' can be included in a general
category of 'regime-rules' we have considered in Chapter 1(1) above.116
finally, it must be noted that, unlike 'adjustments' of control
measures, further 'amendments' to the Montreal Protocol text must be
adopted in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the 1985 framework Ozone
Convention: amendments are thus subject to domestic treaty-acceptance
the 1989 Basel Convention (Article 17(3)), calling for consensus and a three-fourth
majority vote; the 1992 Climate Change Convention (Article 15(3)), calling for
consensus and a three-fourth majority vote..
113 See J. Werksman, 'The Conference of the Parties to Environmental Treaties' in
idem, Greening International Institutions, (1996) pp. 60-61. But see also P. Szell,
'Decision Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements', 26/5 E.P.L. (1996) p.
213, noting that 'the circumstances of the Montreal Protocol were unusual': at the
adoption of the 1987 Protocol, ozone negotiators anticipated eventual total elimination
of all O.D.Ss.
114 See U.N.E.P./W.M.O., Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion 1994, (W.M.O.
Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project, Report no. 37); U.N.E.P., Environmental
Effects of Ozone Depletion: 1994 Assessment, (November 1994). On the importance of
periodic assessments see Environment Canada, '10th Anniversary Colloquium:
'Lessons from the Montreal Protocol', (13 September 1997).
115 The Conference of Parties to Environmental Treaties' in J. Werksman, Greening
International Institutions, (1996) p. 61.
116 'A set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international
relations'.
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procedures (see in detail Chapter II(III.D.2) above).117 The pace of
ratification of the London/Copenhagen/Montreal Amendments have been
slow and the number of parties to these instruments is still
unsatisfactory118 (see Appendix III below). It is important to note in this
respect that G.E.F. funding119 is directly linked to the ratification of the
1990 London Amendment, and the C.E.I.T. parties are required to do so.
It is worth noting in this respect that the London and Copenhagen
Amendments entered into force with the ratification of only twenty parties
to the Protocol, whilst Article 9(5) of the Vienna Convention requires a
two-third majority vote.120 The 1997 Montreal Amendments will also enter
into force in the exactly same way (Article 3(1)).121 Just like the Protocol's
dynamic control measures, these decisions may also contribute to the
dynamics of the international ozone regime as a whole.
D. The European Community as the 'Regional Economic Integration
Organisation': The 'Joint Implementation' of the O.D.S. Control Measures
With regard to the much-disputed question of a 'regional economic
integration organisation',122 the parties could also reach the following
agreement at a very late stage in the ozone regime negotiations.
The European Community - as a 'single unit'123 - was allowed to
jointly fulfil its reduction obligations, provided that (i) the combined
levels of 'consumption' of the individual states did not exceed the
determined levels and (ii) all states of the European Community became
117 See also J. Werksman, 'The Conference of Parties to Environmental Treaties' in
idem, Greening International Institutions, (1996) p. 61.
118 'To urge all States that have not yet done so, to ratify, approve or accede to the
Vienna Convention, the Montreal Protocol and its Amendments, taking into account
that universal participation is necessary to ensure the protection of the ozone layer'
(Decision 1X/10(3) adopted in September 1997).
119 On the G.E.F. see Chapter Vl(llI.C) below.
129 ibid., p. 61. See Article 2(1) of the 1990 Amendments and Article 3(1) of the
1992 Amendments.
121 See also Article 2 of the Montreal Amendments (Relationship to the 1992
Amendments), providing that no state may ratify the Amendment unless previously or
simultaneously ratified the 1992 Amendment.
122 As was suggested, the definition provided for in Article 1(6) of the Ozone
Convention was taken from the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. (see in detail Chapter 11(II. B.4)
above).
123 See Section 11(C) above.
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parties (Article 2(8.a)).124 This 'joint implementation' mechanism125 is
not applicable to production obligations, however.126
To date, the European Community is the only regional economic
integration organisation under the international ozone regime. This
legally 'differentiated' treatment under the Protocol regime will also be
regarded as the partial success of the European Community's ozone
diplomacy.127 The European Community is also treated as an organisation
having a special status, e.g. in the 1992 Climate Change Convention128 and
the 1992 Biodiversity Convention,129 and the 1989 Basel Convention.130
Similarly, the 1994 Sulphur Protocol provides that the Executive Body may
decide to allow two or more parties jointly to implement treaty obligations
to reduce emissions.131
Such special treatment may be potentially beneficial for the regime
members of the Community and their industry. In the case of the Montreal
Protocol, the special status of the organisation enables members of the
Community to exchange consumption quotas, thus allowing European
industry to re-distribute production among C.F.C. manufacturers in
different countries to secure the 'maximum efficiency'.132 Corresponding
124 Since the European Community can exchange consumption quota, it is possible
that some member states could evade a treaty obligation of reductions on CFC
production/'consumption'. See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 94-97.
125 Farhana Yamin says that a limited form of joint implementation has been adopted
in the Montreal Protocol (i.e. Articles 2(5) & 2(8.a)). See 'The Use of Joint
Implementation to Increase Compliance with the Climate Change Convention' in J.
Werksman (eds.), Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law, (1996)
p. 229, endnote no. I; P. Okowa, 'The European Community and International
Environmental Agreements', 15 Y.bk.E.L. (1995) p. 180; O. Kuik, P. Peters and N.
Schrijver (eds.), Joint Implementation to Curb Climate Change: Legal & Economic
Aspects, (1994) pp. 9-11. As to Article 2(5) see Section 1II(B.2) above.
126 See P. Szell, 'Ozone Layer and Climate Change' in W. Lang (eds.), Environmental
Protection and International Law, (1992) p. 171 & its footnote no. 12, noting that the
E.C. tried to achieve such a concession for the Organisation.
127 'The Community is prepared to support the idea that there should be a freeze on
production together with a limitation of imports of C.F.Cs. by non-producing
countries, provided that for this purpose the Community itself is treated as a single
producing unit' (emphasis added). UNEP/WG.167/CPR.6, para. 3.
128 See Article 1(6). See F. Yamin, 'The Use of Joint Implementation to Increase
Compliance with the Climate Change Convention' in J. Werksman (eds.), Improving
Compliance with International Environmental Law, (1996) pp. 229-42; S. Nilsson and
D. Pitt, Protecting the Atmosphere: The Climate Change Convention and Its Context,
(1994) pp. 48-49 & 141-43.
129 See Article 2.
139 The European Community is considered as a 'political and/or economic integration
organisation'. See Article 2(20).
131 Article 2(7).
132 See K. T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses, (1994) p. 114.
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Article 3(11) of E.C. Regulation 94/3093 therefore allows trading in
production rights between E.C. members.133 However, as the United States
argued during the Montreal negotiation process, this would imply that
over-fulfilment of environmental obligations by some ambitious members
(e.g. Germany) might be potentially exploited by others (e.g. the United
Kingdom and France).134
Finally, it must be added that the members of the Community still
have to report technical data to the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat
individually.135
E. Special Situation of Developing Countries: The 'Grace Period' for Article
5 Countries
Participation by developing countries - as large potential sources of O.D.S.
emissions - has been essential to both establishing and sustaining the
regulatory Protocol regime. As will be addressed in Chapter IV(II.A) below,
a substantial number of industrialising nations decided to participate in the
ozone layer regime due partly to possible economic sanctions provided for
in Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol.136
However, is the universal and immediate application of Article 2
control measures acceptable for newly industrialising nations?
(1) The Justification for the Grace Period
In the first place, it should not be forgotten that the contribution to ozone
modification by developing nations has been relatively modest.137 On the
other hand, industrialised nations as major polluters have substantively
benefited from almost unrestrained use of ozone-depleting C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss.
for the past forty years or more. For this historical reason, differentiated
environmental standards should apply to these countries defined as 'low-
volume-consuming countries'.
133 See Section IV(B.2) below.
134 See T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) p. 254.
133 Non-compliance with data reporting has been observed in some member states (see
Chapter V(VlI.A.l) below.
136 To date, only twenty-five members of the United Nations are non-parties to the
Montreal Protocol. See also Conclusion below.
137 While in 1986 developing countries accounted for 15 per cent of the total usage of
O.D.Ss., by 1991 the figure had risen 21 per cent.
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In the second place, most of developing countries do not currently
have the capability to comply fully with the control measures for C.F.Cs.
and O.D.Ss.138 In other words, they still suffer financial, structural and
administrative difficulties in meeting their legal obligations under the
Protocol. Technically speaking, their treaty compliance depends on the
availability of financial resources or C.F.C.-free replacements including
H.F.Cs. and not-in-kind technologies ('N.I.K.'), the extent of O.D.S. recycling
and its technological feasibility, and environmental acceptability.139
Therefore, it would seem apparent that, under the evolving co¬
operative ozone regime, Non-Article 5 industrialised nations should take on
greater international responsibility regarding a decrease of stratospheric
ozone.
(2) The Grace and Phase-Out Period for Article 5 Countries
The Montreal Protocol shows international equity considerations for
industrialising countries (or 'low-volume-consuming' countries: 'L.V.Cs.').
A special treaty provision under Article 5 allows 'developing
countries' to delay their compliance with the international regulations
under Article 2 for ten years, provided that their annual 'consumption' of
Annex A substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita and 0.2 kilograms
per capita for Annex B controlled substances. As a result, they are allowed
to produce and consume specified C.F.Cs. and halons until 2010,140 though
they must put an immediate freeze on their consumption by 1 July 1999
(see Table II below). In other words, these Article 5 developing countries
are not allowed to consume more than 0.3 or 0.2 kilograms per capita on
the date of entry into force of the Protocol and ten years thereafter.
Parties in non-compliance with these requirements (and potentially
reporting requirements under Article 7 of the Protocol) would not be
138 gee principle 23 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, stating that 'the extent of the
applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which
may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries'
(emphasis added).
139 See further Chapter VI(IV.B) below.
149 See Article 5(1) & 8bis in UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12, Annexes I-II; Section IV(F) below.
Yet, as Bales says, it must be noted that developing countries are not necessarily
allowed unlimited pollution of the environment through O.D.S. use. His argument may
be further developed in the context of the concept of international obligations erga
omnes. See J. S. Bales, 'Transnational Responsibility and Recourse for Ozone
Depletion', 19 Boston C.1.C.L.J.{ 1996) pp. 285-86 esp.
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classified as 'developing countries' under the Montreal Protocol.141 Such a
situation whereby Article 5 countries exceed that limit should be first dealt
with by - just like non-compliance with Article 2 control measures142 - the
Ozone Secretariat and the Implementation Committee on a case-by-case
basis.143
An average of each Article 5 country's 'consumption' between 1995
and 1997 will be used as the reference base level for the staged reductions,
which will take effect in 1999 (i.e. freeze of C.F.C. consumption: see Table II
below).
At the final stage of the negotiations, Canada's proposal advocating a
five year delay in compliance was rejected by developing countries as 'too
restrictive'.144 The grace period of ten years, as part of a package deal, is a
product of political compromise, and thus not necessarily based on detailed
scientific or economic considerations or reliable technical data.145 It
appears that the ozone negotiators were not necessarily clear about the
long-term consequences of this unprecedented environmental
provision.146 What was certain was that, during this specified period of
'capacity-building',147 they would have to develop capabilities to fully
comply with the detailed binding controls under the Protocol with the help
of Non-Article 5 industrialised nations.
(3) The 'Principle' of Common-But-Differentiated Responsibility
This 'differentiated' legal obligation, the grace period, could be labelled as a
so-called mutual but differentiated duty or common-but-differentiated
responsibility in the field of international law for sustainable
development.148
141 As at August 1997, there are 98 developing countries operating under Article 5
paragraph 1 of the Protocol. On non-compliance with date reporting by developing
countries see Chapter V(VII.A.l) below.
142 See III(B.5) above.
143 See Decision IV/15 and discussion at the Open-Ended Working Group,
UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.I/7/4, para. 135.
144 See Section 11(C) above & R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (1998) p. 93.
143 In the case of the 1985 Sulphur Protocol, the figure 30 per cent was chosen as an
'achievable first step'; thus, similarly, this reduction rate was also not founded on
reliable technical data. See R. R. Churchill, G. Rutting and L. M. Warren, 'The 1994 UN
ECE Sulphur Protocol', 9 J.E.L. (1995) p. 179.
146 See ibid. pp. 92-94.
147 See Chapter 1(111) above and Chapter VI below.
148 For an extensive discussion see P. Sands, Principles of International
Environmental Law (1995) pp. 217-20; J. Werksman, 'The Conference of Parties to
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The 'principle' of common-but-differentiated responsibility claims
the common responsibility of developed/developing nations for the
protection of the environment, whilst such responsibility should be
equitably differentiated in accordance with (i) each state's contribution to
environmental damage and (ii) its level of economic development. In
short, this therefore means that industrialised nations may be required to
shoulder immediate heavier burdens of environmental protection in a
given issue-area of international environmental relations. International
environmental regimes, containing this newly developing legal principle,
may be called 'concentric regimes' for the environment.149
Not surprisingly, this 'principle' has recently gained significant
recognition in environmental legal instruments.150 The Preambles of the
1985 Vienna Convention and its Protocol seem to endorse the evolving new
'principle'. In addition, Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration provides that
'states shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of
the different contributions to global environmental degradation, states
have common but differentiated responsibilities'. Under the 1994 Sulphur
Protocol regime, differentiated target years 2005/2010 were introduced in
order to accommodate participation from Central/Eastern European states.
Yet, it is right to say that the terminology in the sphere of
international law presently has no definite meaning, and therefore it may
be regarded as a policy-oriented concept in the international legal
system.151 Perhaps we can only say that, as in the present case of the
international ozone layer regime, its potential flexibility as a concept can
be of some practical use in the law-making process of environmental
treaties (see Chapter I(III.B)). It is easily assumed that, without this grace
Environmental Treaties' in idem, Greening International Institutions, (1996) pp. 64-
68; P. H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, (1990) pp. 6-14.
in the context of the ozone regime see R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) Chapter
16.
149 See J. Werksman, 'The Conference of Parties to Environmental Treaties' in idem,
Greening International Institutions, (1996) pp. 65-67.
150 Legal instruments advocating this 'principle' include the 1992 Climate Change
Convention and its 1997 Protocol (Preamble, Articles 3(1), 4) and the 1992
Biodiversity Convention (Preamble).
151 The term is loosely and generally used in many meetings of the parties. See e.g.
UNEP/OzL.Pro9/l 2, para. 48. See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 241,
saying that 'the principle was never precisely defined and was subject to
differentiated interpretations (emphasis added). The 'polluter pays principle' is also
used in the same way (see e.g. UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/12, para. 4).
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period, the regulatory ozone layer regime would remain merely a rich club
of industrialised nations located in the northern hemisphere.152
Essential ingredients of the 'principle' of common-but-differentiated
responsibility would be (i) time required for compliance (e.g. a grace
period of a limited time span), (ii) money (financial/technical assistance),
and (iii) other compliance-related factors peculiar to each environmental
agreement. In the present case of the ozone regime, major contents of the
'principle' will be (i) the ten years' grace period, (ii) the creation of the
Multilateral Fund and technology transfer155 and (iii) the provisions for
'basic domestic needs' in Article 5.154
(4) The Consequences of the Grace Period
Apart from its expected utility to secure universal participation from
developing nations, the real value of the compliance-delay clause in
maintaining (i.e. not 'establishing') the global ozone regime still remains
uncertain, however. At present, the Article 5 grace period has created the
serious danger of weakening the precautionary environmental 'principle'
that has formed the core of the international regulatory regime.
First, rapid increase in C.F.C. consumption in Article 5 nations is
likely to eventually undermine non-Article 5 countries' earlier phaseout
efforts: undeniably, it will retard - rather than expedite - the possible
recovery of the stratospheric ozone layer.155 Second, unfortunately, this
first introduction of the grace period in environmental treaties has become
a source of illegal international trade in controlled C.F.Cs (see Section IV(F)
& Chapter V(VII.A.2) below). Perhaps the same may be true of the term
'basic domestic needs' that was deliberately left undefined by the original
ozone negotiators.156
152 In spite of such special treatment under Article 5(1), developing countries -
including India and China - remained reluctant to participate in the international
regulatory ozone regime. In reality, it was since the creation of the Montreal Protocol
Multilateral Fund that most industrialising nations decided to participate in the legal
regime.
155 Article 5(5) provides that the ability of Article 5 countries to comply with the
Protocol 'will depend upon the effective implementation of the financial co-operation .
. . and the transfer of technology' clauses. See further Chapter VI below.
154 See Section IV(E) below.
155 It is said that if they keep on increasing their consumption of O.D.Ss. at current
growth rate, their use will double every seven years. See U.N.E.P. 'Press Release'
under <http://www.unep.ch/iuc/submenu/press/ozone/pr9-97a.htm>.
156 gee Section IV(E).
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It could be tentatively suggested that having only one category of
'developing countries' with a uniform grace period of ten years seems to be
too broad. Ideally, parties to the Protocol should introduce two or three
categories of 'developing countries' whose grace or phase-out period
should also be differentiated depending on the amount of their O.D.S.
consumption and/or their state of economic growth (e.g. Gross Domestic
Product ['G.D.P.'], and so on).157
Having said this, attention should be drawn to the fact that during
the phaseout period, Article 5 industrialising countries have already
received financial and technical assistance from the Montreal Protocol's
Multilateral Fund established in 1990. Indeed, faster phase-out of the major
O.D.Ss. earlier than 2010 depends on the political will of Article 5
developing nations as well as strong commitments by Non-Article 5
countries, including available financial resources and technological
alternatives as provided by Articles 10 and 10A of the Protocol (see Chapter
VI(V) below). In this respect, some Article 5 countries such as Thailand
and Cameroon have developed and implemented programmes to phase out
C.F.Cs. in advance of the treaty reduction schedules.158
IV. THE MAINTENANCE/DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CO¬
OPERATIVE AND REGULATORY OZONE REGIME : THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MEASURES AND OTHER O.D.Ss.-RELATED ISSUES
The following is a brief overview of regime-developments subsequent to
the adoption of the 1987 Montreal Ozone Protocol.
A. The Need for Revisions of the 1987 version of the Protocol:
New Scientific Knowledge on the State of the Ozone Layer
Shortly after the signing of the 1987 Montreal Protocol, the Protocol
regime was accused of not going far enough to protect the global ozone
layer. 159 Dramatic scientific advances on ozone modification suggested
that even full global compliance with the existing regulatory measures
157 Under the Climate Change Convention, countries 'undergoing the process of
transition to a market economy' are to enjoy 'a certain degree of flexibility' in the
implementation of their commitments, only if it is so allowed by the Conference of the
Parties (Article 4(6)).
158 £ee a|so part g below.
l5^ see e.g. the Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Environment in
International Relations (1992) p. 226.
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under the 1987 Protocol would be insufficient to protect the severely
damaged ozone layer.160
Only two weeks after signing the Protocol, scientists of the second
international expedition in Antarctica announced that the Antarctic 'ozone
hole' in the stratosphere could be attributed to anthropogenic chemicals
containing chlorine and bromide. It must be noted therefore that, until
this 'post-Montreal period', the existence of the Antarctic ozone hole could
not be decisively linked to man-made C.F.C. emissions.
This means at the same time that, because of this localised 'hole',
countries such as Argentina and Australia are at a high risk due to
increased solar U.V.-B. radiation, although the major parts of O.D.Ss. are
released by developed nations located in the northern hemisphere.
Furthermore, it is also revealed that measurements over the Arctic
indicated that real reductions of ozone were occurring over the Arctic as
well. 162 The 1989 U.N.E.P. Scientific Meeting, therefore, reported that;
'[Ojne ramification of our conclusion is that even if the Montreal Protocol
with its present control measures, was ratified by all nations the Antarctic
ozone hole would remain forever'.16^
One of the early criticisms of the Protocol was that the C.F.C. and
halon reduction targets were not substantial enough to protect the damaged
ozone layer. In addition to this point, the Protocol was severely accused of
not covering all C.F.Cs. and other important O.D.Ss. H.C.F.Cs. - which became
160 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.Asmt. 1/2.
161 Though the ozone hole had already been discovered before the adoption of the
Montreal Protocol, the cause for the hole was not been established during the treaty
negotiations. See e.g. R. Benedick, 'Protecting the Ozone Layer: New Directions in
Diplomacy' in J. T. Mathews, Preserving the Global Environment: The Challenge of
Shared Leadership, (1991) p. 133; B. M. Seaver, 'Stratospheric Ozone Protection: 1R
Theory and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer', 6
Environmental Politics (1997) pp. 33-34; L. B. Talbot, 'Recent Development in the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer: The June 1990 Meeting
and Beyond', 26 The International Lawyer, (1992) p. 14.
16^ UNEP/OzL.1/5, para. 17; Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion 1994:
Executive Summary, World Meteorological Organisation Global Ozone Research and
Monitoring Project - Report No. 37, W.M.O. & U.N.E.P. In April 1997 the W.M.O.
reported that the ozone layer was 15-25 per cent thinner over the Arctic in March
1997 than in March 1996 and that the worst-affected area was over the North pole
region and north-central Siberia.
163 UNEP/OzL.Sc.1/14, p. 2. It is worth noting that a 1989 scientific report to the
parties of the Protocol reviewed new scientific findings: the dilution effect on ozone
over southern populated latitudes caused by the recurring Antarctic ozone hole;
unexpectedly large ozone losses over northern latitudes; the potential for serious
ozone loss over Arctic; a hypothesis that a large volcano eruption could propel minute
sulfate particles into the stratosphere, which could intensify chlorine's ozone-
destroying effect over heavily populated regions
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popular among the C.F.C.-producing companies in the late 1980s, as a
substitute - turned out to have an ozone depleting potential of from two to
ten per cent of the C.F.Cs. regulated under the Protocol regime. Moreover,
it was emphasised that not only C.F.Cs. but the next best substitutes, FI.C.F.Cs.,
have global warming potential. Methyl chloroform (CH3GCI3), which is the
fifth biggest destroyer of the stratospheric ozone layer, contributes more to
chlorine loading in the atmosphere than C.F.C.-113, but the chemical was
not covered under the 1987 version of the Montreal Protocol. Similarly,
carbon tetrachloride (CCI4) was also not covered until the 1990 amended
Protocol.
Apart from these international ozone regulations, the special
treatment of Article 5 developing countries and the establishment and
operation of the Financial Mechanism for the implementation of the
Protocol - which were not pressing central concerns until 1987 - has also
become one of the substantive issues in the international co-operation
regime.1 64 Thus, after the Montreal-period, developing countries (i.e.
Article 5 countries) have also become key ozone regime actors in
international environmental relations.
B. The 1989 Helsinki Ozone Meeting and its International 'Soft Law'
Following an international Conference on Saving the Ozone Layer
organised by the British government and the U.N.E.P.,165 the First Meeting
of the Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Convention and the First
Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol took place in Helsinki from 26 to 28
April 1989 and from 2 to 5 May 1989, respectively. 16>6 The Vienna Ozone
Convention had already entered into force on 22 September 1988, and the
1987 Montreal Protocol on 1 January 1989.
We may say that, at this development stage, the international ozone
layer regime had largely been based on the Montreal Protocol and
therefore, the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention and its treaty
institution (i.e. the Conference of the Parties) were given only a secondary
role in ozone diplomacy. 167 yet it was decided that (i) the Convention is the
most appropriate instrument for harmonising the policies and strategies
164 gee further Chapter VI below.
165 Tf,e Conference was attended by 123 countries. See UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, p. 5; 19/2
E.P.L. (1989) pp. 45-46; R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 123-24.
166 See UNEP/OzL.Conv. 1/5 and UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5.
167 y Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) pp. 268-69.
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on research, and (ii) the Protocol is the appropriate instrument for
achieving the harmonisation of policies, strategies and measures for
minimising the release of O.D.Ss (Decision 1/3 made by the Conference of
the Parties to the Convention).
Although the Protocol in itself was not legally revised due mainly to
notice requirements, 168 First Meeting of the Parties produced an
important international 'soft law' instrument that influenced strong
decisions in London in 1990 - the Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of
the Ozone Layer. 169
Concretely, under the Helsinki Declaration it was declared that a
phase-out of C.F.Cs. would be necessary no later than the year 2000,170
halons should eventually be phased out completely. 1~1 In addition, it was
further agreed that controls should be introduced for H.C.F.Cs., methyl
chloroform (CH3QCI3) and carbon tetrachloride (CCI4) as soon as feasible.
Added to this, the Helsinki Declaration also addressed developing-
country issues, including the disputable interpretation of 'basic domestic
needs',172 and the creation of an international fund for financial and
technical assistance for such states.
It is worth mentioning that the First Meeting decided to create four
'assessment panels' consisting of internationally recognised experts in the
respective field, that is to say, (i) the Panel for Ozone Scientific Assessment,
(ii) the Panel for Environment Assessment, (iii) the Panel for Economic
Assessment and (iv) the Panel for Technical Assessment.173 Yet the Panels
for Economic and Technical Assessment have been merged into the
Technology and Economic Assessment Panel ('T.E.A.P.').
Lastly, the First Ozone Meeting decided to establish an Open-ended
Working Group - a comparatively less formal regime group open to all
parties - inter alia to prepare draft proposals for any amendments to the
Montreal Protocol.174
168 jftg Vienna Ozone Convention and its Protocol provide that any proposed
amendments and adjustments of the Protocol must be submitted to the U.N.E.P. for
communication to all parties at least six months before the meeting of the parties
which would consider them.
169 UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5: Appendix 1; 19/3/4 E.P.L. (1989) p. 137.
179 However, this was subject to the special situation of developing countries.
171 Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, May 2, 28 l.L.M. (1989)
p. 1335.
172 See Section E below.
173 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, Annex VI. On Terms of Reference of the T.E.A.P., see
Annex V of UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/14.
174 Decision 1/5.
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C. The 1990 London Ozone Meeting: Strengthening the Control Measures
and the Establishment of the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund
The Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, which was
hosted by the British government, was held in London from 27 to 29 June
1990.175 The primary goals of the London Ozone Meeting of the Parties
were (i) to further expedite the total phaseout of C.F.Cs. and O.D.Ss. and (ii)
to establish a Funding Mechanism for assistance to developing countries,
with a view to securing wide participation by major O.D.Ss.-
producing/consuming states (i.e. India and China, together accounting for
40 per cent of the world's population), l7^ The 1990 London Amendments
entered into force on 10 August 1992 in accordance with Article 2(1) of the
Amendment. I77
With regard to the control measures for O.D.Ss., by updating the 1987
text, the London Ozone Meeting could adopt a comprehensive regulatory
regime. Besides the political will of the parties, this was due partly to the
astonishing speed of technological advances (e.g. the availability of C.F.C.
substitutes and alternatives in virtually all sectors) and growing domestic
and international pressures for ozone protection, which are generated by
the alarming scientific evidence described above.
In respect of contents of O.D.Ss., unlike the original 1987 regulatory
regime, the 1990 London Amendments addressed five Groups of controlled
O.D.Ss. under the Protocol: (i) the original five C.F.Cs. and (ii) three
important halons in Annex A, (iii) ten C.F.Cs. (iv) carbon tetrachloride
(CCI4) and (v) methyl chloroform (CH3GCI3) in Annex B.17^ In addition, the
Meeting of the Parties also adopted a non-binding resolution that addressed
other halons and 'transitional substances', namely,
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (H.C.F.Cs.).l7^
As regards the reduction schedules, the 1990 London Adjustments
introduced the gradual phaseout of both 'consumption' and production of
*7^ The Conference was attended by 54 parties to the Protocol and 42 non-parties. See
UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3; 20/4-5 E.P.L. (1990) pp. 134-35.
176 gy tge time of the Meeting, fifty-eight countries plus the European Community
representing ninety-nine per cent of estimated C.F.Cs. in the world production and
ninety per cent of the consumption had ratified or acceded to the Protocol.
177 It had ninety-three parties on 1 October 1994. The Adjustments entered into
force on 1 March 1991. See also Section III(C) above.
'7 8 See T. Gehring, Dynamic Environmental Regimes, (1994) p. 285, pointing out that
the reduction schedule for methyl chloroform was the only major surprise, however.
^79 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3. para. 51 and its Annex VII.
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the five original C.F.Cs. and three halons by the year 2000,180 which is
subject to the ten-year period of grace for Article 5 developing countries
and an allowance of 15 per cent on production, based on 1986 levels. Other
newly added controlled substances were scheduled for various interim
reductions and/or phase out in ten to fifteen years (see Table I below). For
the most part, however, industrialising countries were not actively
involved in the discussion on the control measures for O.D.Ss.
Apart from these control measures, the parties could also agree to
establish the Financial Mechanism that includes the Multilateral Fund of
$160 million for assisting Article 5 developing countries in meeting their
legal obligations under the Protocol.181 It is particularly important to
notice here that Article 5(5) states that the capacity of Article 5 developing
countries to fulfil their obligations will depend on the effective
implementation of the international financial co-operation relating to
technology transfer.182 In addition, the procedure for voting on
adjustments has also changed based on the principle of international
'equity'.183
Furthermore, at this stage, the 'interim' Montreal N.C.P. was adopted,
and its Implementation Committee as a standing governmental institution
thus began its early operations.184
D. The 1992 Copenhagen Ozone Meeting: Strengthening the Control
Measures of H.C.F.Cs. and the Establishment of the Montreal N.C.P.
Regime
The Forth Meeting of Parties was convened in Copenhagen from 23 to 25
November 1992. The Copenhagen Amendments entered into force on 1 June
1994 in accordance with Article 3(1) of the Amendments, I83 According to
Decision 111/12, the Panels established by the First Ozone Meeting had
ISO Though many of the Parties favoured a total phaseout of C.F.Cs. by 1997, as a
matter of fact, U.N.E.P.'s technology assessment panel had not concluded that a
complete phaseout before 2000 was technically feasible. See R. Benedick, Ozone
Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 171-72.
181 See further Chapter Vl(IlI.A) below.
182 But there exists conditionality between the M.L.F. funding and compliance with
the Protocol (see Chapter VI(III.D.4) below).
183 See Section III(C) above.
184 See further Chapter VI(VII.A) below.
183 It had thirty-four parties on 1 October 1994. The Adjustments entered into force
on 22 September 1993. See also Section 111(C) above.
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produced a 'synthesis document'.186 Scientific/technical finding in the
paper influenced the sequences of the negotiations led to Copenhagen.
In general, the new package of O.D.S. control provisions under
Article 2 may be considered as an amicable agreement based on
political/economic considerations; the reduction schedules of O.D.Ss. were,
again, re-negotiated by regime members and then significantly
accelerated.187 Because the 1995/1997 Ozone Meetings of the Parties did not
radically change the legal regulatory measures for O.D.Ss. that have
already been taken, most of the measures described here represent current
strategies for global stratospheric ozone protection.
In relation to the reduction schedules, the Meeting agreed on a 75
per cent reduction of 'consumption' and production of five major C.F.Cs. by
1994 with a total phaseout by 1996. The Meeting also decided on the total
elimination of an additional ten C.F.Cs. to January 1996, with the possible
exception of certain necessary 'essential uses', which have to be agreed by
the parties. I88 Though the most serious exception in the 1990 London
Amendments was the treatment of H.C.F.Cs. as 'transitional substances' (i.e.
not subject to a reduction schedule), the 'consumption' of H.C.F.Cs. in Group
I of Annex C was to be capped at 1989 levels with a total elimination by
2030.18<^ H.C.F.Cs. are to be selected for use in a manner that minimises
ozone depletion and that also meets other environmental, safety and
economic considerations.1^ Moreover, the 1992 Copenhagen Adjustments
introduced the total phase-out of halons to take effect from January 1994.
The 'essential use' exception is still valid, and definitions of 'essential use'
were adopted by Decision IV/25 of the Adjustment.1^1
186 UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG. 1/6/3.
187 For details see R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 202-09; K. T. Litfin,
Ozone Discourses, (1994) p. 174; T. Gehring, 'The Copenhagen Meeting', 23/1 E.P.L.
(1993) pp 6-12.
188 1992 Adjustment, Article 2A, Article 2C(1), (2) and (3).
189 The Article also requires parties to endeavour to ensure that the use of H.C.F.Cs.
is limited to applications where alternatives are not available, that such use is not
outside the areas of application currently met by substances in Annex A, B and C,
except in rare cases for the protection of human life or human health.
190 1992 Amendments, Article 2F(7) (a), (b) and (c).
1°1 Use will only be 'essential' if it is necessary for health and safety or critical for
the functioning of society and there are no technically and economically feasible
alternatives or substitutes which are acceptable from a health and environment
standpoint. Furthermore, 'essential use' will only be permitted if all economically
feasible steps have been taken to minimise the essential use and associated emissions,
and the controlled substance is not available in sufficient quantity and quality from
existing stocks or banked or recycled controlled substances. See also Decisions V/14;
V/18; VI/8; Vl/9; V1I/28; V1I/11. Environmental N.G.Os. consider 'essential uses' as
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The Meeting also agreed on a prohibition on the 'consumption' of
'new' O.D.Ss. not covered by the 1987/1990 text, i.e.
hydrobromofluorocarbons (H.B.F.Cs.) in Group II of Annex C after January
1996, except for 'essential uses'. Similarly, under Article 2H, annual
'consumption' of methyl bromide (CH3BR) in Group I of Annex E192 is to be
limited to 1991 levels for 1995 and hereafter. In addition, the 1992
Copenhagen Adjustments brought forward the total phase-out of carbon
tetrachloride (CCI4) in Group II of Annex B and methyl chloroform
(CH3GCI3) in Annex E to January 1996 (see Table I below). 193
It is true that previous Ozone Meetings did not pay much attention to
the problems of recycling or reclamation of O.D.Ss. to prevent their release
into the atmosphere. In this context the Copenhagen Ozone Meeting
adopted Decision IV/24 that is followed by Decision VI/19. The parties
agreed, for instance, that the import/export of recycled and used O.D.Ss.
should not be taken into account in calculating 'consumption', provided
that parties report relevant data to the Ozone Secretariat.194
However, Decision VI/24(2) has now become a source of the illegal
'gray' market in C.F.Cs. that are disguised (or mislabelled) as 'recycled
substances'. It is reported that the availability of recycled materials for
maintaining O.D.Ss.-using equipment, and the potential to trade in these
chemicals for non-Article 5 nations phasing out such equipment, will be
an important factor in minimising the so-called 'adaptation costs'2 95
Finally, the 1992 Copenhagen Ozone Meeting further strengthened
the Financial Mechanism including the Multilateral Fund. The 1992
Meeting could also adopt the formal Montreal N.C.P. regime as 'Annexes' to
the Protocol text - the Montreal N.C.P. is to be given a first case in the 1995
Seventh Meeting of the Parties.
potential loopholes. For a discussion see R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp.
236-40.
192 Methyl bromide is a economically important chemical that is used for fumigating
commodities and soils for crops. Some 70,000 tonnes are produced every year and
developing countries account for nearly eighty per cent of its use. On the negotiations
on methyl bromide see R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 207-09.
193 1992 Adjustments, Article 2D(1) and (2); Article 2E(1), (2) and (3).
194 See also Decision VI/19 saying that 'only used controlled substances may be
excluded from the calculated level of consumption of countries importing or exporting
such substances'. See also discussions at the Open-Ended Working Group,
UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/7/4, para. 79.
19^ See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG. 12/2/Add.l, cited in D. Brack, International Trade and the
Montreal Protocol (1996) p. 42.
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E. The 1995 Vienna Ozone Meeting: The Control Measures for H.C.F.Cs. and
Methyl Bromide, and the Extension of the 'Grace Period'
In 1995 the Seventh Meeting of the Parties was held in Vienna, immediately
after an unofficial ceremonial event - the tenth anniversary of the 1985
Vienna Ozone Convention. 1°° The Vienna Adjustments entered into force
on 7 August 1996.
In the meantime, the 1993 Fifth Ozone Meeting decided not to allow
any production of halons for 'essential uses' (Decision V/14) and further
extended the funding of the Financial Mechanism.197 The 1994 Sixth Ozone
Meeting then decided to allow production of certain O.D.Ss. to continue at a
low level after January 1996 for certain defined 'essential uses' (Decision
VI/9).198 At this stage, Non-Article 5 nations had already concentrated
their efforts on control measures for H.C.F.Cs. and methyl bromide in
Annexes C and E, rather than on C.F.Cs. in Annexes A and B.
In the Vienna Meeting, only after arduous negotiations, the parties
could have agreed on new - but rather tentative - reduction schedules for
some O.D.Ss.
In accordance with E.C. Regulation 3093/94, the European
Community had already agreed in 1994 to completely phase out H.C.F.Cs. by
the year 2015, i.e. fifteen years earlier than the Copenhagen decision of
2030. However, the United States - whose industries had already heavily
invested in H.C.F.Cs. - were resolutely opposed to the restrictions of these
chemicals.199 As a result, the Ozone Meeting could not adopt a new
reduction schedule for H.C.F.Cs.200 However, a number of parties delivered
harsh criticisms of control measures for H.C.F.Cs. and methyl bromide:
twenty-four parties thus officially signed the 'Vienna Declaration on
196 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12; The Vienna Meeting', 26/2/3 E.P.L. (1996) pp. 66-71; R.
Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 287 et seq.; W. Lang, 'Ozone Layer', Y.bk.l.E.L.
(1995) pp. 220-23 See also U.N.E.P., 'Vienna Plus Ten: The Vienna Convention: 10
Years of Achievement' (OzonAction Special Supplement, November 1995).
197 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.5/12; 24/2/3 E.P.L. (1994) pp. 67-68.
198 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/7; 25/1/2 E.P.L. (1995) pp. 21-23; W. Lang, 'Ozone Layer', 5
Y.bk.l.E.L. (1994) pp. 162-63.
199 See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 292-93. Under the U.S.E.P.A.
Regulations the United States is to phase out all H.C.F.Cs. as Class II substances by the
year 1 January 2030 (sec. 82.4 q). See also Part B, II(A.I).
200 yet it was decided that the calculated baseline level of consumption had been
changed and consumption of H.C.F.Cs. before its phaseout was to be restricted to the
servicing of refrigeration and air conditioning equipment (Article 2F(l)(a) and (5)).
See Annex III of UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12.
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HCFCs'201 and the 'Declaration on Methyl Bromide' 2°2 respectively. One
representative of the N.G.O. even professed concern that 'many of those
positions [on the control measures for HCFCs and methyl bromide]
represented a retreat from commitments at London and Copenhagen'.203
In addition, the Vienna Ozone Meeting clarified requirements of the
regulatory Protocol regime on Article 5 developing countries. According to
the 1992 Copenhagen Adjustments, developing countries - who are given a
ten year grace period204 - are eventually to phase out C.F.Cs. by the year
2006 and halons by 2004. However, at the Meeting, these Article 5 nations
insisted that the Copenhagen Adjustments should not apply to these
nations.205 as a result, it was finally agreed that, in order to meet their
'domestic needs', Article 5 countries are thus entitled to delay for ten years
compliance with the control measures for C.F.Cs. and halons, adopted by the
1990 London Meeting, thus not by the 1992 Copenhagen Meeting (Article
5(8 bis a)). This means that they are entitled to consume and produce the
specified C.F.Cs. and halons by the year 2010 (in case of methyl chloroform
by 2015).
The meaning of the term 'basic domestic needs' was not defined in
the 1987 Protocol due partly to a lack of time.206 Thus subsequent Meetings
of the Parties had to clarify the ambiguity of the text.207 In this respect,
the 1989 First Ozone Meeting had decided only that 'basic domestic needs'
should be understood as not to allow production of products containing
O.D.Ss. to expand for the purpose of export.208
201 UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12, p. 80.
202 Ibid. p. 81.
208 Ibid. p. 22.
204 See Section III(E) above.
2°5 gee Article 5(1) & 8 bis in UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12, Annexes I-II; R. Benedick, Ozone
Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 212-13. The developing countries even made abortive effort to
weaken the 1990 London Agreement: they demanded a 'service tail' after the year
2010. See 26/2/3 E.P.L. (1996) p. 67. On this point see Article 40 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
206 See P. Szell, 'Negotiations on the Ozone Layer' in G. Sjostedt (ed.) International
Environmental Negotiation, (1993) p. 46, noting that the key term was deliberately left
undefined.
207 For an extensive discussion of 'basic domestic needs' see D. Brack, International
Trade and the Montreal Protocol, (1996) pp. 90-94. It is important to bear in mind
that the ambiguity of treaty texts - which could often provide certain flexibility -
would become a potential source of environmental disputes (in this context, this is
'treaty disputes').
208 Decision I/12C. Other Decisions relating to the term are Decision IV/29, Decision
V/16, Decision V/25 and Decision VI/14A.
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The 1995 Vienna Ozone Meeting adopted Decision VII/9, which
recognises the 'need of Article 5 countries for adequate and quality
supplies of ozone-depleting substances at fair and equitable price' and the
need to avoid monopolies of supply. It was thus decided that until July 1999
Article 5 countries may supply controlled O.D.Ss. to meet the 'basic domestic
needs' of other Article 5 industrialising nations.209 At the same time
Decision VII/9(7) prohibit new production capacity for O.D.Ss. in Annexes A
and B after December 1995. They have to monitor and regulate such O.D.S.-
related trade by means of a new licensing system, which was instituted by
the 1997 Montreal Ozone Meeting ( see section F below).
Lastly, the Non-Compliance Procedure ('N.C.P.') of the Montreal
Protocol regime was, for the first time, invoked regarding the
implementation of treaty obligations in the Russian Federation, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Poland and Ukraine.210
F. The 1997 Montreal Ozone Meeting, the Control Measures of Methyl
Bromide and Illegal Trade in C.F.Cs. and O.D.Ss.
The Ninth Meeting of the Ozone Parties, which reached the tenth
anniversary of the Montreal Ozone Protocol, took place in Montreal from
15th to 17th September 1997. In the previous year, the 1996 Meeting of the
Parties discussed issues concerning the replenishment of the Multilateral
Fund and illegal trade in C.F.Cs. and adopted Decisions about these issues.211
In respect of O.D.Ss., the Montreal Ozone Meeting of the Parties
decided to take more strict measures on methyl bromide in Annex E of the
Protocol. Article 2H decided, with regard to non-Article 5 countries, on the
interim reductions of 25 per cent by 1999, 50 per cent by 2001, 70 per cent
by 2003 and a total phaseout by 2005 with exemptions for emergency and
critical uses, and quarantine and pre-shipment.212
Regarding Article 5 countries that were committed only to a freeze
by 2002, the Meeting decided on a 20 per cent reduction by 2005 and a
phaseout by 2015.213 A four-year average from 1995 to 1998 will be used as
the reference year (period) for calculating the O.D.S. phaseout.214 Yet the
209 Decision I/12C(2).
210 See further Chapter V(VII.B) below.
211 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/12; E.P.L. 27/2(1997) pp. 86-88.
212 See Decisions 1X/3, IX/6 & IX/7; Article 2H, Annex 111 in UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12.
213 See Article 5(8)(ter (d)(ii)-(iii)). See also Decision IX/5.
2^4 Article 5(8)(ter (d)(ii)).
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interim reduction schedule must be reviewed in 2003.215 The Multilateral
Fund will make available $25 million per year for activities in both 1998
and 1999 to phase out methyl bromide in Article 5 developing nations.216
The proposals by the European Community and Switzerland to
strengthen the consumption controls for H.C.F.Cs. and to add controls on its
production217 were eventually withdrawn due to widespread rejections
mainly by the Group of 77 and China.218 Yet the European Community,
supported by other parties, adopted a declaration that at the Eleventh
Meeting in Egypt the parties should decide further steps to control
H.C.F.Cs.21 ^
As indicated above, it must also be noted that, as the date of the 1996
phaseout of O.D.S. production and its use by Non-Article 5 industrialised
countries came around, a black market for O.D.Ss. had newly emerged in
the international community. Consequently, it now impairs the ozone
regime's developmental process and effectiveness (see also Part B, Section
II(A.l) & Chapter V(VII.A.2 & VII.B) below).220
In relation to this point, it should be remembered that, due to their
delayed compliance, Article 5 developing countries may continue to
produce large amounts of O.D.Ss. at relatively cheap prices. Consequently,
these chemicals are illegally imported from Article 5 industrialising
countries to Non-Article 5 industrialised countries such as the rich O.E.C.D.
nations.221 As in the case of India, by using the international financial
aid, the country had built new industrial plants capable of producing or
using C.F.Cs. that are in fact unnecessary for meeting its 'basic domestic
needs'.222 This non-compliance matter is thus not necessarily concerned
with Article 4 trade restriction provisions imposed on non-parties, which
are designed to plug possible loopholes in the global ozone regime.
218 Decision IX/5(e).
216 See Decision IX/5(b).
217 See the proposal by the E.C. in UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.l/15/2/Add.3. Cf. proposals by
the United States (UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.l/15/2/Add.2; Canada (UNEP/OzL.Pro/
WG.l/15/2/Add.5); Switzerland (UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.l/15/2/Add.6.
218 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, para. 87.
219 Annex XI in UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12.
220 See Decision 1X/23 on continuing availability of C.F.Cs. See also e.g. F. P. Landers,
Jr., 'The Black Market Trade in Chlorofluorocarbons: The Montreal Protocol Makes
Banned Refrigerants a Hot Commodity', 26 Georgia J.I.C.L. (1997), pp. 457-85; D.
Brack, International Trade and the Montreal Protocol (1996) Chapter 6; R. Benedick,
Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 273-76 esp.
221 This means that the demand for C.F.Cs. or O.D.Ss. from industrised countries is
still likely to continue in the international community.
222 On Basic Domestic Needs see Section E above.
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In an attempt to remedy the situation, the Meeting of the Parties
adopted Decision VII/33 that requests the U.N.E.P. Secretariat additional
reports on dumping, illegal imports/exports, was adopted in 1995.223 In
1996, Decision VIII/20 that is based on a U.S. proposal224 was adopted by the
Eight Meeting of the Parties. It urged Non-Article 5 countries to establish a
system for validation and approval of imports of any used, recycled or
reclaimed O.D.Ss. before they are imported. The 1997 Montreal Ozone
Meeting then agreed to institute a new licensing system to help national
governments track international trade in O.D.Ss. and discourage unlicensed
black/grey market trade (Article 4B and Decision IX/8). Article 4B(1)
requires the parties to establish and implement a system for licensing the
import/export of new/recycled/reclaimed O.D.Ss. in Annexes A, B, C and E
(by January 2000 or within three months of the entry into force of this
new Article).
The illegal O.D.S. trafficking will be examined further by the Tenth
Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, which will be held in Egypt in
November 1998.
22^ This decision is based on a U.S. proposal. See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy,
(1998) p. 276.
224 See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 276.
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Table no. I: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
MEASURES FOR O.D.Ss. UNDER THE MONTREAL OZONE LAYER PROTOCOL
Substances 1987 Montreal 1990 London 1992Copenhage 1995 Vienna 1887 Montreal
[Base level] Protocol Adjustments n Adjustments Adjustments Adjustments
CFCs 11, 12, Freeze at 1986 No Change No Change No Change No Change
113,114, 115 levels in mid- 85% reduction 25% reduction
Annex 1989 in 1995 in 1994
Group I 50% reduction Phaseout in Phaseoutin
[1986J in mid-1998 2000 1996
Halons 1211, Freeze at 1986 No Change Phaseoutin No Change No Change
1301,2402 levels in 1992 50% reduction 1994
Annex A Group in 1995
B [19861
Other fully Not covered 85% reduction 25% reduction No Change No Change
halogenated in 1997 from 1989
CFCs Phaseout in levels in 1994
Annex B 2000 Phaseout in
Group 1 [1989] 1996
Carbon Not covered 85% reduction No Change No Change No Change
tetrachloride from 1989 50% reduction
(Annex B: Group levels in 1995 in 1994
II) [1989] Phaseout in Phaseout in
2000 1996
Methyl Not covered Freeze at 1989 No change No Change No Change
chloroform levels in 1993 50% reduction
Annex B 70% reduction in 1994
Group 111 in 2000 Phaseout in
[1989] Phaseout in 1996
2005
HCFCs Not covered Nonbinding Phaseout in No Change No Change
AnnexC Group I resolution calls 2030
[1989 HCFC for phaseout no


























Source: Figures from the Montreal Protocol as Ajusted/Amended
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Table no. II: INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MEASURES FOR ARTICLE 5
COUNTRIES UNDER THE MONTREAL OZONE LAYER PROTOCOL
Substances Stage 1 Stage II Stage III Stage IV
[Base Level]
CFCs 11, 12, 113,
114, 115/Annex A:
Group I [Average of
1995-1997
Freeze at 1995-97





























Annex B: Group 11







































Phaseout in 2015 ~~ """"
Source: Figures from the Montreal Protocol as Adjusted/Amended
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PART B
THE NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER
I. INTRODUCTION
In Part A of the present chapter, the historical evolution of the Montreal
Protocol regimes was examined through the dynamic development of its
regulatory measures taken by the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol.
Yet, measures for implementing the international ozone treaties are
to be undertaken by domestic means of the parties that formally decided to
accept the international commitments to global ozone protection.225 In
this regard, it must be recalled here that the Vienna Ozone Convention
specifically requires parties to adopt 'appropriate legislative or
administrative measures and co-operate in harmonising appropriate
policies'.226 Although the regulatory Protocol certainly does not require
states to adopt any definite form of ozone laws at the national level, the
obvious lack of such legislative, administrative and/or executive measures
would therefore imply a possible violation of the treaty.
As we shall see, the parties to the Protocol regime have taken
creative approaches, including domestic percentage reductions, taxes on
O.D.Ss., voluntary agreements between government and industry, labelling
requirements, economic incentives/disincentives, and so forth.
In Part B, we are thus concerned with national implementation and
enforcement of the international ozone treaties. Part B provides an
overview of national laws and regulations regarding ozone protection in
specific countries, namely, (i) non-Article 5 countries including the United
States, the European Community, Germany and Japan, and (ii) Article 5
countries, including Brazil, Malaysia and Thailand. These parties to the
Protocol that I have selected here are all important in sustaining the
international co-operation ozone regime.227 Section B on ozone legal
225 For an extensive discussion of the relationship between international and national
law, see in particular J. Ebbesson, Compatibility of International and National
Environmental Law, (1996).
226 Article 2(2). Cf. The 1973 C.I.T.E.S. (Article VIII.1-2 and 7) and the 1989 Basel
Convention (Article 9(5)).
227 Part B does not deal with national laws and regulations in China and India,
although both Article 5 countries are undeniably crucial to the management of the
ozone layer regime. One of the main reasons for this is that relevant information was
not readily provided by these two governments and international organisations
involved in ozone activities (to date, no reply to my many letters). But see countries
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instruments in Article 5 countries also briefly describes various country
programmes under the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund.
Lastly, it must be said that, for reasons of space, this part cannot deal
with an analysis of each country's national legal system.228
II. NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL OZONE TREATIES
A. Non-Article 5 Countries
(1) The United States229
In the United States, the following statute and regulations are used to
control O.D.Ss.: (i) 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments ('C.A.A.A.'),230 (ii)
U.S.E.P.A. Regulations 231 - Phaseout Regulations,232 Refrigerant
Recycling Regulation,233 Motor Vehicle A/C Regulation,234 Ban on Non¬
essential Uses,235 Labelling Regulation,236 Significant New Alternatives
Regulation,237 Federal Procurement Regulations,238 and (iii) Internal
programmes in China in Chapter V[(D) below. As for Russia's national ozone laws and
its country programmes see Chapter V(VII.B) below.
228 For a comprehensive review see e.g. J. A. Schlickman (eds.) International
Environmental Law and regulation, (1991).
229 The (jnjted States, which is non-Article 5 country, ratified the Protocol 21 April
1988, the London Amendment 18 December 1991 and the Copenhagen Amendment 2
March 1944. U.S. controls measures of O.D.Ss. are primarily governed by federal
regulations, though several states have also promulgated ozone regulations. Parts of
this section are indebted to information provided by the U.S. Government and the
U.N.E.P. 'Regulations to Control Ozone-Depleting Substances: A Guidebook' (1996).
236 Title VI: Stratospheric Ozone Protection, Sections 601-18, signed into Law by the
President 15 November 1990.
23^ Cited here as 40 C.F.R. Part 82. The E.P.A. Regulations are founded on directives
and mandates in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment.
232 40 C.F.R. Part 82, Subpart A implementing Sec. 603-606 and 616 of 1990 C.A.A.A.
See the daily Federal Register, vol. 60, p. 24970.
233 40 C.F.R. Part 42, Subpart F implementing Sec. 608 of 1990 C.A.A.A. See The
Federal Register, vol. 58, p. 28660.
234 40 C.F.R. Part 82, Subpart B implementing Sec. 609 of 1990 C.A.A.A. See The
Federal Register, vol. 57,
235 40 C.F.R. Part 82, Subpart C implementing Sec. 610 of 1990 C.A.A.A. See The
Federal Register, vol. 58, p. 69672.
236 40 C.F.R. Part 82, Subpart E implementing Sec. 611 of 1990 C.A.A.A. See The
Federal Register, vol. 60, p. 4010.
237 40 c.F.R. Part 9 & 82, Subpart G implementing Sec. 612 of 1990 C.A.A.A. See The
Federal Register, vol. 59, p. 13044; ibid., vol. 60, p. 31092.
238 40 C.F.R. Part 82, Subpart D implementing Sec. 613 of 1990 C.A.A.A. See The
Federal Register, vol. 58, p. 54892.
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Revenue Service ('I.R.S.') Code. 239 The 1990 C.A.A.A. is the most
comprehensive legislation for ozone protection in the United States.
The U.S. Environment Protection Agency ('U.S.E.P.A.') has the main
responsibility for implementing O.D.S. phaseout strategies and it also issues
rules or decisions to implement the C.A.A.A. on a regular basis. The
U.S.E.P.A. has adopted a Significant New Alternatives Policy (S.N.A.P.) and it
published a list of acceptable substitutes for O.D.Ss.240
Sanctions against violations of the 1990 C.A.A.A. and its regulations
include inter alia fines, jail and withdrawal of permits to operate, such as
withdrawal of certificates for refrigerant technicians. Criminal
enforcement actions have been taken under 1990 C.A.A.A. Sec. 606
(phaseout) and Sec. 608 (refrigerant recycling). Monitoring of O.D.S.
imports is based on mandatory reporting by all importers241 and customs
statics. It is reported that in 1997 a Miami-based company and three
employees - who were found of guilty of conspiring to smuggle 4,000 tons
of C.F.C.-12 - agreed to forfeit more than $10 million in assets.242
The United States has not entered into any formal voluntary
agreements with the industry on actions to phase out O.D.Ss.
Under the I.R.S. Code the United States has imposed an excise tax on
C.F.Cs., halons, carbon tetrachloride and 1,1,1 - trichlorroethane in
proportion to their O.D.Ps.243 The tax is applicable to these chemicals when
sold or used by a producer, manufacture or importer. The tax is also
applicable to imported products which are made with these chemicals. Yet
the United States has not introduced any economic incentives to encourage
use of O.D.S. alternatives.
239 26 C.F.R. Part 52 Sec. 4681-82, as amended in 1990 by Pub.L. 101-508, in 1992
by Pub.L. 102-486 and in 1995.
249 E. E. Shea, Introduction to U.S. Environmental Laws, (1995) p. 17.
241 40 C.F.R. Part, Subpart A, sec. 82.13.
242 U.S. v. Refrigeration USA, DC SFla, No. 96-0276-CR-Moreno, 5/28/97, cited in
20/12 International Environment Reporter, (11 June 1997) p. 558. A German citizen
living Florida was also found guilty of smuggling an ozone depleting refrigerant into
the United States. See 20/11 International Environment Reporter, (28 May 1997) p.
519.
243 Sees. 4681-82. In 1993 the tax revenue amounted only to approximately 0.06 per
cent of total U.S. government receipt. P. Dubois-Felsmann, 'US Revenue from ODS
Excise Tax', under <ozone-webweaver@acd.ucar.edu>.
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In this connection, Denmark has special levies on C.F.Cs. and
halons.244 The Seychelles has also introduced differentiated taxes and
duties for aerosols.245
(2) The European Community246
The European Community legally controls C.F.Cs. and O.D.Ss. by using three
kinds of E.C. legislation, that is, (i) a regulation ('directly applicable'), (ii) a
recommendation (non-binding) and (iii) a Council decision to ratify the
ozone treaties on behalf of the Community. In general, although these E.C.
legal instruments regarding the ozone are endorsements of international
ozone treaties, the European Community has adopted comprehensive
control measures for O.D.Ss.
It was in early 1980 that the European Community adopted its first
binding measures, Council Decision 80/372/E.E.C. concerning C.F.Cs. in the
environment of 26 March 1980.247 Under the decision, the member states
were required to take all appropriate measures to ensure that industry
situated in their territories did not increase its production capacity of
C.F.Cs.24^ Subsequent Recommendation 89/349 limits the use of C.F.Cs. in
aerosols with some exceptions.249 Further, the Directive 67/548/E.E.C.
requires labelling of ODSs with the name of substances, and so forth.250
Since then, the European Community has adopted Regulation 94/3093
of 15 December 1994 on substances that deplete the ozone layer251
244 Act from the Ministry of Taxes on taxes on certain C.F.Cs. and halons, 30 June
1994.
245 U.N.E.P. Regulations to Control Ozone-Depleting Substances: A Guidebook, (1996)
p. 132.
246 The European Community - that is the regional economic integration organisation
- approved the Protocol 16 December 1988, the London Amendments 20 December
1991 and the Copenhagen Amendments 20 November 1995. For a critical analysis of
the relationship between the Community law and multilateral treaties, see among
others P. Okowa, 'The European Community and International Environmental
Agreements; 15 Y.bk.E.L. (1995) pp. 169-92.
247 O.J. No. L 90/45. Previously, the European Community adopted a non-binding
Council Resolution of 30 May 1978 on fluorocarbons in the environment. See O.J. No.
C 133/1. See also Chapter II above.
24^ Article 1(1).
249 See also Directive 92/72 on a harmonised procedure for monitoring, information
exchange, etc.
250 67/548/E.E.C.; 93/21/E.E.C., Articles 5.2.2.1 and 7.1. On H.C.F.Cs. see Article
5.2.2.2.
251 O.J. No. L 333/1.
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amending Regulation 91/594,252 to speed up the phasing out of O.D.Ss.
under the Montreal Protocol. Its Articles 3, 4 and 5 are dedicated to detailed
O.D.S. control measures.253 For the purpose of 'industrial rationalisation'
within the members states, Article 3(11) allows trading in production
rights between member states.254 O.D.S. import from and export to non¬
parties to the Protocol is prohibited.255
Articles 14 and 15 address the recovery of used controlled O.D.Ss. and
leakages of these chemicals. As to monitoring of O.D.S. import, producers,
exporters and importers of O.D.Ss. are required to submit annual reports to
the E.C. Commission and the competent authority of the member state
concerned.256 In this respect, the Commission shall take 'appropriate steps
to protect the confidentiality of the information submitted'.257
One of the most valuable provisions of the implementing regulation
will be Article 18 concerning inspection. Under Article 18(3) the
competent authorities must carry out the investigations which the E.C.
Commission considers necessary under this regulation.258 This seems to
suggest that the member states have little or no discretion regarding this
matter.259
252 O.J. No. L 67/1. The Regulation was amended by Council Regulation/E.E.C.
92/3952, O.J. No. L 405/41.
253 A producer may not produce, sell or use for his account virgin O.D.Ss. after the
following date: C.F.Cs. (1 January 1995); halons (1 January 1994); carbon
tetrachloride (1 January 1995); 1,1,1-trichloroethane (1 January 1996); H.B.F.Cs. (1
January 1996).
254 On E.C.'s status as a regional economic integration organisation, see Section III.D
above.
255 Articles 8 and 11. The same rules apply to any territory which is not covered by
the Protocol (Article 13). But see also Article 12.
256 Article 17.
257 Article 17(4). See also Article 18(5).
258 When the Commission requests information from an undertaking, it must at the
same time forward a copy of the request to the competent authority of the member
states within whose territory the undertaking's seat is situated, together with the
reasons why that information is required (Article 18(2)).
259 See J. H. Jans, European Environmental Law, (1995) p. 318.
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(3) Germany260
As stated above, E.C. regulations are automatically binding on all member
states including Germany.
In addition to the above mentioned regulations, Germany introduced
the following national regulations for O.D.Ss., that is, (i) an Ordinance on
the Prohibition of Certain Ozone-depleting Halogenated hydrocarbons
(C.F.C./Halon Prohibition Ordinance),261 (ii) an Ordinance on the
Limitation of Emissions of Highly Volatile Halogenated Hydrocarbons,262
and (iii) a Notification on Alternatives for Appliances Containing C.F.C.-
12.263
Sanctions against non-compliance include fines and jail.264 The
national German regulations prohibit manufacture and sale of O.D.Ss.
including C.F.Cs. and H.C.F.C.-22 as refrigerants, cleansing agents and
solvents, fire extinguishants, and for production of foams.265 In
accordance with E.C. Regulation 3093/94266 monitoring of O.D.S. import is
based on information acquired in connection with the import permit
process and subsequent mandatory reporting by all importers. Germany
does not have specific regulations banning import of products containing
O.D.Ss. from non-parties. In this respect, Article 9 of E.C. Regulation
3093/94 prohibits import of certain products containing, for example,
C.F.Cs., halons and H.B.F.Cs. from non-parties.267
The Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and
Nuclear Safety ('B.M.U.')268 entered into (binding) voluntary agreements
with industries and trade associations.
260 Germany - which is non-Article 5 country - ratified the Protocol 16 December
1988, the London Amendment 27 December 1991 and the Copenhagen Amendment 28
December 1993. Parts of this section are indebted to information furnished by the
U.N.E.P. 'Regulations to Control Ozone-Depleting Substances', (1996) and the German
Government.
261 6 May 1991.
262 10 December 1990, amended 5 June 1991.
265 Issued 21 December 1995 by the Federal Environment Agency. In this respect,
the U.K. Environment Protection (Controls on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer)
Regulations of 1996 set out detailed offences and penalties in relation to non¬
compliance with the Council Regulation or Regulations (Regulations 11-13). Statutory
Instruments, (1996, Part 1), 1996/506, p. 1393.
264 See Article 9 of the C.F.C./Halon Prohibition Ordinance.
265 Tjie 1991 Ordinance (Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 & 11).
266 Article 17.
267 See Annex V of E.C. Regulation 3093/94.
268 jhg b.M.U. may authorise exemptions to meet the needs of users licensed by the
EC Commission to use O.D.Ss. for approved 'essential use'.
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Regarding recycling of C.F.Cs., it is important that under Article 8(2)
of the C.F.C./Halon Prohibition Ordinance distributors of C.F.Cs. must accept
the return of these chemicals and preparations after use or ensure return
is accepted by a third party designated by them.
(4) Japan269
Japan enacted the Law Concerning the Protection of the Ozone Layer
through Regulation of Specified Substances and Other Measures (the 'Ozone
Protection Law') in May 1988, and other administrative ordinances on
ozone protection.270 The Ozone Protection Law has been amended two
times, in 1991 and in 1994. On the basis of the Ozone Law of Japan,
regulations on the production and importation of specified C.F.Cs. and
O.D.Ss. have been enforced by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry ('M.I.T.I.') since 1989.
The controls in Japan on production and import of O.D.Ss. in
particular are governed by Chapter II of the Law and Article 52 of the
Japanese Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.271 In
accordance with the Foreign Exchange/Trade Control Law, trade with non¬
parties in O.D.Ss. and products containing or made with these specified
chemicals has been strictly prohibited.
Sanctions against violation of these legal regulations include fines
and jail.272
As to financial and other assistance, it is provided that Japan should
make efforts to take necessary measures with a view to facilitating the
development/use of substitutes for O.D.Ss. and of equipment for controlling
269 Japan - non-Article 5 country - ratified the Protocol 30 September 1988, the
London Amendment 4 September 1991, the Copenhagen Amendment 20 December 1994.
For a discussion of environmental law in Japan in general, see e.g. A. Morishima,
'Environmental Law of Japan', in J. A. Schlickman (eds.), International Environmental
Law and Regulation, (1991). A. Yasutaka and T. Awagi (eds.), Environmental Law,
(1995), (Japanese).
270 See The Ministry of Trade and Industry (ed.) The Ozone Protection Law (Japanese).
To date, no English translation is available.
See also an Ordinance on the Protection of the Ozone Layer Through Regulation
of Specified Substances and Other Measures of 26 September 1994 as amended; An
Enforcement Regulation of the Ozone Protection Law of 1988 as amended; A Guideline
for Control on the Emissions and Use Rationalisation of Specified Substances of 1989
as amended. To date, no English translation is available.
271 Promulgated in 1 December 1949, amended in 1979 and in 1987. See further, The
Ministry of Trade and Industry, The Ozone Protection Law, pp. 95-156 (Japanese).
272 See further Chapter 6, Articles 30-34 and Article 70 of the Japanese Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.
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emissions of specialised substances.273 In this regard, for the year 1991-96,
Japan has agreed to contribute U.S.$ 98 million to the Montreal Protocol
Multilateral Fund,274 and has also engaged in practical bilateral assistance
for Article 5 countries, including Asian countries such as China and
Thailand.275
Local governments of Japan - which are delegated administrative
functions by the national government276 - have also introduced various
regulations regarding ozone protection, including criminal sanctions.277
Recently, the M.I.T.I, introduced strategic plans that require
manufacturers to recycle their products-consumers will bear some of the
estimated U.S.$ 30-90 cost per machine.278
B. Article 5 Countries
(1) Brazil279
At present Brazil's share of ozone depletion is five per cent - though it was
one per cent in 1986 - and this Article 5 country is the third largest
consumer of O.D.Ss. to be eligible for the Montreal Multilateral Fund. It is
reported that a significant increase in the manufacture of O.D.S.-related
equipment (e.g. refrigerators and air conditioner) to meet the rising
internal demand led to industrialising nations exporting C.F.Cs. to Brazil at
marginal cost. Yet Brazil decided to phase out C.F.Cs. by 2001, and since 1997
manufacturers, aiming to build up external markets, have been using
substitutes for O.D.Ss. in some equipment.
273 Article 21 of the Ozone Protection Law. See also Preamble and Article 3.
274 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/21/36, Annex I.
275 See Section B(2) below.
276 In this respect, the Japanese Constitution provides that local authorities may
enact local regulations (Article 94). See also Article 2 of the Local Autonomy Law. Yet
the relationship between the general law and local regulations is controversial.
277 See The Environment Agency, The Measures for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
(1996) pp. 343-50 (Japanese).
278 Of the 3.2 million refrigerators collected by local governments in 1995, less than
one-fourth were virtually recycled. See 24 OzonAction, (October 1997).
279 Brazil - which is Article 5 country - ratified the Protocol 19 March 1990, the
London Amendment 1 October 1992 and the Copenhagen Amendment 30 may 1996.
Parts of this section are indebted to information provided by the U.N.E.P. 'Regulations
to Control Ozone-Depleting Substances: A Guidebook' (1996) and the Brazilian
government, under: <http:www.mma.gov.br/ingles/SMA/decop/conv4.html>.
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Brazil has adopted the following ozone regulations: (i) a decree
authorising the manufacturers of aerosols to use labels or stamps,280 (ii) a
decree prohibiting the use of C.F.Cs. as a propellant in the manufacturing
and trade of aerosols,281 (iii) a decree specifying the substances referred to
in Portaria M.S. N.R. 534 as substances in Annex A of the Protocol,282 (iv) a
decree requesting the producers, importers, exporters, traders and users of
O.D.Ss. to register their enterprise at I.B.A.M.A.283 In addition, a resolution
implementing the Brazilian Country Programme ('C.O.N.A.M.A.') prohibits
the use of O.D.Ss. in Annexes of the Protocol and bans the use of O.D.Ss. in
new, locally produced or imported equipment, products and systems and
even recycled O.D.Ss.284
Recently, Brazil has implemented legislation that prohibits all
governments and companies from purchasing products and equipment
containing O.D.Ss.285 Trade with non-parties in products containing O.D.Ss.
has been prohibited since January 1995. Further, Brazil intends to start
restricting the use of methyl bromide in 2000.286 A Communique No. 7,
dated 13 December 1995, creates procedures for importing and exporting
controlled O.D.Ss.
The monitoring of O.D.S. import is based on mandatory reporting by
all importers and customs statistics. By reducing/increasing tax, Brazil also
intends to introduce economic incentives to encourage use of O.D.S.
alternatives, and economic disincentives to discourage use of O.D.Ss.
Brazil adopted the Brazilian Programme to Eliminate the Production
and Consumption of Ozone Depleting Substances ('P.B.C.O.'), which is
designed to meet the objectives of the Protocol. The P.B.C.O. was approved
by the Executive Committee of the Protocol in July 1994, and project
financing is implemented through the U.N.D.P., the U.N.E.P. and the World
Bank.
The Programme has been implemented in a decentralised manner
with participation from various entities of Federal and State Governments
and the private sector. In order to implement the P.B.C.O., Brazil established




283 I.B.A.M.A. NR 29/95.
284 C.O.N.A.M.A. NR/13/95, published on 29 December 1995.
285 See 24 OzonAction (October 1997).
286 gee ajso 23 OzonAction (July 1997).
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representatives from Ministries and private sectors. At present the
P.R.O.Z.O.N. has an established co-operation with thirteen trade
associations287 to promote reduction of O.D.Ss.
Until now, the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund has financed
fifty-two projects in Brazil, amounting to U.S.$ 25.4 million, corresponding
to an elimination of 3,491.85 tonnes O.D.P. Recently, at its Twenty-Second
Meeting in June 1997, the Executive Committee approved nine projects and
it requested the Implementing Agencies and the Secretariat to provide
additional information on the project implementation in Brazil.288
(2) Malaysia289
Malaysia has adopted eleven orders and guidelines to discourage any use of
O.D.Ss. that would be contradictory to the phaseout targets stated in
Malaysia's Country Programme. They include, for example, (i) a 1989
Custom Duties Order,290 (ii) a 1993 Environmental Quality Order,
prohibiting the use of C.F.Cs. and other gases as propellants and blowing
agents,291 (iii) Custom Duties on prohibition of import,292 (iv) 1994
Guidelines on Control Measures for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and
(v) 1995 Guidelines for Prequalifying and Selection Criteria for Acceptable
Alternatives of O.D.Ss. in Malaysia.
Administrative orders and guidelines - which are based on mandates
in the 1974 Environmental Quality Act, the 1967 Custom Act and the 1988
Fire Act - are not binding, however. All acts must be passed and endorsed
by the Cabinet or the Parliament.
Sanctions against non-compliance include fines, jail, withdrawal of
permits to operate and withdrawal of privileges.298 Monitoring of O.D.S.
287 They are all members of Enterprises Council to Implement the Montreal Protocol
in Brazil (CCSEE).
288 Decision 22/39 of the Executive Committee in UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/22/79/Rev.l.
289 Malaysia - which is Article 5 country - ratified the Montreal Protocol 29 August
1989, the London Amendment 16 June 1993 and the Copenhagen Amendment 5 August
1993. Parts of this section are indebted to information provided by the U.N.E.P.
'Regulations to Control Ozone-Depleting Substances: A Guidebook' (1996) and the
Malaysia Government. For a discussion of environmental law of Malaysia, see e.g. M.
Kimura, 'Malaysia's Environmental Law and Administrative System' in Y. Nomura and
N. Sakumoto, Environmental LawofDeveloping Countries, (1996) pp. 81-11 8.
290 Entered into force 14 December 1989, revised 17 November 1994 by a 1994
Customs Duty Order.
291 31 December 1993.
292 Entered into force 7 April 1994.
298 See the 1974 Environmental Quality Act and the 1967 Custom Duty.
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import is based on information obtained in connection with the approval of
import permits, as well as information from customs and the Statics
Department and voluntary information from trade associations and
importing companies. In addition, under the Approved Permit system
('A.P.') no import from non-parties will be approved. Yet there are no
regulations banning import or sale of any products containing, made with
or requiring O.D.Ss. for its use.
Although Malaysia has no formal voluntary agreements with
industry on ozone actions, it formed a sector specific Working Group under
an O.D.S. Working Groups Committee to formulate strategies to eliminate the
use of O.D.Ss. The Country Programme and its strategies are developed in
co-operation with the participating industrial associations in the Working
Group.
Furthermore, Malaysia has introduced duty exemptions for recovery
and recycling machines and import of H.C.F.Cs. (134a), and tax reductions
for manufacture and imports of environmental protective equipment to
encourage the use of O.D.S. alternatives.294
The strategy applied in the Multilateral Fund is the adoption of
regulatory and control measures to discourage future investments in
production and use of O.D.Ss., direct investment in ozone-friendly
technologies, and incentive schemes to encourage industries to use
substitutes.295 Under the Protocol's Fund, implementation of the M.A.C.
recycling project was completed in 1995.296 The project by the World Bank
is expected to result in an annual phaseout of 370 tons of C.F.C.-12, which is
the largest O.D.S. consuming sector in Malaysia. Yet it is reported that
implementation of the O.D.S. Project I was delayed due partly to the fact that
an Ozone Unit was not yet established within the Department of the
Environment in Malaysia.297
As to the refrigeration sector, the World Bank is now engaged in, for
instance, the Phaseout Project of C.F.C.-12 M.A.C. (Mobile Air Conditioners)
294 Enacted under the 1967 Customs Act.
295 See CountryProgramme (1992).
29^ See The World Bank, 1996 Work Programme: Bank-Implemented Montreal Protocol
Operations as Proposed to the 18th Meeting of the Fund EC, (October 1995), p. 14.
With regard to O.D.S. Investment Project II, grant became effective in January 1996.
297 See The World Bank, Implementation Performance Review of Bank-Implemented
Montreal Protocol Investment Operations, (December 1994), p. 2.
139
The Historial Evolution of the International Ozone Layer Regime
manufacturing equipment and conversion to H.F.C.-134a system, which is to
be completed in November 1999.298
(3) Thailand299
Thailand has established the following two national regulations, that is, (i)
the Hazardous Substance Act,800 and (ii) the 1995 Notification by the
Ministry of Industry,801 which designated controlled substances in
Annexes of the Protocol.802 The 1995 Notification incorporated an earlier
Declaration by the Ministry of Public Health on consumer aerosols
containing C.F.Cs. In addition, the Department of Industrial Works ('D.I.W.')
under the Ministry of Industry, that undertakes the major responsibility
for implementation, has passed two guidelines, i.e. (i) the Instructions by
the D.I.W. to control the use of O.D.Ss. in industrial plants808 and (ii) the
Ministerial Declarations and other D.I.W. Orders and Guidelines.804
Monitoring imports is based on information by the D.I.W.
concerning clearance of import shipments and mandatory reporting from
the importers. Sanctions against non-compliance include fines and jail.805
Foreign trade with non-parties is controlled as part of the general permit
approval procedures for O.D.Ss. As to voluntary agreements, Thailand has a
trilateral agreement with U.S.E.P.A. and the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry ('M.I.T.I.').800 Further, duty exemptions
298 See Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol: Inventory
ofApproved Projects, (as at November 1995), p. 210.
2" Thailand - which is Article 5 country - ratified the Montreal Protocol 7 July
1989, the London Amendments 25 June 1992 and Copenhagen Amendments 1 December
1995. Parts of this section are indebted to information furnished by the U.N.E.P.
'Regulations to Control Ozone-Depleting Substances: A Guidebook', (1996) and the Thai
Government. For a discussion of environmental law in Thailand, see e.g. S. Ogano,
'Thailand's Environmental Law and Administrative System', in Y. Nomura and N.
Sakumoto, Environmental Law ofDeveloping Countries, (1996) pp. 119-64.
800 B.E. 2535, 29 March 1992.
301 \i February 1995.
802 These chemicals are also regulated by the 'Toxic Substance Act'.
808 1 April 1992.
804 English translation is not available.
305 gee Hazardous Substance Act.
800 At the Japan-U.S.-Thailand Joint Technical Seminars on Ozone Layer Protection
held in Bangkok in March 1992, seven Japanese companies pledged the complete
elimination of C.F.Cs. from household refrigerations by the end of 1996. This
phaseout goal - the earliest in the world in developing countries - was achieved with
support from Japan, the United States and Thai governments through the efforts of the
member companies of the Japan Electrical Manufactures' Association (J.E.M.A.).
Information provided by Ms. Fukuhara of the Japan M.I.T.I. (2 February 1998).
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are introduced for import of recovery and recycling equipment. Thai
industries seeking support from the Government are encouraged not to use
O.D.Ss.
As at November 1995, about thirty projects in various sectors are
prepared and carried out under the Financial Mechanism of the
Protocol.307 In relation to capacity-building, the U.N.D.P. and the World
Bank in particular have been implementing institutional strengthening
projects for the D.I.W. More recently, at its Twenty-Second Meeting, the
Executive Committee approved additional two projects on incremental
operating costs for compressors.308
CONCLUSIONS: LOOKING AHEAD
As discussed in Part A, the overall success of the Montreal Protocol regime
will be characterised by international co-operation in protecting ozone
among regime actors, e.g. Non-Article 5 and Article 5 nations, international
institutions such as the U.N.E.P., scientists, industry, and environmental
N.G.Os. Attention should also be directed at the regime's specialised internal
institutions - e.g. the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund, the
Implementation Committee of the N.C.P. and their subsidiary bodies - that
have been playing important roles in long sustaining the co-operative and
regulatory regime.300
As described in Part B, the Protocol's concept of international co¬
operation or global partnership has been well translated into partnership
at the national level. Parties, both Non-Article 5 and Article 5 countries
(with the exception of India), have dedicated considerable efforts to meet
the legal requirements of the Montreal Protocol. Many of those parties are
ahead of the Protocol reduction schedules for O.D.Ss., and only a few
countries - such as the Russian Federation of the C.E.I.Ts. - are currently
not complying with the strict control measures of the regulatory Protocol.
However, it should be noted that, even with full compliance with the
amended Protocol regime, the ultimate objective of the international
regime, i.e. complete recovery of the ozone layer, would not occur until the
middle of the next century: peak ozone decreases are expected to occur
307 See the U.N.E.P. 'Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal
Protocol: Inventory of Approved Projects (as at November 1995)'.
308 Decision 22/48 of the Executive Committee in UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/22/79/Rev.l.
300 See Chapters V-VI below.
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during the next several years. In this sense, the international
environmental regime is a precautionary environmental regime for future
generations.
The Montreal Protocol and its Amendments and Adjustments must
continue to be strengthened to further protect the stratospheric ozone
layer; there is still much progress to be made. Only eight points - some of
which might be debatable - are stressed here.
With regard to the binding controls of O.D.Ss., (i) the control
measures for H.C.F.Csand methyl bromide in particular should be
strengthened: with regard to methyl bromide, as seen in the case of the
Netherlands, alternatives, substitutes and related technologies are already
widely available.3! 1
As a newly emerging problem of the ozone regime operation, (ii)
illegal trade in C.F.Cs., which has become a lucrative activity, must be
resolved as soon as possible through e.g. the new import/export licensing
system adopted at the 1997 Ninth Ozone Meeting (Article 4B). How the
system will develop is a matter of great interest.
In relation to the previous point (iii) the grace period for production
of C.F.Cs. in Article 5 nations should, arguably, be shortened considerably.
Undeniably, the grace period has become a source of illegal trade.
For purposes of assessing/judging the effectiveness of the
regulatory measures for O.D.Ss., (iv) data reporting under Articles 7 and 9
of the Protocol must be improved substantially. It has been pointed out that
Non-Article and Article 5 country parties are submitting incomplete
data.312
Though this was not discussed in the present chapter, (v) greater
financial resources for monitoring, research and analysis of the state of
the ozone layer should be allocated to internal/external scientific regime
institutions such as the T.E.A.P. and its sub-Committees and the W.M.O.;313 as
in the past, it will be new scientific findings and technological/economic
assessments that can encourage further developments of the international
control measures for O.D.Ss.
310 It should be noted that production/use of H.C.F.Cs. have risen in developed and
developing countries (from 13.000 tons in 1989 to 35,000 tons in 1995). See 20/18
International Environment Reporter, (3 September 1997) p. 820.
3H But see R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 207, noting that there is no
universal substitute for all the uses and pests.
3^2 See 20/18 International Environment Reporter, (3 September 1997) p. 820. See
further Chapter V(Vll.A.l) below.
3^3 See statements by Co-Chair of the T.E.A.P. in UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, para. 29.
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Perhaps one of the most important points is that (vi) the number of
ratifications of the Amendments to the Protocol is still unsatisfactory. In
this respect, the regular Meeting of the Parties has continuously adopted
Decisions. If not widely and quickly ratified by the majority of the parties,
the international regime may not maintain or strengthen its well-
recognised dynamic character.
Further, (vii) it is expected that a large number of developing
countries - probably two-thirds of them - will have difficulties in
achieving in 1999 a freeze of C.F.C. consumption. 314 In this respect, it must
be emphasised that the phase-out by Article 5 countries depends on
adequate financing and technology transfer being available from the
Multilateral Fund, as stated in the Montreal Protocol text.
Finally, (viii) in accordance with Decisions by the Meeting of the
Parties, the countries with their economies in transition should be given
special and appropriate assistance to enable them to comply with the
Protocol (e.g. G.E.F. funding, which is, however, external to the Multilateral
Fund of the international ozone regime).315 An effective combination of
'sticks' and 'carrots' has to be achieved in this context.316
*
The following chapters will examine Article 4 trade restrictions (Chapter
IV), the Montreal N.C.P. regime (Chapter V), and the Financial Mechanism
of the Protocol including the Multilateral Fund (Chapter VI) - these treaty
provisions and institutions all help toward securing full compliance with
the above-mentioned substantive provisions of Articles 2, 2A to 2H - and
corresponding control measures contained in Article 5.
314 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, para 69.
313 As we shall see in Chapter V below, many of the C.E.I.Ts. are presently in non¬
compliance with the treaty.
316 See Chapters I(III.B) and V(VII.B) esp.
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PART III
THE OZONE LAYER REGIME AND
THE G.A.T.T./W.T.O. LAW REGIME
CHAPTER IV
THE MONTREAL OZONE PROTOCOL REGIME AND
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIME OF THE G.A.T.T./W.T.O. LAW
I. INTRODUCTION: MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW REGIME OF THE G.A.T.T./W.T.O.
A. Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. Law
One of the vexing problems of global environmental protection is the
complicated relations between multilateral environmental agreements
('M.E.As.') and trade-oriented rules/principles of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law
(the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organisation).
Although the relentless pursuit of economic growth or free capital
mobility - which is likely to have adverse environmental impacts - is
frequently subject to certain treaty obligations under M.E.As., the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law does not specifically address current issues
relating to environmental protection. Consequently, the legal status of
trade-related provisions of M.E.As. within the framework of the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law regime remain, to a greater or lesser extent,
controversial. International trade restrictions of O.D.Ss. contained in
Article 4 of the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol provide an archetypal and
striking example of M.E.As.-G.A.T.T./W.T.O. conflicts in the context of newly
developing modern international environmental law4
To begin with, it will be helpful to describe M.E.As. briefly, before
moving to the main exacting task in this Chapter.
1 See in general J. Cameron and J. Robinson, 'The Use of Trade Provisions in
International Agreements and Their Compatibility with the GATT', 2 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1991)
pp. 3-30: E. U. Petersmann, 'International Trade and International Environmental Law:
Prevention and Settlement of International Environmental Disputes in GATT',- 27 J.W.T.
(1993) pp. 43-81; H. Ward, 'Trade and Environment in The Round - and After', 6 J.E.L.
(1994) pp. 263-95: the G.A.T.T. Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, (1992)
reprinted in J. H. Jackson (eds.) Internationa] Economic Relations, (1995) pp. 561-72.
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B. Multilateral Environmental Agreements ('M.E.As.')
The newly-coined term 'M.E.As.' - which is widely received in international
legal literature 2 - implies that the environmental treaties contain some
kinds of trade-related provisions or international economic law rules.
Currently, there are at least one hundred and eighty M.E.As. Some twenty
of those M.E.As. contain trade-related environmental measures ('T.R.E.Ms.')
and they lay down quantitative restrictions on foreign trade (at least).3 As
was described in Chapter III(III-IV) above, the Montreal Ozone Layer
Protocol places quantitative limits on production/'consumption' of
specified controlled substances in its Article 2 and technical Annexes.^
M.E.As. are generally classified in three broad categories: (i)
agreements to protect wildlife - e.g. the 1973 C.I.T.E.S.,3 (ii) agreements to
2 As to the basic features of M.E.As. see e.g. J. Werksman, 'The Conference of Parties
to Environmental Treaties' in idem (ed.), Greening International Institutions, (1996)
pp. 55-68; V. Rege, 'GATT Law and Environment-Related Issues Affecting the Trade of
Developing Countries', 28 J.W.T. (1994) p. 126.; T. J. Schoenbaum, 'International Trade
and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation', 91
A.J.I.L. (1997) pp. 281-84.
3 The 1933 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna/Flora in Their Natural
State (Article 9), 172 L.N.T.S. 241; the 1940 Western Hemisphere Convention (Article
9), 161 U.N.T.S. 193; the 1950 Birds Convention (Article 6), 638 U.N.T.S. 185; the
1956 F.A.O. Plant Protection Agreement for South-East Asia and the Pacific Region
(Article III), 247 U.N.T.S. 400; the 1957 Interim Convention on Conservation of North
Pacific Fur Seals (Article VIII), 314 U.N.T.S. 105; the 1959 Agreement Concerning the
Co-operation in the Quarantine of Plants and Their Protection against Pests and
Diseases (Article 4), 1 S.M.T.E. 153; the 1967 Phyto-sanitary Convention for Africa;
the 1968 African Nature Convention (Article IX); the 1968 European Convention for
the Protection of Animals During International Transport (Article 1), I.E.L.M.T.; the
1970 Benelux Birds Convention (Articles 6 & 9), 847 U.N.T.S. 255; the 1973 Polar
Bears Agreement, 13 I.L.M. (1974) 13; the 1980 Convention for the
Conservation/Management of the Vicuna (Article 4); the 1985 A.S.E.A.N. Agreement;
the 1985 F.A.O. Code of Conduct on the Distribution/Use of Pesticides; the 1989
Amended London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in
International Trade; the 1989 Wellington Convention (Article 3(2.c), 29 I.L.M. (1990);
the 1992 U.N. Climate Change Convention, 31 I.L.M. (1992) p. 849; the 1992
Biodiversity Convention (Article 16), 31 I.L.M. (1992) p. 822; the 1994 Oslo Sulphur
Protocol (Preamble); the 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement (Article 36).
See E. U. Petersmann, International and European Trade and Environmental Law after
the Uruguay Round, (1996) Annex VIII.
4 The original version of the 1987 Montreal Protocol intended to adopt restrictions on
the methods used in the production or processing of products (see Section 11(B) below).
The legal strategies of the ozone layer regime are not based on domestic
production/consumption taxes, labelling, etc. But see also Part B of Chapter III
regarding various national ozone laws/regulations containing economic
incentives/disincentives.
3 Articles III, IV & V. See further S. Lyster, International Wildlife Law, (1985)
Chapter 12(5); T. M. Swanson, 'The Evolving Trade Mechanisms in CITES', 1 R.E.C.I.E.L.
(1992) pp. 57-63.
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protect the environment of the importing states from harmful organisms
and products - e.g. the 1989 Basel Convention,6 and (iii) agreements to
protect the so-called 'global commons'. ^ it is said that at present the
Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol is arguably the only M.E.A. which addresses
in considerable detail the third category.^
It is interesting to note here that the North American Free Trade
Agreement ('N.A.F.T.A.') specifically referred to the Montreal Ozone Layer
Protocol as amended, the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. and the 1989 Basel Convention.
Under Article 104 of the N.A.F.T.A., these M.E.As.' trade-related
environmental provisions - such as provided for in the Ozone Protocol's
Article 4 - may prevail over the N.A.F.T.A. general exceptions 'to the extent
of their consistency [with the N.A.F.T.A.], provided that where a Party
chooses among equally effective and reasonably available means of
complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is
the least inconsistent with the other provisions of the Agreement'.9
On the other hand, the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law does not contain such
a provision designed specifically for clarifying the complicated
relationship between any of these major M.E.As. and the international
trade law regime: it is only in the Preamble that the W.T.O. addresses the
principle of sustainable development.10 In this respect, however, the
W.T.O. Committee on Trade and Environment ('C.T.E.') - which is newly
0 Article 4, arguably, the most controversial M.E.A. in the context of the G.A.T.T. law.
Cf. The 1991 Bamako Convention (Article 4); the 1989 Lome Convention (Article 39).
For a comprehensive review see K. Kummer, Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes at the Interface ofEnvironment and Trade, (1994), available from the U.N.E.P.
7 See J. Cameron, Mjolo-Thamage and J. Robimson, 'Relationship between
Environmental Agreements and Instruments Related to Trade and Development' in P. H.
Sand, (1992) pp. 475 et seq.
8 Ibid., pp. 487 et seq.
9 Article 104 also states that parties may add to an Annex additional agreements to
which the consistency provisions of Article 104 apply. See also Article 904 regarding
scientific justification for strict environmental regulations; Article 2015 as to the
possibility of some environmental expertise in the D.S.Ps.; Article 1106 regarding
investment incentives.
10 It reads 'allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with
the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment and enhance the means of doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development' (emphasis
added). On the meaning of 'sustainable development' in the context of the W.T.O. see
W. Benedek, 'Implications of the Principle of Sustainable Development, Human Rights
and Good Governance for the GATT/WTO' in K. Ginther (eds.) Sustainable Development
andGoodGovernance, (1995) pp. 274-88.
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established in accordance with the Decision of 14 April 1994 - has played an
active role within the framework of the G.A.T.T./W.T.0.11
At the Meeting of the C.T.E. held in July 1996, Singapore (on behalf of
A.S.E.A.N. countries) put forward an expost or ex ante proposal for creating
a 'multi-year' and 'case-by-case' waiver for trade measures of M.E.As., based
on non-binding guidelines for measures that might be eligible for such
treatment.^2 A.S.E.A.N. pointed out that trade measures that are specifically
to be used in M.E.As. could be recognised on a case-by-case basis as
exceptional circumstances qualifying for a W.T.O. Article IX waiver, subject
to them meeting conditions and criteria including 'necessity', 'least trade
restrictiveness', 'effectiveness', 'proportionality' and the 'degree of
scientific evidence'.13
Members of the W.T.O. Committee have continued inconclusive
discussions with regard to such a question (see further Sections below).14
The purpose of this Chapter is to explore in depth the trade related aspects
of the Montreal Protocol regime. Section II analyses Article 4 trade
measures against non-parties to the Ozone Layer Protocol. Section III
briefly discusses international trade rules governing the G.A.T.T./W.T.O.
regime, though limitations of space do not permit a detailed discussion on
that issue - we will focus rather on the relationship between the well-
known Article XX exceptions in the G.A.T.T. trade law and Article 4 trade
controls of the Ozone Layer Protocol. Section IV then focuses on the legal
conflicts between M.E.As. and the G.A.T.T./W.T.O., including the relationship
between dispute settlement procedures of M.E.As. - the Montreal N.C.P. in
particular - and the W.T.O. dispute settlement system. In deciding which
international treaty obligations should be given priority, it will be
desirable to consider briefly the principles and rules of the 1969 Vienna
11 See e.g. J. Schult, 'The GATT/WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment -
Toward Environmental Reform', 89 A.J.I.L. (1995) pp. 423-39. For a discussion see R.
G. Tarasofsky, 'Ensuring Compatibility between MEAs and GATT/WTO', 7 Y.bk.l.E.L.
(1996) pp. 58-62.
12 PRESS/TE013 (September 1996).
PRESS/TE013 (September 1996). Yet some W.T.O. Members such as the United
States, Switzerland and Canada suggested that the waiver approach would be
inappropriate to resolve legal conflicts of M.E.As. and the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. On this
point Cf. E. U. Petersmann, International and European Trade and Environmental Law
after the Uruguay Round, (1996) p. 43.
14 'The breadth and complexity of the issues covered by the Committee's Work
Programme shows that future work needs to be undertaken on all items of its agenda,
as contained in its report', the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13
December 1996.
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Convention on the Law of Treaties (Section IV(A)). Section V is then
devoted to the main analysis of the relationship between G.A.T.T. Article XX
and the global protection of the ozone layer under the Montreal Protocol.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR
THE TRADERESTRICTIONS OF C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss.
A. The Background of the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol's Article 4:
Resolving the Problem of Non-Participation in the M.E.A. Regime
It is no exaggeration to say that most transboundary or global - or even
purely domestic - environmental problems assume, to a greater or lesser
extent, trade-related aspects. In other words, nowadays the nation state and
its contemporary life-style could not eliminate direct or indirect
dependence on the growing world trade system (i.e. 'interdependence').15
Yet, unlike the above-mentioned cases of species extinction (the 1973
C.I.T.E.S. regime) or illegal hazardous waste disposal (the 1989 Basel
Convention regime), the ultimate cause of ozone depletion is not
necessarily trade transactions in themselves at the bilateral, regional or
international levels. C.F.Cs. or O.D.Ss. in themselves are neither directly
harmful to human health nor natural resources shared by any particular
countries. More correctly, it may be said that the restrictions of
'consumption' and production of C.F.Cs. or other O.D.Ss. within each state -
whether 'developed' or 'developing' - could be considered as the central and
obvious cause of the stratospheric ozone depletion.16
Nonetheless, it is only natural that, in order to control or limit the
proliferation of ozone-depleting substances, members of the international
ozone layer regime needed some kind of trade restrictions on the O.D.Ss.
commonly used in the import/export of industrial products (see
Introduction above). In other words, they therefore needed legally
effective global strategies to surmount knotty problems of the so-called
'free-rider' -X1 in this respect, R. Snape refers to the undeniable fact that
15 'The World has become increasingly interdependent': see J. H. Jackson, The World
Trading System: Law & Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd. edn. (1996)
Chapter 1 esp.; idem (eds.) Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 4th
edn. (1995) Chapter 1 esp.
16 For a discussion see G.A.T.T. 'The 1990-91 GATT Report on International Trade',
(1993) and Section V(D.l) below.
1' In general it means 'to try to make individual gains without contributing to the
collective control of the resource'. See A. Enders and A. Porges, 'Successful
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'Trade measures are not ideal instruments of environmental policy, but
they may often be the only policy options available' to environmentally
motivated countries.18
In concrete, it can be said that, without such trade restrictions, non¬
parties would simply increase their production as ozone parties gradually
phase down their O.D.S. production, and it is possible that unrestricted
imports from non-parties would impair the further development of
C.F.C./O.D.S. substitutes. Furthermore, if industries using O.D.Ss. simply
moved to non-parties and then manufacture such products for export to the
parties, this would eventually nullify the environmental benefits of the
Montreal Protocol regime.19 During the negotiation leading up to the 1987
Montreal Protocol, the United States therefore argued that 'Without
restrictions on imports of ozone-depleting chemicals from non-parties,
there would be a strong incentive for the development of 'pollution
heavens'. 20
It cannot be emphasised too strongly that Article 4 T.R.E.Ms, are
therefore likely to help accommodate much wider participation by
sovereign states: the incorporation of the tough export/import restrictions
in the Montreal Protocol is designed to prevent C.F.C.-producing countries
and potential producers (developing states in particular staying outside the
international regime for ozone) to gain market shares left behind by the
parties to the Protocol.2^ Under the Montreal Protocol regime, possible
'free-riding' non-parties are wholly denied access to international markets
Conventions and Conventional Success: Saving the Ozone Layer' in K. Anderson and R.
Blackhurst (eds.) The Greening of World Trade Issues, (1992) pp. 135 et seq.; Turner
(eds.) Environmental Economics, (1994) pp. 215-16; A. C. Aman, 'The Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer: Providing Prospective Remedies
Relief for potential Damage to the Environmental Commons', in F. Francioni and T.
Scovazzi (eds.) International Responsibility for Environmental Harm, (1991) p. 192.
18 R. H. Snape, 'The Environment, International Trade and Competitiveness', in K.
Anderson and R. Blackhurst (eds.) The Greening ofWorld Trade Issues, (1992) pp. 73-
92 (emphasis added). But Cf. G.A.T.T. 'The 1990-91 GATT Report on International
Trade'.
19 See R. Twum-Barima and L. Campbell, Protecting the Ozone Layer through Trade
Measures, (1994) pp. 51-54; discussion paper submitted by the United States, 'GATT
Considerations and the Ozone Protocol', (4 September, 1987).
29 Ibid. p. 1. See in more detail Chapter III(II.A) above.
21 It is pointed out, for instance, that the threat of economic sanctions by ozone
regime members (such as the United States and the United Kingdom) against Korean
exports seems to have influenced South Korea's 1992 decision to become a party to the
Montreal Protocol regime. See D. Brack, International Trade and the Montreal Protocol,
(1996) pp. 55-56; B. Kingsbury, 'The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, The World Trade
Organisation, and the Liberal Project to Reconceptualize International Law', 6
Y.bk.I.E.L. (1995) p. 29; R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 244.
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for C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss., although many of these controlled chemicals are today
indispensable for high-technology industries, etc. Moreover, it is also
worth noticing that non-parties are denied access to the 'best available,
environmentally safe substitutes and related technologies' in the context of
the Protocol's Financial Mechanism.22 On one view, Article 4 trade
restrictions employed for the purposes of global ozone layer protection can
be seen as environmental 'sanctions' against non-parties to the
international legal regime for ozone.23
For the reasons stated above, it seems right to say that Article 4 of the
Montreal Protocol does not necessarily conform to the maxim pacta tertiis
nec nocent nec prosunt.24 Nevertheless, it is also true at the same time that
because 'a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
State [= a non-party] without its consent',23 in theory, the Montreal
Protocol regime still cannot entirely prevent non-parties from legally
producing any ozone-depleting chemicals.26
B. The Montreal Protocol's Article 4 and 'P.P.M.' related Arguments
Such trade provisions had been contemplated since the first discussions on
an expected protocol to the Vienna Ozone Convention. The fundamental
structure of this article can be seen in a proposal by the United States of
America.27 The G.A.T.T. Secretariat - participating in the 1987 Montreal
Protocol's negotiation28 - rather favourably commented upon the expected
22 As for the Multilateral Ozone Fund see Chapter VI below.
23 On this point see A. Nadelmann, 'Global Prohibition Regime: The Evolution of Norms
in International Society', 44 International Organizations, (1990), suggesting that
political aspects of international regimes tend to reflect the economic/political
interests of the powerful states e.g. the U.S.A. For a discussion see also Chapters
1(111.B) & V(V1) below.
2^ See e.g. I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, (1984) p. 99
et seq.
23 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 34). See also, I.
Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1984), pp. 98 et seq.; I.
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (1990), pp. 622-24; H. Fugita,
International Law, vol. 1 (1992) pp. 82-89 (Japanese).
26 But, in reality, most newly developing countries (= Article 5 L.V.Cs.) - which do not
have necessary technologies to produce C.F.Cs./O.D.S. related industrial products -
would have to decide to join the international ozone layer regime.
27 See UNEP/WG. 167/CPR.7; Discussion paper by the United States 'GATT
Considerations and the Ozone Protocol' (4 September 1987).
28 See Part II of Chapter III(II) above.
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inclusion of Article 4 trade provisions in the ozone layer agreement (see
further Section V(D) below).29
The Montreal Ozone Protocol contains no restrictions on foreign
trade between contracting parties, although the Ozone Protocol seems to
conflict with the terms of the 1989 Basel Convention, about the shipment of
controlled O.D.Ss. such as C.F.Cs. and halons.30
Article 4 of the Protocol, however, requires contracting parties to
prohibit international trade of O.D.Ss. with non-parties and/or non-treaty-
complier. The global strategies prescribed by the Ozone Layer Protocol are:
(i) trade in controlled substances by parties with states that are not parties
to the Protocol:
(ii) trade in products containing controlled substances:
(iii) trade in products produced with but not containing controlled
substances, and;
(iv) the export of relevant technologies.
It is said that Article 4 'constitutes a highly sophisticated and well
graduated scheme' (i.e. from O.D.Ss. themselves to products containing
O.D.Ss. or products produced with O.D.Ss.).31 Yet parties are not necessarily
required to report on the implementation of this Article (see in detail
Chapter V(VII.A.3) below).
The Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol (as amended in London,
Copenhagen, Vienna and Montreal) envisages that, after January 1990, the
import of major O.D.Ss. in Groups II and II of Annex A (i.e. C.F.Cs. and
halons) from non-parties was to be totally banned (Article 4(1)), and
import of O.D.Ss. in Annex B was also banned from January 1993 (Article
4(lbis)). Within one year of the date of entry into force of the 1992
Copenhagen Amendment (i.e. June 1994), imports of any controlled
substances in Group II of Annex C such as hydrobromofluorocarbons from
non-parties must be banned (Article 4(lter)). Similarly, the import of the
29 See also R. Twum-Barima and L. Campbell, Protecting the Ozone Layer through
Trade Measures, (1994) endnote no. 113.
39 See Decision V/24 and Decision VII/31. It is agreed, however, that recycled C.F.Cs.
and halons meeting usable purity specifications prescribed by appropriate
institutions (such as International Standards Organisation ('I.S.O.')) would not be
considered as 'wastes' under the Basel Convention.
31 W. Lang, 'Trade Restrictions as a Means of Enforcing Compliance with International
Environmental Law' in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic
Mechanisms as Viable Means? (1996) p. 270. In this respect, Prof. Lang argues that
drafters of Article 4 were aware of the so-called G.A.T.T. 'necessity' argument.
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O.D.Ss. in Annex E (i.e. methyl bromide) was to be prohibited within one
year of the date of the entry into force of the 1997 Montreal Amendment.
Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol also requires parties to ban the
export of the O.D.Ss. in Annex A (from January 1993); O.D.Ss. in Annex B
(from August 1993); ODSs in Annex C (from June 1995) and; O.D.Ss. in Annex
E (one year after the entry into force of the 1997 Montreal Amendment).
With regard to restrictions on products containing O.D.Ss. in Annex A, as
required by Article 4(3), the 1991 Third Ozone Meeting of the Parties
adopted a list as Annex D to the Protocol.32
Further, it is important to notice that Article 4(4) of the Protocol
provides that the parties shall determine the feasibility of banning or
restricting the import of products produced with, but not containing,
controlled O.D.Ss. from non-parties to the Protocol.33 The 1993 Fifth
Meeting of the Parties in Bangkok adopted in this respect a decision which
states 'it is not feasible to impose a ban or restriction on the import of such
products [i.e., products produced with, but not containing, controlled
substances] under the Protocol at this stage'.34 This means that the risk of
a complaint as to the use of P.P.Ms, as trade barriers has therefore been
greatly diminished - or even 'vanished'.35 Yet some developed countries
32 Products contain (i) automobile and truck air conditioning units, (ii) domestic and
commercial refrigeration and air conditioning/heat pump equipment, (iii) aerosol
products, except medical aerosols, (iv) portable fire extinguisher, (v) insulation
boards, panels and pipe covers and (vi) pre-polymers. Regarding this issue the 1985
Vienna Ozone Meeting adopted Decision VII/32 ('Control of Export and Import of
Products and Equipment Containing Substances Listed in Annexes A and B of the
Montreal Protocol' in UNEP/OzL.7/12, p. 43). For a comprehensive analysis see D.
Brack, International Trade and the Montreal Protocol, (1996) pp. 46-47.
33 See also Articles (4bis) & (4ter), amended in London and Copenhagen. Ozone-
depleting substances such as C.F.C.-ll and C.F.C.-113 used as solvents for cleaning
semiconductor chips are related to such environmental P.P.Ms. During the Montreal
Protocol negotiation Japan initially insisted that C.F.C.-l 13 should be excluded from
the list of controlled substances since it is indispensable for the technology of
manufacturing computers. However, since it was finally decided through the Montreal
negotiations that parties can organise lexible reduction schedule within each of the
two classes of controlled substances (i.e. C.F.Cs. and halons), Japan's objection was
resolved (see Chapter 111(111.B.3) above). Enders and Porges suggest that products
produced with but not containing C.F.Cs. amount to sixteen per cent of world trade.
See A. Enders and A. Porges, 'Successful Conventions and Conventional Success: Saving
the Ozone Layer', in K. Anderson and K. Blackhurst, The Greening the World Trade
Issues, (1992) p. 132.
34 See Decision V/17 in UNEP/OzL.Pro.5/12. See also D. Brack, International Trade
and the Montreal Protocol, (1996) pp. 48-49; E. U. Petersmann, International and
European Trade and Environmental Lawafter the Uruguay Round, (1996) p. 43..
35 W. Lang, 'Trade Restrictions as a Means of Enforcing Compliance with International
Environmental Law' in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Enforcing Environmental Standards, (1996) p.
273.
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such as Finland have banned the import of certain products containing or
made with C.F.Cs (Decree no. 891 of 24 September 1992). Finland has given
notification of this decision in accordance with G.A.T.T. rules.36
G.A.T.T. Article XX environmental exceptions are generally
applicable to Tike products'37 that directly address characteristics of
products, and not the production or processing of products ('P.P.M.')3^ in
the exporting countries. This argument is primarily based on G.A.T.T.
Article III, which imposes the national treatment obligation on domestic
taxes or standards applied to imports. Article 111(4) reads:
'The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use'.3^
In the view of some legal authors, since Article 4(4) of the Montreal Ozone
Layer Protocol is closely related not only to the characteristics of products
but also to the methods used in P.P.Ms., such measures are therefore in
breach of the related G.A.T.T. obligations.^ Assuming that products which
use C.F.Cs. in the production process are not distinguishable from products
using other 'ozone safe' P.P.M., we could say that they would fall in the Tike
36 See R. Twum-Barima and L. B. Campbell, Protecting the Ozone Layer through Trade
Measures: Reconciling the Trade Provisions of the Montreal Protocol and the Rules of
the GATT, (1994) p. 104.
37 In the G.A.T.T. law there is no precise definition of this term. The meaning of the
word 'like product' would be clarified only in a concrete context. See J. H. Jackson,
World Trade and the Law of GATT, (1969) pp. 259 et seq.; V. Rege, 'GATT Law and
Environment-Related Issues Affecting the Trade of Developing Countries', 28 J.W.T.
(1994) pp. 159-62: G.A.T.T. Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th edn. (1994) p. 35.
See also the Panel Report on 'Japan - Custom Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on
Imported Wine and Alcoholic Beverages', B.I.S.D. 34S/83, para. 5.6.
33 On this theme see in particular, M. Schlagenhof, 'Trade Measures Based on
Environmental Processes and Production Methods', 30 J.W.T. (1995) pp. 123-55; T. J.
Schoenbaum, 'International Trade and Protection of the Environment', 91 A.J.I.L.
(1997) pp. 288-301; S. Murase, Perspectives from International Economic Law on
Transnational Environmental Issues, 253 Hague Recueil (1995) pp. 336 et seq.
3^ G.A.T.T. Panel frequently offers interpretations of G.A.T.T. Article III: see e.g. the
Italy-Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery', adopted October 23
1958, B.I.S.D. 7S/60; 'United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930', adopted
November 7 1989, B.I.S.D. 36S/345.
40 See e.g. M. Schlagenhoff, 'Trade Measures Based on Environmental Process and
Production Methods', 30 J.W.T. (1995) pp. 147 et seq.
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products' concept of the G.A.T.T.41 With regard to the G.A.T.T. case law, it is
worth noting that the Tuna Panels distinguished between a regulation
regarding product characteristics and a regulation related to a production
process. Significantly, the Panels held that Article III covered the former,
but not the latter.42 Perhaps supporters of the G.A.T.T. Panel decisions may
argue that restrictions on international trade with products produced with
(but not containing) controlled substances are by no means 'necessary'
trade-related environmental measures.
Under paragraph (5) of Article 4, each party undertakes to the
'fullest practicable extent' to discourage the export to any non-parties to
the Protocol of technology for producing and utilising controlled
substances in Annexes A, B, C (Group II) and E. Article 4 of the Protocol also
requires parties to discourage the export of technology for producing and
for utilising controlled substances (Article 4(5)), and to refrain from
providing new subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance for the
export to non-parties of products, equipment, plants or technology which
would facilitate the production of controlled substances (Article 4(6)).
However, it should be noticed that certain exceptions are allowed for
products, equipment, plants or technology that could improve the
containment, recovery, recycling or destruction of controlled substances,
promote the development of alternative substances, or otherwise
contribute to the reduction of emissions of these controlled substances
(Article 4(7)).
Article 4A provides that where a party is unable to cease production
of O.D.Ss. for domestic consumption, it shall ban the export of used, recycled
and reclaimed quantities of the O.D.Ss., other than for the purpose of
destruction: this paragraph applies 'without prejudice to the operation of
41 See Ibid., pp. 148 et seq.; A. Enders and A. Poegers, 'Successful Conventions and
Conventional Success: Saving the Ozone Layer' in Anderson and Blackhurst (eds.)
Greening World Trade Issues, (1992) pp. 134 et seq. It can be also assumed that such
P.P.M. might invite discrimination in certain elements of trade competitiveness, such
as low labour costs. See 'Relationship between Environmental Agreements and Trade
and Development Instruments', p. 488.
42 'United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna' (i.e. 'Tuna case IP), reproduced in
30 I.L.M. (1991) p. 1594, paras. 5.8-5.9; 'United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna' (i.e. 'Tuna case I'). B.I.S.D. 39S/155, reproduced in 33 I.L.M. (1994) p. 839,
paras. 5.11-15. Provided tuna imports from Mexico were polluted, unsafe, or harmed
humans or animals, there is little question that the United States could impose a
regulation that is practically equal to that imposed on their own products. However,
the United States' prohibition of imports of tuna and its product caught by vessels of
Mexico was based on humanitarian considerations, i.e. incidental killing of dolphins
that is caused by the use of 'purse sein nets' in fishing for tuna. The panel said that
such incidental taking of dolphin could not possibly affect tuna as a product'.
155
The Ozone Layer Regime and the GATT/WTO Trade Law Regime
Article 11 of the Convention and the non-compliance procedure developed
under Article 8 of the Protocol' (Article 4A(2)). Finally, it is also decided
that, by January 2000 or within three months of the date of entry into force
of the 1997 Montreal Amendment, each party shall establish and implement
a system for licensing the import/export of new, used, recycled and
reclaimed O.D.Ss. in Annexes A, B, C and E (Article 4B).
in. THE G.A.T.T./W.T.O. TRADE LAW
The G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law, consisting of substantive, procedural and
institutional rules, is the specialised branch of international economic law,
which is part of public international law.43 It is often argued in legal
literature that the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. has its own flexible 'jurisprudence' and in
a certain sense the trade law regime may be seen as a 'self-contained
system' in the context of general international law.44 However, strictly
speaking, the question whether the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. (trade law) is self-
contained or not depends largely on the particular context in which the
term 'self-contained' is used.45 It is important to note that recent reports
by the panels and the W.T.O. Dispute Settlement Body frequently refer to the
customary international law rules codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (e.g. the U.S. Standards for Gasoline case).46
A. The G.A.T.T./W.T.O. Trade law
To put it plainly, the central aim of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law is to encourage
the world trading system. In this regard the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. is vitally
43 See Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement (1994) Chapter 2 p. 16 (Japanese), noting
the so-called 'constitutional functions' of 'International Economic Law' within nation
states. See also E. U. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional
Problems of International Economic Law, (1991) cited in ibid, footnote no. 12. On the
term 'International Economic Law' see in general J. H. Jackson, The World Trading
System, 2nd edn. (1997) pp. 25-26; M. Matsushita, International Economic Law, (1988)
pp. 1-6 (Japanese).
44 See P. J. Kuyper, 'The Law of GATT as a Special Field of International Law', 25
N.Y.bk.I.L, (1994) pp. 227-57. On the concept of 'self-contained' regimes see Chapter
I( IV) above.
45 Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1994) Chapter 6 p. 161 & its endnote 355
(Japanese). See also the D.S.U. (Article 3(2)), saying that 'The Members recognise that
it [i.e. the W.T.O.'s settlement system] serves ... to clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law' (emphasis added).
46 See Section IV(A) below.
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important in creating a degree of certainty for international traders. The
G.A.T.T.47 is the principal multilateral treaty for trade in goods supported
by a series of over two hundred agreements, protocols, process-verbaux
and statements. It is often said that 'only ten people in the world
understand it [i.e., G.A.T.T.], and they are not telling anybody.'48
It is certain that environmental protection was not regarded as a
serious 'international' issue when the G.A.T.T. trade law was drafted in the
post-war periods. Therefore, as with the U.N. Charter,49 it contains no
explicit reference to (global) environmental issues. Rather, the original
negotiators were concerned largely with free trade law instruments that
are designed to promote 'better relations among nations', i.e. world peace
that is based on economic well-being.50
B. The Governing Economic Principles of the G.A.T.T. Law
G.A.T.T. law is designed to regulate multilateral trade mainly by reducing
tariffs and other barriers to trade, and by using the principle of the
(unconditional) 'most-favoured-nation treatment' ('M.F.N.').5! The G.A.T.T.
47 The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement established the World Trade Organisation
(W.T.O.) as a successor to the G.A.T.T.: the W.T.O. thus incorporated the G.A.T.T. 1947
and the 'G.A.T.T. 1994' was thus newly established. The G.A.T.T. 1994 is legally
distinct from G.A.T.T. 1947 (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for
signature 30 October 1947: see Chapter 1(1)). To be precise, once all contracting
parties to the G.A.T.T. 1947 have become Members of the W.T.O. Agreement, the
G.A.T.T. 1947 could be considered to be terminated and states would be governed
exclusively by the W.T.O. Agreement (a country joining the W.T.O. is to adhere to all
and not just one or some of its agreements). Even if one argues that the G.A.T.T. 1947
would not be terminated, it would remain applicable only to the extent that it is
compatible with the W.T.O. Agreement. However, a country which is a signatory of the
G.A.T.T. 1947 and which chooses not to join the W.T.O. would remain a contracting
party of the G.A.T.T. 1947. See Article 11(4) of the Agreement Establishing the W.T.O.
See also Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1994) pp. 6-7 (Japanese); G. Marceau,
'Transition from GATT to WTO: A Most Pragmatic Operation', 29 J.W.T. (1995) pp.
150-51.
48 Statement by a American jurist, Gardner cited in A. Cassese, International Law in a
Divided World, (1986) p. 340. In this respect see also Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute
Settlement, (1994) Chapter 1 p. 2 & its footnotes no. 8-9 (Japanese). As to the
complexities of G.A.T.T. Articles see in particular J. H. Jackson, World Trade and the
Law ofGATT, (1969) Chapter 1 esp.
49 On this issue see P. Birnie 'Environmental Protection and Development', 20
Melbourne U.L.R. (1995) pp. 66-67.
50 W. J. Davey, 'The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview' in Handbookof
GATT, pp. 10-11.
5^ Article 1 reads 'any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties' (Article 1(1), emphasis
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trade law therefore obliges contracting parties to treat other G.A.T.T.
members at least as well as it treats any other country with regard to
imports or exports. In other words, G.A.T.T. contracting parties are to
accord non-discriminatory treatment to goods coming from the territories
of other contracting parties. In addition, the principle of legal
'reciprocity' forms the basis of this M.F.N, treatment.5^
It is interesting to note that the International Law Commission
('LL.C.') once observed that the legal principle of the M.F.N., which has
existed over several centuries,53 is not an established rule of customary
international law: this means that the principle of the M.F.N, must be based
specifically on bilateral/multilateral economic treaty law.54 In this
respect, distinguished international (trade) lawyers, Georg
Schwarzenberger and John H. Jackson take a similar view.55
To take a shortsighted and surface view of the Ozone Layer Protocol,
the restrictions on international trade with 'free-riding' non-parties under
Article 4 of the legal ozone regime seem to be in breach of the principle of
the 'multilateral' M.F.N., simply because it provides that trade with non¬
parties must be banned or more severely restricted than trade between
states parties.56
The G.A.T.T. trade law further provides that imports shall be treated
no worse than domestically produced goods under internal taxation or
regulatory measures ( 'National Treatment on Internal Taxation and
Regulation': Article III).57 Its general purpose is to ensure that
added). See e.g. G. Schwarzenberger, The Frontiers of International Law, (1962) pp.
225-26: idem, 'The Most-Favoured-Nation Standard in British State Practice', 22
B.Y.bk.I.L. (1945) pp. 96-121: J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System, (1989),
Chapter 6: 'The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause', 2 J.W.T. (1968) pp. 581-86. See also
'Belgium-Family Allowances', adopted on 7 November 1952, B.l.S.D. IS/59.
57 There are two types of reciprocity, however: discriminatory and non¬
discriminatory. The former is concerned chiefly with bilateral agreements.
53 See G. Schwarzenberger, 'The Most-Favoured-Nation Standard in British Practice',
22 B.Y.bk.I.L (1945) pp. 96-121.
54 See S. Zamora, 'Is There Customary Economic Law?', 32 G.Y.bk.I.L. (1989) p. 29 & its
footnote no. 97.
55 See e.g. G. Schwarzenberger, 'Equality and Discrimination in International
Economic Law', 25 Yearbook of World Affairs, (1971) p. 163: J. H. Jackson, The World
Trading System, (1989) p. 23 & p. 134.
56 See e.g. U.N.E.P. The Use of Trade Measures in Selected Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, (1995) p. 79.
57 See 'W. J. Davey, 'The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview' in Handbook
ofGATT, pp. 28-35; G.A.T.T. Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th edn. (1994) pp. 116
et seq. See also 'United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances',
adopted 17 June 1987, B.I.S.D. 34S/136. However, Part II (Article 1II-XXI1I) of the
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taxes/regulations are not imposed to afford protection to the domestic
industries of the importing country. The 1973 C.I.T.E.S.'s import/export ban
based on a finding of detriment may be regarded as the violation of both
the M.F.N, principle and the principle of national treatment, provided that
the parties fail to regulate domestic or internal consumption.5 8
In the context of environmental protection, what has to be noted is
that G.A.T.T. Article XI provides for the general elimination of quantitative
restrictions ('Q,Rs.').59 It has been suggested that this provision is the
subject of more G.A.T.T. dispute panel reports than any other.60 Many
international trade lawyers have pointed out that M.E.As. with global trade
controls that distinguish between parties to the agreements and non¬
parties, such as the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol, the 1989 Basel
Convention and the 1973 C.I.T.E.S., might violate the general prohibition
against quantitative restrictions provided in G.A.T.T. Article XI. This is a
point to which we shall return later.
G.A.T.T. Article XVI deals with subsidies which are tolerated if they do
not harm the export interests of other countries.61 Some commentators
point out that the Montreal Multilateral Fund,62 which provides
'environmental subsidies' for developing country parties, may be in
violation of a basic G.A.T.T. principle that aims to eliminate subsidies as
undesirable barriers to international trade.63
Generally speaking, the newly established W.T.O. deals with not only
tariff barriers but non-tariff barriers to foreign trade, subsidies, trade in
services, intellectual property and other trade policies. The W.T.O. trade law
includes: (i) the Agreements on Trade in Goods (this includes G.A.T.T. 1994);
(ii) the Agreement on Trade in Services (G.A.T.S.); (iii) the Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights including trade in
agreement is subject to 'grandfather rights'. See e.g. J. H. Jackson, (1995) pp. 300-
301; idem, World Trade and the LawofGATT, (1969) Chapter 12.
5 8 See footnote no. 5 above.
50 See Section V(A) below. On this theme see e.g. G.A.T.T. Guide to GATT Law and
Practice, 6th edn. (1994) pp. 287 et seq.: J. H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of
GATT, (1969) Chapter 13; T. Murray and I. Walter, 'Quantitative Restrictions,
Developing Countries, and GATT', 11 J.W.T. (1977) pp. 391-421.
60 W. J. Davey, 'The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview' in Handbook of
GATT, pp. 41-42.
61 See in general W. J. Davey, 'The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview' in
Handbook ofGATT, pp. 59-62 & its footnote no. 201.
62 See Chapter VI below.
63 S. N. Carlson, 'The Montreal Protocol's Environmental Subsidies and GATT: A
Needed Reconciliation', 29 Texas I.L.J. (1994). Cf. R. Twum-Barima and L. Campbell,
Protecting the Ozone Layer through Trade Measures, (1994) pp. 77-79.
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counterfeit goods (T.R.I.Ps.)64; (iv) the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (1994 W.T.O.
Understanding 'D.S.U.'); and (v) the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.65
However, these W.T.O. obligations are subject to many exceptions.
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. members could justify the breach of the principles of the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law by relying on them.66 Examples of those
exceptions include: (i) the waiver authority of Article XXV para. 5; (ii) the
escape clause of Article XIX that specifies conditions of emergency action
on imports of particular products; (iii) Article XII-XIV addressing balance
of payments problems; (iv) Article XXIV relating to customs unions and free
trade areas; and (v) Article XX and Article XXI, mainly dealing with general
exceptions for national health and safety regulations and national security.
The point to observe here is that some of these G.A.T.T. exceptions are
directly or indirectly related to the protection of the ozone layer. For
reasons that we shall go into later, it seems reasonable to suppose that, as
far as the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol is concerned, its T.R.E.Ms, for
O.D.Ss. could be justified on grounds of G.A.T.T. Article XX exception!s).
C. The G.A.T.T. Case-Law67
With regard to the G.A.T.T. case-law, Professor Shinya Murase has observed
that '[I]n studying an instrument such as GATT, we should take "common
law approach" rather than "legalist" or "management" approaches, as was
6^ The T.R.I.Ps. (Article 27(2)) is concerned with the Biodiversity Convention (Article
16: Access to and Transfer of Technology).
65 See in more detail G.A.T.T., The Results of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts, (1994); E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement System, (1997) Chapter 1(5); J. H. Jackson (eds.) Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations, 3rd edn. (1995) Chapter 6(3).
66 See also J. H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law ofGATT, (1969) Chapters 21 & 28
esp.; B. Kingsbury, 'Environment and Trade: The GATT/WTO Regime in the
International Legal System' in A. Boyle (ed.), Environmental Regulation and Economic
Growth, (1994) pp. 217-19.
67 The G.A.T.T. case law regarding environmental matters include e.g. 'United States-
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna' (i.e. 'Tuna case I'), not adopted, B.I.S.D. 39S/155
reproduced in 30 l.L.M. (1991) p. 1594; 'United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna' (i.e. 'Tuna case II'), not adopted, D.S.29/R reproduced in 33 7.L.M. (1994) p. 839;
'Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes', adopted on
7 November 1990, B.I.S.D. 37S/200; 'United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and
Tuna Products from Canada', adopted on 22 February 1982, B.I.S.D. 29S/91; 'Canada-
Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon', adopted on 22 March
1988, B.I.S.D. 35S/98; 'United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline', adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/29. These cases are briefly summarised
in E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) Chapter 3.
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once mentioned by Dr. Frieder Roessler, then Director of the GATT Legal
Office. The reality of the GATT law cannot be well understood by simply
reading the statutes. . . Rather, the GATT law is largely an accumulation of
panel findings that leads to the continuous development of substantive
GATT law'.68 In a sense, G.A.T.T./W.T.O. panel decisions that have evolved in
its legal system could be regarded as 'subsequent practice in the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation' stated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.69
In addition, it should be pointed out that the reasoning advanced by
reports of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. dispute settlement panels or the D.S.B. does not
necessarily apply to future transnational disputes over the G.A.T.T./W.T.O.,
simply because, in principle, these precedents do not produce a legally
binding effect. Yet, just like other national and international tribunals,
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. panels frequently refer to the previous panel decisions with
a view to resolving trade disputes.70
It is interesting to note that, in the Japan Alcohol Taxes case of 4
October 1996, by rejecting the view of the Panel that adopted panel reports
'constituting subsequent practice in the specific case', the Appellate Body
described panel reports as 'an important part of the GATT acquis', creating
'legitimate expectations among WTO members':71 this seems to fall short of
the 'subsequent practice' principle and thus indicates that the Body may
wish to retain some flexibility in G.A.T.T. case law.72
Lastly, it should be noted that the 1994 Agreement provides that 'The
Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive
68 See S. Murase, Perspectives from International Economic Law on Transnational
Environmental Issues, 253 Hague Recueil (1995) p. 329. See also Y. Iwasawa, WTO
Dispute settlement, (1994) pp. 3 &18 (Japanese).
69 See further Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1994) pp. 138 et seq. (Japanese)
70 See J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 2nd edn. (1997) p. 122, noting that 'A
common-law lawyer would find himself very much at home in GATT legal discussions'.
W. Davey notes in this respect that reports by the new Appellate Body will often be
relied upon by future panels and effectively constitute 'fairly stable body of
precedent'. W. J. Davey, 'The WTO/GATTWorld Trading System' in Handbook ofGATT,
pp. 19-20.
71 See the discussion in 'Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages', adopted on 1 November
1996, WT/DS8, 10 & 11/AB/R, Section E.
72 Thus its decision disagreed with the above-mentioned view of Prof. Murase. Cf. W.
J. Davey, 'The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview' in Handbook ofGATT,
p. 20. Cf. E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) pp.
111-17.
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authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral
Trade Agreement'.73
IV. THE LEGAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN M.E.As. AND
THEGAT.T./W.T.O. TRADE LAW
In Chapter I(IV) above, it is argued that the international regime for ozone
is a multilateral treaty of a unique erga omnes character: however, does
this mean at the same time that contracting parties to the ozone layer
regime - most of the members are also contracting parties to the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law - can completely ignore G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law
obligations that are also widely accepted in the international community?
In order to effectively 'operate' erga omnes, they would have to minimise
(at least) expected legal conflicts in the 'practice' of public international
law of the environment (this is the so-called 'bridge-building' between
environment and trade law regimes74).
It is also important to note that, apart from the ozone layer regime,
most M.E.As. do not have such legal character erga omnes.75
A. The Legal Conflicts Between M.E.As. and the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. Trade Law
In the 1996 panel report on U.S. Standards for Gasoline, the W.T.O. Appellate
Body noted that Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 'forms part of the "customary rules of interpretation of public
international law'" and that the G.A.T.T. law 'is not to be read in clinical
isolation from public international law'.76 The 1969 Treaty for treaties has
therefore proved in practice relevant to the international trade law of a
highly technical character.77
73 Article IX(2), (emphasis added).
74 See W. Lang, 'Is the Protection of the Environment a Challenge to the International
Trading System?', Georgetown l.E.L.R. 7(1995) pp. 463-83.
73 See W. Lang, 'International Environmental Agreements and the GATT: The Case of
the Montreal Protocol', 3-4 Wirtschaftspolitische Blatter (1993) p. 371, noting that
'drafters of environmental treaties should be invited to consider/reconsider the trade
impact of certain measures written into the respective instruments'.
76 See the discussion in 'United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline' (the Venezuela Gas case), adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, Section B.
77 In this respect see also Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995) p. 117 esp.; E.
U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, (1997) pp. Ill et seq.; J. H.
Jackson, The World Trading System, 2nd edn. (1997) p. 127.
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Legal principles and rules provided for in the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties supply basic guidelines on problems
posed by successive treaties or incompatible treaties concerned with the
same subject matter. It may be said that the T.R.E.Ms. provided for in the
Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol and the G.A.T.T. deal with such 'same subject
matter' of international trade restrictions of certain goods (i.e. controlled
C.F.Cs. and O.D.Ss.).
Article 30 of the 1969 Vienna Convention lays down (i) the
hierarchical principle and the principles of (ii) lex prior and (iii) lex
posterior:7^
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and
obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter
shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provision of that other treaty prevail.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one;
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3
[that is, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible
with those of the later treaty];
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the
treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and
obligations.
The principle of lex specialis - i.e. more specific treaties take priority over
earlier ones - is also important in this context (note; it is not provided for
in Article 30).79 In addition, we should notice here that the decision as to
which treaty is the earlier depends on the date of adoption, and not that of
its entry into force.
7& See I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1984) pp. 96-98.
79 Ibid. p. 96.
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Table no. Ill: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN M.E.As. AND THE
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. TRADE LAW^
COUNTRY 'A' IS A PARTY TO:
MEAs WIO MEAs+WTO [Non-Party]
COUNTRY MEAs XI X2 X3 -
'B' IS A WIO X4 X5 X6 -
PARTY TO: MEAs+WTO X7 X8 X9 -
[Non-Party] - - - -
As the Table III illustrates, types of potential trade-environmental
disputes multiply enormously. Furthermore, the number of both M.E.As.
and independent sovereign states is likely to grow in the international
community. With regard to the Ozone Layer Protocol, since most of the
members of the ozone layer regime are also parties to the G.A.T.T./W.T.O., it
may safely be assumed that the potential legal conflicts are likely to
happen in the case of X9, rather than X2 or X4.81 In this connection,
Professor E. U. Petersmann submits the following three legal situations: (i)
disputes between W.T.O. members over the W.T.O. consistency of M.E.A. trade
measures accepted by both parties to the disputes, (ii) disputes between
W.T.O. members over the W.T.O. consistency of M.E.A. trade measures
accepted by only one party and (iii) disputes between W.T.O. members over
trade measures not specifically regulated in M.E.As.82
Before the establishment of the W.T.O., under Article 30 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the international ozone treaties
were given priority over G.A.T.T. 1947 obligations for those states that are
parties to both agreements. Therefore, those treaty provisions that were
likely to be violations of the G.A.T.T. principles generally formed
exceptions to the rules (see Table III: X2, X7 and X9). It thus meant that only
if the G.A.T.T. parties were not parties to the 1985 Vienna Convention and
8^ See N. Iwata, 'Environmental Problems and Trade Disputes in the WTO System', 6
Trade Journal, (1996) p. 50 (Japanese).
It assumed that the countries are parties to both G.A.T.T. 1994 and the W.T.O.
Agreement. In XI, X3 and X7, parties should refer to M.E.As. In X5, X6 and X8, parties
can settle disputes by referring to the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law. In X2 and X4, it is
actually difficult to rely on either M.E.As. or G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law. See the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 30 (4)).
8^ Yet it may be true that, as Canada pointed out in a meeting of the WTO Committee on
Trade and Environment, disputes between parties and non-parties had the potential to
become a more important issue. PRESS/TE008.
82 E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) pp. 132-34.
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the Montreal Ozone Protocol (see Table III: X4, X5, X8 or 'Non-Party'), they
were allowed to hold prior rights to the G.A.T.T. incompatible provisions.
However, in 1994 the W.T.O. formally incorporated the G.A.T.T. 1947
(see Section III(A) above). The 'G.A.T.T. 1994' was thus newly established
and CONTRACTING PARTIES (not 'Members' as such) effectively withdraw
from the original 'G.A.T.T. 1947'. They formally became 'members' of the
'G.A.T.T. law 1994'. In this context it would be possible to argue that the
situation has been completely reversed. This means that the 1994
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law now prevails over all earlier M.E.As. in accordance with
the principle of lex posterior {see Table III: X6, X8 and X9).
Nevertheless, it should also be noted - as I strongly emphasised in
this thesis - that international environmental treaty regimes have a
dynamic character - just like the international ozone layer regime, they
are in many cases subject to periodic review, future amendments and
adjustments that may be often extensive.83 It is for this reason that
Conferences/Meetings of the Parties have played a central role in the
development of international environmental regimes (see Chapter 1(1) and
Chapter II(III.D.2)).
In conclusion, it is not to be denied that conflicts between the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. legal regime and M.E.A. regimes cannot be easily solved by
traditional legal principles such as lex prosterior or lex specialis, just
mentioned above.84 A simple example will be that, whilst M.E.A. provisions
allowing trade restrictions are certainly more 'specific' and 'technical'
than G.A.T.T. Article XX environmental exceptions, it is also certain that
these environment-related exceptions must be read in context together
with other relevant rules of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law regime.85 In
addition, as exceptional cases, some treaty rules contained e.g. in the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (i.e. 'T.B.T.') or other
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law instruments can be more specific than the T.E.R.Ms.
contained in M.E.A.s.86
83 See Chapter I & Part I of Chapter III(IV.C-F) esp. above.
84 The same opinion is expressed in R. G. Tarasofsky, 'Ensuring Compatibility between
MEAs and GATT/WTO', 7 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1996) p. 65.
85 On this point see e.g. 'United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline', adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS/AB/R, Section B ('relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources').
8^ See ibid., p. 63.
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As Professor W. Lang observes, it will be true that:
'[T]rade and environment disputes in general would probably need some special kind
of overarching jurisdiction in which the different legal regimes [i.e. ozone and G.A.T.T.
regimes] could be considered together and applied in a balanced way'.8^
B. The Relationship Between M.E.A. Dispute Settlement Procedures and
the W.T.O. Dispute Settlement System: the Montreal N.C.P. or the W.T.O.
Dispute Settlement Procedures?
There are many problems as to a legal hierarchy between M.E.A. dispute
settlement procedures and the W.T.O. dispute settlement system.88
(1) General Discussions
Some commentators argue, for instance, that potential legal conflicts
between M.E.As. and the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. should be decided in their entirety
by an authoritative international tribunal, e.g. the International Court of
Justice ('EC.J.').89 It has been suggested that seeking an Advisory Opinion
from the I.C.J, would be 'attractive especially as regards systematic
problems'.90
It is generally agreed in a limited political forum, i.e. the C.T.E., that
an environment-related trade dispute between an M.E.A. party and an
M.E.A. non-party that is a member of the W.T.O. should be addressed by a
W.T.O. dispute setdement panel.91 It is certain that when parties to a W.T.O.
trade dispute are also M.E.A. parties, their right to the W.T.O. dispute
8^ w. Lang, 'Trade Restrictions as a Means of Enforcing Compliance with International
Environmental Law' in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Enforcing Environmental Standards, (1996) p.
282.
88 For a comprehensive discussion of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. settlement system, see from
among a considerable literature, Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995),
Japanese: E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO System: Internationa] Law, International
Organisations and Dispute Settlement, (1997).
89 As with the cases of M.E.As., however, disputes involving the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law
has so far never been brought to the I.C.J. See J. H. Jackson, The World Trading
System, 2nd edn. (1997) p. 124; Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995) Chapter 3
p. 55 & its footnotes no. 95-97 (Japanese).
90 See R. G. Tarasofsky, 'Ensuring Compatibility between MEAs and GATT/WTO', 7
Y.bk.l.E.L. (1996) p. 71.
91 See 'WTO Trade and Environment Bulletin', No. 3 (22 May 1995).
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settlement system is not to be denied.92 However, it is important to note
that at the C.T.E., a number of countries have argued that (i) the W.T.O.
settlement procedures should not be overburdened, and (ii) the M.E.A.
dispute settlement process should be 'exhausted' before a dispute is brought
to the W.T.O.'s settlement mechanism.93
(2) The Formal N.C.P. or the W.T.O. Dispute Settlement Procedures?
To discuss all the questions submitted by the W.T.O. legal adviser Professor E.
U. Petersmann is certainly beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis, having
as it does the limited purposes stated in the Introduction.94 However, as
many delegations at the C.T.E. meetings suggested, it might be ideal that
environment-related disputes (e.g. between W.T.O. members which are
M.E.A. parties or non-parties) should first be dealt with by M.E.A. dispute
settlement procedures, thus not by the more 'judicial' W.T.O. settlement
mechanism,95 particularly if the M.E.A. contains a flexible dispute
settlement procedure, i.e. the non-compliance procedure ('N.C.P.').
Only two points are noted here in the context of the non-compliance
regime of the Montreal Protocol type (Article 8/Decisions).96:
In the first place, it can be possible to argue that the settlement of
M.E.A./W.T.O. related trade disputes by the formal non-compliance
procedure would be 'politically' feasible.97 In the Montreal N.C.P. model,
non-parties to the M.E.A.98 - particularly non-parties in non-compliance
with the T.R.E.Ms. - are likely to be allowed to participate in the meetings of
92 In this context, at the Third Meeting of the W.T.O.'s C.T.E., some delegations - such
as Columbia - suggested that W.T.O. Members had to maintain their right of submitting
to the W.T.O. dispute settlement mechanism any conflicts which might arise as a result
of an environmental measure (PRESS/TE008). See also E. U. Petersmann, The
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) pp. 132-33.
93 In this connection, the delegations of Norway rightly observe that the issue of non¬
parties could be problematic, especially if dispute settlement procedures of M.E.As.
were insufficient - efficient dispute settlement mechanisms should be developed
within M.E.A. regimes. See PRESS/TE008.
9^ See E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) pp. 132-
34.
95 This means that the formal N.C.P. presently has many political aspects, rather than
judicial ones (see 'Russia's Non-Compliance Case' in Chapter V(VIll) below).
9^ See in detail Chapter V below.
97 Cf. R. G. Tarasofsky, 'Ensuring Compatibility between MEA and GATT/WTO', 7
Y.bk.l.E.L. (1996) pp. 70-71.
98 That is, even in case of disputes between W.T.O. members over the W.T.O.
consistency of a particular M.E.A.'s provisions for trade accepted by only one party.
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the standing Implementation Committee." Constructive discussions within
this international conciliation body could potentially contribute to
amicably settling/avoiding this kind of T.R.E.M.-related dispute.
As a precondition, in order to supply the internally specialised
institutions of the ozone regime with impartial and workable advice, the
U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat - as a group of technical experts - should
mutually co-operate with the W.T.O. Secretariat and other secretariats of
international institutions in various fields. Undeniably, the Ozone
Secretariat is not necessarily expert in questions of international economic
law rules such as the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law.100 In this connection,
Switzerland suggested at the C.T.E. that 'Many conflicts between MEAs and
WTO rules could be prevented if co-operation existed between trade and
environment officials at the national and international level, and a co¬
operation mechanism should be concluded between the WTO and competent
MEA bodies, based on reciprocity which applied, inter alia, to observer
status and information exchange'.101 Several countries including Japan
take a similar view. 102
In the second place, although this will be arguable, the law of the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. is still 'ill-equipped' for settling 'amicably' increasing global
environmental problems today. In this sense, the legal tools that a W.T.O.
dispute settlement panel may employ so as to approach environmental
matters are still severely limited. Certainly, the 'basic sources' of
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law will be the General Agreement, the 1994 Uruguay
Understandings on the General Agreement and Side Agreements.103 In a
meeting of the C.T.E., the United States argued the 'necessity'104 of trade
measures in M.E.As. was best determined by M.E.A. negotiators, and the
W.T.O. did not have the technical competence to determine whether other
00 In case of the Montreal N.C.P., although observers (e.g. environmental N.G.Os.) are
currently not allowed to participate in the meetings of the ImCom (see Chapter
V(IV.B.2.b), non-parties to the Protocol (e.g. Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) in
reality participate in such political forums (see UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/3/3, para. 4).
100 It is important that the U.N.E.P. Secretariat is invited as an observer to meetings
of the W.T.O. Committee on Trade and Environment.
101 PRESS/TE010 (Item 1). See also WTO Trade and Environment Bulletin, no. 3 (22
May 1995).
102 "phe Relationship between Trade Measures Pursuant to MEAs and the WTO
Agreement' (WT/CTE/W/31, May 1996), proposal by Japan.
103 y/ j_ Davey, 'The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview' in Handbookof
GATT, pp. 18-21.
104 See Section V(A) below.
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measures that are 'reasonably available' to achieve the same objectives of
M.E.As. meet the M.E.A. objectives.105
However, it must be noted at the same time that, provided that a
trade-related environmental dispute is to be dealt by the W.T.O. Expert
Review Groups, which is provided for in Appendix 4 of the 1994 W.T.O.
Understanding (i.e. 'D.S.U.'/Annex 2), would contribute greatly to resolving
such a technical question.100 Moreover, Article 13 of the W.T.O.
Understanding states that W.T.O. panels shall have the right to seek useful
information and technical advice from any individual or body - which
might be environmental experts (e.g. M.E.A. Secretariats)107 and they may
also seek information from any relevant source (e.g. N.G.Os). In the 1990
case 'Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes', the Panel sought some specialist advise from the W.H.O. on the
health risks of smoking on the effectiveness of non-discriminatory
tobacco-control strategies.108
To summarise, it is my opinion that (i) the N.C.P. regime would be a
reasonable starting point. From the above, however, it still cannot be
denied that (ii) possible conflicts between M.E.As. and the G.A.T.T./W.T.O.
(e.g. trade measures applied against non-parties) should be addressed case-
by-case (through dispute settlement of M.E.As., including the N.C.P. and/or
theW.T.O.).
Moreover, (iii) in the present case of the international ozone
treaties, provided that the new Montreal N.C.P. proved too 'soft' or
ineffective, it is still possible that traditional dispute settlement procedures
under Article 11 of the 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention (see Chapter
II(III.D.4)) could also be applied to Article 4-related environmental ozone
disputes (see Chapter V(III.B) & V(VI) below).
105 PRESS/TE008.
100 It is provided that '[participation in expert review groups shall be restricted to
persons of professional standing and experience in the field in question' (Appendix
4(3): emphasis added).
107 On the role of the M.E.A. Secretariat see Chapter II( III.D.3) above.
108 E. U. Petersmann, International and European Trade and Environmental Law after
the Uruguay Round, (1996) p. 39.
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V. G.A.T.T. ARTICLE XX AND THE GLOBAL PROTECTION OF THE
OZONE LAYER UNDER THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL REGIME
A. The Exceptions Under G.A.T.T. Articles XI(1) and XX
G.A.T.T. law exceptions - which were usually provided for in bilateral trade
agreements109 - are largely based on a proposal made by the United States
of America. The travaux preparatoris of Article XX is not necessarily
helpful in clarifying the exact meaning of these G.A.T.T. exceptions.110
Yet, it must be noted at the outset that the treaty drafting history is only a
'supplementary means of interpretation' (Articles 31 & 32 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).111
In order to eliminate trade barriers between parties to the
international economic regime, G.A.T.T. Article XI(1) in general prohibits
the use of quotas or other quantitative limitations on exported or imported
products. Article XI(1) provides:
'[N]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures shall be
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of
the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party (emphasis
added).'
However, exceptions are permitted under G.A.T.T. Article XI(2), inter alia,
for temporary prohibitions or restrictions applied to prevent or relieve
critical shortages of other products essential to the exporting contracting
parties (see section B below). We can find here striking similarities in
109 In this respect see T. J. Schoenbaum 'Free International Trade and Protection of
the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflicts?', 86 A.J.l.L. (1992) p. 711, pointing out
that 'The text apparently derived from the kinds of exceptions traditionally written
into bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation'.
110 For a discussion of drafting history of G.A.T.T. Article XX, see G.A.T.T. Guide to
GATT Law and Practice, 6th edn. (1994), pp. 519 et seq.: S. Charonvitz, 'Exploring the
Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX', 25 J.W.T. (1991) pp. 38-47; J. H.
Jackson, World Trade and the Law ofGATT, (1969) Chapter 28.
111 Cf. J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 2nd edn. (1997) p. 122.
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Articles 30 and 34 of the E.C. Treaty that generally prohibit quantitative
restrictions and all measures having equivalent effects on imports.112
Article XX contains general exceptions to the G.A.T.T. trade law
regime. As we will see, Article XX exceptions are closely related to possible
'adverse effects'11^ caused by the depletion of the ozone layer. Article XX
states that:
"Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (emphasis added)"
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; . . .
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archaeological value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption . . . A1'*
Any such restrictions, to be permitted under Article XX, must not be applied
in a manner which would constitute (i) a means of arbitrary
discrimination (between countries where the same conditions prevail) or
(ii) unjustifiable discrimination (with the same qualifier) or (iii) a
disguised restriction on international trade.115 It has been suggested that
112 For a discussion see E. U. Petersmann, International and European Trade and
Environmental Law after the Uruguay Round, (1996) pp. 64-71.
115 See Chapter II(III.A) above.
11 ^ See 'United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline' adopted
on 20 May 1996, WT/DS/R, Sections D & G. The Tuna Panel II ('United States-
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna', D.S.29/R) stated that Article XX (b) and (g)
adjudication should follow a three step process:
1. Whether the policy underlying the trade measure at issue fit within the range of policies meant to conserve
exhaustible natural resources and whether the policy was made effective in conjunction with domestic
restrictions.
2. Whether the trade measure was "related to" the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
3. Whether the measure conformed to the Article XX headstone.
115 Preamble ("Chapeau"). See 'United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline', adopted on 20 may 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, Section IV; G.A.T.T.
Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th edn. (1994) pp. 519-21; J. H. Jackson, World
Trade and the Law ofGATT, (1969) p. 743.
Likewise, Principle 12 of the 1992 Rio Declaration states that:
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this introductory paragraph of G.A.T.T. Article XX - 'whose legal meaning
had never before been convincingly and precisely clarified in GATT panel
practice'116 - was inserted in order to prevent abuse of possible general
exceptions of Article XX.
It is generally observed that Article XX(b) focuses on the use of
sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of humans, animals or plants
within the jurisdiction of the importing states.is interesting to note
here that during the Geneva Session of the Preparatory Committee it was
agreed to delete from the New York draft of paragraph (b) the phrase 'if
corresponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the
importing country'.118 The term 'necessary' under G.A.T.T. Article XX(b)
has been strictly interpreted, and parties invoking Article XX are therefore
faced with a number of hurdles before their claims of exception to the
G.A.T.T. obligations will be accepted.11^ For a treaty provision to be
'necessary', there must be 'no alternative measure consistent with the
General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, which [a country] could
reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy
objectives'.^0
'States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to
economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental
degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade'.
116 E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) pp. 114 et
seq.; T. J. Schoenbaum, 'International Trade and Protection of the Environment', 91
A.J.I.L. (1997) p. 274. Cf. 'United States-Standards for Reformulated/Conventional
Gasoline', WT/DS2/AB/R, Section IV, noting that '[t]he text of the chapeau is not
without ambiguity, including one relating to the field of application of the standards
its contains'.
11 ^ See the Tuna Panel II, para. 5.27. See further Section D below.
In this respect, we may recall, again, that Article 36 of the E.C. Treaty allows
Member State to adopt measures restricting the free movement of goods for the purpose
of protecting a series of non-economic values such as public morality, public policy,
public security and protection of human health, animals and plants. See e.g. R.
Griffith, 'International Trade Treaties and Environmental Protection Measures', 1
R.E.C.I.E.L. (1992) pp. 26-27; M. Wheeler, S. Weatherill and P. Beaumont, EC Law,
(1993) Chapters 16 & 17; 'Greening the EEC Treaty' in P. Sands, (1993) pp. 89 et seq.
118 See further G.A.T.T. Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th edn. (1994) p. 521. Cf.
the interpretation of Article XX(d) in 'United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930', adopted on 7 November 1989, B.I.S.D. 36S/345, para. 5.26.
119 Recent G.A.T.T. cases have defined this term to mean 'least G.A.T.T.-inconsistent'.
See 'Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes', adopted
on 7 November 1990, B.I.S.D. 37S/200; 'United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna
and Tuna Products from Canada', adopted on 22 February 1982, B.I.S.D. 29S/91;
'Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon', adopted on
22 March 1988, B.I.S.D. 35S/98.
!20 'Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes',
(emphasis added).
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Article XX thus generally establishes the following legal requirements:12 1
(i) Trade measures must avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail;
(ii) Trade measures must not be a disguised restriction on international
trade;
(iii) The purpose of the import or export bans must be for one of the
purposes listed in G.A.T.T. Article XX and;
(iv) The measures invoking an Article XX exception must be necessary for
the purpose in question.
Next, we will examine whether the trade restrictions against non-parties
under the Montreal Protocol regime comply with these stringent
requirements.
B. G.A.T.T. Article XI(2) Exceptions and the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol
As has been suggested, though certain exceptions are permitted under
G.A.T.T. Article XI, they are not particularly applicable to the trade controls
of ozone-depleting substances. As in the Japanese Agricultural Restriction
case,122 the Article XI(2) exceptions - which are designed essentially for
agricultural products - have been very strictly construed.123
First, trade measures under Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol are by
no means 'temporary prohibitions' in the context of Article XI(2.a). Second,
O.D.Ss. are not "foodstuffs'. In addition, controlled substances (e.g. C.F.Cs.
and specified halons) would not be 'essential', since there already exist
some substitutes available for these chemicals. I24 Third, the
(stratospheric) ozone layer as the 'C.C.M.'125 does not come under the
121 See in detail Sections B-E.
122 'Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products', adopted on 22
March 1988, B.I.S.D.35S/163, partly reproduced in J. H. Jackson (eds.), Legal Problems
of International Economic Relations, 3rd edn. (1995) pp. 355-56.
122 J. H. Jackson (eds.) Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 3rd edn.
(1995) p. 423; W. J. Davey 'The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview' in
Handbook ofGATT, pp. 44-45.
124 See e.g. U.N.E.P. 1991 Assessment Report of the Technology and Economic
Assessment Panel, (December 1991, Final); Chapter 1 above.
12^ See Chapter II(III.B) above.
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category of tradable products.120 Further, the Montreal Protocol's trade
measures are not 'necessary to the application of standards or regulations
for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in
international trade' (G.A.T.T. Article XI(2.b)).
C. The Preamble Conditions for G.A.T.T. Article XX Exceptions and Article
4 of the Montreal Protocol Regime: Compliance with the Terms of the
"Chapeau"
As to the question whether trade measures discriminate on justifiable and
nonarbitrary bases, it can be said that the Montreal Protocol's T.R.E.Ms. are
not arbitrary discrimination and at the same time, have not disguised trade
restrictions on international trade. The M.E.A. ozone regime commonly set
up guiding purposes in their legal texts and the foreign trade restrictions
of controlled O.D.Ss. are by no means unpredictable.127 In addition, just as
the United States suggested during the negotiation of Article 4, terms of the
T.R.E.Ms. are clear, open and environmentally-motivated.128 If the
country applying the import ban was acting with the intention of
protecting human health or other related issues as listed in G.A.T.T. Article
XX(b) - thus not seeking to protect its own O.D.S. production - this cannot be
seen as disguised restrictions.129
The same logic could apply in the cases of the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. and the
1989 Basel Convention.130
Further, we can be fairly certain that cogent scientific evidence
contributes to eliminating such arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries. It is also important to notice that a precautionary
environmental 'principle' or approach (see Chapter II(III.C)) approved by
many environmental agreements is in many cases subject to careful
120 Baker argues that '[t]he ban is certainly being applied to prevent a critical
shortage of an item, ozone, that is essential to the CFC exporting country'. See B.
Baker, 26 Vanderbilt J.T.L. (1993) p. 449.
127 U.N.E.P. The Use of Trade Measures in Selected Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, (1995) p. 83. As we have seen, such legitimate environmental purposes
can be observed in 'General Obligations' or 'Fundamental Principles' of these
international treaties (see Chapter II(llI.D.l) above).
128 See 'GATT Considerations and the Ozone Protocol' (discussion paper by the United
States, 4 Spetember, 1987).
129 See P. M. Lawrence, 'International Legal Regulation for Protection of the Ozone
Layer: Some Problems of Implementation', 2 J.E.L. (1990) p. 39.
130 See U.N.E.P., The Use of Trade Measures in Selected Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, (1995) Chapters 6 & 5.
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periodic reviews of trustworthy data produced by scientists and their
scientific institutions.
A question arises, however, as to the application of the
environmental measures, T.R.E.Ms.: the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol once
encountered judicious criticism from the G.A.T.T. Secretariat for claiming a
clear distinction between parties and non-parties.131 However, it is
nevertheless possible to argue that under G.A.T.T. Article XX, trade
discrimination would be legally permissible provided it does not take place
between countries 'where the same conditions prevail'. 132 xhe ozone
drafters therefore inserted the following provision to ensure compatibility
between Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol and the G.A.T.T. rule:
'Notwithstanding the provisions of this Article, imports referred in [this Article] and
exports referred in [this Article] may be permitted from, or to, any State not Party to
this Protocol, if that State is determined, by a meeting of the Parties, to be in full
compliance with Article 2, Article 2A to 2E and this Article, and have submitted data
to that effect as specified in Article 7'. 133
It must be noted that this provision allows export to non-parties and thus
tactfully suggests that the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol draws a
distinction between treaty compliers - whether they are parties to the
Protocol or not - and noncompliers, rather than parties and non¬
parties. ^34 jn other words, a state's membership or formal status is not the
ozone regime's paramount concern. Of course, non-parties to the Ozone
Protocol regime can avoid this discrimination so far as they would apply
the Article 2 production/'consumption' restrictions provided by the
Montreal Protocol. In the light of the fact that non-parties, which seek
131 For the same reason, the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. and the 1989 Basel Convention were also
criticised as discriminatory. See the 1989 Basel Convention]Article 4(5)).
132 See UNEP/WG.l 67/2, p. 22.
133 x^e Montreal Protocol (Article 4(8)), emphasis added. Likewise, trade provisions
of the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. would be justified unless non-parties to the treaty substantially
conform to the C.I.T.E.S. and supply comparable documentation (Article X).
However, it was pointed out during the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol that
'If the Protocol were to provide for such a year-by-year escape . . ., this would be a
powerful incentive for states not to join the Protocol. The Protocol would be weakened
from an institutional standpoint, and its environmental benefits would be nullified or
impaired'. See 'GATT Considerations and the Ozone Protocol' (discussion paper by the
United States, Spetember 4, 1987).
134 see aiso UNEP/Trade/lEA/1/7, para. 13 g, cited in W. Lang, 'Trade Restrictions as
a Mean of Enforcing Compliance with International Environmental Law' in R. Wolfrum
(ed.) Enforcing Environmental Standards, (1996) p. 281.
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special permission for exportation or importation, are required to submit to
the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat scientific and technical data on their O.D.S.
production135 imports and exports of O.D.Ss., it seems reasonable to suppose
that they may wisely decide to ratify the Montreal Protocol in order to
regain lost markets.
Unlike the Montreal Protocol regime, the 1989 Basel Convention
regime has adopted trade measures that clearly distinguish between parties
and non-parties, rather than treaty-compliers and non-compliers, such a
restriction is not fully compatible with the one Preamble condition of
G.A.T.T. Article XX.136
In addition, it could be pointed out that the differences between
production costs in countries accepting and not accepting reductions in
production and use of O.D.Ss. could make them countries where the 'same
conditions' do not prevail.131? Moreover, it would be possible to argue that,
unlike parties to the Ozone Layer Protocol, non-parties are not subject to
the N.C.P. regime of the Montreal Protocol - this would also support the
argument that the same conditions do not prevail between parties and non¬
parties.138 Yet, as the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat suggests, if the Meeting of
the Parties decides to take a countermeasure as listed in the N.C.P. regime -
i.e. suspension of Protocol privileges139 - then the 'same condition' would
then prevail.140
133 See the discussion on non-parties' compliance in Chapter V(VII) below.
130 Whilst trade restrictions of the Basel Convention raise a number of serious
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. issues, in practice parties to the treaty would seem more likely to
conclude appropriate bilateral agreements under Article 11 than to initiate a
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. challenge.
13^ Such differences in production costs soared by the M.E.A. compliance would be a
matter of foreign trade competition. However, it is pointed out that 'it is impossible to
distinguish between the sort of cost difference. . . and that caused , for example, by
differences in the minimum wage'. It is interesting to note that if 'different
conditions' under G.A.T.T. Article XX contain environmental law in different
countries, the 'internationalisation of environmental costs' would grow. This does not
require an amendment of Article XX. See R. Buckley, 'International Trade, Investment
and Environmental Regulation: An Environmental Perspective', 27 J.W.T. (1993) p.
132.
138 See U.N.E.P. The Use of Trade Measures in Selected Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, (1995) pp. 81-82.
139 See Chapter V(IV.B.3.a) below.
140 In this respect see B. Kingsbury, 'Environment and Trade: The GATT/WTO Regime
in the International Legal System' in A. E. Boyle (ed.) Environmental Regulation and
Economic Growth, (1994) p. 207, noting that 'Question as to whether the same
conditions exist and, if so, what forms of discrimination would be arbitrary or
unjustified, are potentially problematic, particularly as in some cases the onus of
demonstrating that a measure is justified under Article XX appears to rest on the
party relying on it'.
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With regard to the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. regime, Wold plausibly argues that
restrictions on trade with non-parties under the C.I.T.E.S. would not
discriminate between countries where the same conditions prevail as far as
parties to the environmental treaty, which comply with substantive
provisions of the C.I.T.E.S., operate under a strict regime affecting their
economy and trade.141
D. G.A.T.T. Article XX(b) and the Global Protection of the Ozone Layer
It must be noted at the outset that during the negotiation of the 1987
version of the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol, the G.A.T.T. Secretariat said
that 'such an article on control of trade would be in order in accordance
with article XX paragraph (b) of the G.A.T.T. concerning the protection of
human, animal or plant life or health'.142
Added to this, there is fairly general agreement that Article 4
T.R.E.Ms, of the Montreal Protocol regime seem to qualify for the exception
under Article XX(b) due to growing threats to human, animal and plant life
and health from the severe depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer.
(1) The Montreal Protocol's Article 4 is 'Necessary' to Protect Human Health
and the Environment: G.A.T.T. Article XX(b) and Modern International
Law of the Environment
As we have seen in Chapter II(III.A) & the Introduction above, degradation
of the ozone layer would result in injury not only to the health of human
beings but also to the ecosystem as a whole. 143 phe global protection of the
ozone layer is indispensable for maintenance of human health. In this
connection, it is worth noting that, as the 1994 Final Report of the Sub-
Commission (so-called the 'Ksentini Report') asserts '[a] 11 persons have the
right to freedom from pollution, environmental degradation and activities
that adversely affect the environment, threaten life, health, livelihood,
141 See C. Wold, 'The Conservation on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora' in U.N.E.P. The Use of Trade Measures in Selected Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, (1995) pp. 178-80 & pp. 190-92.
14^ Yet it should be noted that the G.A.T.T. Secretariat stressed that the final
judgement as to whether the action proposed satisfied Article XX lay with the G.A.T.T.
contracting parties themselves. See UNEP/WG.l 72/2, p. 18. See also UNEP/167/2, p.
22; E. U. Petersmann, 'International Trade Law and International Environmental Law:
Prevention and Settlement of Internationa] Environmental Disputes in GATT', 27 J.W.T.
(1993) pp. 74 et seq.
14^ See Chapter II(IILA) above.
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well-being or sustainable development within, across or outside national
boundaries'. 144
As was described earlier, scientific uncertainty regarding ozone
observations was already settled after the adoption of the 1987 Montreal
Protocol (see Chapter III(IV.A)). Surely, this will lessen to a great extent
the ozone regime members' burden of proof that G.A.T.T. Article XX applies
to their environmental legal regime. The 'principle' of sound scientific
evidence would not be used as opposed to the ozone regime's precautionary
approach.145 jn addition, it is particularly important to note that - as E. U.
Petersmann rightly observes 146 . since all G.A.T.T. contracting parties
have recognised the customary law rule of Stockholm Principle 21/Rio
Principle 2 (see Chapter II(III.C.l)), the rule of international
environmental law must be taken into account in interpreting the G.A.T.T.
law rules. Viewed from this perspective, the parties to the Protocol could
argue collectively or individually that Article 4 trade restrictions would
protect human, animal and plant life at the domestic levels. The global
protection of the stratospheric ozone is a matter of no small concern to
each country in the international community and therefore the trade
control regime is 'necessary' to protect parties' own environments.
Article 4 T.R.E.Ms, of the Montreal Protocol regimes could therefore
be justified or exempted under G.A.T.T. Article XX(b) as 'necessary'
environment-related trade measures that are consistent with the G.A.T.T.
law. Likewise, it is also possible to argue that trade restrictions of
endangered species of wildlife under the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. are also 'necessary'
in order to protect the life and health of animals and plants listed in the
Appendixes. These measures would fall within the category of G.A.T.T.
Article XX(b).
An expected opposing argument will be that - as T. J. Schoenbaum
argued447 _ the principal purpose of the Montreal Protocol's Article 4
444 u.N. Document, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (6 July 1994), reprinted in A. E. Boyle, 'The
Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the Environment' in A. E.
Boyle (ed.) Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, (1996) pp. 65-69.
4 45 }s worth noting that in the meeting of the C.T.E., one W.T.O. member suggested
that the principle of a sound scientific basis for environmental measures should be
used as opposed to the precautionary principle. See PRESS/TE010 (Item 2). On the
precautionary 'principle'/approach see Chapter II(IlI.C.2.b) above.
446 u. Petersmann, 'The Settlement of International Environmental Disputes in
GATT and EEC' (F.I.E.L.D. London Conference, 23 April 1993) p. 12 footnote no. 19.
447 gee f Schoenbaum, 'Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment:
Irreconcilable Conflicts?', 86 A.J.l.L. (1992) p. 720; M. Schlagenhof, (1995) p. 149.
Cf. E. Petersmann, 'International Trade and International Environmental Law:
178
The Ozone Layer Regime and the GATT/WTO Trade Law Regime
T.R.E.Ms. is only to incite non-parties to join the ozone layer regime and
therefore this could be done by other available means including
financial/technical assistance through the Protocol's Financial
Mechanism. While the ozone layer regime's stated purpose has been 'to
protect human health and the environment against adverse effects' (see
Chapter II(III) above), it seems difficult to deny, however, that Article 4
trade provisions as collective 'sanctions' specifically aim to secure states'
participation.148 In this similar vein, the 1990-91 G.A.T.T. Report on
International Trade suggests that 'the parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) could have structured the Protocol in such a
way that it reduced consumption of CFCs in the participating countries by
the target amount, without the necessity of including provisions for special
restrictions on trade with non-parties'.
But, it is still unlikely that these economic measures constitute
'reasonably available alternatives' to the Protocol's Article 4 restrictions,
which are, as we have seen, skilfully drafted so as to prevent potential
'free-riders' in the international community of over 190 states. Though
seen as less inconsistent with the G.A.T.T., they cannot be arguably
'alternative measures' in the context of ozone protection: after exhausting
'all options reasonably available' to the parties to the Protocol, ozone would
be completely depleted and all states in the international community would
then be subject to cumulative adverse effects.
(2) Environmental Objectives of the International Legal Ozone Regime are
Widely Recognised by the International Community
It is also important to note that more than one hundred and sixty states are
now parties to the 1987 version of the Montreal Protocol and the 1985
Prevention and Settlement of International Environmental Disputes in GATT', J.W.T. p.
76.
148 See Section 11(A) above. In this respect see also Chapter V, footnote no. 229.
M9 Thg G.A.T.T. Report advocates, for instance, a proposal to impose taxes on the
consumption of C.F.Cs.; '[Ojne way would be to impose taxes on the consumption of
CFCs, or quota on domestic consumption, implemented by a system of auctioned
domestic sales licences which permitted the licence holder to buy from all potential
suppliers, regardless of whether they are in a participating country. In either case,
the scarcity value of the reduced amount of CFCs would accrue to the government (in
the form of tax or auction receipts). Production of CFCs in participating countries
could then be regulated by quotas set at the projected level of consumption in those
countries' (cited in V. Rege, 'GATT Law and Environment-Related Issues Affecting the
Trade of Developing Countries', J.W.T. p. 124); Cf. A. Enders and A. Porges, (1992) pp.
133 et seq.
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Vienna Ozone Layer Convention (see Appendix III). This could mean that
the environmental objectives of the international ozone regime are now
widely accepted in the international community (see also Chapter I(IV)
above). Indeed, as the G.A.T.T. Secretariat says:
'GATT rules could never block the adoption of environmental policies which have
broad support in the world community. . . What the rules do constrain is attempts by
one or a small number of countries to influence environmental policies in other
countries not by persuasion and negotiation, but by unilateral reductions in access to
their markets'. 150
Perhaps one may notice here that this point is in line with Principle
12 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. It states:
'Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems
should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.'151
Similarly, the 1994 T.B.T. Agreement provides that technical regulations
that are prepared, adopted, or applied in accordance with relevant
international standards are rebuttably presumed not to create an
unnecessary barrier to international traded52
In contrast, in the famous Tuna cases,153 the United States took a
unilateral trade policy (i.e. embargo of tuna against Mexico) based on the
Marine Mammal Protection Act ('M.M.P.A.'), which is national act based on
P.P.M.154 standards (i.e. harvesting techniques), still lacking in widely
obtained international support. Consequently, the G.A.T.T. Panels decided
that such a trade embargo could not be justified under the exceptions in
G.A.T.T. Article XX(b) or XX(g).
It is assumed that, should the United States apply the trade measure
under the authority of a related international environmental agreement,
150 See 'Trade and the Environment' - a report prepared by the G.A.T.T. Secretariat,
(1992). The final judgement of a bilateral dispute would depend on the contracting
parties to the G.A.T.T./W.T.O., however (see Table 111 above).
151 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.l (reprinted in 31 I.L.M. (1992) p. 878).
152 Article 2(5).
153 gee panei reports on the Tuna cases 1 & II reproduced in 30 I.L.M. (1991) p. 1594
& 33 I.L.M. (1994) p. 839.
154 See Section below.
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the G.A.T.T. Panels might approve the G.A.T.T. Article XX exception!s).15 5 In
this regard, at the meetings of the W.T.O.'s C.T.E., many government
delegations repeatedly warned against the use of unilateral trade measures
for environmental purposes, and indicated a general preference for
multilateral approaches over any form of unilateral measures.156
E. G.A.T.T. Article XX(g) and the Protection of the (Stratospheric) Ozone
Layer
As regards Article XX(g), since G.A.T.T. Article XX does not make reference to
the term 'environment' itself - neither does the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. Agreements
provide the definition of this term - it is debatable whether the protection
of the (stratospheric) ozone layer falls into the category of 'exhaustible
natural resources' in the context of the G.A.T.T. trade law.^5^
It is said that - in the light of the drafting history of Article XX(g) -
'natural resources' in question can be generally considered as 'resources of
certain economic value rather than resources not exploitable economically
in any shape or form'.158 Presumably, they include renewable flow
resources (e.g. animals, plants and fisheries) as well as stock resources (e.g.
'like minerals').159 Given that, we may say that the protection of life and
health of listed animals and plants under the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. is directly
concerned with the 'exhaustible natural resources', and trade measures
under the environmental treaty might cover the meaning of G.A.T.T.
Article XX(g) exceptions.160 In the panel report on U.S. Standards for
155 See Tuna Panel I, para. 5.28. Cf. W. Shih, 'Multilateralism and the Case of Taiwan
in the Trade Environment Nexus', 30 J.W.T. (1996) p. 131.
156 In the Trade and Environment Committee several delegations cautioned that 'only
appropriate and effective manner with which to address transboundary environmental
problems at the international level was through MEAs' (TE006, 8 December 1995). On
unilateralism in the context of environmental protection see e.g. I. Cheyne,
'Environmental Unilateralism and the WTO/GATT System', 24 Georgia J.l.C.L. (1995)
pp. 433-65.
15^ See P. M. Lawrence, 'International Legal Regulation for Protection of the Ozone
Layer: Some Problems of Implementation', 2 J.E.L. (1990) p. 39.
158 See P. M. Lawrence, 'International Legal Regulation for Protection of the Ozone
Layer: Some Problems of Implementation', 2 J.E.L. (1990) p. 39.
159 E-U. Petersmann, 'International Trade Law and International Environmental Law',
27 J.W.T. (1993) p. 70, footnote no. 55. See also S. Charnoviz, 'Exploring the
Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX', 25 J.W.T. (1991) pp. 45-47. The Tuna
case I (para. 5.26) & the Tuna case II (para. 5.13).
160 U.N.E.P. The Use of Trade Measures in Selected Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, (1995) pp. 181-82 esp.
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Gasoline, the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. panel observed that clean air was an
'exhaustible natural resource' in the context of Article XX(g).161
In the context of ozone, we should take into account that the
cumulative effects of stratospheric ozone loss on plants, including crops,
animals and global climate could hinder the world's food production (see
Introduction above). Theoretically speaking, the 'complete destruction' of
the ozone layer - as Dotto and Schiff suggested with some emphasis - would
result in 'the end of all life on earth'.162 In this respect, although the
stratospheric ozone in itself is free from any economic value, it may be
possible to argue that 'policy' for ozone conservation would fall within the
range of laws or policies regarding the conservation of 'exhaustible
natural resources'. Article 4 restrictions would thus seem to qualify under
Article XX(g).165 In this connection, one knowledgeable commentator on
the G.A.T.T. law observes that the wording of the Article XX exceptions seem
to address most trade-related environmental objectives.16^
Added to the above-mentioned requirement for an Article XX(g)
environmental exception is, as stated in a panel report on Canada's
Restrictions on Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, that a trade
measure as to the conservation of natural resources must primarily be
aimed at rendering effective restrictions on domestic production or
consumption (i.e. 'effectiveness requirement').165 Nevertheless, the
ninety per cent of the protective ozone layer (i.e. 'stratospheric ozone
shield') is located in the upper atmosphere area.
With regard to jurisdictional issues, the Panel in the Tuna I case
decided that G.A.T.T. Article XX(b) and (g) had no application to natural
resources located outside the jurisdiction of the trade-restricting state.166
In this context, one commentator has observed that the C.I.T.E.S. regime
161 See WT/DS2/AB/R, para. 6.37, noting that 'a policy to reduce the depletion of
clean air was a policy to conserve a natural resource within the meaning of Article
XX(g)' (emphasis added). See also WT/DS2/AB/R, Section B.
162 L. Dott and H. Schiff, The Ozone War, (1978) p. 2.
165 The same opinion is expressed in R. Twum-Barima and L. Campbell, Protecting the
Ozone Layer through Trade Measures, (1994) p. 71.
I6"1 E. U. Petersmann, 'International Trade Law and International Environmental Law:
Prevention and Settlement of International Environmental Disputes in GATT', 27 J.W.T.
(1993) p. 72.
165 B.I.S.D. 35S/98(1988) p. 114. See also Tuna Panel I, para. 5.31; 'United States-
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline', WT/DS2/R, paras. 6.39-40. Cf.
the 1996 U.S. Standards for Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, Section B & E. U. Petersmann, The
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) p. 116, noting that 'the term "relating
to" need no longer be interpreted as "primarily aimed at"..
166 Tuna/Dolphin Panel 1, paras. 5.26 & 5.31-32.
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violates G.A.T.T. Article XI(1) due to trade restrictions applied to natural
resources outside the jurisdiction of a party. I67 However, the next Panel
in the Tuna case II suggested that the text of environmental exceptions
does not explicitly provide any jurisdictional limitation as far as public
international law permits governments to exercise jurisdiction over their
nationals and vessels outside their territory.168 Likewise, David Pearce
points out, the legal text of the G.A.T.T. does not strongly indicate the
'location' of the environmental damage done relevant to an exception.169
In the context of the global protection of ozone, it must be emphasised that,
since the depletion of the ozone will not respect territorial boundaries, the
above-mentioned argument presented by the Tuna Panel II cannot not be
overemphasised.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It should be concluded, from what has been observed above, that we can
broadly accept the coexistence of the T.R.E.Ms. in the Montreal Protocol
regime (Article 4) with the free-market principles/rules governing the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law regime. At the very least, the Montreal Ozone
Protocol's Article 4 could be seen as compatible with Article XX(b) of the
G.A.T.T. trade rules. Viewed in its entirety, Article 4 of the Montreal Ozone
Layer Protocol thus seems to be a 'non-discriminatory' trade measures for
the protection of ozone. Hence, the Montreal Protocol regime forms an
important environmental exception to the international free trade
principles/rules of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. law.
However, apart from the above-mentioned problems of Article 4 of
the Ozone Layer Protocol, there will be further points which need to be
clarified as to the relationship between the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. regime and other
existing M.E.As., such as the 1989 Basel Convention, the 1973 C.I.T.E.S., the
1992 Climate Change Convention and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention. In
addition, there would be, perhaps, other potential tension or conflicts
between future international environmental regimes which decide to use
trade restrictions and the existing G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade regime: T.R.E.Ms.
provided for in these M.E.As. must be applied and enforced in practice.
167 See T. Schoenbaum, 'Tree International Trade and Protection of the Environment',
86 A.J.I.L. (1992) p. 720.
168 The Tuna/Dolphin case II, paras. 5.15-20 & 5.31-33.
169 D. Pearce, 'The Greening of the GATT: Some Economic Considerations' in J.
Cameron (eds.) Trade and the Environment, vol. 1, (1994) p. 25.
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Although we did not discuss potential amendments to the G.A.T.T. law
for environmental protection, it may be desirable or advisable that
members should partly amend the G.A.T.T. Article XX and other
environment-related provisions so as not to retard the evolving concept of
'sustainable development' in international law.170 This assumption is now
widely accepted in legal writing.171 However, it is true that adding
amendments to the G.A.T.T. law depends on the political will of the
contracting parties of the G.A.T.T. regime and, in practice, this is extremely
difficult.17^ It has been suggested that at the C.T.E. circle, developing states
are generally opposed to making any modification to the WTO trade rules in
favour of M.E.A.s.173
It is hoped that the new C.T.E. would contribute to settling the
question as to the disputed legal status of trade provisions of M.E.As., such as
those in the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol within the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade
regime.
1711 See R. G. Tarasofsky, 'Ensuring Compatibility between Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and GATT/WTO', 7 Y.bk.l.E.L. (1996) p. 54, noting the legal uncertainty
and 'the chill effect' on elaborating T.E.R.Ms. in future M.E.As.
17^ See e.g. J. Cameron and J. Robinson, (1994) pp. 18 et seq.; S. Murase, 'Perspectives
from International Economic Law on Transnational Environmental Issue', 253 Hague
Recueil (1995); T. J. Schoenbaum, 'International Trade and Protection of the
Environment', 91 A.J.I.L. (1997) pp. 268-313. See however Trade and the
Environment: News and Views from the GATT, TE004 (26 November 1993) p. 3; E.
Petersmann, 'International Trade Law and International Environmental Law', J.W.T. p.
72.
177 Amendment of G.A.T.T. Article XX requires two-thirds majority of the Members
(Article X of the WTO Agreement), but forced votes will be rare. See also Y. Iwasawa,
WTO Dispute Settlement, (1994) p. 9 (Japanese); S. Murase, 'Perspectives from
International Economic Law on Transnational Environmental Issues, 253 Hague Recueil
(1995) pp. 346-48. See J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 2nd edn. (1997) p.
343, noting that the difficulty of amending the texts could lead to a host of 'ad hoc or
other "end-run" type measures'.
17^ See R. G. Tarasofsky, 'Ensuring Compatibility between MEAs and GATT/WTO', 7






THE MONTREAL NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE AND
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNAL INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
I. THE MONTREAL NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE ('N.C.P.')
A. The Judicial Settlement of International Environmental Disputes
International environmental disputes do arise on sundry occasions, and
corresponding means of settling these disputes often vary widely in
accordance with the type of issues involved, the type of natural resources,
the parties concerned, geographical scope, the source of pollution or
adverse effects, and the nature of the harm done, its potential remedies,
and so forth.1 In order to fully guarantee treaty compliance with their
environment-related obligations, the dispute settlement mechanisms of
international environmental regimes must be designed properly and
flexibly to enable these regimes to settle, or ideally 'avoid', such various
kinds of environmental disputes.
In actual practice, however, it is disappointing that a number of
environmental agreements contain, if they exist at all, inadequate dispute
settlement clauses in their legal instruments. In addition, traditional and
legally binding methods of dispute settlement procedures - such as those
envisaged in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter - are not necessarily preferred
approaches to settling environmental disputes at the international level
because of their highly complex procedures, a lack of confidence, time-
consuming legal processes with considerable expense, and long-pending
problems as to the principles of state responsibility.2 Consequently, states
do not usually resort to these strictly judicial procedures, even though
several environmental agreements provide the widest possible choice of
legal devices for the settlement of disputes (e.g. the dispute 'settlement'
procedures under Article 11 of the Ozone Convention: see Chapter
1 For a further discussion of 'international' or 'transnational' environmental disputes,
see R. B. Bilder, 'The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the International Law of the
Environment', 144 Hague Recueil, (1973) pp. 153-236.
2 See ibid., p. 225-27; P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment,
(1992) pp. 136 et seq. See also Chapter II(III.C) above.
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II(III.D.4)).3 In most cases, states are more inclined to retain their freedom
of action relying on the principle of state sovereignty.4
Naturally, where an appropriate or reliable dispute avoidance or
settlement mechanism or system still does not exist for the purpose of
ensuring treaty performance, it would often be much easier for regime
member states to ignore their established treaty obligations. Analysing
these real-life situations, Professor G. Palmer thus observed in the early
1990s that 'Nearly twenty years after the Stockholm Declaration, we still
lack the institutional and legal mechanisms to deal effectively with
transboundary and biosphere environmental degradation'.5
B. The Avoidance/Quasi-Judicial Settlement of 'Multilateral'
Environmental Disputes: The Non-Compliance Procedure ('N.C.P.')
It is possible to argue that ozone disputes can arise from 'non-compliance'
relating to 'compatibility with the objectives of international regimes',6 for
non-performance with ozone treaty obligations would affect the
international community as a whole rather than be geographically limited
to particular sovereign states or individuals under state jurisdictions. In
this sense, potential ozone disputes differ radically from environmental
conflicts concerning transboundary air pollution or conservation of
living/non-living natural resources (see Chapter III(III.A) above).
Judging from the above we may say therefore that 'there is
undoubtedly need for regime-specific legal compliance mechanisms'.7
With this background in mind, drafters of the Montreal Protocol's
dispute avoidance/settlement regime have become more concerned with
3 In this respect see Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1994) Chapter III p. 55 &
its footnotes 95-97, suggesting that the role of the I.C.J, in 'settling' economic
disputes (of highly technical nature) is rather limited and treaty instruments
regarding international economy does not usually contain resort to the international
tribunal (Japanese).
4 Indeed, it is true that the most frequently used mechanism for settling international
or transnational environmental disputes is, without doubts, direct discussion of a
dispute between states - i.e. official and/or unofficial diplomatic negotiation and
consultations.
^ G. Palmer, 'New Ways to Make International Environmental Law', 86 A.J.I.L. (1992) p.
259.
6 S. Murase, 'Perspectives From International Economic Law on Transnational
Environmental Issues', 253 Hague Recueil, (1995) p. 415. On ozone treaty disputes see
also Section V(A) below.
7 G. Handl, 'Controlling Implementation of and Compliance with International
Environmental Commitments: The Rocky Road from Rio', 5 Colorado J.I.E.LP. (1994) p.
327.
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the crucial question of ensuring greater 'compliance' with the ozone
treaties' obligations that generally deal with the application (and
interpretation) of complex and detailed environment-related obligations
and standards - e.g. O.D.S. emission reductions (Articles Z & 5), trade
controls of C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss. (Article 4) and national/regional reporting
requirements (Articles 7 & 9) - rather than with purely legalistic and
political issues in the branch of customary international law or
international human rights law. As a result of their pioneering
endeavours,8 a flexible arrangement for environmental dispute
avoidance/settlement - i.e. a 'non-compliance procedure' ('N.C.P.') regime0
has only recently been added as an integral part to the Montreal Ozone
Protocol (Article 8/Decisions). It is said that the creation of the
Implementation Committee in particular constituted a 'real breakthrough'
in international environmental law.10
The N.C.P. of the 1994 Oslo Sulphur Protocol follows with substantial
accuracy the existing lines of the Montreal N.C.P. model (Article
7/Decision)11 and the parties of the 1992 U.N. Climate Change Convention
have also recently started to have discussions on the expected
establishment of a 'Multilateral Consultative Process' to deal with questions
of non-compliance or non-performance in accordance with Article 13 of
the agreement.12 In addition, the Conference of the Parties to the 1997
8 On the N.C.P. negotiation see Section II below.
0 The 'Montreal N.C.P. (ozone) regime' to refer to an 'internal' compliance-monitoring
or dispute avoidance/settlement mechanism based on Article 8 of the Protocol. P.
Szell also describes the N.C.P. as a 'regime'. See e.g. 'Compliance Regimes for
Multilateral Environmental Agreements', 27/4 E.P.L. (1997) pp. 304-07.
10A. Kiss, 'Compliance with International and European Environmental Obligations',
Hague Y.bk.l.L. (1996) p. 51. Cf. G. Palmer (eds.), International Environmental Law &
World Order, (1994) p. 1120.
11 See EB.Air/WG.5/CPR.13. See also ECE/EB.AIR/38. para. 9 and ECE/EB.A1R/40
cited in P. Szell, 'Compliance Regimes for Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A
Progress Report', 27/4 (1997) pp. 304-07.
Article 13 (Resolution of questions regarding implementation) reads 'The
Conference of the Parties shall, at the first session, consider the establishment of a
multilateral consultative process, available to Parties on their request, for the
resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention'. For a
discussion of the Climate Change Convention's compliance system, see in particular J.
Werksman, 'Designing a Compliance System for the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change', in J. Cameron (eds.), Improving Compliance With International
Environmental Law, (1996), pp. 85-121; D. G. Victor, Design Options for Article 13 of
the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Lessons from the GATT Dispute Panel
System, (1996); P. Szell, 'Compliance Regimes for Multilateral Environmental
Agreements: A Progress Report', 27/4 E.P.L. (1997) pp. 304-07.. Similarly, the 1994
U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification provides that 'The Conference of the Parties shall
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Kyoto Protocol is to approve a new non-compliance regime (see Chapter
I(III.C) above).
In the present case of the international regime for the protection of
the ozone layer, as we have already seen, the only legal 'remedy' is
collective treaty compliance, but not monetary compensation by sovereign
states or transnational corporations ('T.N.Cs.') producing/consuming
C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss. (see Chapters I(IV) & III(III.C) above). In this view, it cannot
be emphasised too strongly that, under the Montreal N.C.P. regime, both
any member state and the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat can initiate this new
procedural mechanism to ensure the implementation of the ozone layer
treaties, without any question of its own legal interests being involved.
Therefore, needless to say, these international N.C.P. regime initiators do
not have to exhaust any domestic legal remedies as a precondition. In this
way, the Montreal N.C.P. can be characterised as an unprecedented
procedural mechanism that is designed to effectively 'operate' or 'enforce'
erga omnes (i.e. the global protection of the ozone layer: for details see
Chapter I(IV) above).
In this context, we may say that this new dispute
avoidance/settlement regime differs essentially from pre-existing human
rights conciliation committees such as those under the First Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
('I.C.C.P.R.'), and under the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Human Rights
Convention) that strictly require the exhaustion of local remedies.13
Although we still should not make any easy generalisations about
the Montreal N.C.P. regime on the basis of its early operation (see Section
consider and adopt procedures and institutional mechanisms for the resolution of
questions that may arise with regard to the implementation of this convention'
(Article 27). Cf. Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention), 1972: Final
Act, 1996 Protocol and Resolutions (Article 11), 36 I.L.M. (1997) p. 1.
I3 The 1966 I.C.C.P.R. (Article 5.2(b)); Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Article 41); the European Convention (Article 26[Article 35 of the Revised
Convention]). The Committee against Torture under the Convention against Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has a similar provision. Yet
these interstate complaints procedures (i.e. Committee jurisdiction) must be formally
accepted by states concerned. As to the burden of proof in relation to human rights
protection, see C. F. Amerssinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, (1990) pp.
291-97 esp. Likewise the 1962 U.N.E.S.C.O. Protocol provides that 'The Commission
shall deal with a matter referred to. . . only after it has ascertained that all available
domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case, in conformity with
the generally recognised principles of international law'. (Article 14). See further J.
P. Cot, International Conciliation, (1972) pp. 311 et seq.
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VII below), the N.C.P. regime - in which the internal treaty institutions
exercise regulatory and supervisory functions - can be regarded as the
compliance-monitoring14 or quasi-judicial settlement mechanism based on
a 'collective reaction' or 'multilateralism', but not on confrontational
bilateralism common to formal dispute settlement mechanisms. The
'multilateralism' is concerned with traditional collective non-sanctions
such as 'informal persuasion' and the 'mobilisation of shame' applied by
global institutions.15 What is more, compared with formal judicial
settlement that usually require time-consuming processes, the N.C.P.
regime seems to be much more 'flexible', 'simple' and 'rapid'. We may say at
the same time that, in the light of step-by-step negotiation processes of the
N.C.P. regime, this mechanism shows, by seeking feasible and amicable
solutions, a scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of ozone regime
member states.
Apart from these four characteristics - i.e. multilateralism,
flexibility, simplicity and rapidity, it is also important to notice that the
Montreal N.C.P. regime has gradually established a close link with
international financial mechanisms, namely, the Multilateral Fund of the
Montreal Protocol and the Global Environment Facility (see further
Chapter VI below): this will certainly strengthen 'soft enforcement' of
international environmental regime rules.
The organisation of this Chapter is as follows: Section II provides a brief
summary of the Montreal N.C.P. negotiation process. Section III then
clarifies, to some extent, the meaning of the legal term 'non-compliance'
within the Montreal Protocol and the Ozone Convention. It also addresses
the relationship between the Montreal N.C.P. and the settlement procedures
under Article 11 of the Vienna Convention. Section IV deals with the
mechanics of the operation of the Montreal N.C.P. regime, pointing out the
important functions played by the specialised N.C.P. regime institutions -
i.e. the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat, the standing Implementation Committee
and the Meeting of the Parties. Section V then attempts a comparison
between the Montreal N.C.P. and other dispute settlement procedures, (i)
the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. Violation Procedure and (ii) the Complaints Procedure in
the I.L.O. Supervisory Machinery. It also characterises the N.C.P. as a
14 See Chapter I(III.C).
15 See F. L. Kirgis, International Organisations in their Legal Setting, 2nd edn. (1993)
pp. 524 et seq.
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multilateral conciliation mechanism. Section VI discusses the unique
relationship which exists between the Montreal N.C.P. regime and the
evolving principle of international environmental law, i.e. the
precautionary environmental 'principle'/approach. Section VII is devoted
to the Montreal N.C.P. regime in practice: it analyses the effectiveness of
the specific treaty requirements - including technical data reporting,
control measures of O.D.Ss. and trade controls. This Section also gives a case
study of the Russian Federation's non-compliance with Article 2 control
measures.
n. THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MONTREAL N.C.P. REGIME
Whilst the 1987 version of the Montreal Protocol succeeded in introducing
specific control measures of O.D.Ss. to prevent steady ozone depletion (see
Chapter III(II-III)), negotiators of the ozone regime could not conclusively
establish the non-compliance procedure in time for its adoption. 16 As a
result, it was provided in Article 8 of the Protocol that:
'The Parties, at their first meeting, shall consider and approve procedures and
institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of this
Protocol and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance'.
Yet, it then took several years of gradual preparations to establish the
existing Montreal N.C.P. regime.
The 1989 Helsinki Meeting of the Parties17 established an Ad Hoc
Working Group of Legal Experts,18 which was to develop three different
proposals for a non-compliance procedure submitted by the United
1 6 See D. G. Victor, The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's
Non-Compliance Procedure, (1996) p. 4, pointing out that, although the United States
offered a detailed non-compliance procedure in the final stages of the negotiation,
some negotiators of the E.C. considered it as a 'strategy to clutter the agenda at the last
minutes'. See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 270, noting that '1 can
attest that it was consciously intended as a laconic but important maker, not as a
tactic'. On the U.S. proposal see UNEP/OzL.WG.Data.2/3/Rev.2/Annex VII.
17 See Chapter Ul(lV.B) above.
18 Decision 1/8.
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States, 19 the Netherlands, 20 Austria^! and Finland.22 At this stage, some
developed states - the United States and Nordic countries, in particular -
strongly supported a 'more stringent and punitive approach' rather than
an 'encouragement-based approach' that was recommended by the
Working Group of Legal Experts.23 Industrialising countries and the
European Community supported the encouragement-based approach.
The First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group was held in Geneva
in 1989.24 The U.S. proposal, unlike its initial proposal, addressed a
conciliation procedure with non-compliance under the 1985 Vienna Ozone
Layer Convention, which could ultimately lead to recommendations and/or
further punitive measures approved by the Meeting of the Parties. Under
an Australian proposal, the Secretariat was to be given stronger powers as
the 'guardian of the Protocol', which included regular reporting as to both
compliance and non-compliance. 25 After an extensive discussion about the
non-compliance procedure, it was agreed that:
(i) it was important to avoid drawing up an unnecessarily complex and duplicative
system;
(ii) the procedure should not be confrontational;
(iii) action under the non-compliance procedure could be commenced by either one or
a number of Parties or the Parties collectively registering concern with the
Secretariat;
(iv) the procedure proposed should not alter or weaken in any way article 11 of the
Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer;
(v) confidentiality must be respected and specific reference to this should be made in
the procedures proposed;
(vi) the Secretariat's role should be that of a servicing, administrative body rather
than a judicial one;
(vii) the Secretariat should compile the necessary data and other information;
19 UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.l/2/Annex II.
20 UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG. 1 /CRP. 1.
21 UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG. 1/CRP.4.
22 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG. 1/3, para. 20, noting that Finland supported the adoption of a
conciliation procedure.
23 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.IV/3, para. 4; R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 182-
83.
24 UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.1/3;EPL, 19/5(1989) pp. 147-48.
25 The proposal also stated that 'the determination of compliance or non-compliance
should be as far as possible a time-bound, non-political process, producing a legal and
technical decision' (emphasis added), cited in T. Gehring, Dynamic International
Regimes, (1994) p. 315.
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(viii) early indications of possible non-compliance might be resolved through
administrative action by the Secretariat and through diplomatic contacts between
Parties;
(ix) decisions on non-compliance should be recommendatory rather than mandatory.26
In addition to these matters, the Working Group also agreed that
there should be a supervisory body that was called the 'Implementation
Committee' (TmpCom').27 However, many delegations emphasised that such
a standing committee should not have a judicial function, and therefore
any decisions as to non-compliance by a Party would have to be taken by
the Ozone Meeting of the Parties.28 The Working Group also approved a
'Draft Non-Compliance Procedure', which specified basic functions of the
Ozone Secretariat, the Implementation Committee and the Meeting of the
Parties.29 The 1990 London Meeting of the Parties30 adopted this draft
N.C.P. as prepared by the Working Group on an 'interim' basis, and it
established the standing Implementation Committee.3^
In the Second Meeting of the Working Group held in 1991, the
European Community offered the most sweeping proposal. That proposal
included in its draft text 'Indicative Lists of Steps to Bring about Full
Compliance with the Protocol' that dealt with three types of non¬
compliance, i.e. (i) reporting requirements, (ii) control measures of O.D.Ss.
and (iii) trade restrictions.32 Under the E.C.'s proposal, the functions of
internal international institutions - including the Ozone Secretariat and
the Committee - were essentially similar in many respects to the existing
Montreal N.C.P. regime. Apart from draft proposals submitted, it is worth
noting that many experts in this Meeting communicated the view that
dispute settlement procedures under the 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention and
the Montreal N.C.P. were 'two distinct and separate procedures which could
2° UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.1/3, para. 9. The ideas propounded were all shaped into the
existing Montreal N.C.P. regime, as we shall see.
27 ibid., para. 10.
28 ibid., paras. 11 & 17.
29 Ibid., Annex.
30 See Chapter III(IV.C) above.
3^ Decision II/5. This Decision also extended the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working
Group to elaborate (i) N.C.P. regime itself and (ii) terms of reference for the
Committee. The Decision III/2 adopted by the Third Ozone Meeting also extended the
mandate of the Working Group with regard to the development of a Indicative List of
Measures.
32 UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/2/3/Annex; T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes,
(1994) pp. 316-17.
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well exist in parallel'.33 The formal N.C.P., as improved by the Third
Meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group, was finally adopted at the 1992
Copenhagen Ozone Meeting34 (Decision IV/5). The decision is legally
binding because of the enabling provisions of Articles 8 and ll(3.d).35
Lastly, it must be noted that, in order to review and strengthen the
N.C.P., the 1997 Montreal Meeting of the Parties36 decided to establish an Ad
Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on the N.C.P., which is
composed of fourteen members.37
IE. THE MEANING OF 'NON-COMPLIANCE' IN THE OZONE LAYER PROTOCOL:
A GREY AREA OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OZONE REGIME
A. The Meaning of 'Non-Compliance' in the Ozone Layer Regime
In general, 'compliance' means a 'desired state of conformity with the law,
a regulation, or a demand'. Its working definition will not be static ( =
dynamic). Unlike the term 'enforcement', compliance implies that regime
member states are induced to comply, rather than being coerced to do so.38
In this sense, the use of the legal terminology 'non-compliance' in the
Montreal Protocol seems to be particularly appropriate for its global
regulatory rules on O.D.S. controls (see also Chapter I(III.C) above).
33 UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/2/3, para. 18. See Section IV. A(3).
34 See Chapter III(IV.D) above.
33 See M. Bothe, 'The Evaluation of Enforcement Mechanisms in International
Environmental Law' in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards (1996) p.
31.
36 See Chapter lli(IV.F) above.
37 Decision IX/35. See the following recent reports by the Ad Hoc Working Group:
UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG/1 /1 /Add. 1 (14 April 1998); UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.4/l/l/Add.2 (18
May 1998); UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG/l/l/Add.l (15 April 1998).
38 See B. M. Hutter, Compliance: Regulation & Environment, (1997) Chapters 1-4 esp.
Generally speaking, 'compliance', in English, (non-conformite/ Nicht-befolgung)
refers to 'obedience' or 'conformance'. See E. B. Weiss and H. K. Jacobson,
Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords: Preliminary
Observations from a Collaborative Project', 1 Global Governance, (1995) pp. 123 et
seq., defining compliance as 'whether countries in fact adhere to the provisions of the
accord and to the implementing measures that they have instituted' - 'compliance'
should be thus distinguished from 'effectiveness'. The term 'violation' (in English)
can be defined as 'breach of right, duty or law' and 'enforcement' as the execution of a
law. 'Enforcement' implies rather positive coercion, such as 'countermeasures',
'reprisals' and 'police force and courts'. These terms are often used interchangeably,
however. See Black's Law Dictionary, (1990); L. Henkin, 'General Course on Public
International Law', 216 Hague Recueil, (1989) pp. 67 et seq.; L. Chazournes, 'Mise en
oeuvre du droit international dans le domaine de la protection de l'environment:
enjeux et defis', Revue generate de droit international public, (1995) pp. 62 et seq.
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States' 'non-compliance' could be defined as the 'breach' of
obligations owed under public international law - i.e. the determination of
'internationally wrongful acts'. However, it should be noted, again, that
possible non-compliance with the international ozone treaty provisions is
not necessarily concerned with states' responsibility or liability in the
context of the payment of compensation for environmental damage (see
Chapter I(IV) & Section I above).
The definition of the term 'non-compliance' is not provided for in
the legal text of the Montreal Protocol or in that of the 1985 Vienna Ozone
Layer Convention. The reason for this is that the 1992 Copenhagen Ozone
Meeting was not ready to adopt an 'Indicative List of Possible Situations of
Non-compliance with the Protocol' as prepared by the Ad Hoc Working
Group of Legal Experts.39 in the absence of such a helpful list of potential
non-compliance, the risk of non-compliance is likely to increase: as
Professor M. Bothe says, 'Compliance is furthered by the possibility of
obtaining a clear determination of the content of a norm in relation to a
given case'.40 Yet, in the light of the nature of the N.C.P. regime (i.e. its
flexibility), it is also possible to argue in response that formal
determination of non-compliance could be merely counterproductive.41
In taking account of the draft Indicative List, we may safely assume
that non-compliance with regard to the following four ozone treaty
obligations would first go to the Montreal N.C.P.:
(i) non-compliance with treaty provisions relating to O.D.S. control
measures (Articles 2, 2A-2H);
(ii) non-compliance with treaty provisions relating to restrictions on trade
with non-parties (Articles 4);
(iii) non-compliance with time schedules reporting of data (Article 7);
(iv) non-compliance with reporting of a summary of national ozone
activities (Article 9);42
39 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/3/3/Annex II. paras. 32-43.
40 See M. Bothe, 'International Obligations, Means to Secure Performance', 1
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, (1982) p. 102.
41 Cf. M. Koskenniemi, "New Institutions and Procedures for Implementation Control
and Reaction' in J. Werksman, Improving Compliance with International Environmental
Law, (1996) p. 246 and its endnotes.
42 Other candidates include; 'non-provision of the contributions referred to in
Article 10, paragraph 1, for the purpose of financing on a grant or concessional basis
the incremental costs agreed upon in its paragraph 3, as well as what is provided for
in Article 10 A concerning substitute substances and the transfer of technology';
failure to take 'every practicable step' consistent with the programmes supported by
195
The Montreal Non-Compliance Procedure and the Internal Institutions
It is arguable, however, that non-payment of contributions to the
financial mechanism - namely, the Montreal Multilateral Fund, could be
also regarded as possible non-compliance with the ozone layer treaty.
Whereas most donor countries consider the obligation to contribute to the
M.L.F. as legally binding, the United States, for instance, interprets it as
merely 'voluntary compliance'.43 The legal text of the M.L.F. is silent on
this contentious matter, and, consequently, the legal status of these
monetary contributions is still left intentionally ambiguous.44
B. 'Depoliticising' Multilateral Ozone Disputes?: The Relationship between
the 'Self-Contained' N.C.P. and the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the
1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention:
The above analysis implies therefore that the ascertainment of 'non¬
compliance' with ozone layer treaty obligations is likely to depend on the
'practical decisions' of the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol as a
supreme treaty organ and/or the contracting parties themselves.
In relation to this point, Professor M. Koskenniemi rightly observes
that 'a dispute about whether some particular type of non-compliance is
wrongful act is another dispute about interpretation or application of the
treaty [i.e. 'treaty disputes'] and capable of being resolved only within the
the financial mechanism, for transfer of technology; non-compliance with the
obligations in decisions of the Parties to the Protocol. The Working Group noted,
however, that 'The above list is without prejudice to the generally accepted rules of
international law related to the interpretation and application of treaties'.
UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/3/3 (Annex II: Indicative Lists).
43 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/3/3, paras. 37-38, noting that developing countries
disputed the view that Article 10 ('Financial Mechanism), after entry into force, did
not contain an obligation to contribute to the financial mechanism. This disruptive
issue among ozone regime members is often raised in the Ozone Meeting of the Parties
(see e.g. UNEP/OzL.Pro.5/12, para. 22; UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12). Whilst the 1992 Climate
Change Convention and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention require industrised state
parties to provide 'new and additional financial resources to newly industrising state
parties, monetary contributions under these two environmental agreements could be
regarded as only voluntary. See A. E. Boyle, 'The Rio Convention on Biological
Diversity' in C. Redgwell and M. Bowman (eds.), International Law and the Conservation
of Biological Diversity, (1995) pp. 46-47.
44 The Implementation Committee has never discussed on this issue. See R. Benedick,
Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 262 & p. 271, saying that 'the contributions are, from a
strictly legal perspective, voluntary' and that 'arranges of payment were never
formally deplored by the parties but never labelled as non-compliance with the
protocol'. See also D. G. Victor, 'The Montreal Protocol's Non-Compliance Procedure:
Lessons for Making Other International Environmental Regimes More Effective' in W.
Lang, (ed.), The Ozone Treaties and Their Influence on the Building ofEnvironmental
Regimes, (Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, Austria) pp. 67 et seq.
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procedures under Article 11 of the Vienna Ozone Convention', and
ultimately, 'the question of wrongfulness is one of general international
law, and not a question that can be solved, or indeed even approached, from
within the special regime of the Vienna Ozone Convention and the Protocol
at all'.45 Thus he argues that, to be a strictly judicial organ, the Meeting of
the Parties may suspend the rights of an allegedly defaulting party only if
there exist 'non-compliance' (breach of treaty) as an internationally
wrongful act by that state party.46
With regard to the relationship between Article 11 of the Convention
(see Chapter II(III.D.4) above) and the Montreal N.C.P. regime, the
Convention provides that 'the provisions of Article 11 of the Vienna
Convention shall apply with respect to any protocol except as provided in
the protocol concerned' (Article 11(6)).47 This means that the operation of
the Montreal N.C.P. is not necessarily stipulated as condition precedent to
the settlement mechanisms enumerated in the Vienna Ozone Layer
Convention.48 Moreover, since under the ozone treaty regime (and under
general public international law) there does not exist a hierarchy - except
for the full use of diplomatic negotiations as a departure point - in settling
disputes, no ozone regime member could or would eliminate the possibility
of invoking binding procedures under the Ozone Convention.4^ For
instance, the allegedly defaulting party (e.g. Article 5 country parties and
the 'C.E.I.Ts.': see Section VII(B.l) below) - which considers that it has not
committed an internationally wrongful act entailing state responsibility -
can invoke, as a means of avoiding collective suspension of rights or
countermeasures, the traditional settlement mechanisms under the
Convention. At this later stage, the Montreal N.C.P. may not be seen as 'self-
contained' regime any more.
48 See M. Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance?', 3 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1992) p.
144 (and its footnotes), saying that 'The travaux preparatories of the NCP as well as
the composition and functions of the Implementation Committee and, a foriori, the
Meeting of the Parties, make it clear that neither can, or is expected to, work as a
judicial body, assessing the performance of the parties' obligations with a view of
determining whether or not there has been a wrongful act triggering state
responsibility'. See also UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/3/3, para. 46; Section 11 above.
46 M. Koskenniemi, ibid., p. 145.
47 See also Article 14 of the Montreal Protocol.
48 The Implementation Committee once noted that the parallel exercise might even be
conductive to the functioning of the N.C.P. See W. Lang, 'Ozone Layer', 2 Y.bk.I.E.L.
(1991) p. 109.
49 In cases of disputes involving T.R.E.Ms., parties to the Protocol may first use the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. dispute settlement system, rather than the N.C.P. (see Chapter
IV(IV.B) above).
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The N.C.P. of the Protocol provides only that:
(i) the special procedural regime (i.e. the N.C.P.) shall apply 'without prejudice to the
operation of the settlement of disputes procedure laid down in Article 11 of the
Vienna [Ozone] Convention' (Preamble);
(ii) the Meeting of the Parties may issue an interim call and/or recommendations,
pending completion of these proceedings (Annex IV( 13)) and:
(iii) the contracting parties that decide to use a dispute settlement mechanism
described in Article 11 of the Vienna Ozone Convention must inform the Meeting of the
Parties through Ozone Secretariat (Annex 1V( 12)).
These three points will not radically change the above-mentioned
controversial relationship between Article 11 traditional settlement
mechanisms and the new Montreal N.C.P. regime.50
It should be noted that the 1991 Nairobi Meeting of the Parties
decided, as has already been pointed out, that these two types of processes
for dealing with parties' non-compliance were distinct and separate
procedures (Decision III/2)5! Further, at the 1992 Copenhagen Ozone
Meeting of the Parties, it was also decided that 'the responsibility for legal
interpretation of the Protocol rests ultimately with the Parties themselves'
(Decision IV 5(5): see Section IV(B.3.2) below).52
Perhaps one acceptable explanation for this current situation will be
that the internally specialised treaty bodies - as legal advisers to the
regime-practitioners - still have to take account of the existing principles
and rules of international law as a whole, in deciding what is 'non¬
compliance' or breach of treaty and which measure should then be taken55
- even if members of these bodies are, in reality, unwilling to clarify such
a nagging question and, in the quest for flexibility, would allow it to
remain a grey area of the international legal ozone regime.
Though this view is not necessarily confirmed in practice,54 it is
probable that the international institutional supervision of compliance
50 For a comprehensive discussion see M. Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Non-
Compliance?', 3 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1992) pp. 157-61.
51 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/L.4 .
52 See also Section IV. B(3) below.
55 See also Section V below.
54 See Section VII below. It has been often pointed out, however, that the N.C.P. of the
Montreal type is 'too soft' (e.g. statement made by J. E. Butler at the 91st Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 'The Establishment of a Dispute
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through the Montreal N.C.P. would be only powerless or too weak to resolve
certain ozone disputes. Hence, as a rule, should failure by the new N.C.P.
regime to settle ozone disputes occur, an allegedly defaulting party could
still be taken to the formal dispute settlement procedure under Article 11 of
the Vienna Ozone Layer Convention that includes binding third party
settlement (see also Section VI below).55
IV. THE MECHANICS OF THE OPERATION OF THE MONTREAL N.C.P.:
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SPECIALISED INTERNAL TREATY INSTITUTIONS
A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE MONTREAL NCP REGIME
1. The Actors of the N.C.P. Regime
The main actors of the Montreal N.C.P. regime are, apart from each state
party, three specialised internal treaty institutions - namely, (i) the
U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat, (ii) the Implementation Committee, and (iii) the
Meeting of the Parties. They are all both 'functional' and 'sectional'
institutions in the field of international ozone layer protection. The N.C.P.
regime can be triggered in the three regime actors by (i) one party against
another party, (ii) a party itself which is/would be in non-compliance, and
(iii) the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat.
The role of regime-supporting actors of international financial
mechanisms (i.e. the Executive Committee ('ExCom'), the Multilateral Fund
Secretariat, the World Bank and other U.N. institutions such as the U.N.D.P.
and the U.N.I.D.O.) will be considered in Chapter VI below. Unlike N.G.Os. in
the field of international human rights protection law - such as Amnesty
Resolution/Non-Compliance Mechanism in the Climate Change Convention', 11 April
1997, Washington D.C.).
55 See M. Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance?', 3 Y.bk.l.E.L. (1992) p.
160.
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International56 - environmental N.G.Os. are given only a minor role in
releasing informal information about anticipated non-compliance.57
2. The Principle of Good Faith (bona fides)
In the light of its characteristic features - notably those demanding
voluntary or political co-operation in ensuring implementation of the
technical obligations including the self-reporting requirements, it is
especially important to note at the outset that the fundamental basis of the
N.C.P. regime is the principle of good faith - that which has also formed
the foundation of the international ozone regime itself (see Chapter 1(1)
above). The principle of good faith is based on reciprocity: member states
of the ozone regime - i.e. mainly Non-Article 5 developed countries, which
already have the capacity to fully comply with ozone treaty obligations -
entertain the rational expectation that other majority group members -
namely Article 5 developing states ('L.V.Cs.') - will also try to comply with
stringent but differentiated ozone treaty obligations (see Chapter
III( III.E.2) above) and other related principles/rules of international law.
In view of the 'enforceability' of multilateral environmental treaty
rules, international reputations are also politically important: as Henkin
observed, it may be said with some exaggeration that 'States recognise that
stability, law and order, reliability (and a warranted reputation for
reliability) are in their national interest, and therefore that they have a
more-or-less enlightened self-interest in compliance'.5®
56 As regards human rights law regime, under the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, individuals and N.G.Os. can
submit applications against states that have accepted the right of individual petition
(Article 25(l)[Article 34 of the Revised Convention]; entered into force in 3 September
1953, amended by Protocol No. 11). The Inter-American Commission, likewise,
receives complaints from individuals and other non-state entities (The American
Convention on Human Rights, Article 44). See also the Charter of the United Nations
(Article 87(b)).
57 For details see O. Yoshida & A. Sakota, 'The Role of N.G.Os. in the International
Legal Regime for the Protection of the Ozone Layer' in The Japanese Society of Human-
Environment Related Problems (ed.), N.G.Os. and Global Environmental Problems,
(October 1998, Japan Environment Agency).
56 See L. Henkin, 'General Course on Public International Law', 216 Hague Recueil
(1989) p. 72.
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B. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNAL INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN
THE MONTREAL NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE
1. The U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat
The 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention established the U.N.E.P. Ozone
Secretariat on an interim basis, and the Secretariat currently serves on a
permanent basis (see Chapter II(III.D.3) above). Whereas the Secretariat
also carries out similar secondary functions in its routine as provided for
in Article 12 of the Montreal Protocol, it expanded its role as a regime-
supporter in the N.C.P. The U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat acts at a early stage to
monitor compliance with detailed technical ozone regulations, and then
identify the points at issue.59
(a) The N.C.P. Regime Initiators & the Functions of the Ozone Secretariat
As stated earlier, it is in the following three situations that the Montreal
N.C.P. regime will be invoked through/by the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat,
regardless of the fact that there will exist material damage, or breach of
treaty under general international law: the mechanics of the operation of
the Montreal N.C.P. Regime are not based on the establishment of standing
to bring inter-state claims.
CASE (I): One Party Against Another Party
In this event, the U.N.E.P. Secretariat (i) receives a report presented by any
contracting parties that have reservations as to another party's
implementation of its treaty obligations under the Protocol,® (ii) sends
that submission made by party/parties to the party whose implementation
is at issue,161 and (iii) transmits the submission provided by parties,
including reply and information, to the standing Implementation
Committee.® The submission must be supported by 'corroborating
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information', which might include informal information offered by non-
state international actors such as environmental N.G.Os.63
CASE (II): Self-Reporting
The U.N.E.P. Secretariat, in this case, (i) obtains a written explanation given
by the party with regard to the particular circumstances of the causes for
non-compliance, and64 (ii) transmits the submission to the Implementation
Committee.65
It is interesting to note that this self-reporting system was instituted
into the N.C.P. regime based on the proposal made by the former Soviet
Union:66 several of whose successors, i.e. the Countries with Their
Economies in Transition, for the first time, initiated the N.C.P. ozone dispute
settlement regime (see Section VII(B) below).
CASE (III): The U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat
The U.N.E.P. Secretariat can also invoke the N.C.P. regime by itself, where it
becomes aware of possible non-compliance 'during the course of preparing
its reports'. The Ozone Secretariat can request any party to provide
necessary information in connection with its possible non-compliance,
including the reporting requirements, control measures and trade
restrictions.67 This will be the first case in which the Secretariat has been
empowered to invoke a formal dispute avoidance/settlement procedure of
M.E.As. Compared with the Montreal N.C.P., the Secretariat under the N.C.P.
of the 1994 Oslo Sulphur Protocol seems to be given relatively stronger
power.63
65 For details see O. Yoshida & A. Sakota, 'The Role of N.G.Os. in the International
Legal Regime for the Protection of the Ozone Layer' in The Japanese Society of Human-
Environment Related Problems (ed.), N.G.Os. and Global Environmental Problems,
(October 1998, Japan Environment Agency).
64 Annex IV(4).
65 ibid.
66 See P. Szell, 'The Development of Multilateral Mechanisms for Monitoring
Compliance, in W. Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law, (1995)
p. 100.
67 Annex IV(3); Article 7.
68 The N.C.P. of the 1994 Oslo Sulphur Protocol provides that 'Where the secretariat,
in particular upon reviewing the reports. .. , become aware of possible non-compliance
by any Party. . . , it may request the Party concerned to furnish necessary information
about the matter'(emphasis added). See EB.A1R/WG.5/CPR.13, para. 14.
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Here we can see that it is possible that information derived from
environmental N.G.Os. might - without any governmental support - reach
the Montreal N.C.P. regime.® However, until now, the U.N.E.P. Ozone
Secretariat is rather reluctant to invoke the N.C.P. regime in this way.
In the case that the party concerned does not respond within fixed
periods or that the matter cannot be settled by diplomatic means, the Ozone
Secretariat then includes that matter in its report of the Ozone Meeting of
the Parties, and it also informs the Implementation Committee.7(3 We may
say that this 'sociological sanction' might, to some extent, have immediate
effect (see also Section IV(A.2) above).
(b) The Secretariat of Other Environmental Regimes
The Secretariat of the 1994 Oslo Sulphur Protocol takes on almost the same
functions in its newly established N.C.P. regime.73 Yet, unlike the
Montreal N.C.P., the quality of data reported by parties is evaluated by the
Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Pollutant Technical Centres
('E.M.E.P.'), and/or by 'independent experts' nominated by the
Implementation Committee of the Oslo Sulphur Protocol.72
To take other examples, the U.N.E.P. Secretariat of the 1973 C.I.T.E.S.
may ask for additional data and information as to the implementation of the
C.I.T.E.S. Convention where it considers necessary, though, in reality, this
function is not well activated yet.73 It can also make recommendations for
the 'implementation of the aims and provisions of the present Convention,
including the exchange of information of a scientific or technical
nature'.74
® See A. E. Boyle, 'Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Law of the Sea and the
Environment', 26 Thesaurus Acioasium (1996) p. 259; T. Gehring, Dynamic
International Regimes, (1994) p. 318. Same thing can be said of the N.C.P. under the
1994 Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur. See D. G. Victor, The Early Operation
and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's Non-Compliance Procedure, (1994) p. 7,
suggesting that though an N.G.O. appealed for its participation in the meeting of the
Committee in 1992, it was denied on the ground that 'confidential, delicate, and
sensitive information might be discussed and the presence of an NGO could limit frank
discussion'.
70 Ibid.
71 EB.A1R/WG.5/CPR. 13, paras. 3-5.
72 EB.AIR/WG.5/CPR.13, para. 6(d).
73 Article XV. 2(d). See D. S. Favre, International Trade in Endangered Species,
(1989) p. 286.
74 Article XII. 2(h).
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The Secretariat of the 1991 Bamako Convention is given relatively
greater powers, and it may also conduct a 'verification of the substance of
the allegation and submit a report thereof to all the Parties to the
Convention'.75 On the other hand, the U.N.E.P. Secretariat under the 1989
Basel Convention is only required to inform the parties of the alleged
violations.76
Finally, under the N.A.F.T.A. Side Agreements on Labour, Health and
Environmental Regulation, the Secretariat is to consider complaints from
environmental N.G.Os. that a party is 'failing to effectively enforce its
environmental law', and it can also request a response from the party if it
decides that the submission so merits.77
2. The Implementation Committee of the Montreal N.C.P.
(a) The Structure of the Implementation Committee
The standing Implementation Committee - as the 'legitimate first stop' in
any formal discussion'7^ - has examined and decided most of the debatable
non-compliance issues (see Section VII(A) below). However, vexed
questions such as non-compliance by the Countries with Their Economies
in Transition may have to be ultimately referred to the Meeting of the
Parties.
It is widely agreed that the Committee is not an international judicial
institution.7^ Rather, the Committee can be regarded as a conciliatory body
within the ozone regime (see also Section V below).
As we noted, the 1990 London Meeting of the Parties established the
Implementation Committee under the interim N.C.P. as a standing
governmental committee, which originally consisted of five members in
75 Article 19. See K. Kummer, International Management ofHazardous Wastes, (1995)
p. 234.
76 Article 19. Cf. The 1957 Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur
Seals (Article 12). Yet during the negotiations of the 1989 Basel Convention it was
proposed that the Secretariat should have the power to investigate alleged
contraventions of the Convention. See K. Kummer, International Management of
Hazardous Wastes, (1995) p. 76-77.
77 Article 14(1), North American Free Trade Agreements: Treaty Materials, p. 13; J. I.
Garvey, 'Trade Law and Quality of Life - Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA Side
Accords on Labour and the Environment', 89 A.J.I.L. (1995) pp. 439-53.
76 See D. G. Victor, The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's
Non-Compliance Procedure, (1996) p. 36.
79 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/12, para. 39, noting that 'the Committee had operated in a co¬
operative, non-judicial and non-confrontational atmosphere'..
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accordance with Decision 11/5.80 The Implementation Committee meets
regularly twice a year at least and its meetings are organised by the
U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat.
At present, the Implementation Committee consists of ten
representatives from governmental parties elected by the Meeting of the
Parties to the Protocol for two years. As is often pointed out, sovereign
states are usually reluctant to entrust independent experts with decision¬
making powers. On this particular point, A. Kiss, for example, argues that:
'[T]he existence of independent elements inside a commission may be
considered as fundamental criterion for deciding whether it really may be
called an international institution'.8^
Whilst the members of the Committee - unlike the I.L.O. supervisory
commissions, the I.C.C.P.R./I.C.E.S.C.R. Committees or other human rights
committees82 - do not necessarily have either technical/scientific
expertise and skills or any special legal competence, they still have to deal
with not only political or diplomatic matters, but all matters pertaining to
technical or scientific non-compliance issues.83 in this respect, the
importance of the role of the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat as a highly
experienced body of technical/scientific experts cannot be
overemphasised. In addition, in order to improve the immediate situation, a
subsidiary agency of the U.N.E.P., the Technical and Economic Assessment
8^ UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, para. 47. The first parties elected were Japan, Norway,
Trinidad and Tobago, Hungary and Uganda.
8^ See A. Kiss, 'Mechanisms of Supervision of International Environmental Rules', in
G. Lammers (eds.), Essays on the Development of the International Legal Order, (1980)
p. 103 (emphasis added).
82 It is noteworthy that in 1985 an E.C.O.S.O.C. working group composed of
governmental representatives was replaced by a committee of eighteen independent
experts, i.e. the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the I.C.E.S.C.R.
Committee). The composition of the Committee, established in 1987, reflects the
principle of an equitable geographic distribution. See E.C.O.S.O.C. Res. 1985/17 (cited
in H. G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, (1995) pp. 190
et seq. & 416. See further P. Alston (eds.), International Human Rights in Context,
(1996) Chapter 6. On the I.L.O. Compliance Machinery, see, 4.2. below; Cf. United
Nations Rules for Conciliation of Disputes between States (Article 21 & 25). See also
the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (Article 14). However, in many cases, such individual
experts are not entirely independent from their governments. See e.g. H. G. Schermers
and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, (1995) pp. 194 et seq.
88 See P. Szell, 'The Development of Multilateral Mechanisms for Monitoring
Compliance' in W. Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law, (1995)
p. 108.
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Panel ('T.E.A.P.'), has been contributing toward selecting, organising and
supplying information as to expected non-compliance of parties.84
Like many other international conciliation commissions, the
composition of the Committee is based on the principle of equitable
geographical distribution designed to ensure 'political equilibrium' in
which common interests of the international community are to be
represented as intended.88 Unlike the Implementation Committee,
however, the Executive Committee of the Montreal Multilateral fund
consists of seven representatives from both developed country parties and
developing county parties (i.e. "7+7" formula).86
(b) The Functions of the Committee in the Montreal N.C.P. Regime
Under the Montreal N.C.P. regime the Implementation Committee assumes
the following prominent four roles 'with a view to securing an amicable
solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the provisions of the
Protocol'.87 These conciliatory functions do not necessarily cause legal
conflicts with the dispute settlement procedures of the 1985 Vienna Ozone
Convention, if taken at all.88
84 The T.E.A.P. has reported on anticipated non-compliance by countries with
Economic in Transition (C.E.I.Ts.), such as the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Yet it
is natural that powers delegated to the agency are no more than these of the
Implementation Committee. See Assessment of Basic Problems Confronting Countries
With Economies in Transition in Complying With the Montreal Protocol: Report of the
TEAP Ad-Hoc Working Group on CEIT Aspects, UNEP, (November 1995). See also
Decision VII/34 in UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12, pp. 43-46.
88 Ongoing Parties of the Montreal N.C.P. may be re-elected for one immediate
consecutive terms (Annex IV(5)). The Implementation Committee elects its own
President and Vice-President who serve for one year. In the Third Meeting of the
Parties it was decided that the number of Parties should be increased by 5 to ten
(UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/L.4: Decision 111/21). The N.C.P. Committee of the 1994 Oslo
Sulphur Protocol consists of eight Parties (EB.AIR/WG.5/CRP, para. 1).
86 See Decision 11/20. It is important to note that the United States holds a permanent
seat on the Executive Committee.
87 Annex IV(8). The N.C.P. of the 1994 Oslo Sulphur Protocol employs the phrase,
'securing a constructive solutions'. See EB.AIR/WG.5/CPR.13, para. 6(c); P. Szell, 'The
Development of Multilateral Mechanisms for Monitoring Compliance' in W. Lang (ed.),
Sustainable Development and International Law, (1995) p. 106.
88 Cf. M. Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance?', 3 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1992) p.
159.
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First, the Implementation Committee receives, considers and reports
on:
(i) a report from a party/parties in another party's implementation of its treaty
obligations under the Protocol;"®
(ii) the submission provided by a party that considers itself unable to comply fully
with its obligations;®®
(iii) other relevant submissions, replies and information concerned;®!
(iv) any information or observations with regard to compliance or production, import
and export of controlled substances received and forwarded by the U.N.E.P.
Secretariat.®^
In analysing those reports/submissions, in order to make
appropriate recommendations, the Implementation Committee must
ascertain particular underlying reasons for anticipated non-compliance.
In the light of national data reporting from parties, the Committee also
'amicably' arranges the classification/re-classification of 'developing
countries'®^ entitled to receive funding from the established Montreal
Multilateral Fund. In addition, the Implementation Committee may request
further information where it considers it to be necessary, through the
U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat.®^ The Committee's initial four years were
occupied with discussions on such reported data, though, since late 1993, it
has also examined substantial non-compliance issues such as trade controls
(see Section VII(A) below).®5
The Committee considers confidential information as to treaty
performance contained in such data reports provided. However, its reports
must not include such delicate matters®® and the members of the Committee
Annex IV(7-a).
90 Ibid.
Ibid. The U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat, as we noted, is assigned the role to transmit
such information on possible non-compliance.
92 Annex IV(7-b).
93 The Implementation Committee often put in a necessary correction of data reports
from state parties.
94 Annex IV(7-c)
95 See also D. G. Victor, The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal
Protocol's Non-Compliance Procedure, (1996) Chapter 6.
9® Annex IV (15-16). It is important to note that the Third Meeting of the Parties
decided that data submitted to the Secretariat on the production of controlled
substances would be confidential, while data on the 'consumption' of these substances
would not. It follows that environmental N.G.Os. by themselves could not compile
exact data as to global trade in O.D.Ss.
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and any party involved in its N.C.P. processes must protect the
confidentiality of information.97 Due partly to the fear that such
confidential data might be publicly disclosed,98 environmental N.G.Os. are,
at present, totally excluded from the Implementation Committee meetings.
Yet it is important that N.G.Os. are free to send any written submissions on
any matter they consider important for the attention of the
Implementation Committee."
By contrast, it is noticeable that a number of committees and
commissions in the field of international humanitarian law rely, to an
appreciable extent, on unofficial information supplied by human rights
N.G.Os. at national and international levels, whereas their 'complaints
procedures' are undertaken in closed meetings. 10® The 1989 Basel
Convention compliance regime also depends in part on N.G.Os.' active
informal monitoring as to trading in illegal hazardous wastes at
national/international levels.101 It is also interesting to note that under
the dispute settlement mechanisms of the North American Free Trade
Agreement ('N.A.F.T.A.') environmental N.G.Os. are allowed to file
complaints with its Commission.102
Second, the Implementation Committee submits a report, including
any recommendations on individual non-compliance cases, to the Meeting
of the Parties. jhe implementation Committee may also make
recommendations where it considers it appropriate, though the parties
97 The N.C.P. of the 1994 Oslo Sulphur Protocol does not contain a similar provision.
9® P. Szell, 'The Development of Multilateral Mechanisms for Monitoring Compliance'
in W. Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law, (1995) p. 102.
99 Information provided by the Ozone Secretariat, Mr. G. Bankobeza, (11 March 1998).
Environmental N.G.Os. are allowed to attend the Meetings of the Parties as observers
(see Appendix), and they may circulate certain documents at such formal ozone
meetings. They also participate in meetings of the Executive Committee of the
Montreal Multilateral Fund.
100 Their legal texts mostly does not prescribe for the role of human rights N.G.Os.
See e.g. H. J. Steiner and P. Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law,
Politics, Morals, (1996) Chapter 8.
101 See G. Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to
International Law', 1 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1990) p. 18. On the role of N.G.Os. in the 1973
C.I.T.E.S. see K. Sachariew, 'Promoting Compliance with International Environmental
Legal Standards', 2 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1991) p. 39.
102 See e.g. N. Aldaraca, 'The North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation', 2 R.E.C.l.E.L. (1994) pp. 98-104; P. Sands, Principles of International
Environmental Law, (1995) pp. 713-14.
10^ Annex lV(7-e) and Annex IV(8). Under the early N.C.P. the Committee was not
empowered to make such recommendations.
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concerned cannot participate in the decision-making process.104
making such recommendations, the Implementation Committee - as a
subsidiary body of the Meeting of the Parties - must conform to the Rules of
Procedure adopted by the 1989 Ozone Meeting, by applying mutatis
mutandis, however.105
It should be noted that, under international law, the Committee as a
conciliation body is not necessarily restricted to basing its
recommendations on the ozone treaties, but it can also provide
recommendations ex aequo et bono by taking all the relevant
circumstances into account.1°° Whilst such recommendations are legally
non-binding on ozone regime members, they may carry to some extent
political' weight 107 anci fn many cases they are widely followed. Such
voluntary acceptances of the Committee's recommendations has gradually
developed the favourable reputation of the Implementation Committee on
anticipated treaty non-compliance.
Third, the Implementation Committee undertakes information-
gathering in the territory of a party for achieving its functions based on
the consent of the party. This is the so-called 'on-the-spot investigations',
or a kind of 'verification', in a limited sense.10^
Although during the negotiation of the Montreal N.C.P. regime
developing countries regarded as unacceptable consideration by the
Implementation Committee of related information from on-site inspections
104 Annex IV(9). This is also provided for in the Oslo Protocol N.C.P. regime
(EB.A1R/WG.5/CPR.13, para. 10). See also the statement by the President of the
Implementation Committee, Mr. Schally, who stresses the importance of confidentiality
(UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/INF.l, paras. 38 & 41).
105 jhg Ru]es 0f Procedures in UNEP/Ozl.Pro.1/5. See U.N.E.P., Handbook for the
International Treaties for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 6th edn. (1996) pp. 52-
60. In principle, they would apply to meetings of any subsidiary committees/panels
(UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, para. 7). Yet it can be assumed that the Committee usually takes
their recommendations by unanimous vote or consensus. The Executive Committee has
its own rules of procedure.
100 See R. L. Bindschedler, 'Conciliation and Mediation', 1 Encyclopaedia of Public
International Law, (1982) pp. 47 et seq. See also Section V(A) below.
101? See further 5 Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, (1982), p. 133.
10^ Annex IV(7-d). This provision is also provided for in the N.C.P. of the 1994 Oslo
Sulphur Protocol. Cf. The 1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental
Protection (Article 14); the 1971 Nuclear Weapons Treaty (Article 111(6)). For
instance, the l.A.E.A. has its own inspectors who carry out on-site inspections and
then report to the institution: for further details of inspection, see A. E. Boyle, 'Saving
the World? Implementation and Enforcement in International Environmental Law
Through International Institutions', 3 J.E.L. (1991) pp. 236 et seq.; H. G. Schermers
and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, (1995) pp. 878 et seq.; W. Fischer,
The Verification of International Convention on Protection of the Environment and
Common Resources, (1992).
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that is based on the Committee's initiative, and from N.G.Os., industries, mass
media and individuals, 109 this workable compromise was finally reached
by mutual concession.
Fourth, since financial and/or technical assistance are, in practice,
closely related to a party's capability to comply with obligations, the
Implementation Committee maintains an exchange of information with the
Executive Committee of the M.L.F. concerning financial and technical
assistance.!!®
3. The Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
(a) The Functions of the Meeting of the Parties in the N.C.P. Regime
As already pointed out, the Meeting of the Parties has served as the final
decision-maker under the Montreal N.C.P. regime.m Flence the highest
institution of the ozone regime retains, to the very end, direct control over
multilateral ozone disputes raised among member states. It would not be
denied that this decision-making technique reveals parties' intentions to
conserve their various economic/political national interests. The same
may be said of other non-compliance mechanisms of the 1994 Oslo Sulphur
Protocol and the Climate Change Convention regime.
After receiving the reports from the standing Implementation
Committee, the Meeting of the Parties will consider 'the circumstances of
the matter, decide upon and call for steps to bring about full compliance
with the Protocol, including measures to assist the Parties' compliance with
the Protocol, and to further the Protocol's objectives'.
The 'Indicative List of Measures' in Annex V, which might be taken
by the Meeting of the Parties as regards non-compliance with the treaty
obligations, include:
(i) Appropriate assistance, including assistance for the collection and reporting of
data, technical assistance, technology transfer and financial assistance, information
transfer and training.
109 See UNEP/OzLPro/WG.3/3/3, para. 23.
1Annex IV(7-e). It is since 1992 that the Implementation Committee has invited to
its meetings representatives from the Secretariat of the Montreal Multilateral Fund
and its implementing organisations.
HI See Section IV(B) above. As to the Conference of the Parties to the 1985 Vienna
Ozone Convention, see Chapter 111(111.5) above.
112 Annex IV(9).
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(ii) Issuing cautions.
(iii) Suspension, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law
concerning the suspension of the operation of a treaty, of specific rights and
privileges under the Protocol, whether or not to time limits, including those concerned
with industrial rationalisation, production, consumption, trade, transfer of
technology, financial mechanism and institutional arrangements.!^
The Meeting of the Parties may also make an interim call and/or
recommendations. H4 Moreover, it can request the standing
Implementation Committee to make recommendations to assist the Meeting's
consideration of matters of treaty non-compliance.H5 Those decisions and
recommendations made by the Meeting of the Parties with a view to
implementation must be fully effective in accordance with the objectives
of the international ozone regime.
It is worth pointing out, in passing, other basic but vital functions of
the Meeting of the Parties that will help enhance its efficiency in deciding
which measure(s) should be taken for a member state's anticipated non¬
compliance with treaty obligations:
(i) decide on any adjustments/reductions:1 16
(ii) decide on any addition to/insertion in/removal from any annex of substances and
on related control measures; 1 1 7
(iii) establish guidelines or procedures for reporting of information;! 1 ^
(iv) review requests for technical assistance submitted;! 19
(v) review reports prepared by the Secretariat;
11^ Cf. The International Monetary Fund (denial of access to funds or credits, Article
XXVI: 2(a). Yet, in practice, the I.N.F. usually does not resort to these sanctions and
adapts other means of securing compliance. See H. G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker,
International Institutional Law, (1995) pp. 913. The G.A.T.T. 1994 (withdrawal and
denial of concessions, Articles 11:5, XII:4, XV1I1:7, XVIII:21, X1X:3, XXI11, XXVII, and
XXVII1:4); the N.A.F.T.A. (withdrawal of benefits, Article 40); the United Nations (the
loss of voting rights, Article 19; suspension/expulsion from membership, Articles 5-
6, UN Charter); the I.A.E.A. (the suspension of the privileges/rights, Article XIX); the
I.L.O. (the loss of voting rights, Article 13(4),the I.L.O. Constitution); the l.C.A.O. (the
loss of voting rights, Article 62, the I.C.A.O. Convention); the I.M.O. (the loss of voting
rights, the I.M.O. Convention); the W.M.O. (the suspension of rights/privileges, Article
31, the W.M.O. Convention).
114 Annex IV( 13); Section VII below.
Annex IV( 14); Section VII below.
H6 See Chapter Part A of Chapter III(IV) above.
I17 Ibid.
11 3 Ibid.
H9 Chapter VI below.
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(vi) assess and review control measures; 120
(vii) consider and adopt proposals for amendment of the Protocol or any annex and for
121
any new annex;1 ^1
(viii) consider and adopt the budget for implementing the Protocol;122 and
(iv) consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for the
achievement of the purposes of the Protocol. ^ 23
(b) The Legal Nature of the Decisions of Meeting of the Parties
Here we shall focus on some of the important features of the binding
'quality' of Decisions adopted by the Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Ozone Protocol.
By September 1997, the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol alone
adopted more than two hundred Decisions in accordance with the 'Rules of
Procedure',124 and many of them are - directly or indirectly - related to
non-compliance issues concerning international regulation of O.D.Ss.,
trade controls of O.D.Ss. and data reporting. These Decisions usually
stipulate that regime members shall take further necessary measures for
the achievement of the purposes of the dynamic regulatory regime, or they
often reiterate obligations already laid down in Articles of the
international ozone treaties.125
However, the legal status of the Decisions of the Meeting remains
unsettled (but presumably 'ordinary decisions' are non-binding; see
below), and it is not necessarily clear that non-compliance with the
obligations in the Decisions of the Parties to the Protocol (and to the Vienna
Ozone Convention) can be regarded as 'non-compliance' (= breach of
120 See Part A of Chapter III(IV) above.
121 Ibid.
122 See Chapter VI below.
125 See Section IV.B(b) below. It is worth noting that, in order to analyse destruction
technologies, the 1990 London Meeting of the Parties established an Ad Hoc
Technical Advisory Committee on Destruction Technologies; 'The members shall be
experts on destruction technologies and selected with due reference to equitable
geographical distribution' (UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, pp. 15-16 & para. 48).
124 The processes to adopt these decisions are rather complicated; see 'Rules of
Procedures for the Meeting of the Parties' in UNEP/OzL.Pro.l/5/Annex I; Cf. Article
11.4(j) of the Montreal Protocol. Cf. the Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the
Executive Committee in UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/11/Annex VI. On Rules of Procedure in
M.E.As. see P. Szell, 'Decision Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements',
26/5 E.P.L. (1996) p. 211.
125 See U.N.E.P., Handbook for the International Treaties for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, 6th edn. (1996) pp. 63-175.
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treaty). In addition, they are often vague and open to a variety of
interpretations - their vagueness may often be the result of workable
political compromise within the environmental regime (see e.g. Decision
VII/8 as to Russia's non-compliance with Article 2 control measures).126
It is interesting to note that during the negotiations of the Montreal
N.C.P. regime many representatives from the governments suggested that
such Decisions made by the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol were
distinct from Articles of the Montreal Protocol's text, and likewise some
states were of the opinion that not all decisions were binding on the state
parties.127 Yet some other representatives stated that such decisions were
always legally binding if they related to 'matters of substance'.128 In this
regard, China made a formal reservation.12^ Consequently, as stated
earlier, the 1992 Copenhagen Meeting failed to adopt the 'Indicative List of
Possible Situations of Non-Compliance'. Until now, this matter has not been
formally discussed in the Meeting of the Parties and in meetings of the
Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Ozone Convention.
One may notice that, essentially different from state entities that
have established their fully independent legal personality in international
law, 130 the functional capacity or 'implied powers' of the Meeting of the
Parties - as the product of the multilateral ozone layer treaty - are strictly
limited to their 'objectives' and 'functions', and, generally speaking, they
are not well defined by customary international law or general
international law, but based primarily on the Montreal Ozone Layer
Protocol. Whilst the regular Meeting of the Parties has some supranational
aspects, it is not a 'super-state' organisation: as Professor P. Birnie and
Professor A. Boyle shrewdly pointed out, 'the supervisory body, whether a
meeting of the parties or a Commission, is in substance no more than a
diplomatic conference of states, and the existence. . . of a separate legal
126 See Section VII(B.2) below.
^27 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/3/3, para. 41 & 'Indicative List of Possible Situations of
Non-Compliance with the Protocol' (in Annex II). See also comments made at the time
of adoption of Decision IV/17 C ('Application of Trade Measures Under Article 4 to
Non-Parties to the Protocol) in UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, paras. 73-74.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
186 As for legal personality, see Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations Case, I.C.J. Reports, (1949) p. 180; The International Status of South
West Africa Case, I.C.J. Reports, (1950) pp. 136-38. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, 4th edn. (1990), Chapter III; D. W. Bowett, The Law of International
Institutions, 4th edn. (1982) Chapter 11; N. D. White, The Law of International
Organisations, (1996) Chapter 2; R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law
and How We Use it, (1994) pp. 46 et seq.
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personality does not alter the reality that the membership of these
institutions is in no sense independent of the states they represent'.131 In
this connection, it is also possible to argue that 'any additional action'132
required for the achievement of the purposes of the Montreal Protocol
should be defined in terms of its limited functional capacity or 'implied
powers' in general international law.133
In addition, it is important to note that 'internal' international law
and procedural rules of the Meeting of the Parties (i.e. Rules of Procedure)
are subject to customary international law and rules governing the
principles of state sovereignty and equality of states.134 Therefore, in
theory, the individual Decisions adopted through the internal legal rules of
the Ozone Meeting are - in a formal sense, at least - of secondary
importance for the legal ozone regime unless declared with an expressed
intention to be bound. It should also be pointed out that ozone regime
members may dispute the validity of a Decision adopted by the Ozone
Meeting on the ground of violation of the Rules of Procedure.135
In the light of the above considerations, we may say that an ozone
Decision cannot impose on regime member states a legal obligation to adopt
measures which will conflict with the objectives of the international ozone
regime. Needless to say, however, certain specific decisions adopted
through 'formal' procedures provided in advance in the ozone treaties (e.g.
adjustments/amendments) are legally binding on member states - in this
context, they may be properly regarded as 'hard' international law.
Yet it is right to say at the same time that this controversial issue
offers one of the absolutely key factors to the understanding of the self-
contained ozone regime that now assumes a dynamic character (see
131 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992) p. 165.
132 Article 11(f); see Section IV(B.a) above.
133 It is noteworthy, however, that a key feature of the doctrine of 'implied powers' is
its flexibility, and such powers must be defined in the light of specific circumstances.
See H. G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, (1995) pp.
232-37; R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, 9th edn. (1992) pp.
16-22.
134 G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, 5th edn. (1967) pp. 32-33 &
pp. 268-69. Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice does not
necessarily refer to the legal status of 'internal' international law of institutions.
135 For a discussion of non-compliance with rules of procedure, see for instance B.
Conforti, 'The Legal Effect of Non-Compliance With Rules of Procedure in the U.N.
General Assembly and Security Council', 63 A.J.I.L., (1969) pp. 479-89,
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Chapter I(IV) above). 136 indeed, one of the primary functions of the
Meeting of the Parties as a quasi-legislative body is to change 'constantly'
the international law of ozone layer protection. Numerous Decisions -
whether adopted as 'soft' or 'hard' law instruments (see Chapter I(III.A)
above) - have created certain legal norms (and expectations) and elements,
which are capable of forming part of the international legal system of the
developing regulatory regime. As this question is taken up in Chapter VI
below, it is worth noting that, as with the N.C.P., the 'Interim' Multilateral
Fund of the Montreal Protocol - which is seen as a prototype for financial
mechanisms in protecting the global environment - was established on the
basis of Decision 11/18 of the Ozone Meeting of the Parties, rather than by
amendment.137 Hence it is mistake to think that they have no legal effects.
As decisions of international organisations have contributed to customary
international institutional law, arguably, many Decisions of the Meeting of
the Parties could show 'immediate' evidence of consensus among regime
actors138 and at the same time they provide essential indicators for a
proper understanding of the developing ozone regulatory regime.
Finally, we should not overlook the fact that the current rapid pace
of environmental degradation has produced a situation in which customary
international law obviously does not necessarily keep pace with the
immediate need to surmount such new environmental problems, including
ozone depletion, global climate change and the loss of living/non-living
natural resources.139
There is another important legal issue to be taken account in the
present discussion - namely, the intergovernmental Meeting's 'power' to
interpret the ozone layer treaties.
In the 1995 Vienna Meeting, the Russian Federation insisted that the
Meeting of the Parties should have applied 'appropriate measures' in
accordance with the 'Indicative List' in an ascending order of importance, -
that is, from assistance, caution to sanctions. 140 At present there does not
13^ See A. E. Boyle, 'State Responsibility for Breach of Obligations to Protect the
Global Environment' in W. E. Butler (ed.), Control over Compliance with International
Law, (1991) pp. 75-77; Chapters 1, IV & IX.
137 It is also important to note that, subsequently, the Ozone Meeting adopted
Decision VII/16 regarding judicial personality, privileges and immunities of the
Montreal Multilateral Fund. See UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/7, p. 22. See Chapter VI below.
138 See J. I. Charney, 'Universal International Law', 87 A.J.I.L. (1993) pp. 529-51.
139 See Chapter I(III.A) above on the framework-protocol & 'soft law' approaches.
!40 in this context, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides 'A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'
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exist, in a legal sense, a clear preference in choosing such 'Measures' as
listed. Such an 'appropriate measure' - Decision VII/18 which Russia would
not describe in such mild terms - was, as we shall see, adopted through
Rules of Procedure of the Meeting of the Parties, but with the help of the
U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat's own interpretation. In this respect, it is
possible to argue that, referring to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties,141 the travaux preparatories of the Montreal N.C.P.
regime would partly defend Russia's position (see Section II above).
Further, this kind of dispute relating to treaty interpretation could
potentially be settled by traditional settlement procedures under Article 11
of the Vienna Ozone Layer Convention (see Section IV(A.3) above) as a last
resort.
However, as we noted, the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol
decided in its Third Meeting that: 'the responsibility for legal
interpretation of the Protocol ultimately rests with the Parties themselves'
(i.e. the 'control' of the interpretation of the ozone layer treaty texts).
Given that this debatable statement implies that the quasi-judicial
interpretative organ of the ozone regime would not be entirely bound by a
body of principles/rules of general public international law, such
Decisions (or 'rules of behaviour') ratified by the Meeting of the Parties as
a result of the inter-state bargaining process may not conceal their
political orientations in existing international environmental relations.
Such outcomes might be criticised by some for lack of 'legitimacy' l4^ or as
mere declarations of international environmental politics: So, to what
extent must such Decisions take account of general international law? Is
the Ozone Meeting's real intention declared, ultimately, to interpret and
apply the provisions of the ozone layer treaties in the light of multi-faceted
national interests of the ozone regime member states? These are difficult
questions.
(Article 31). Yet the subsequent conduct of the Meeting of the Parties (or the
Implementation Committee) may determine this controversial issue (see the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 31(3)).
141 Article 32. See e.g. I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
(1984) p. 115-17. Yet it is also important that the regime member's original
intentions would be clarified in terms of the purposes of the ozone treaties.
1411 In the widest sense, the term 'legitimacy' can be defined as 'quality of a rule
which derives from a perception on the part of those whom it is adhered that it has
come into being in accordance with right process ' [i.e. 'the notion of valid sources but
also encompasses literary, socio-anthropological and philosophical insights']. See T.
Frank, 'Legitimacy in the International System', 82 A.J.I.L. (1988) pp. 705-59: O.
Schachter, 'United Nations Law', 88 A.JA.L. (1994) pp. 9-16 esp.
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It can be tentatively suggested that internal international regime
institutions within the system of the ozone treaties are more suitable for
interpretations and settlement of disputes than judicial organs external to
them. For instance, interpretation of I.M.F. rules are always made by the
Executive Board, the Board of Governors (or/and a Committee on
Interpretation).143 Similar examples are abundant.144 In addition, it has
been argued in the legal literature that governmental representation in
one environmental legal regime can be often regarded as a certain
'guarantee' for a consistent diplomatic policy in another international
legal regime or international organisation.145 This could partially explain
why member states of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law regime have never
formally disputed the validity of Article 4 T.R.E.Ms, of the Montreal
Protocol, the Multilateral Fund's environmental subsidies146 and other
M.E.A. trade restrictions.
V. THE PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE MONTREAL NON-COMPLIANCE
PROCEDURE: THE MONTREAL N.C.P., INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
AND OTHER DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
What I seek to show in this Section is that dispute settlement under the
N.C.P. regime can be viewed as a mixture of diplomatic and quasi-judicial
efforts in resolving treaty disputes at the multilateral level. It is a new set
of institutionalised global negotiation processes that decrease the
possibilities of international confrontation.147 Among other settlement
143 H. G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, (3rd edn.
1995) p. 843. See also G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, 5th edn.
(1967).
l44In the World Bank Administrative Tribunal and in the Administrative Tribunal of
the I.N.F., there is no possibility for judicial review by the l.C.J. (see H. G. Schrmers
and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, (1995) pp. 437-38). In this
connection, secretariats of international legal regimes in many cases play important
functions to deal with questions of interpretations. Cf. the I.M.O. Convention (Article
69); F. L. Kirgis, International Organisations in their Legal Setting, (1992) pp. 479-
81. See, also, constitutions of; the F.A.O. (Article 17); the W.H.O. (Article 75); and
the W.M.O. (Article 29). Yet, it is not necessarily clear that the Ozone Meeting of the
Parties to the Protocol would make consistent interpretation of the ozone treaties.
145 As to arguments against composing independent technical bodies, see H. G.
Schermers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, (1995), pp. 192-95.
146 For details of the relationship between the Fund's environmental subsidies and
the G.A.T.T., see S. N. Carlson, 'The Montreal Protocol's Environmental Subsidies and
GATT: A Needed Reconciliation', 29 TEXAS I.L.J. (1994) pp. 211-30.
147 It is also probable that, in certain circumstances, such an 'institutionalised'
negotiation procedure would reduce the impact of 'power relations' of the parties to
the dispute, which is inherent in negotiation process.
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techniques148 international conciliationis chosen here as a candidate
somewhat similar to the Montreal N.C.P. model. In addition, dispute
settlement procedures in (i) the European Human Rights Convention (the
role of the Committee of Ministers in particular), (ii) the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. and
(iii) the I.L.O. will be briefly considered in comparison to the Montreal
N.C.P.
A. The Montreal N.C.P. as a Multilateral Conciliation Mechanism
1. International Conciliation and the N.C.P. Regime
In conciliation, a friendly third party or an international institution such
as a conciliation commission works out not necessarily an authoritative but
an amicable solution, and it reports with recommendations for the parties
concerned, based on hearings, findings and evidence. In contrast to an
arbitral award, its marked advantages will be that 'the parties retain
control over the outcome and remain free to negotiate a politically
acceptable settlement of their differences without being bound to adhere to
treaty provisions of international law'. 150
148 Methods of peacefully settling disputes are generally classified into seven broad
categories, i.e. (i) negotiations, (ii) good offices, (iii) enquiry and fact-finding, (iv)
mediation, (v) conciliation, (vi) arbitration and (vii) formal judicial settlement. For
details see United Nations, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between
States, (1992).
1411 See e.g. J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, (1991) Chapter IV; D. W.
Bowett, 'Development in the Settlement of Disputes', 180 Hague Recueil, pp. 185 et
seq.; J. P. Cott, International Conciliation, (1972) pp. 8-11; the Unuted Nations,
Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement ofDisputes between States, (1992) Section II.E.
See also Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1994) Chapter 3(2). The 1928 General
Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, revised on April 28 1949,
(Article 1-16); the 1957 European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes;
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 66 & Annex); the 1971
Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects (Article
XIX); the United Nations Rules of the Conciliation of Disputes between States (Chapter
VII regarding rules applicable to conciliation by commission, esp.); the 1992 Decision
on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Including the Convention on Conciliation and
Arbitration Within the C.S.C.E. (Annex III).
1811 See A. E. Boyle, 'Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Law of the Sea and the
Environment', 26 Thesaurus Acroasium, (1996) p. 259. See also the 1969 Law of the
treaties (Annex. 6); Brierly, The Law of Nations, (6th edn. 1963) pp. 373-76. But Cf.
the 1975 Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with
International Organisations (Article 87(5)).
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The text of the Montreal N.C.P. does not employ the term
'conciliation', although it refers to an 'amicable solution'.151 Yet, so far as
the functions of the standing Implementation Committee as an
international conciliation body152 (and of the Secretariat as a group of
technical experts155) are concerned, the N.C.P. regime comes close to
international conciliation as a formal method of settling 'treaty disputes'.
Such treaty disputes are, as was described above, concerned with reporting
of data (Articles 7 and 9), O.D.S. control measures (Article 2),154 trade
matters (Article 4) and the classification of Article 5 country parties.
Under the Montreal N.C.P. regime, the Implementation Committee plays a
similar role to a conciliator who is given the task of investigating the
dispute in its various aspects and of helping parties reach an amicable but
non-binding agreement (see Section VII(A) below). The Ozone Secretariat
and subsidiary treaty bodies are to provide the N.C.P. Committee with
relevant expert information (see Section IV(B.l)).
However, the N.C.P. regime is not a conciliatory dispute settlement
procedure in a more restricted sense of the term;155 strictly speaking, this
means therefore that the N.C.P. may fall into the category of 'other
peaceful means' of settling disputes provided for in Article 33 of the U.N.
Charter.156 There are at least two differences between normal conciliation
procedures and the N.C.P. of the Montreal Protocol type.
In the first place, international conciliation - and formal judicial
proceedings - is more applicable in the case of bilateral, rather than
multilateral disputes or agreements.157 Strictly speaking, as Bindschedler
says, the primary objective of conciliation is not to establish a 'uniform
151 Cf. Article 28 of the European Human Rights Convention reads 'it shall at the same
time place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to securing a
friendly settlement of a matter on the basis of respect for Human Rights as defined in
this Convention' (emphasis added).
152 See Section IV(B.2) above
155 Chapter II(III.D.3) and Section IV(B.l) above.
154 And freeze of C.F.C. consumption for Article 5 countries, which will take effect in
1999.
155 It should be noticed that the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention contain a good
'international' conciliation procedure. See in detail Chapter 11(111.D.4) above.
156 For 'other peaceful means' see United Nations, Handbook on the Peaceful
Settlement ofDisputes between States (1992) paras. 288-312.
157 Yet a number of multilateral treaties contain detailed conciliation procedures.
See United Nations, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States,
(1992) para. 143.
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legal order'. 158 as noted above, a non-compliance dispute about the ozone
treaties is not a bilateral one between two or more parties but a multilateral
one between a party and all other parties.159 It is important in this respect
that non-compliance complaints will be initiated by both any party and the
Secretariat. Those N.C.P. initiators by themselves may determine the 'right
timing' to trigger the dispute avoidance/settlement procedure.160 Unlike
normal international conciliation procedures, the N.C.P. regime as a
multilateral conciliation mechanism thus inspires a collective reaction
taken by the parties in cases of non-compliance. 161
In the second place, the N.C.P. Committee is not an independent third
party but is composed of government representatives:162 this partly
reflects one of the noteworthy political aspects of the Montreal N.C.P.
regime. It may be assumed that the Committee is likely to decide what
measures should be taken on non-compliance cases at its broad discretion.
Under the N.C.P. regime the members of the Committee are strictly required
to protect the confidentiality of information from the parties and,
moreover, N.G.Os. are not allowed to participate in the Committee's meetings
(see Section IV(B.2.a) above). In this respect, G. Palmer argues that the
Committee could 'ignore certain rules of international law whose
application might not be considered desirable and it may draw upon the
body of normative expectations developed within the [ozone] regime
regardless of the formal legal status of any particular rule'.163
Yet under the Montreal N.C.P. - unlike under both an ad hoc
conciliation or arbitration commission and the so-called 'panels' in the
field of international economic law - the question at issue will be addressed
by the permanent Committee that meets several times a year, and not
therefore by a temporary ad hoc third party commission; the Committee is
a treaty organ created specifically for the settlement of treaty disputes
concerning the global protection of the ozone layer. In political terms,
153 See e.g. R. L. Bindschedler, 'Conciliation and Mediation', in Encyclopaedia of
Public International Law, 1(1982), p. 49.
159 See also M. Bothe, 'The Evaluation of Enforcement Mechanisms in International
Environmental Law' in R. Wolfrunt (ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards, (1996)
pp. 32-33.
160 See Section VII(B.2) below. See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 281.
161 See Chazournes, 'Mise en oeuvre du droit international dans le domaine de la
protection de l'environment: enjeux et defis', Revue generate de droit international
public, 1(1995), p. 63; T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) pp. 318-19.
162 For details see Section IV(B.2) below.
163 G. Palmer (eds.), International Environmental Law & World Order, (1994) p. 1120
(emphasis added).
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this pre-constituted international institution may foster a 'basic set of ideas
relating to societal values' 164 shared by the ozone regime members.
2. From Conciliation to the Political Organ of the M.E.A. Regime
Although the role and capability of the Implementation Committee are
strictly limited to making non-binding recommendations, the Committee
thus being conferred with not comprehensive but only conciliatory
powers, should the standing Committee not succeed in settling an ozone
dispute, the supreme organ of the ozone regime, i.e. the Meeting of the
Parties is then to take quasi-judicial decisions as to treaty non-compliance
by a regime member in accordance with the Indicative List of Measures in
Annex V165 (see Section IV(B.3) above). As in Russia's non-compliance
case, this dynamic quasi-legislative activity of the international political
institution often far exceeds the conciliatory role of the Implementation
Committee. As we shall see below, its decisive power may be comparable to
that of the Committee of Ministers under the European Human Rights
Convention.
In exceptional circumstances involving cases which have not been
referred to the European Court of Human Rights, the Committee of
Ministers of the European Convention on Human Rights - which consists of
state representatives, usually the foreign ministers of member states - is
empowered to make a binding determination whether or not there has
been a violation of the Convention. Its deliberations on certain cases is
highly confidential and the individual applicant is totally excluded from
the Committee's procedure. 166 In short, as is the case with Decisions of the
Meeting of the Parties,167 it is likely that the Committee of Ministers might
also politicise to a not inconsiderable extent legal/political disputes that are
unsolved.
164 See W. D. Coplin, The Functions of International Law: An Introduction to the Role
of International Law in the Contemporary World, (1966) Chapter 5.
166 It should be noted, however, that even if a regime member refuses to accept
compliance-related recommendations by the Implementation Committee, the whole
procedure for settling ozone disputes does not have to be restarted before the Meeting
of the Parties. International ozone negotiations within the Meeting of the Parties will
continue based on the evidence and factual, technical data provided by the Committee,
the Ozone Secretariat and other technical bodies such as temporary sub-committees.
166 F. G. Jacobs and R. C. A. White, The European Convention on Human Rights, (1996)
p. 693 and its footnote 13.
167 See Decision VIII/26(1) discussed in Section V1I(B.2) below.
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In addition, it is worth noting that there have been many cases in
which the Committee of Ministers has failed to achieve the required two-
thirds majority, and, in fact, the Committee has taken no decision at all: in
such cases, in a certain sense, lack of decisions might be viewed as non¬
compliance of the Committee under Article 32(1) in deciding whether or
not there has been a violation of the European Human Rights
Convention.168 This fact clearly shows the inherent limitations of such
political bodies when dealing with controversial 'legal' and/or 'political'
issues.
Accordingly, whilst the Committee of Ministers thus acts in a quasi-
judicial capacity, it is probable that the Committee takes account of
considerations of political expediency and in certain cases, such decisions
made by the diplomatic institution are thus not necessarily consistent with
principles of general international law (see also Section III(B) above).
B. The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Used by Other International
Institutions
Let us, for the moment, consider dispute settlement procedures of the
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. legal system and of the International Labour Organisation
('I.L.O.'). There are some similarities between the Montreal N.C.P. regime
and the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. non-violation procedure under international
economic law or the complaints procedure in the I.L.O. under the branch of
international social law.
1. The G.A.T.T./W.T.O. Non-Violation Procedure in International Economic
Law169
168 See D. J. Harris, M. O'Boyle and C. Warbrick, Lawof the European Convention on
Human Rights, (1995) p. 695.
169 On the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. dispute settlement system see among others Y. Iwasawa,
WTO Dispute Settlement, (1994), Japanese; E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement System, (1997). With regard to the non-violation complaints in particular
see E. U. Petersmann, 'Violation and Non-Violation Complaints in Public International
Trade Law', 34 G.Y.bk.I.L. (1991) p. 192; T. Cottier and K. Schefer, 'Non-Violation
Complaints in WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future' in E. U.
Petersmann (ed.), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
System, (1997) Chapter 3; A. von Bogdandy, 'The Non-Violation Procedure of Article
XX1IL2, GATT: Its Operational Rationale', 26 J.W.T. (1992) pp. 95-111; P. J. Kuyper,
'the Law of GATT As a Special Field of International law', 25 Netherlands Y.bk.I.L.
(1994) pp. 245-49.
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The G.A.T.T. dispute settlement procedure - though formally based on
G.A.T.T. Articles XXII and XXIII (and a few other provisions) - has been built
over time through the progressive development of subsequent customary
practice.170 It is important that the principal purpose of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O.
dispute settlement procedure is not to sanction breaches of a treaty rule but
to ensure predictability and the maintenance of the balance of advantages
in the changing circumstances of international economic relations.171
The dispute settlement system of G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade law is now
clearly described in the 1994 W.T.O. Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (i.e. the 1994 'D.S.U.'/Annex II) that
prescribes considerable changes.172 The early operation of the W.T.O.
dispute settlement system (1995-97) appears to have been successful.173
Article 3(1) of the D.S.U. provides that the Members affirm their adherence
to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied under
G.A.T.T. Articles XXII and XXIII, and the procedures further elaborated and
modified. Further, Article 3(2) of the D.S.U. states that the W.T.O. settlement
system is 'a central element in providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system and it serves to 'clarify the existing provision
of [the] agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation
of public international law'.
One of the distinguishing feature of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. dispute
settlement procedures has been the introduction of the panel system
(Articles 6-16 & 18-19 of the 1994 D.S.U.),174 having certain elements of
170 See Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995) Chapter 2; (Japanese); E. U.
Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) Chapter 2; J. H.
Jackson, The World Trading System: Law & Policy of International Economic Relations,
2nd edn. (1997) pp. 112-20 esp.
171 See 'General Provisions' contained in Article 3 of the 1994 D.S.U. in particular
(e.g. Articles 3(2-3), 3(7) & 3(10).
172 W.T.O., The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: A Collection of the Legal Texts,
(1995). It applies to all the 'multilateral trade agreements' in the Annexes to the
1994 W.T.O. Agreements. For a brief summary of these improvements see J. H.
Jackson, The World Trading System: Law & Policy of International Economic Relations,
2nd edn. (1997) pp. 125-26; Y. Iwasawa, 'WTO Dispute Settlement: The Significance of
the 1994 D.S.U.', Jurist, no. 1071 (1995) pp. 53-58 (Japanese).
173 J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 2nd edn. (1997) pp. 126-27. For a
critical analysis of its operation see in particular E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO
Dispute Settlement System, (1997) Chapter 6.
174 The G.A.T.T./W.T.O. dispute settlement procedure commences with bilateral
consultations, however (see G.A.T.T. Articles XXII(1) & XXlll(l): Article 4 of the
D.S.U.). The member concerned must reply within ten days to a request for
consultations and should enter into consultations within thirty days (from the date of
request). If these consultations prove unsuccessful - and if both parties so agree - the
case may be brought to the W.T.O. General, acting ex officio, may offer his good office.
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international conciliation with a marked (quasi-)judicial character.175
Members of a panel perform their duties in their individual capacities and
may not receive instructions from their government (Article 8(9) of the
D.S.U.).178 The panels examine the dispute, consider the various questions
of fact and law involved, record their findings and recommendations, and
send their report to the D.S.B. for a decision. In accordance with Article 11
of the D.S.U., such a report must include 'an objective assessment of the
matter before it', and present such findings and recommendations as will
assist the Dispute Settlement Body ('D.S.B.') in making its recommendations
or rulings (Article 7 of the D.S.U.).177 The panel report in and of itself has
no legal force and is therefore treated as an advisory opinion by the D.S.B.
Unlike the procedures under the G.A.T.T. 1947, panel reports are now
automatically adopted by the political body of the D.S.B., unless otherwise
decided by consensus (Article 16(4) of the D.S.U.). Of course this essentially
differs from the Montreal Protocol's N.C.P. In addition, the 1994 D.S.U.
newly instituted an appellate review system (Articles 17-19 of the
D.S.U.).178
It is interesting that, in support of its request for a panel, a party
does not necessarily have to invoke the actual breach of a rule of the
'covered agreements', including the G.A.T.T., G.A.T.S. and T.R.I.Ps.179 A
If the party concerned does not respond to a request for consultations within ten days,
or if the consultations fail to arrive at a solution after sixty days, the party concerned
may request that a panel be set up by the Dispute Settlement Body ('D.S.B.'). It is
interesting to note that, a panel is to be established unless there is a consensus not to
do so (almost 'automatic'). The W.T.O. dispute settlement system contains 'mandatory'
consultations (Article 4), arbitration procedures (Article 25), and 'optional'
procedures for good offices (Articles 5 & 24), conciliation (Articles 5 & 24) and
mediation (Articles 5 & 24). There are also several special dispute settlement bodies
such as the Textile Monitoring Body ('T.M.B.').
175 For a comprehensive discussion see Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995)
Chapters 3(1.2), 4 & 7 esp. (Japanese). See also panel reports on the cases referred to
in Chapter IV above.
176 q"he W.T.O. Secretariat must suggest the names of three possible panellists to the
dispute and, if the parties could not agree on the panellists within twenty days, the
Director General shall constitute the panel by appointing the panellists he considers
most appropriate.
177 See also Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995) pp. 117-18 (Japanese).
178 For a discussion see e.g. E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
System, (1997) pp. 186-91; Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995) pp. 133-35
(Japanese). See reports on 'United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline', adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R (discussed in Chapter IV above);
'Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages', adopted on 1 November 1996, WT/DS8, 10 & 11
AB/R.
179 Cf. e.g. The 1960 Agreement establishing the E.F.T.A. (Articles 13(2) & 31(3));
the 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement (Article 2004), 32 I.L.M. (1993) pp.
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party need only claim that [1] a benefit accruing to it under the 'covered
agreements' is nullified or impaired,180 or that [2] the attainment of any
objective of the covered agreements is impeded, as a result of the following
three situations:
t
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement (i.e. 'violation complaints'), or;
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement (i.e. 'non-violation complaints'); or,
(c) the existence of any other situation ('situation complaints).
If the breach of a rule is invoked, the adverse effects on the balance
of benefits is presumed. Only two of the six different kinds of complaints
mentioned above (i.e. [l]/[2] X (a)(b)(c) = 6) have been so far used by the
parties, i.e. (l-(a)) 'violation complaints' over 'nullification or impairment'
(over ninety per cent) and (1 -(b)) 'non-violation complaints' over
'nullification or impairment' (less than ten per cent, however).181
Complaints by the G.A.T.T. parties about the case [2] have been extremely
rare.182 This means, therefore, that parties and G.A.T.T. panels have
chosen to lay the greatest emphasis on normal violation complaints [l].188
G.A.T.T. Article XXIII(2) provides for three types of remedies, i.e. (i)
'appropriate' recommendations; (ii) 'appropriate' rulings, and; (iii)
suspension of obligations.184
It is interesting that, under the non-violation procedure (Article
XXIII(l.b)), parties can bring complaints, regardless of the actual breach of
the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. trade rules in itself or of the existence of material
damage. In this context, it could be possible to argue that the non-violation
procedure - in the field of international trade law - is something to do with
the concept of 'international liability for injurious consequences arising
289 & 605. On the N.A.F.T.A. dispute settlement system see Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute
Settlement, (1995) pp. 68-73 (Japanese).
180 '[A]n fortunately ambiguous phrase'. See J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System,
2nd edn. (1997) p. 115.
181 E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) p. 136.
182 Yet complaints over this case (2) are indicative of the notion of 'actio popularis'.
See Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995) p. 76 (Japanese).
188 See E. McGovern, 'Dispute Settlement in the GATT - Adjudication or Negotiation?',
in E. U. Petersmann (eds.), The European Community and GATT, (1986), p. 77.
184 See also the 1994 D.S.U. (Articles 19, 21 22). For a discussion see e.g. P. J.
Kuyper, 'The Law of GATT as a Special Field of International Law', 25 N.Y.bk.I.L.
(1994) Section 5.
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out of acts not prohibited by international law'.185 In the past, the non¬
violation procedure - as a supplement to G.A.T.T. Article XXVIII - appeared to
be useful particularly in protecting tariff concession186 (yet, panels
reports regarding the non-violation procedure on E.E.C. Production Aid on
Canned Fruit187 and E.E.C. Tariff Treatment188 have not been adopted).189
The non-violation provision of the specialised trade regime, W.T.O.
may be of potential utility in handling growing international economic
transactions, but only if it is to be properly used on the case-by-case
basis.190 Armin von Bogdandy made several important statements on the
non-violation procedure:
'it is sensitive to have a procedure in which any trade related concern can be brought
up, irrespective of the lawfulness of the measure in question. The non-violation
procedure is important as it allows . . . the closing-up of a loophole in substantive law.
It offers the possibility of maintaining the balance of interests even in cases where the
substantive law does not cover the issues at hand'.191
Finally, it must be briefly noted that the 1994 D.S.U. brought about
significant improvements. It decided that, for example, a complaining
party that triggers the non-violation procedure must submit a 'detailed
justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does
not conflict with the relevant covered agreement': this is the introduction
185 E. U. Petersmann, 'Violation-Complaints and Non-Violation Complaints in Public
International Trade Law', 34 G.Y.bk.I.L. (1991) pp. 175-77; Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute
Settlement, (1995) pp. 77-78 (Japanese). Cf. P. J. Kuyper, 'The Law of GATT as a
Special Field of International Law', 25 N.Y.bk.I.L. (1994) pp. 246-47.
186 See cases as to non-violation complaints summarised in E. U. Petersmann,
'Violation-Complaints and Non-Violation Complaints in Public International Trade
Law', 34 G.Y.bk.I.L. (1991) pp. 200-20; Y. Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement, (1995)
pp. 82-84 (Japanese).
187 'EEC-Production Aids Granted on Canned Fruits and Dried Grapes', L/5778
(1985).
188 'EEC Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain Countries in
Mediterranean Region', L/5776 (1985).
189 On this point see A. von Bodandy, 'The Non-Violation Procedure of Article XXIII:2,
GATT: Its Operation and Rationale', 26 J.W.T. (1992) pp. 98-99.
190 See T. Cottier and K. N. Schefer, 'Non-Violation Complaints in WTO/GATT Dispute
Settlement: Past, Present and Future' in E. U. Petersmann, International Trade Law and
the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, (1997) p. 182, noting that 'The political agenda of
trade policy must remain separated from the legal debate if the non-violation
provision is not to develop into the all-encompassing - and therefore meaningless -
tool for harassment and ex aequo et bono decisions'. See also ibid. Section V.
191 von Bogdandy, 'The Non-Violation Procedure of Article XXI1L2, GATT: Its
Operation and Rationale', 26 J.W.T. (1992) p. 110.
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of a reversal of burden of proof (Article 26(l.a) of the D.S.U.). 192 This
requirement indicates partly the growing trend towards 'legalisation' or
'judicialisation' of the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. dispute settlement rules and
procedures - 'from power-oriented diplomatic to rule-oriented legal
methods of dispute settlement'.193 Added to this is that the 1994 D.S.U. only
requires a panel/Appellate Body to make rulings or recommendations as to
such 'non-violation complaints' (Article 26(1.b) of the D.S.U.). It follows
that there is actually no obligation to withdraw the measure discussed, even
though they are regarded as inconsistent with objectives and purposes of
the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. legal system. Further, the T.R.l.Ps. agreement also limits
the use of the non-violation procedure (Article 64).194
2. The I.L.O. Complaints Procedure in International Social Law
The International Labour Organisation ('I.L.O.'), which is one of the
specialised agencies of the United Nations, aims basically to improve
conditions of 'labour'.393 In order to fulfil the particular purpose in mind,
the I.L.O. advocates two guiding principles: (i) 'the interdependence of
human rights and social policy', and: (ii) 'the interdependence of social
policy and policies of an economic character and the primacy of the social
objective'.1%
192 see p. Cottier and K. Schefer, 'Non-Violation Complaints in WTO/GATT Dispute
settlement: Past, Present and Future' in E. U. Petersmann (ed.), International Trade
Law & the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) p. 154 & its footnote 37-38,
suggesting that this is meant to clarify the principle of G.A.T.T. case-law. With regard
to subparagraph (c) of 'situation complaints', similarly, a complaining party must
present a 'detailed justification in support of any argument made with respect to
issues covered under this paragraph' (Article 26(2.a)).
193 See E. U. Petersmann, 'The Dispute Settlement System of the WTO and the
Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948', 31 C.M.L.R. (1994) p.
1169.
194 See further T. Cottier and K. Schefer, 'Non-Violation Complaints in WTO/GATT
Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future' in E. U. Petersmann (ed.), International
Trade Law & the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) p. 156. In relation to
the G.A.T.S. see ibid. pp. 157-58.
193 The I.L.O. was established in 1919 as a part of the League of Nations. Since then,
the 1946 Montreal Amendments to the l.L.O. Constitution greatly expanded its roles in
protecting human rights regarding labour conditions. For detailed arguments for the
historical background of the institution, see, for example, V. Y. Ghebali, The
International Labour Organisation: A Study on the Evolution of U.N. Specialised
Agencies, (1988).
196 See F. Morgenstern, 'Wilferd Jenks in the I.L.O.', 46 B.Y.bk.I.L. (1972-73) pp.
xxii-xxiii.
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It is interesting to note that - as in the case of the ozone regime - the
founders of the I.L.O. recognised that non-compliance behaviour of one
member state would undermine the stability of the established legal regime
of the I.L.O.; the I.L.O. Constitution declares that 'the failure of any nation to
adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other
nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries'.
The I.L.O. is unique in that it included representation of workers and
employers, as well as governments (i.e., the principle of 'tripartism'), and it
consists of three permanent treaty institutions - that is, the General
Conference of Representatives of the Member States (International Labour
Conference), the Governing Body and the International Labour Office. 198
These institutions have played important functions in ensuring the
effective application of international labour standards.
The I.L.O. supervision/compliance system could be roughly divided
into three categories: (i) examinations of periodic reports from member
states by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations ('the Committee of Experts') and the Conference
Committee on the Application of Standards ('the Conference Committee): 199
(ii) the I.L.O. Representation Procedure: 200 ancj (tu) the I.L.O. Complaints
Procedure. These I.L.O. supervision procedures are widely seen as
instructive and 'sophisticated' precedents for other international
institutions and multilateral treaties' regimes.201
197 Preamble, Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, (adopted October
9 1946),15 U.N.T.S. 35. Wilfred Jenks observed very truly, regarding South Africa's
apartheid, that; 'the universality and performance of the world community preclude
recourse to expulsion as an effective sanction for violation of its standards; such
problems must be solved within its membership by insistence on the obligations of
membership, not by measures of expulsion or exclusion the practical effect of which is
to release the offender from those obligations'. See Universality and Ideology in the
ILO, (Geneva, 1969), p. 7 in F. Morgenstern, 'Wilfred Jenks in the I.L.O.', 46
B.Y.bk.I.L. (1972-73) p. xviii.
198 gee Article 2-13.
199 gee Article 19, 22 and 23. Article 22 requires a ratifying state to report
regularly to the International Labour Office 'on measures which it has taken to give
effect to the provisions of the Convention to which it is a party'. Complaints may be
raised with regard to the examinations of reports. See, Victor, ibid., p. 4 et seq.
200 Article 24 of the I.L.O. Constitution provides for representations by
employers/workers associations alleging failure to secure the observance of ratified
Conventions. The Governing Body may establish an Examination Committee in order to
examine the representation and publish its findings. See further D. G. Victor, The ILO
System of Supervision and Compliance Control: A Review and Lessons for Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, (1996) pp. 10-11. As for the 'Freedom of Association
Procedures', see, ibid., pp. 16-19.
201 See e.g. D. W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, (4th edn. 1982) p.
152; Consideration of the Establishment of a Multilateral Consultative Process for the
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Yet, it is the third category of the I.L.O. supervision techniques that,
for the present, we shall concentrate on.
Under Article 26 of the I.L.O. Constitution, any member (including
employees/employers), dissatisfied with the adherence of other ratifying
members, can invoke ad hoc dispute settlement procedure by filing a
complaint with the International Labour Office, and this is the so-called
I.L.O. Complaints Procedure.202 The Governing Body can also trigger this
procedure either of its own motion or on receipt of a complaint from a
delegate to the Conference.203 Unlike the Montreal N.C.P. regime, the I.L.O.
Secretariat is not, however, given power to invoke this procedure on its
own initiative. However, it is interesting to note that - just like the
Montreal N.C.P. complaints - formal complaints made by l.L.O. plaintiffs
including States and their nationals do not necessarily have to be based on
any direct injury to them, provided that they are much concerned with
common purposes of I.L.O. regime member states.
After prior communication to the government in question,204 the
Governing Body can appoint ad hoc Commissions of Inquiry to consider
and report on the complaint.205 The Commissions are normally composed
of three highly qualified individuals who serve in their personal capacity
(e.g. university professors)206 anh may carry out on-the-spot
investigations, though this is subject to the consent of the government
involved.207
Resolution of Questions Regarding Implementation, (Conference of the Parties of the
1992 Climate Change Convention, 22 March 1995) in J. Werksman (eds.), Improving
Compliance with International Environmental Law, (1996) pp. 138-39; D. C. Victor,
(1996) pp. 3-4 esp.
202 Provisions of Constitutions of the International Labour Organisation Relating to
Complaints Concerning the Observance of Ratified Conventions' (Article 26(1)). For
Useful information on the Commissions of Inquiry is given by N. Valticos, 'Les
commissions d'enquete de l'Organisation internationale du travail', 91 Revue generale
de droit international public, (1987) pp. 847-79.
203 Article 26(4). See e.g. E. A. Landy, The Effectiveness of International
Supervision: Thirty Years of I.L.O. Experience, (1966) p. 173 et seq.
204 Article 26(2).
205 Article 26(3).
206 §ee Valticos, 'Les commissions d'enquete de l'Organisation internationale du
travail', 91 Revue generate de droit international public, (1987) pp. 855-56. They are
appointed by the Governing Body on the recommendation of the Director-General.
207 Recently, Commissions have investigated situations in Chile, the Dominican
Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Haiti, Nicaragua, Portugal, Romania and
South Africa. See N. Valticos, 'Les Commissions d'enquete de l'Organisation
internationale du travail', 91 Revue generate de droit international public, (1987) pp.
873 et seq.; D. C. Victor, The ILO System of Supervision and Compliance Control: A
Review and Lessons for Multilateral Environmental Agreements, (1996) p. 12 and its
footnote no. 50.
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In the initial stages the Commission of Inquiry investigates the
charges in question; it considers not only information offered by the
parties concerned, but other governments, international institutions,
workers/employers agencies and N.G.Os.208 Provided they are in breach of
an I.L.O. Convention, the Commission then incorporates its
findings/recommendations in a published report. The reports of the
Commission are legally non-binding, however; in this respect, the I.L.O.
Commission of Inquiry could be regarded as, like the Montreal
Implementation Committee, a quasi-judicial body, rather than a judicial
one.209
Unlike the Montreal N.C.P., however, a government that declines to
accept these recommendations can refer the complaint to the International
Court of Justice ('I.C.J.'),210 which 'may affirm, vary or reserve any of
findings/recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry'.211 In the event
that a member fails to implement the recommendations made by the
Commission (or the decision of the Court), the Governing Body 'may
recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem wise and
expedient to secure compliance therewith'.212
In practice, in the majority of cases, the governments concerned
have accepted reports presented by the Commission of Inquiry.
Consequently, the I.C.J, has never participated in the legal processes of the
I.L.O. Complaints Procedure.
Under the I.L.O.'s machinery of supervision, complaints, in
themselves, have been infrequent, however.
208 gee o. g. Victor, The ILO System ofSupervision and Compliance control: A Review
and Lessons for Multilateral Environmental Agreements, (1996) p. 12.
209 see p> q. Victor, The ILO System ofSupervision and Compliance Control: A Review
and Lessons for Multilateral Environmental Agreements, (1996) pp. 11 et seq.
210 Article 29(2).
211 Article 32.
212 Article 33. However, it should be noted that the defaulting party may at any time
inform the Governing Body that it has taken the steps necessary to comply with the
recommendations of the Commission or the decisions of the I.C.J. In addition, the
party may require the Governing Body to constitute a Commission of Inquiry to verify
its contention (Article 34).
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VI. THE MONTREAL N.C.P. REGIME THEORY: THE PRECAUTIONARY
'PRINCIPLE'/APPROACH AS BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE MONTREAL N.C.P.
'SOFT ENFORCEMENT' OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Before turning to an examination of the Montreal N.C.P. regime in practice,
we must now draw attention to a 'philosophical foundation' of this new
dispute avoidance/settlement procedure in the sphere of international
environment protection law.213
The point to observe is that the distinctive characteristics of the
Montreal N.C.P. regime must be viewed against a background of the nature
of the technical Protocol's specific obligations - which requires
international environmental co-operation in facilitating Article 5
industrialising countries' capabilities to comply with their obligations (see
Chapter I(III.B) above), and of the evolving principle/rules of public
international law of the environment - i.e. the precautionary
environmental 'principle' (see Chapter II(III.C) above).
It is true that certain issues of law 'enforcement' arise whenever
states fail to comply with their legally binding obligations under
environmental treaties or under customary international law. It is also
right to say that most reprisals or countermeasures in a limited sense,
including suspension of certain rights/privileges, are presented as direct
responses to consequences of such violations of international rules or
obligations. In early 1990, Professor M. Koskenniemi therefore brought
forward the argument that '[Fjrom the perspective of state responsibility,
the Montreal NCP appears as a mechanism for collective countermeasures
(or reprisals ) in case of non-performance'("Breach of Treaty or Non-
Compliance?": see Section 11(B) above).214 detailed analysis on the
Montreal N.C.P. may be true - though within certain limitations.
It would be nearer the truth to say that, in theory, resorting to the
new N.C.P. regime in itself reflects both limitations of existing principles of
customary rules of environmental protection or of state responsibility, and
growing roles of international supervisory institutions (see Chapters I and
2*3 On the role of the principle of good faith in the Montreal N.C.P. see Section
IV(A.2) above.
2^4 Koskenniemi, 'Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance', 3 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1992) p. 142,
(emphasis added); Section III(B) above. He also criticised, for example, the character
of the amicable solution, nature of decisions by the Meeting of the Parties, and the
relationship between the N.C.P. and the dispute settlement procedures under the 1985
Vienna Ozone Convention. See also his recent writing, "New Institutions and
Procedures for Control and Reaction' in J. Werksman (ed.), Improving Compliance With
International Environmental Law, (1996) pp. 236-48.
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II(III.C) above). In my view, his speculative legal argument, founded on
traditional international rules on law 'enforcement', obscures the fact that
the N.C.P. - within a self-contained international ozone regime - is or must
be based on the precautionary approach to environmental destruction, and
that the N.C.P.'s redeeming characteristic feature can be adaptability to
changing circumstances, i.e. the greatest possible flexibility, even though
it may also have both merits and limitations in complicated international
relations. The Montreal N.C.P. is not a consequence of ignorance of the
principles and rules of general public international law.
To begin with, the nature and contents of the international ozone
layer regime must be recalled here.
In the first place, it is important to notice that many developing
countries including Article 5 L.V.Cs. decided 'rather reluctantly' to join in
the international regulatory regime due mainly to Article 4 trade
restrictions in spite of the fact that they were not quite sure, in reality,
how to comply with the substantial and technical treaty obligations
(including reporting procedures, control measures of C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss. and
trade controls). With a few exceptions, states usually decide to participate
in international legal regimes only when they think they would comply
with the treaty obligations.215 Hence, we may say that, in a certain sense,
considerable 'collective (economic) countermeasures' - which would make
it possible to ensure not only treaty compliance but the necessary
universal participation - were therefore employed beforehand in this
Article 4 T.R.E.Ms. of the Montreal Protocol (see Chapter IV above).
In the second place, it is also important that - despite the objection of
state parties - adjustments of control measures of O.D.Ss. to the Protocol are
binding on all the parties on the basis of the revolutionary 'simplified
majority decision-making' (Article 2(9)).2^ Assuming that there would be
some dissenting minority states that unsuccessfully oppose, on account of
their recognised low capacity to comply, time-targeted adjustments adopted
in such a simplified procedure, we may say that this departure from the
traditional principle of unanimity might become a potential cause of
multilateral ozone disputes.2122
215 M. Bothe, 'The Evaluation of Enforcement Mechanisms in international
Environmental Law' in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards' (1996) p.
14 (and its footnote no. 6).
216 See also Part A of Chapter IIl(III.B.C) above.
212 However, the 1990 London Adjustments, 1992 Copenhagen Adjustments, the 1995
Vienna Adjustments and the 1997 Montreal Adjustments were adopted on consensus,
without resorting to that voting procedure.
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In the third place, in order to ensure strict consistency in the
international obligations of all the state parties to the ozone regime, no
reservation is allowed under the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention and
its Protocol.2 2 8 Nevertheless, in reality, most Non-Article 5 developed state
parties have come to duly recognise that a number of Non-Article 5
developing state parties, unlike developed states, do not necessarily have
the capacities at present to comply fully with the technical treaty
obligations, including the national reporting requirement (see section
VII(A.l) and Chapter VI below).
In point of fact, as we shall see, the Implementation Committee under
the Montreal N.C.P. regime has been overloaded with routine
administrative work - such as missing baseline/annual data, the correction
of such data reports from parties, and a detailed
classification/reclassification of 'Article 5 developing countries'.
Obviously, apart from purely bureaucratic matters, such non-compliance
with national/regional reporting requirements has stemmed back to a lack
of member states' capacities to do so, and it cannot be denied that, in most
cases, non-complying states within the regulatory ozone regime are at
present Article 5 developing countries under the Montreal Protocol, and
Countries with Economies in Transition ('C.E.I.Ts.') such as the Russian
Federation, Baltic states and Eastern European states - this view is entirely
confirmed in practice (see Section VII below).
Given that, we can now explain why the basic mechanics of the
Montreal N.C.P. regime in dealing with possible non-compliance would be
to encourage, by giving 'appropriate' financial/technical assistance, the
party that is willing to - but occasionally unlikely to - fulfil its treaty
obligations .
Mr. P. Szell, who was the Chairman of the N.C.P. negotiations, noted
that 'a regime should be based on the recognition that non-compliance was
frequently the consequence, not of malice or greed, but rather of
technical, administrative or economic difficulties'.219 in addition, as was
described earlier, the travaux preparatories of the Montreal N.C.P. support
the idea that the new procedure should be the encouragement-based
218 Article 18 (1985 Vienna Ozone Convention) & Article 18 (Montreal Ozone
Protocol).
229 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/INF.l, para. 28.
233
The Montreal Non-Compliance Procedure and the Internal Institutions
approach, or a rather friendly settlement of environmental disputes: 220
'All possible assistance measures encouraging Parties to comply with the
Protocol should be exhausted before stronger measures were
considered'.221
We may say, at the same time, that the primary functions of both the
standing Committee and the Ozone Meeting of the Parties are to effectively
control the fulfilment by member states of their international obligations
derived from the international ozone regime (i.e. compliance monitoring:
see Chapter I(III.C) above), rather than to decide what sources of
international law should be applied in cases of treaty 'non-compliance' or
non-performance:222 there is now some validity to this concept, though it
should not be pushed too far.223
In summary, countermeasures as seen in the paragraph(C) of the
Indicative List of the Montreal N.C.P. could or would be merely
counterproductive. One of the central aims of the N.C.P. regime is,
therefore, not to take controversial countermeasures that would
occasionally give rise to questions of state responsibility, but basically to
seek 'amicable solutions' to expected non-compliance arising from 'good
faith' bona fides,224 In another case - not surprisingly - the N.C.P. regime
of the 1994 Oslo Sulphur Protocol does not even provide any sanctions.
Viewed in this light, we can see now that the Montreal N.C.P. regime
- which is (i) multilateral: (ii) flexible: (iii) simple, and: (iv) rapid225 - is
therefore designed carefully for applying the precautionary
environmental 'principle'/approach to the urgent global environmental
problem, that is, stratospheric ozone layer depletion (see Diagram no. II
below).
Furthermore, in the present case of the regulatory ozone regime, the
evolving precautionary environmental 'principle' must be provided global
financial support for developing low-volume-O.D.S.-consuming countries'
('L.V.Cs.') capacities to fulfil their technical treaty obligations (see in detail
Chapter VI below).
22,3 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.l .3, para. 9; proposal made by the Netherlands in
UNEP/OzL.Pro.LG.l/CPR.l.; T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) pp.
314-17.
221 UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.3/3/3, para. 44, (emphasis added).
222 Cf. G. Palmer (eds.), International Environmental Law and World Order, (1994) p.
1120.
223 See Section 11(B) above.
22^ See Section IV(A.2) above.
225 See Introduction & Sections IV & V(B) above.
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It follows naturally that, in such situations, unless non-compliance
results from malice or greed and is therefore considered strictly to be
'intentional or systematic non-compliance', the Ozone Meeting of the
Parties would not resort to painful international sanctions against the
party in question: as was described above, any 'bad faith' or intentional
non-compliance would seriously endanger the value of the new Montreal
In addition, we should not overlook the fact that - even if the 'real
guarantee' of treaty compliance is the system of collective sanctions - the
measures termed 'sanctions' are not necessarily intended to be directly
punitive or repressive, but rather 'coercive' in the sense that they would
apply 'sufficiently strong pressure' on the defaulting member states.226
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that various principles
and rules of customary international law and state responsibility have
nothing to do with the avoidance or settlement of possible ozone disputes.
226 See J. Combacau, 'Sanctions', in 9 Encyclopaedia of Public International Law,
(1982) pp. 337-40. See also R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and
How We Use It, (1994) pp. 13-16 & their footnotes; O. Schachter, 'United Nations Law',
88 A.J.l.L. (1994) pp. 14-15. In practice, as Schermers and Blokker has pointed out,
international institutions such as U.N. specialised organs, the W.M.O. and the I.N.F.
usually do not invoke the power to suspend a state's rights/privileges, and employ
other means of securing compliance. See International Institutional Law, (1995)
Chapter 10. The same may be true in the G.A.T.T. legal system. See J. H. Jackson,
World Trade and the Law ofGATT, (1969) pp. 178-87, Chapter 29.
N.C.P.
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Indeed, response measures required should be commensurate with the
importance of the provision itself as well as the nature and degree of
compelling reasons behind non-compliance, frequency of non-compliance
and length of non-compliance.227 cannot be denied, perhaps, that the
question of whether the N.C.P. regime is a kind of conciliation, quasi-
judicial mechanism, or a mere institutionalised negotiation process would
depend in part on the nature of the issues the specialised internal regime
institutions must handle (see Section VII below).
Whilst the N.C.P.'s flexibility has contributed to the effective
implementation of the ozone treaties, it is still probable that the N.C.P.
regime would not often counterbalance the ultimate disadvantage of its
considerable 'softness'; we should therefore note the following statements
by Professor Francesco Francioni:
'[T]his question [whether soft enforcement procedures are exclusive of
countermeasures] will arise whenever the soft implementation procedure has failed to
satisfy a contracting party which, for instance, objects to an amicable compromise . . . ;
or when a state reiterate the breach or becomes a systematic defaulting state. In these
instances it would have little sense to exclude the operation of ordinary
countermeasures under customary international law or under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. Soft law and soft remedies cannot be understood in such a way
as to displace and curtail the operation of hard laW. 228
VII. THE MONTREAL N.C.P. REGIME IN PRACTICE
A. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, CONTROL
MEASURES AND TRADE RESTRICTIONS
1. The Reporting Requirements
Most international environmental agreements impose periodic reporting
requirements as to compliance with their treaty obligations229 _ this treaty
227 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG/3/3/3, para. 44, (emphasis added) & a Discussion Paper
from Canada (UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG. 1/15/3.
228 p. Francioni, 'International "Soft Law": A Contemporary Assessment' in V. Lowe
and M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in
Honour ofSir Robert Jennings, (1996) p. 178 (emphasis added).
229 m. Bothe, 'The Evaluation of Enforcement Mechanisms in International
Environmental Law' in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards, (1996)
pp. 22-26; A. E. Boyle, 'Saving the World? Implementation and Enforcement in
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obligation is often called 'procedural compliance.230 Reports can be
broadly divided into two categories: (i) reports containing information on
the overall implementation of a treaty, and (ii) reports as to the compliance
with specific treaty obligations.231 The national/regional reporting
system of international environmental law has great importance for (i)
assessing/judging the effectiveness of control measures and for (ii)
adjusting the existing international standards set up by implementing
treaty bodies. State administrations - including developed ones - usually
devote much time to drafting this kind of data reports232 and non¬
compliance with reporting requirements does not lead to a breach of a
substantive international obligation233
The Montreal Protocol requires contracting parties to provide the
U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat with baseline and annual data on their
production, imports and exports of each controlled substance that is
conveniently divided into a group (see Part A of Chapter III above) or the
'best possible estimates' of such data, provided actual data are not available
(Article 7(l)-(2)). Parties also have to report on the ozone activities in
research, development, public awareness, and exchange of information
International Environmental Law Through International Institutions', 3 J.E.L. (1991)
pp. 236 et seq.; P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, (1992)
pp. 166-67; A. Kiss 'Compliance with International and European Environmental
Obligations', Hague Y.bk.l.L. (1996) pp. 51-52. See e.g. the 1992 Biodiversity
Convention (Article 26); the 1992 Climate Change Convention (Article 12(1)); the 1989
Basel Convention (Article 13); the 1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on
Environmental Protection (Article 17); the 1988 N.Ox. Protocol (Article 8(1)); the
1985 S.O.2 Protocol (Article 4); the 1976 Rhine Chloride Pollution Convention (Article
3(5)); the 1974 Paris Convention (Article 11 & 17); the 1973 C.I.T.E.S. Convention
(Article 8(7)); the 1973 M.A.R.P.O.L. Convention (Article 6. 8 & 11); the 1972 World
Heritage Convention (Article 11). Sands divides reporting requirements under
environmental treaties into four types; (i) regular reporting requirements provided by
international institutions to state parties; (ii) regular reporting by parties to
international institutions or other parties; (iii) a party may be required to provide
information to another party on certain occasions (e.g. nuclear accidents); (iv) a treaty
may allow for a report to be submitted by a N.G.O. to a party. See P. Sands (1995), p.
600 et seq.
23^ See 'Compliance with International Standards: Environmental Case Studies',
(remarks by Professor Weiss), Proceedings of A.S.I.L. (1995) pp. 210-14; Chapter III
above.
231 See K. Sachariew, 'Promoting Compliance With International Environmental
Standards', 2 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1991) pp. 43 et seq.
232 A. Kiss 'Compliance with International and European Environmental Obligations',
Hague Y.bk.l.L. (1996) p. 52.
233 See 'M. Bothe, 'International Obligations, Means to Secure Performance',
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 1(1992), p. 103; K. Sachariew, 'Promoting
Compliance With International Legal Standards', 2 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1991) p. 41.
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concerned (Article 9(3)).234 The names of the parties that have not fully
complied with these reporting and other obligations are to be mentioned in
the reports of the Implementation Committee and of the U.N.E.P.
Secretariat.235
Without timely and detailed reports, it will always be difficult for
implementing agencies to spot particular state parties that should be
provided with financial/technical assistance in implementing the ozone
treaties. Hence, as D. Victor suggests, it is no exaggeration to say that the
N.C.P.'s effectiveness depends on the supply of data reports about national
performance and the ability to compare that information with
international standards.23^
To date, however, on-the-spot investigations based on states' consent
are not initiated by the Implementation Committee.
Since its First Meeting held in 1991, the Implementation Committee
has dealt with a continuing problem of non-reporting or insufficient and
late data reports from both parties and non-parties to the Protocol.237 It is
said that 'the quality of data reporting by parties 'can at best be called
moderate'.238 As for 1995, only fifty parties reported required data out of
157 parties (as at 9 September 1996).239 It is well-recognised, however, that
its major contributing factors will be (i) low capacity to comply with such
an obligation: (ii) an intention to maintain the confidentiality of reports
regarding trade matters: and/or (iii) other reasons (e.g. change of
government or administrative delays24*3).
Non-Compliance with data reporting has been frequently observed
in Parties operating under Article 5 developing countries, rather than in
234 See information by Boliva, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Islamic Republic of
Iran, Kuwait, Norway, Romania, Slovenia in UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/3 para. 29.
235 See e.g. 'The Report of the Secretariat on Information Provided by the Parties in
Accordance with Articles 7 and 9' (UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/3, 12 September 1996).
236 UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/INF. 1, para. 36. It is also important to note that environmental
Secretariat often lack the resources to accomplish its supervisory duties toward treaty
compliance. The Ozone Secretariat has periodically received additional funds from the
U.N.E.P. to compensate for incomplete contributions from parties. See United States
General Accounting Office, International Environment: International Agreements Are
Not Well Monitored, (January 1992) p. 20 & pp. 28 et seq.
237 As we have seen, under Article IV of Montreal the Protocol trade restrictions will
be imposed on 'non-treaty compilers'. See Chapter IV above.
238 See 20/18 International Environment Reporter, (3 September 1997) p. 820;
U.N.E.P., 'Production and Consumption of Ozone-Depleting Substances 1986-1995: The
Data Reporting System under the Montreal Protocol' (September 1997).
239 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/3, para. 26. These include the United Kingdom, the United
States, Czech Republic, Thailand and Venezuela.
249 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/lO/4, para. 14.
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Non-Article 5 parties. 241 The Implementation Committee, in its Third
Meeting, explained that the principal reasons would be 'the turnover of
personnel in the Customs service, their lack of training and experience,
and the lack of qualified specialists to train them'.242 indeed, 'Training on
data-monitoring and reporting could go a long way toward resolving
reporting problems'.243 Consequently, the Ozone Secretariat stressed the
importance of the Country Studies/Programmes being carried out by the
implementing organs of the Multilateral Ozone Fund, namely, the United
Nations Development Programme ('U.N.D.P.'), the U.N.E.P. and the World
Bank.244
In 1993 the Implementation Committee invited, to its Seventh
Meeting, nine parties that had persistently failed to provide reporting
data.245 jn Meeting, the representative of Costa Rica stated that
incompleteness of data was caused mainly by delays in receiving funds
from the U.N.D.P. - that is to say, a lack of prompt financial assistance.246
Belarus explained that difficulties in obtaining the data required stemmed
from 'political and economic problems' concerned with its recent
independence.247 The representative of Italy suggested that its failure was
the result of purely bureaucratic matters and that forthcoming legislation
would resolve the problems of non-reporting.248
The Implementation Committee, considering the E.C.'s significant
production/'consumption' impacts, once expressed 'particular concern'
about non-reporting from some members of the European Community (i.e.
241 Reports of the Committee include a list of countries whose data reporting are
missing or still insufficient. Perhaps, this would pressure those states into providing
such data required.
242 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/3/3, paras. 16 and 17. See also the Secretariat's Third
Report of Data, in J. Werksman (eds.), Improving Compliance with International
Environmental Law, (1996) p. 119.
243 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/12/3, para. 46. See further, UNEP's Efforts to Assist Data
Reporting by Article 5 Countries, in UNEP/OzL.Prp/ImpCom/12/3/Annex III.
244 UNEP/OzL.Pro/lmpCom/3/3, para. 17. See Chapter VI below.
245 They include Belarus, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy,
Maldives, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ukraine. See
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/7/2. See, also, W. Lang, 'Ozone Layer', 5 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1994) p.
161-62. The reports of the Committee usually include the names of countries that do
not participate in the meetings of the Committee regardless of its invitations. Keutsch
argues that this can be an 'inherent threat' to such parties to comply with its
invitations not to lose face. See A. Keutsch, 'Non-Compliance Procedures under the
Montreal Protocol' in J. Werksman (eds.), Improving Compliance with International
Environmental Law, (1996) p. 119.
246 ibid., para. 7.
247 ibid., para. 14.
248 [bid., paras. 9 and 10.
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Belgium, Greece, Italy and Portugal) and at missing 1991 'consumption' data
from the Commission of the European Community. 249 [s likely that some
members of the European Union - or the European Union itself - tried to
preserve the confidentiality of the business information concerned.250
In another case, the Implementation Committee decided to create
conditionality between the supply of technical data and the M.F.L.
funding.251 The Committee recommended that Mauritania be reclassified
as a Party not operating under Article 5 until it reported required data:252
this implies that the Government could not receive funds from the
Montreal Multilateral fund.255 In its Twelfth Meeting the Implementation
Committee noted that reports from many parties on required information
were more than two years overdue, and that 'it should be made clear to the
Meeting of the parties that the trend of late reporting should end,
particularly in respect of those countries in which institutional
strengthening projects have been carried out under the Multilateral
Fund'.254
In order to settle these difficult situations, the World Bank has
proposed (i) licensing the import of O.D.Ss. to facilitate data collection and
to control imports, and (ii) an international labelling system for products
containing C.F.Cs. and other O.D.Ss.255
As for other M.E.As. regimes, developing state parties to the 1972
London Dumping Convention do not satisfactorily meet the reporting
requirement, because they still lack financial resources, efficient
infrastructure, technology, and trained staff needed to comply with the
convention's various requirements. According to systematic studies on
compliance with M.E.As., similar challenging situations have also occurred
249 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/5/3, para. 10. See also UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/3/3, para.
10.
25(9 D. G. Victor, The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's
Non-Compliance Procedure, (1996) p. 9.
251 On conditionality between the Multilateral Fund and compliance with the Protocol
see Chapter VI( III.4) above.
252 UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/12, para 36.
255 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/lmpCom/12/3, note by the Secretariat at p. 3.
254see UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/12/3. para 44. See also Decision VII1/2
(UNEP/OzL.Pro/8/7).
255 See further, UNEP, The Use of Trade Measures in Selected Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, (1995) pp. 88-89.
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in many multilateral environmental agreements, including the 1973
M.A.R.P.O.L., and the 1972 C.I.T.E.S.256
2. The Control Measures of C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss.
Compliance with Article 2 (and corresponding Article 5) control measures
has formed the absolute basis of the international regulatory regime for
the protection of the ozone layer (see Part A of Chapter III(III) above).
According to the recent data received by the U.N.E.P. Ozone
Secretariat, it seems that most of the Non-Article 5 parties appear to comply
with the detailed control measures. 257 Most of these developed state parties
have introduced national regulations that could substantially achieve the
various objectives and purposes of the international ozone regime (see Part
B of Chapter III above). Whilst it is possible for the Ozone Secretariat and
the Implementation Committee to dispute the scientific validity of data
provided by those state parties, to date, neither of them has, however, taken
such an action.258
As we have seen, due to the ten years grace period, developing
countries operating under Article 5 would only have to phase out C.F.Cs. by
2010 and halons by 2015 in accordance with the London Adjustments (see
Chapter III(III.E)). Consequently, their compliance with these control
measures remains to be seen. Perhaps it would be better to say that both
the Ozone Secretariat and other implementing agencies are, at present,
trying to achieve extensive improvement in non-reporting and/or
inadequate reports from these developing state parties.
It can be assumed that a developing state party, which is officially
informed that it has just crossed the borderline of acceptability of what is
permissible under Article 5, could face sudden problems with anticipated
loss of funding from international institutions as well as treaty non¬
compliance.259 in this connection, the Ozone Meeting adopted Decision
256 See United States General Accounting Office, International Environment:
International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored, (January 1992); D. S. Favre,
International trade in Endangered Species, (1989), p. 235 et seq.
257 See e.g. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/10/4; UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/6, para. 11;
UNEP/OzL.Pro/5/5; UNEP/OzL.Pro/5/5 Add. 1.
258 [t must be noted that some statistical data are, as noted above, the 'best possible
estimates' and it could be probable that parties may often wield considerable
discretion in this matter. See Article 7(1-2); D. C. Victor, (1996), p. 9 et seq.
259 por example, Kuwait and Slovenia whose per capita levels of consumption were
once considered as above the ceiling in Article 5 collected their statistical data for
1993, and they thus avoided such a problem. See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/lO/4, para.
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IV/15 regarding the situation whereby low-volume-O.D.S.-consuming states
exceed the 'consumption' limit. The Decision provides that state parties
consider the situation on a 'case-by-case-basis' when requested to do so by
the developing countries.260
In the Tenth Meeting of the Committee, the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat
informed the Committee that Lebanon, which was conferred with the status
of a developing country operating under Article 5, had exceeded the per
capita consumption ceiling, and the matter remain unresolved.263 In
addition to this case, Lithuania once tried to obtain a delay of five years of
control measures as provided in the automatically binding
London/Copenhagen Adjustments, though the Implementation Committee
stated that data reports were 'inadequate' and that the Government could
not be eligible to receive assistance from financial institutions unless it
ratified the 1990 London Amendment;262 this provided a good example of
environmental bargaining.
Lastly, it must be noted that illegal trade in C.F.Cs. and O.D.Ss. (breach
of Article 2 control measures) has newly emerged in the international
community and it weakens or threatens the effectiveness of the regulatory
ozone regime (see also Chapter III(IV.F) above).263 At the 1995 Seventh
Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, many representatives indicated
'regrettable evidence' of illegal trade in controlled substances,264
Vienna Ozone Meeting - and its subsequent meetings - adopted Decisions
regarding illegal imports and exports of those substances.26*^
Article 5 countries (China and India in particular) and Russia
continue to produce large amount of C.F.Cs. and these substances are
illegally imported from these countries to Non-Article 5 Countries. Duncan
24. See also D. C. Victor, The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the MontreaJ
fttsteeol's NoYi-Cc/th'fJsiiarze Q'ivxreiiir/e, (1996) p. 14.
260 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, pp. 17-18. See also Decision Vl/5 in UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/7.
26^ Article 5(1) of the Protocol sets a 'consumption' threshold at 0.3 kg per capita for
the core five CFCs and three halons (see Chapter I above). Lebanon did not accept the
population figures offered by the secretariat. See UNEP/OzL.Prp/ImpCom/10/4, para.
8; UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/12/3, paras. 51-53.
262 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/12/3, paras 54 and 55.
263 See e.g. F. P. Landers, Jr., 'The Black Market Trade in Chlorofluorocarbons: The
Montreal Protocol Makes Banned Refrigerants a Hot Commodity', 26 Georgia J.I.C.L.
(1997) pp. 457-85; D. Brack, InternationaI Trade and the Montreal Protocol (1996),
Chapter 6; R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 273-76 esp. See also 'The Ozone
Layer may be Saved: Fattening the Ozone Layer', 344 The Economist, p. 613 (13
September 1997).
264 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12, para. 69. See also UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, para. 66.
265 Decision V1I/33, Decision VII1/20 & Decision 1X/23.
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Brack of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (R.I.I.A.) in London
says that the above-mentioned countries are the main source of C.F.Cs. and
O.D.Ss. and European countries and Australia may be seen as major
destinations.266 The Ozone Operations Resource Group (O.O.R.G.) established
by the World Bank also reports that there has been startling increases in
illegal C.F.C.-12 imports into the United States, and they eventually result in
numerous arrests and indictments.267 Until now, the United States has
been the only country to take any decisive action to stop such illegal trade
in O.D.Ss., and many European countries have been relatively much slower
to act.268 Yet in July 1997 the European Commission undercovered an
illegal scheme to import 1,000 metric tons of O.D.Ss. that were imported from
China.269
It was agreed in the 1997 Montreal Ozone Meeting that parties shall
institute a licensing system to help national governments track
international trade in O.D.Ss. and discourage unlicensed black-market trade
(see also Chapter III(IV.F) above).270 Now Article 4B(1) requires the
parties to establish and implement a system for licensing the import/export
of new/recycled/reclaimed O.D.Ss. in Annexes A, B, C and E (by January
2000 or within three months of the entry into force of this new Article).
3. Trade with Non-Parties
The international ozone regime decided that, as we have observed, non-
parties/non-complying states were to be denied access to foreign markets
for C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss. (see Chapter IV(II) above). The Montreal Protocol does
not currently impose any obligation to report to the U.N.E.P. Ozone
Secretariat on the implementation of Article 4, however.271 The parties
266 See The Environment Digest, (1996/10) p. 10. See also R. Benedick, Ozone
Diplomacy, (1998) p. 274; 'Holed Up: Chemical Production/Controlling C.F.Cs.', 337
The Economist (9 December 1995) p. 690. The Japan Ministry of International Trade &
Industry says there is no evidence as to illegal trade in O.D.Ss. in Japan (information
provided by Ms. Fukuhara of the M.I.T.I., 2 February 1998).
267 See The World Bank, 'The O.O.R.G. Report', Facing the Global Environment
Challenge, (March 1995) pp. 16-17.
268 Ibid., p. 10. See also statements by a N.G.O. in UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/12, paras 68-69.
Yet since 1995 the EC has developed a quota and licensing system of O.D.Ss. See ibid.,
para. 90. See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998), noting that at the 1995
Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, a U.S. representative said that the penalties in
some countries were 'almost laughable'.
269 See 20/16 International Environment Reporter, (6 August 1997) pp. 750-51.
270 See Article 4B and Decision 1X/8 in UNEP/OzL.Pro/9/12.
271 But see e.g. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/6, Section III; UNEP/OzL.Pro.5/5 Add.l.
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are only encouraged to inform the Ozone Secretariat of the implementation
of Article 4 (see e.g. Decision III/1G & Decision IV/17(1)).272
In accordance with Decision IV/C regarding trade measures adopted
by the Fourth Meeting of the Parties,27^ the Implementation Committee
considered data reports from twenty two non-parties.274 The
Implementation Committee observed that thirteen countries such as
Belgium, Hong Kong and Vietnam satisfied the requirements of the
Decision IV C and they thus should be exempt from the trade controls under
Article IV.27^
In the Tenth Meeting of the Committee, one member stated that,
rather than focusing on the formalities of data-reporting, the Committee
should concern itself more with reports of dumping of obsolete
technologies and, the conclusion of joint venture agreements to construct
C.F.C.-production facilities in developing countries.27^ Nevertheless, this
sensitive issue was not extensively discussed and we have only limited
information on this matter.277
As the 1995 T.E.A.P./C.E.I.T. Report has pointed out, it is widely known
that since January 1993 the Russian Federation is already in non¬
compliance with trade controls under Article 4 of the Ozone Protocol - this
question is taken up in Section VII(B) below.
B. CASE STUDIES: NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND
THE REACTIONS OF THE N.C.P. REGIME INSTITUTIONS
Since early 1990s the issues concerning the C.E.I.Ts.' non-compliance have
formally been discussed in the Implementation Committee and in the Ozone
Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol. Yet, it was not until 1995 that the
Montreal N.C.P. regime was invoked, for the first time, to handle the
272 See W. Lang, 'Trade Restrictions as a Mean of Enforcing Compliance with
International Environmental Law' in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Enforcing Environmental
Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means? (1996) p. 270, noting the lack of
data-reporting requirements 'may be traced back to a certain sense of political
realism and to emerging doubts as to the full compatibility of Art. 4 with GATT-law'.
27^ See 'Application of Trade Measures under Article 4 to Non-Parties to the Protocol'
in UNEP/OzL.Pro/4/15.
274 They included; Belgium, Comoros, Congo, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Guyana,
Hong Kong, Jordan, Laos, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mali, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Poland,
Sudan, Suriname, Turky, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yugoslavia.
275 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/6/3, paras 15-17.
276 UNEP/OzL.Pro/10/4, para. 20.
277 See ibid., paras. 21-22.
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'voluntary' submission of anticipated non-compliance by several countries
of the C.E.I.Ts., which include the Russian Federation, Belarus, Bulgaria,
Poland and the Ukraine. For the present, however, we shall concentrate on
Russia's Non-Compliance case, rather than on the C.E.I.Ts.' treaty non¬
compliance as a whole.
1. The Russian Federation and the C.E.I.Ts.
There are now twenty-seven states with their economies in a transitional
state, and they are divided into four groups: (i) successor states to the
former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, the Ukraine and
Uzbekistan); (ii) Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania); (iii)
Central/Eastern European states (Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia); and (iv) successor states to the
former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and
Yugoslavia -Serbia and Montenegro).278
It is worth noting that the estimated 1994 'consumption' of O.D.Ss. in
these states is approximately equal to a quarter of the world 'consumption'
in that year,279 c.E.I.Ts. are, in fact, contributing immensely to
ozone depletion.
Importantly, the Russian Federation exceeds sixty per cent of the
'consumption' of controlled substances in the C.E.I.Ts., and it is the only
producer of these substances in that region. 280 Furthermore, the Russian
Federation is the major exporter of controlled substances to both twenty
C.E.I.Ts., at least, and possibly some other countries outside the C.E.I.Ts.281
Hence, it is no exaggeration to say that, in the light of its considerable
political/economic influence in the international community, the non¬
compliance behaviour of the Russian Federation above all would
undermine the stability of the international regulatory ozone regime.
While the former Soviet Union adopted the 1987 version of the
Montreal Ozone Protocol on 10 November 1988, after the Russian Federation
278 when the 1987 version of the Montreal Protocol was signed, only eight of the
twenty seven states were sovereign states. See The 1995 T.E.A.P./C.E.l.T. Report,, p.
11.
279 The 1995 T.E.A.P./C.E.l.T. Report, p. 12.
280 The 1995 T.E.A.P./C.E.l.T. Report, p. 25.
281 Ibid.; UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12, para. 43.
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formally became an independent sovereign state on 24 August 1991,282 it
has since taken over the obligations under the ozone treaties from the
dissolved former Soviet Union.283
The Russian Government has employed legislative and other
appropriate measures to comply with regulations of the Ozone Protocol. For
example, the Russian Federation adopted the 1992 Environmental Act
(Article 56 on 'Ozone Layer Protection'); developed the National Programme
on the Phaseout of O.D.Ss. and the introduction of alternative technologies;
decided in 1993 to establish the Commission on Ozone Layer Protection
under the Ministry for the Protection of the Environment; and adopted in
1995 a special act on the measures required to fulfil the obligations under
ozone treaties.284 The Russian Federation declared that it was 'in principle
complying with the basic provisions of the Montreal Protocol'.285
2. Russia's Non-Compliance Case
In the Eleventh Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group held in May 1995, the
Russian Federation submitted a joint statement, speaking also on behalf of
Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland and the Ukraine, that it did not appear possible to
completely phase out production/'consumption' by January 1996 due
mainly to the difficult economic situations the C.I.E.Ts. are faced with.286
282 Russia's O.D.S. production in 1994 was 10,000 O.D.P. tonnes, and its O.D.S.
'consumption' in 1994 was 33.675 tonnes, respectively; it follows that Russia's O.D.S.
'consumption' per capita was 0.22 kg. See the 1995 T.E.A.P./C.E.I.T. Report, p. 139.
288 According to On the Ratification of the Agreement on the Creation of the
Commonwealth of the Independent States; 'For the purposes of the creating conditions
necessary for the ratification of Article 11 of the said Agreement, to establish that the
norms of the former U.S.S.R. shall apply on the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. (i.e., the
Russian Federation) until the adoption of respective legislative acts of the R.S.F.S.R. in
that part which is not contrary to the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., legislation of the
R.S.F.S.R., and the present Agreement'. See Decree of the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Soviet (12
December 1991), 17 Rossiiskaia gazeta, (1991), colso. 4-5. See also, On the
Declaration of the Treaty on the Formation of the U.S.S.R., [Decree of the R.S.F.S.R.
Supreme Soviet], (12 December 1991), 17 Rossiiskaia gazeta, (1991), colso. 4-5. The
Russian Federation has already ratified the 1992 London Amendment in December
1991, but not the 1992 Copenhagen Amendment yet. See also Memorandum on Mutual
Understanding on Issues of Succession to Treaties of the Former U.S.S.R. having Mutual
Interest (6 July 1992).
28^ See further the 1995 T.E.A.P./C.E.I.T. Report, p. 29.
288 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/ll/l/Annex II.
286 See UNEP/OzL.Prp/lO/4, para. 31 ;E.P.L., 26/2/3(1996), p. 68. A subsequent
statement made by the C.E.I.T. at the twelfth meeting of Open-ended Working Group
read '[T]he processed connected with political, geopolitical and social change, with the
break from the previous economic system and the transition to a market economy, have
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It is interesting to note that whilst the Russian Federation's original
intention was to seek a special five-year grace period directly from the
Meeting of the Parties,287 that request was then first sent to the
Implementation Committee288 . be precise, the Government of the
Russian Federation first informed both the Ozone Meeting of the Parties
and the Implementation Committee of anticipated treaty non-compliance,
and it did not initially intend to invoke the mechanics of the Montreal
N.C.P. regime.
After 'considerable prodding' by the United States,289 the Ozone
Secretariat and the Implementation Committee agreed to accept this formal
statement as a submission under paragraph! 4) of the Non-Compliance
Procedure under the Montreal Ozone Protocol regime. The Russian
Federation did not attempt to deny this plausible interpretation by the
Committee; as a result, the standing Implementation Committee has thus
been furnished with a first opportunity to address non-compliance matters
about Article 2 control measures under the Montreal N.C.P. regime.
In its Tenth Meeting the Implementation Committee expressed the
simple fact that there were no treaty provisions that would allow any party
a schedule for O.D.Ss. different from those of the Ozone Protocol regime, and
it further suggested anticipated non-compliance by the Russian Federation
should be addressed by a possible decision of the supreme decision-maker -
i.e. the Ozone Meeting of the Parties, but not by adding an amendment to
the Montreal Protocol.29^) The Committee then stated that: 'It should also be
noted that the Russian Federation was the only one of the five Parties that
had not reported data' 291 and required further information, including data
on production/'consumption' of controlled substances and its compliance
plan, for the elaboration of a committee recommendation.
Ultimately, since the Implementation Committee could not achieve
an agreement with the Russian Federation particularly regarding
monitoring issues and trade controls as contained in draft decision
demanded and continue to demand great moral, material and financial outlays'
(emphasis added). See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/11/1/Annex II.
287 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/11/1/Annex; The 1995 T.E.A.P./C.E.I.T. Report, p. 29.
Compare with the fixed production/'consumption' schedule for controlled substances
under the 1992 Copenhagen Adjustments (Chapter IV above).
288 See D. G. Victor, The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's
Non-Compliance Procedure, (1996) p. 28.
289 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 281.
290 See the 1995 T.E.A.P./C.E.I.T. Report, p. 30.
29^ UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/10/4, para. 32.
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VII/16,292 those recommendations made by the standing Committee were
then brought to the 1995 Ozone Meeting of the Parties without a complete
agreement by Russia.293
At the 1995 Vienna Ozone Meeting, the Russian Federation argued
that 'it was not the Russian Federation but the former Soviet Union and that
ratified the Montreal Protocol, Russia, as the successor Party, cannot be
fully responsible for fulfilling its commitments', and that 'the collapse of
the Soviet Union constituted an event "force majeure" or a "fundamental
change in circumstances" that justifies flexibility in the application of the
Protocol to Russia'.294 as a result, in its Thirteenth Meeting, the
Implementation Committee thus requested the Secretariat to seek
clarification from the Legal Counsel of the United Nations on the status of
the countries of the former Soviet Union regarding succession to the ozone
treaties.295
After much discussion, the 1995 Vienna Ozone Meeting adopted on
consensus, despite the objection of Russia, Decision VII/18 - broadly similar
to Decision VII/16 - with regard to anticipated non-compliance by the
Russian Federation.296 Decision VII/18 required not only data reporting,
namely, more detailed information as to its firm commitments to the Ozone
292 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/9/Rev.
295 UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/12, para. 44; J. Werksman, 'Compliance and Transition: Russia's
Non-Compliance Tests the Ozone Regime', 39 ZaoRV (1996) pp. 746-65 and its
footnotes.
294 Statement by the Minister of the Environment and Natural Resources of the
Russian Federation (translated from Russian), cited in J. Werksman, 'Compliance and
Transition: Russia's Non-Compliance Tests the Ozone Regime', 39 ZaoRV (1996) p. 760.
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties is considered as customary
international law. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (United Kingdom v. Iceland:
Jurisdiction), I.C.J. Rep., (1973), paras. 37-43; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case
(Hungary/Slovakia), para. 104. It is well-known that, in 1871, Russia similarly
maintained the principle of rebus sic stantibus with regard to the Black Sea clause in
the 1856 Peace Treaty.
295 UNEP/OzL.Pro/lmpCom/13/3, para. 8(b). The Counsel's advice on this issue was '.
. . as far as the former Republics are concerned, they are treated as newly independent
States and legally distinct from the former Soviet Union. Under the practice of the
Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties, they could become Parties to
the Convention and the Protocol only pursuant to an explicit expression of consent to
do so by their respective Governments. Such consent can be expressed either by (i)
depositing an instrument of accession or by (ii) explicitly succeeding to these
instruments which were previously applied on their territory. The Secretary-
General's practice does not include the concept of an 'aytomatic succession'. It is for a
newly independent State to decide whether or not it should become a Party to any
treaty deposited with the Secretary-General' (information provided by G. M. Bankobeza
of the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat, 10 December 1997).
296 It should be noted that the Russian Federation called for a vote upon the Decision
VII/18; see UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/12, para. 129.
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Protocol, but also the 'necessary action' to secure that re-exports will be
made from the C.I.S. to any party to the Ozone Protocol regime. 297 this
sense, it can be said that the Ozone Meeting of the Parties consolidated, to
some extent, the contents of the previous Decision VII/16 taken by the
Implementation Committee.298
The representative of the Russian Federation, who considered such
actions as 'discriminatory measures and sanctions against a Party', strongly
disputed the paragraph addressing future trade restrictions, in vain
however,299 and thus regretted that 'it had not been able to accept the draft
decision in its entirely .300
This decision-making process illustrates nicely that, within the self-
contained international ozone regime, an individual conflicting opinion
defended by only one party - i.e. the Russian Federation - eventually has to
coincide with stated regime objectives;3*^ this case pointedly illustrates the
collective side of the Montreal N.C.P. regime.
However, Decision VII/18, at the same time, allows the Russian
Federation to export controlled substances to C.I.S. parties operating under
Article 2 of the Protocol (including Belarus and the Ukraine), and
recommends, as an incentive, international assistance to help it comply
with the ozone treaty obligations.3(32 jn reality, such funds will be
297 Decision VI1/1 8 in UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/12. See also Decision VII/33 regarding
illegal imports/exports of ODS in UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/12.
298 vVe may say that, in the light of the fact that the recommendations by the
Commission were incorporated as the formal 'Decision' of the Parties, the Commission
has developed its quasi-judicial functions.
The representative of the Russian Federation stated that 'that [such a stringent
measure] was not mentioned at all in the Implementation Committee's
recommendations'. See UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/12, para. 128.
299 gee 'Comments Made at the Time of Adoption of the Decisions', in
UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/12, paras. 123-134. The Russian Federation insisted that the
Meeting of the Parties should apply appropriate measures in accordance with the
Indicative List of Measures (Annex V) in an ascending order of importance, (i.e. from
assistance, cautions to sanctions). However, wording of the Montreal N.C.P. would not
necessarily prevent the Meeting of the Parties from choosing such 'appropriate
measures' simultaneously regardless the order of the List.
300 gee UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/12, para. 134, (emphasis added).
301 The Secretariat noted; '[W]hen only one Party objected to a draft decision, that
decision would be carried by consensus and the position of the dissenting Party would
be clearly reflected in the report of the Meeting'; see UNEP/OzL.Pro/7/12, para. 130.
However, as stated earlier, the procedures to adopt Decisions are rather complex and
controversial; while Article 11(4) provides that the Meeting 'consider and undertake
any additional action that may be required for the achievement of the purposes of this
Protocol', for instance, Article 40 of the Rules of Procedures for the Meeting of the
Parties requires a two-third majority of the parties present and voting on all matters
of substantial. See UNEP/OzL.Pro.l/5/Annex I.
302 Ibid.
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indispensable for Russian lame-duck industries to virtually halt O.D.S.
production and then convert existing production capacity to less ozone-
depleting H.C.F.C. or H.C.F. production, although the Russian Federation,
which prefers to use national production processes, is not willing to rely
on transnational corporations' proprietary processes/licenses.303
It is important to note, however, that since the Russian Federation is,
in the light of its high levels of 'consumption' of O.D.Ss., by no means a
'developing country' operating under Article 5 of the Protocol, the high-
volume-O.D.S.-consuming country is thus not entitled to receive funds from
the Montreal Multilateral Fund.304 Consequently, the only international
institution which is ready to contribute the necessary funds for the
possible non-compliance by Russia, will be the Global Environmental
Facility ('G.E.F.') that has no official legal status within the international
ozone regime.305
It has been quite obvious that the Russian Federation wants to
ensure continuity of supplies of O.D.S. to developing countries to meet their
'basic domestic needs' - as permitted under the Protocol - and this fact
supplies one of the rational reasons that it would not choose to withdraw
from the legal regime for the protection of the ozone layer. Meanwhile the
Group of 77 and China, which are fearful of the consequences of Russian
illegal trade of O.D.Ss. in their markets, tried in vain to add to Decision
VII/18 clear wording that would ban export/re-export of controlled
substances to Article 5 parties.306 Therefore, the final text is not
completely clear on this crucial point. At the Open-Ended Working Group
held in September 1996, Kenya submitted an amendment proposal that
reads 'To allow. . . the Russian Federation to export substances controlled
under the Montreal Protocol only to Parties operating under Article 2 of
the Protocol. . . and not to any other Party, including those operating under
Article 5 of the Protocol. This proposal was killed by Russian opposition
303 See the 1995 T.E.A.P./C.E.I.T. Report, p. 40.
3(34 See Article 5 of the Ozone Protocol; Chapter IV above.
305 it is interesting to note that, similarly, under the 1992 Climate Change Convention
the Russian Federation is not eligible for financial assistance from the Convention's
Financial Mechanism (Article 4(3)). See further J. Werksman, 'Compliance and
Transition: Russia's Non-Compliance Tests the Ozone Regime', (unpublished: 1996), p.
14. For a discussion on the response of the G.E.F. Council, see, ibid., pp. 21-22; Part
11 of this Chapter below.
306 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/CPR.l.
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and by the hesitant Western countries including the United States and the
European Community.307
The Thirteenth Meeting of the Implementation Committee held in
1995 considered additional information offered by the Russian Federation
in accordance with Decision VII/18.303 As a result, the Committee
emphasised unmet needs for further information and then the Committee
reiterated that the Russian Federation should monitor and report on the
implementation of the trade restrictions.300 It was reported that the G.E.F.
Council had approved O.D.S. phase-out projects worth $43.6 million for the
Russian Federation,330 and it had also prepared a Country Programme
strategy funded by the Danish Ministry of the Environment.333 The
Committee further recommended that the G.E.F. Council and other funding
institutions should consider additional steps to expedite financial assistance
for future projects.
Although the information provided indicated discouraging signs of
non-compliance for 1996, the Implementation Committee noted that the
Russian Federation had taken 'important steps' to comply with Decision
VII/18 and towards achieving full compliance with the control measures of
the Protocol regime.332 The Fourteenth Meeting of the Implementation
Committee concluded that the Russian Federation satisfactorily answered all
the questions taken up by the Committee and that the information offered
should be adequate for the purposes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the
Committee.333
307 See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 282 and Decision VIII/26(1). See
also statement by Canada in the Open-Ended Working Group in
UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/15/3, para. 4, suggesting that Decision VIH/26 could be
implemented solely through a decision by the Parties to modify the N.C.P.
308 see UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/13/3, paras. 14-18. The Report of the Meeting says
that, despite an invitation by the Committee, representatives of the Russian Federation
was not present for most of the meeting.
309 Ibid.
330 Ibid. See also UNEP/OzL.Pro.8.2, para. 16.
333 UNEP/OzL.Pro/IMpCom/12/3, para. 19. The Russian Federation and the World
Bank has now developed a detailed closure plan for O.D.S. production facilities in the
country, and to set up a multilateral financing scheme for supporting the closure
effort. See further, World Bank, 'The World Bank and Russia: Working Together to Shut
Down CFC Production', Facing the Global Environment Challenge, (Sep. 1995-Jan..
1996), pp. 16-17.
312 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/13/3, para. 17.
333 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/2, para. 16. Victor says, however, that many observers are
privately sceptical about the accuracy of the data provided by the Russian Federation.
See D. C. Victor, The Early Peration and the Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's
Non-Compliance Procedure, (1996) p. 31.
251
The Montreal Non-Compliance Procedure and the Internal Institutions
At the Seventeenth Meeting of the Implementation Committee, the
representative of the Russian Federation reiterated his country's
commitment to meeting its international ozone treaty obligations, and he
also said that a new federal phase-out programme would be implemented in
co-operation with the international community and multilateral financing
agencies. In this meeting the Committee made decisions that the Russian
Federation had continued to produce O.D.Ss. during 1996 contrary to the
provisions of the Montreal Ozone Protocol and Decision VII/18, and that
Russia was still in non-compliance with the Protocol for 1996.314
Moreover, the Implementation Committee resolutely decided that the
Russian Federation had exported both new and reclaimed substances to -
and also imported O.D.Ss. from - many developed and developing countries
under the Montreal Ozone Protocol regime.315 It was thus pointed out that
'there was a danger of a loss of credibility for the whole Montreal Protocol
process if it was seen that Parties not operating under Article 5, which
should have completed phase-out, were still importing and exporting
controlled substances'.316 After the Eighteenth Meeting of the
Implementation Committee,317 Russia's persistent non-compliance case was
further discussed in the 1997 Montreal Ozone Meeting of the Parties and the
Ozone Meeting adopted Decision IX/31 based on the recommendations made
by the Implementation Committee.313
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Since the adoption of the 1987 version of the Ozone Layer Protocol, the
international legal regime for the protection of the ozone layer has been
'adjusting' itself to become more commensurate with the ecological impact
of adverse effects caused by severe ozone depletion. Now, the optional
dispute settlement procedures of the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention
is effectively 'supplemented' with a flexible dispute avoidance/settlement
mechanism - i.e. the Montreal Non-Compliance Procedure.
31/1 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/17/3, para 25(b) and (c).
31 5UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/17/3, para. 25(d).
316 UNEP.OzL.Pro/17/3, para. 23 (emphasis added).
317 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/18/3.
313 Decision IX/31 in UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12. Decision IX/31 noted, for instance, that
international financial assistance - the G.E.F. in particular - should continue
favourably with a view to furnishing funds for projects to implement the programme
for the phaseout of the production/consumption of O.D.Ss. in the Russian Federation.
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As we have seen, it is entirely fair to say that the Montreal N.C.P.
regime is essential to the operation of a regulatory rule-oriented ozone
legal system in the comparatively weak realm of legal obligations of global
environmental protection, and in reality, it has turned out to be a great
step forward in strengthening the collective compliance or 'horizontal
enforcement' of international law principles of the environment,
including the precautionary environmental 'principle'/approach and
other generally accepted Stockholm/U.N.C.E.D. Principles. Therefore, we do
not have to regret the absence of any reliable procedure of identifying, at
an early stage, possible non-compliance with treaty obligations and of
avoiding/ settling multilateral ozone disputes. At the same time, however,
the deterrent influence of the traditional dispute 'settlement' procedures
under the 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention should not be ignored: 'The
possibility of resort to compulsory procedures may have a powerful impact
on the dynamic and effectiveness of a treaty regime even if those
procedures are in practice never used'.319
Yet the standing Committee's regime-monitoring instruments within
the N.C.P. are largely limited to (i) extensive discussions on compliance
matters; (ii) making recommendations to the Meeting of the Parties: and
(iii) making non-compliance transparent. In addition, the Committee can
still deliberately duck certain issues such as the legal status of monetary
contributions to the financial mechanism, the Montreal Multilateral Fund
and the meaning of 'non-compliance' with the Protocol. Furthermore, the
Implementation Committee - as an international conciliator - does not have
formal decision-making power, whilst it is to report regularly to the
Meeting of the Parties. Until now the Committee is, as Mr. Szell observes,
'very careful not to exceed the scope of its mandate or the expectations of
the Parties'.320 Expanding the functions of the N.C.P. Committee beyond the
notion of an ozone dispute conciliator would be hardly admissible, if at all.
Whilst in many cases the standing Committee's recommendations are
widely accepted by the regime member states, unsettled questions as to
non-compliance (and/or breach of treaty) must be ultimately referred to
the supreme ozone institution, the Meeting of the Parties that is entrusted
with all the powers that are indispensable for the fulfilment of its
objectives and purposes in protecting the ozone layer. It may be
319 See A. E. Boyle, 'Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Law of the Sea and the
Environment', 26 Thesaurus Acroasium (1996) p. 259.
320 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/INF.l, para. 29.
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reasonable to suppose that the Committee's influence as a conciliator in the
ozone regime depends in part on the extent to which the Meeting of the
Parties follows the Committee's recommendations.
The weakness of the Montreal N.C.P., since the decisions as to what
kind of recommendations should be made and which measures must be
taken are left largely to the broad discretion of intergovernmental
institutions - i.e. the Committee and/or the Meeting of the Parties, is that it
remains questionable whether political bodies consisting of governmental
representatives can always act impartially and sincerely as trustees of the
ozone layer.321 Unlike international judicial institutions or human rights
committees or commissions, the N.C.P. regime operators are not
'independent' and they do not necessarily have 'professional prestige'. In
addition, we should not overlook the 'confidential aspects' of the Montreal
N.C.P. decision-making process that is often crucial in understanding the
hidden meaning of decisions of the internal regime institutions.^22
It was in 1995 that the Montreal N.C.P. regime started its active
operation to handle the first formal ('voluntary') submission of treaty non¬
compliance. As I have contended, the original intention of the N.C.P. of
the ozone regime is not to apply a sanction-related remedy that is not very
effective and often self-defeating. However, by looking at the above-
mentioned fact that the Meeting of the Parties adopted Decision VII/18 'on
consensus' against the will of the Russian Federation (an action that might
be regarded by some commentators as certain forms of limited collective
sanctions), we may say that 'friendly confrontation' may be beneficial to
the effective operations of the existing Montreal N.C.P. regime. An
ongoing useful lesson from Russia's non-compliance case is, simply, that,
on occasion, the internal regime institutions have to exert 'appropriate'
multilateral pressure on member states that do not comply persistently
with their treaty obligations, by applying not only bunches of 'carrots', but
also the appropriate 'stick' that is carefully chosen to strike the right
balance. If, in this first test on the Montreal N.C.P. regime, the 1995
321 See A. E. Boyle, 'Saving the World? Implementation and Enforcement of
International Environmental Law Through International Institutions', 3 J.E.L. (1991),
pp. 229-45; idem, 'The Principle of Co-operation: Environment', in The United Nations
and Principles of International Law: Essays in Memory of Michael Akehurst, (1994)
pp. 129 et seq.
322 However, we need frequently to remind ourselves of the fact that, in many case,
internal international institutions within treaty regimes are more suitable for
interpretation of regime rules and settlement of disputes than other international
tribunals external to them - often international legal regimes have, to a greater or
lesser extent, their own 'jurisprudence'.
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Meeting of the Parties had merely followed the Committee's rather 'soft'
recommendations, considerable doubts would have sprung up among the
ozone regime members as to the effectiveness of this new dispute
avoidance/settlement procedure against non-compliance.
Hence the Montreal N.C.P. regime is now regarded as one of the most
sophisticated dispute avoidance/settlement procedures for ensuring
compliance with environmental obligations and fixed regulatory standards:
as Rummel-Bulska of the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat, observed: 'The main
element that had led to the regime being considered as a model for other
environmental treaties was mainly its preventive character and the
readiness to assist rather than to sanction a Party considered not in
compliance' .323
Lastly, as stated earlier, it should be noted that - to be more effective
- the Montreal N.C.P. regime was to be reviewed based on Decision IX/35 of
the 1997 Montreal Ozone Meeting of the Parties.324 jn addition, as Canada
suggested in the Fifteenth Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group, the
Montreal N.C.P. should more clearly outline or define (i) identification of
potential non-compliance, (ii) determination of non-compliance, (iii)
consequences of non-compliance and (iv) monitoring and determination of
a return to compliance.325
The experience of the Montreal N.C.P. model would be helpful in
designing other different non-compliance procedures under various
international treaties of environmental protection. Yet it must be pointed
out that, whilst the Montreal N.C.P. regime has turned out to be the very
prototype, each M.E.A. should adopt, depending on the nature/contents of
its established legal obligations and types of potential environmental
323 UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/INF.l, para. 30.
324 new]y established Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on
the N.C.P. is to consider (i) any proposals by parties for strengthening the N.C.P. -
including how repeated instances of major significance of non-compliance could
trigger the adoption of measures under the Indicative List of Measures with a view to
ensuring prompt compliance with the Protocol; and (ii) any proposals for improving
the effectiveness of the functioning of the Implementation Committee - including with
respect to data-reporting and the conduct of its work. See Decision lX/35(5) in
UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12. The Working Group composed of fourteen members from both
developed ('Article 5') and developing ('non-Article 5') countries, namely, Australia,
Canada, European Community, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, Argentina, Botswana, China, Georgia, Morocco, Sri Lanka and St. Lucia.
See the following recent reports by the Ad Hoc Working Group:
UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG/ 1/1/Add.l (14 April 1998); UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.4/l/l/Add.2 (18
May 1998); UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG/1/l/Add.l (15 April 1998).
323 UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/15/3, para. 8 ('Principles').
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disputes, a more suitable form of the N.C.P. regime326 - but on the basis of
the 'philosophy' of the Ozone Protocol N.C.P. model.32^
It is obvious that the N.C.P. regime alone will not strengthen compliance
with ozone treaty obligations, unless it is accompanied by the financial
assistance and the transfer of technology required to improve state parties'
capacity to comply with them (see Chapter I(III.B) above). In Chapter VI,
we shall be examining whether the Montreal Protocol's compliance system
has provided ozone regime members with sufficient 'inducements' to
comply with their international environment-related obligations.
326 For instance, the Montreal N.C.P. model would not be suitable for the Basel
Convention non-compliance regime. For a discussion see P. Szell, 'Compliance Regimes
for Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Progress Report', 27/4 E.P.L. (1997) p.
305.
322 See Section V above. Yet, it is important to note that, as Professor A. E. Boyle
says: 'The acceptance of more advanced models of institutional management and control
remains limited, however, and does not justify the conclusion. . . that the
'precautionary principle' has replaced national freedom to act in the absence of proof
of harm'. See 'The Principle of Co-operation: Environment', in The United Nations and




THE FINANCIAL MECHANISM OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL AND THE
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF OZONE-FRIENDLY TECHNOLOGY:
CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE OZONE REGIME
I. THE CONCEPT OF 'CAPACITY BUILDING'
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT
A. The Question of Defining 'Capacity Building' in International
Environmental Law
It is often said that rendering financial foreign aid or technical assistance
to developing countries1 - such as bilateral overseas development aid
('O.D.A.')2 - has traditionally been considered as not strictly a 'legal' but
rather a 'moral' obligation of donor industrialised countries to developing
states' capacity building. Philosophically speaking, this 'justly acquired
money' is meant to repair past grievous wrongs of colonisation against
these aid-receiving poor countries in the Third World.3 In this way, the
'ethical aspect' of capacity building, under the branch of the international
law of development in particular,4 may be generally understood as a
repeated - but often largely fruitless - demand of poor industrialising
countries for a possible improvement of the existing 'North-South'
economic relations for the benefit of 'Southern' countries. Viewed from
this historical perspective, it is therefore possible to argue that the concept
of capacity building originated in the developing countries' 'N.I.E.O.' (New
1 Developing countries include economically less-developed countries of Asia, Africa
and Latin America. On the technical definition of 'developing countries' under the
Montreal Protocol, see Chapter 11I(2.B) above and Appendix IV. As at 15 May 1998,
105 of the 165 parties to the Montreal Protocol regime were classified as Article 5
developing countries.
2 See e.g. S. Johnston, 'Financial Aid, Biodiversity and International Law' in M.
Bowman and C. Redgwell (eds.), International Law and the Conservation of Biological
Diversity, (1996) pp. 271 et seq.
3 See T. Chengyuan, 'Legal Aspects of the Global Partnership between North and South',
in N. Al-Nauimi and R. Meese (eds.), International Legal Issues Arising Under the
United Nations Decade of International Law, (1995), p. 210; G. Handl, 'Environmental
Protection and Development in Third World Countries: Common Destiny-Common
Responsibility', 20 N.Y.U.J.I.L.P. (1988) pp. 606-08.
4 On international law of development, see e.g. H. Thierry, J. Combacau and S. Sur,
Droit International Public, (1984), Chapter 14; T. Takashima, International Law of
Development, (1995, Japanese).
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International Economic Order) movement, which won its first official
political endorsement at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations
General Assembly held in 1974.5
In the much narrower context of international environmental law
and of its sectoral regimes - such as the ozone regime - the words 'capacity
building' will acquire more specific or technical and different meanings.
In other words, capacity building is not exactly equal to traditional foreign
financial aid that would be originally designed to satisfy the basic human
needs ('B.H.Ns.') of poor people who are barely surviving on the margin of
everyday life and/or promote an industrialising country's economic
development (e.g. O.D.A. funds).6 One of the major objectives of capacity
building is to build the long-term capacity of aid-receiving countries to
fully comply with strict and technical legal obligations of specialised
international environmental regimes.
The notions of capacity building within a developing country and/or
its private industry broadly encompass at least four categories,7 i.e. (i)
bilateral, regional or international environmental financial assistance in
general, (ii) (associated) international technology transfer8 for intended
environment protection purposes, (iii) institutional strengthening for
implementation of environmental agreements (e.g. increases in
administrative and legal capacities, improvements in data collection and
analysis9), and (iv) the development of a recipient country's awareness of
environmental issues in question, including extension of their political
commitment to the legal obligations of environmental regimes.10
6 See A. E. Boyle, 'Comment on the Paper by Diana Ponce-Nava' in W. Lang (ed.),
Sustainable Development and International Law, (1995) p. 137.
6 Yet, since 1990s, not only governments of industrised countries but also the World
Bank and other regional banks have made efforts to distinguish environmental aid from
normal development assistance. See e.g. W. E. Franz, 'Appendix: The Scope of Global
Environmental Financing - Cases in Context', in R. Keohane and M. Levy, Institutions
for Environmental Aid, (1996) pp. 367-80.
7 See also J. Ohiorhenuan and S. Wunker, Capacity Building Requirements for Global
Environmental Protection (G.E.F. Working Paper No. 12) pp. 3-5 esp.; L. Giindling,
'Compliance Assistance in International Environmental Law: Capacity Building
through Financial and Technology Transfer', 39 ZaoRV (1996) pp. 800-02; D. Kaniaru
and L. Kurukulasuriya, 'Capacity Building in Environmental Law' in F. Schlin (ed.),
UNEP's New Way Forward: Environmental Law & Sustainable Development, (1995) pp.
172-79.
8 On the definition of 'technology transfer' see Section IV(A) below.
9 Non-compliance with data reporting has been frequently observed in Article 5
developing countries. See further Chapter V(Vil.A.l) above.
10 It is sometimes pointed out that effectiveness of environmental law in developing
states is impaired by corruption of government officials. See e.g. M. G. Faure,
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The above-mentioned concept of capacity-building is deeply
associated with universal and effective participation from a growing
number of developing states whose contributions as polluters to global
environmental problems (e.g. ozone depletion and global warming) are
relatively minor. For the majority of poor developing countries, the
protection of the global environment - such as the stratospheric ozone
layer - may often be seen as merely an expensive problem or an
inescapable 'by-product' of rich Northern states. Considered against this
background, the concept of capacity-building can be properly regarded as
an effective, but in a sense 'political', bargaining tool for modern
diplomatic environmental negotiations that would eventually lead to the
adoption of new international treaties on the protection of the
environment. In other words, for most industrialising states - who may
regard M.E.As. only as impediments to their economic growth,
international financial resources for capacity building within
environmental legal regimes have become the so-called 'carrots', required
in advance of the establishment of environmental legal regimes (see
Chapter I(III.B) above).11
B. Capacity Building in M.E.As.
Treaty provisions concerning the ideas of capacity building - financial aid
and technology transfer in particular - are already included in some
international environmental agreements precedent to the ozone layer
regime.
With regard to environment protection funds, the 1972 U.N.E.S.C.O.
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage
introduced the 'World Heritage Fund' ('W.H.F.') as a trust fund consisting of
compulsory and voluntary contributions by contracting state parties.12
Likewise, the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the 1971
Ramsar Convention established, in 1990, the 'Wetland Conservation Fund' in
Enforcement Issues for Environmental Legislation in Developing Countries
(U.N.U./I.N.T.E.C.H. Working Paper No. 19, March 1995) pp. 18-19.
11 The legal 'principle' of 'common-but-differentiated responsibility' (see Part A of
Chapter III(E.3) above) could be also understood in this similar context of capacity
building.
12 Article 15. Each party pays one per cent of its contribution to the Rugular Budget
of the U.N.E.S.C.O. to the World Heritage Fund. On the Fund, see e.g. P. H. Sand, 'The
Potential Impact of the GEF of the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP', a paper distributed at
a symposium in Heidelberg (5-7 July 1995), Section 1(1).
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order to assist developing country parties (Resolution C(4.3)).18 In addition
to fund mechanisms within environmental treaties, in accordance with
General Assembly Resolution 2997, the Environmental Convention Trust
Funds were established in 1978 under the auspices of the U.N.E.P. for the
greater implementation of legal obligations in particular environmental
treaty regimes for sustainable development, though its relatively small
total budget for each treaty handicaps its current operations.14
In respect of technology transfer, the 1982 U.N.C.L.O.S. deals with
'marine technology transfer' in two parts, i.e. the provisions on the
international sea-bed regime and Part XIV (Articles 266 to 274). Under
Articles 144 and 274, the 'International Sea Bed Authority'15 is required to
train nationals of developing countries, to make technical documentation
on sea-bed mining available to developing states, and to assist these
countries in the acquisition of sea-bed marine technology.16 Under Article
266(1), state parties are called on to co-operate in promoting the
development and transfer of marine science and technology on fair and
reasonable terms and conditions.17 The 1992 Climate Change Convention
contains the 'classic environment technology transfer clause'18 (Article
4(5)) and, just as the Montreal Protocol, it has created conditionality
between compliance by industrialising countries and the effective transfer
of technology and financial resources (Article 4(7)). Other modern M.E.As.
also contain provisions on technology transfer: they include the 1992
Biodiversity Convention (Article 16),19 the 1989 Basel Convention (Article
18 See P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, (1995) p. 735. In
accordance with Resolution VI.6 the Fund was renamed in 1996 as the 'Ramsar Small
Grants Fund ('S.G.F.'). See also the Operational Guidelines for the Triennium 1997-
1999 under [http://iucn.org/themes/ramsar/key_sgf_guide.htm].
14 See P. H. Sand, op. cit. n. 12, Section 11(2); idem, 'Trust for the Earth: New Financial
Mechanisms for Sustainable Development' in W. Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development
and International Law, (1995) pp. 172-74; U.N.E.P., Environmental Law in the UNEP,
(1990).
15 On this treaty organ see 11 E.P.I.L. (1989) pp. 162-63.
16 R. Churchill and A. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, (1988) p. 302. But the Agreement on
the Implementation of Part XI of the U.N.C.L.O.S. revised the technology transfer
regime in the context of deep-sea bed mining.
17 See also Articles 202-203 ('Scientific and Technical Assistance to Developing
States').
18 G. Verhoosel, 'International Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technology: The
New Dimension of an Old Stumbling Block', 27/6 E.P.L. (1997) p. 475.
19 See I.U.C.N., A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, (1994), noting that
'article 16 is probably the most controversial article' in the Convention.
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10) and the 1994 Sulphur Protocol to the 1979 Geneva L.R.T.A.P. (Article
3)20
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: after evaluating the 1987
version of the Montreal Protocol in the particular context of financial and
technical assistance, Section II analyses the negotiation process of the
Montreal Multilateral Fund, including the issues of international
technology transfer of O.D.Ss. Section III then investigates general aspects
of the Financial Mechanism of the Protocol, including the Multilateral
Fund, and it also considers the role of international institutions within the
framework of the new Financial Mechanism. Section IV studies the
current operation and effectiveness of the Multilateral Fund of the
Protocol, focusing on the phase-out of O.D.Ss. and international transfer of
ozone-friendly technology. The Section also briefly examines a case study
of project implementation in the People's Republic of China.
II. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS OF THE MONTREAL MULTILATERAL FUND
AND THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER -RELATED ISSUES
A. 'Capacity Building' Under the 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention and the
1987 version of the Montreal Ozone Protocol
The 1985 framework Ozone Convention adopted in Vienna neither centres
much international attention on the need for special considerations to be
given to developing countries nor includes a clause concerning additional
multilateral financial assistance from industrially advanced Northern
states. Article 4 of the Vienna Ozone Convention only provided that (i) the
state parties are to 'facilitate and encourage the exchange of scientific,
technical, socio-economic, commercial and legal information relevant to
this Convention'21 and that (ii) they shall also 'co-operate, consistent with
their national laws, regulations and practices and take into account in
particular the needs of the developing countries, in promoting, directly or
211 See also the 1979 L.R.T.A.P. (Article 8); the 1988 N.Ox. Protocol (Article 3); the
1991 V.O.C. Protocol (Article 4).
21 Article 4(1). For instance, socio-economic and commercial information include: (i)
Production/production capacity; (ii) Use/use patterns; (iii) Imports/exports; (iv) The
costs, risks and benefits of human activities which may indirectly modify the ozone
layer and of the impacts of regulatory actions taken or being considered to control
these activities. See Annex 11(5).
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through competent international bodies, the development and transfer of
technology and knowledge'.22
These treaty provisions indicate that, in most cases, global
cooperation in transferring technology under the Vienna Ozone
Convention is thus frequently subject to national laws regarding, for
example, patents, trade secrets, and protection of confidential business or
commercial information involved. During the negotiation of the Vienna
Convention regime many experts had considered that Article 4 contained
an escape clause that could or would undermine the Ozone Convention. In
actual practice, it then deterred industrialising developing states from
participating in the international ozone regime.23 Before the adoption of
the 1987 Montreal Ozone Protocol, only a few developing countries24
decided to become contracting parties to the framework Ozone Convention
that may have been seen as merely an environmental regime of rich
Northern states.
Since the ozone negotiations of the 1987 version of the Montreal
Protocol were focused on technical and thorny issues on O.D.Ss. emission
reductions,25 matters pertaining to an expected financial and
technological assistance mechanism - including a multilateral fund,
multilateral, regional and bilateral cooperation - were appropriately left to
the Meeting of the Parties. Article 13(2) states that 'The Parties, at their
first meeting, shall adopt by consensus financial rules for the operation of
this Protocol'.26 The 1989 First Meeting of the Parties was thus to begin
deliberations on the means of fulfilling these treaty obligations, including
the preparation of workplans.27 Yet, as was described in Chapter
III( II1.E.2) above, it was agreed that a special provision in Article 5 of the
Protocol should allow developing countries to delay their treaty
compliance with O.D.Ss. control measures for ten years.
According to Article 5(3) of the 1987 Ozone Protocol, state parties are
only required 'to facilitate bilaterally or multilaterally the provision of
22 Several developing states preferred 'consistent with', instead of 'subject to'. See,
UNEP/WG.94/8, p. 3.
23 See e.g. UNEP/WG.94/8, p. 4.
24 These countries include Guatemala (11 September 1987, [accession]) and Mexico (14
September 1987).
25 See Chapter 111 above for full account of the Montreal N.C.P. regime.
26 Yet, the Working Group on the Special Situation of Developing Countries noted that:
'[W]hen the Financial Rules are drawn up it would be most important not to place
undue financial burden on the developing countries whose contribution to depletion of
the ozone layer is minimal'. See UNEP/WG.l 67/2, p. 32.
27 Article 10(3), Article 11 (3)-(4).
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subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance programmes to Parties that
are developing countries for the use of alternative technology and for
substitute products'. Yet, it is important that Article 10(2) provides that any
party or signatory to the Protocol can file a request to the U.N.E.P. Ozone
Secretariat for technical assistance for the purposes of implementing or
participating in the Ozone Protocol.
B. The Negotiation of the Montreal Multilateral Fund and the Technology
Transfer
The First Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group of the Parties to the
Montreal Protocol was held in August 1989 in order to develop modalities
for finance related mechanisms.28 The Meeting was attended by
representatives from twenty-two contracting parties and twelve non-
contracting parties (e.g. China, India and Republic of Korea). The
Executive Director of the U.N.E.P. officially introduced the Meeting by
giving an opening statement that the hesitation of developing states was
due mainly to the lack of financial resources to comply with ozone treaty
obligations without serious disruption of their development efforts. He also
suggested that 'what they needed was concessional funding and outright
grants additional to existing aid programmes'.29 The Executive Director
further indicated that the financial mechanisms of the Montreal Ozone
Protocol regime would constitute an important precedent for those of a
global climate change treaty.30
Industrialising states delegates - led by Mexico, Venezuela, China and
India - strongly advocated the establishment of a trust fund within the
U.N.E.P. or any other suitable institution with 'legally enforceable
obligations of contributions' by developed state parties to the Ozone
Protocol.31 They also supported the view that the totality of funds should
show an 'increase' - i.e. the concept of additionally - and that there must
be burden sharing amongst these industrialised donor states.32 However,
industrialised donor states - including the United States, the United
28 UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.I( 1 )/3 (the First Session of the First Meeting, held at U.N.E.P.
headquarters in Nairobi from 21 to 25 August 1989).
29 UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.I(l)/3, para. 2 (emphasis in original).
30 Ibid.
31 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.l( 1 )/3, paras. 9 and 34 esp.: R. E. Benedick, Ozone
Diplomacy, (1998) p. 153.
32 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.I(l)/3, para. 26 (not officially agreed on the precise wording
due to time constraints, however).
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Kingdom and Japan - advocated the use of existing bilateral aid
programmes and/or multilateral financial assistance from the World Bank.
They considered that the concept of an 'International Environmental
Facility', as a clearing house mechanism to identify and match
bilateral/multilateral funding with individual projects, would be one of the
acceptable alternatives to the creation of such a new financial institution
within the self-contained ozone regime, but may be external to existing
international monetary organisations dominated by a handful of rich
Northern states, including the United States.33
The Working Group also introduced the definition of transfer of
technology in the context of financial aid, which means 'facilitating access
to environmentally safe alternative substances for Parties that are
developing countries and assist them to make expeditious use of such
alternatives' by meeting the incremental costs associated with transition
from O.D.Ss. to alternatives and substitutes.34 It was also agreed that
incremental costs covered by the financial mechanism would include (i)
production, (ii) use as an intermediate good, and (iii) action at the
consumer level.35
Yet, industrialising states insisted that free access to technical
information and non-profit technology transfer of substitutes for O.D.Ss.
should not be subject to trade concerns relating to matters of intellectual
property rights, licences and patents.36 We may notice here that the
definition of international technology transfer above does not necessarily
refer to an anticipated difficult situation where certain Multinational
Companies (M.N.Cs.) could often refuse to sell patents for O.D.Ss. emission
control technology37 - in the absence of promising economic benefits for
these companies, the introduction of new technology would be difficult
except by national regulations supported by socio-economic assistance
from a government. In this context, the Director-General of the World
Intellectual Property noted in a subsequent meeting that national
governments have Tittle space for manoeuvre with private industries
beyond persuasion and incentives'.38
33 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.I( 1 )/3, para. 9: R. E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p.
153.
34 Article 5(2), the 1987 Montreal Protocol. See also UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.II(2)/7.
35 For further details, see, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.I(l)/3, para. 12.
36 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.I(l)/3: R. E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 153.
37 T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) p. 289.
38 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.Il(2)/7, para. 7.
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The meeting of the Bureau of the Montreal Protocol held in
September 1989 made a recommendation that the Second Working Group
should consider the creation of a binding financial mechanism based on
compulsory contributions from advanced industrial countries and a
situation in which private parties were not likely to release legal patents
on O.D.Ss. technologies.39
In the Open-Ended Working Group held in November 1989 an
industrialising state group, which was led by Mexico, put forward a new
Article lObis, 'Transfer of Technology and Financial Assistance'; it provides
that international technology transfer from industrialised to
industrialising countries should be arranged on a 'preferential and non¬
commercial basis' and that an 'International Trust Fund' - proposed by an
environmental N.G.O., the World Resources Institute -40 shall be established
within U.N.E.P. to meet fully the incremental costs'.44 The concept of the
Trust Fund was comparatively more modest than that of the 'Earth Fund' -
this idea was put forward by the Executive Director of the U.N.E.P. - that
would institute a global levy on the use of the environment, that is to say,
the stratospheric ozone layer.42
These states also introduced an amendment to Article 5 of the
Protocol which reads that the obligation of Article 5 parties or
industrialising countries to comply with O.D.Ss. control measures will be
subject to the transfer of technologies and financial assistance as provided
for in Article lObis above.43
The Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group was held in
March 1990.44 The Executive Director of the U.N.E.P. introduced the
following six principles of a general agreement reached through previous
formal/informal discussions:45
39 UNEP/OzL.Pro.Bur.1/2, para. 8.
49 For further details, see UNEP/OzL.Pro.Mech.1/2, paras. 23-24. The other scheme
put forward by the N.G.O. is a pilot investment programme for Sustainable Resource
Use, 'ECOVEST'. See ibid., para. 25.
41 UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.Il( 1)/5, p. 16.
42 See a Note by Dr. M. Tolba, 'Transfer of Technology and the Financing of Global
Environmental Problems: The Role of Users' Fees' (UNEP/OzL.Fin.1/2), para. 31 esp.
43 UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.lI( 1 )/5, Article 5(2), p. 14.
44 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.II(2)/7, (Geneva, 26 February - 5 March 1990 [second
session]).
45 See a report of an informal consultations held in January 1990,
UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.II(2)/2: T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) pp. 290-
91.
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(i) a new financial mechanism must be established and its funding must be additional
to existing development assistance,
(ii) contributions should be on an assessed rather than voluntary basis,
(iii) existing bilateral/multilateral sources of funding should be maintained,
(iv) The U.N.E.P. - as an Ozone Secretariat - should be assigned a major role in
catalysing/coordinating the work of other organisations in a joint venture,
(v) Decisions on policies and criteria for the use of the resources should be taken by
the contracting parties, and this will require expanding the role of the U.N.E.P. Ozone
Secretariat, and:
(vi) Whilst each country enjoys a prerogative to decide how to raise funds, the
establishment of a 'user's fee' for ozone-depleting activities has several advantages.48
However, delegations of industrialised donor state parties pointed out
the difficult and lengthy process that might be involved, and therefore
they still defended their preference for existing financial/technical
assistance through major international economic institutions - the World
Bank in particular - over such a new multilateral financial treaty
institution. Some of them even favoured only the creation of a
'clearinghouse' to furnish 'objective' information and to facilitate formal
requests for possible assistance.47 Indeed, the Mechanism was likely to
form a historical precedent for the United States government, as
potentially the largest donor, to channel good money into a future CO 2
financial mechanism.48 Recognising that they have not much say in the
present market-oriented political-economic systems, developing states
considered it undoubtedly favourable, strengthening the U.N.E.P.'s
moderating influence on that very trying situation in the operation of the
expected new environmental funding mechanism - this critical issue
remained unsettled.
The Second Meeting of the Parties was held in London in June 1990,
and, prior to that Meeting, the Forth Meeting of the Working Group
managed to clear up several immediate problems such as the voting
procedures of the Executive Committee.49 Developing states such as India
and China considered that their ratification of the Protocol would depend
48 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.II(2)/7, para. 6: R. E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p.
155.
47 See R. E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1991) pp. 155-56.
48 See R. Bowser, 'History of the Montreal Protocol's Ozone Fund', 20 I.E.R. (November,
1991) p. 637; R. E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 159.
49 See T. Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, (1994) pp. 296-98.
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not only on the expected establishment of the ozone-related financial
mechanism but also on sufficient guarantees for access to new
technologies of O.D.Ss..50
At the London Ozone Meeting, India argued that, for instance, it is
morally desirable that all C.F.Cs. production should be stopped, but only
after developing countries receive alternative technologies.51 The
delegation of Malaysia even stated that denying access to modern
technology amounts to a so-called 'environmental colonialism'.52
As Blake and Walters pointed out, it is said that underdeveloped
Southern countries, which cannot help depending on international
technology transfer via major M.N.Cs., generally consider that they have
paid enough to the developed First World countries through the
exploitation of their natural resources. They thus think that technology is
part of 'human heritage' - but not proprietary scientific knowledge (i.e.
the private property of the patentee) - and they should have a right of
access to such technology to improve their low standards of living.53 On
the other hand, industrialised countries generally regard patent protection
as an incentive for the development of new technology; it is true that the
lack of a national legislative and regulatory regime with a limited
enforcement mechanism has often destroyed certainty of making a
business investment in the Third World. In practice, it has also discouraged
various bilateral or multilateral overseas investments.
Yet, it is important to notice that at this Meeting the Parties adopted
the interim Montreal N.C.P. regime - if developing countries have
difficulties in gaining ozone-friendly technologies necessary to fully
comply with the obligations of international ozone treaty including control
measures of O.D.Ss., the internal treaty institutions such as the
Implementation Committee and the Meeting of the Parties are to decide
future remedial measures for these matters, such as appropriate financial
and/or technical assistance.54
After resolving major problems with the expected environmental
fund, the parties to the Montreal Protocol decided to start operation of the
50 M. W. Browne, '93 Nations Move to Ban Chemicals that Harm Ozone' in N.Y. TIMES
(30 June 1990).
51 See K. T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses, (1994) p. 144.
52 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (1998) p. 189.
53 D. H. Blake and R. S. Walters, The Politics of Global Economic Relations (1983) p.
156.
54 See Chapter V above for a full account of the Montreal N.C.P. regime.
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Financial Mechanism on 1 January 1991 for an interim period of three
years, therefore, prior to the Amendment entering into force and the
establishment of the actual institutional mechanism. Accordingly, the
Interim Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol
was established by the 1990 London Meeting based on a simple Decision II/8
of the Ozone Meeting of the Parties. It was thought that, as a rule, the
Interim Fund was to be transformed into the Montreal Protocol Multilateral
Fund on a permanent basis as established under the Amendment.
In the 1992 Copenhagen Ozone Meeting members of the European
Community - France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in
particular - disputed, however, the validity of such a transformation of the
Fund and they were unwilling to reaffirm their financial commitment to
the Multilateral Fund beyond 1993; however, not only Article 5 developing
countries and small industrialised donor countries, but also the United
States - which in the 1990 London Meeting greatly preferred the G.E.F. run
by the World Bank - advocated the dominant and practical idea of newly
establishing the Montreal Multilateral Fund.55
As a result, the Forth Meeting conclusively established the Financial
Mechanism, including the Multilateral Fund, and therefore the Interim
Fund operated, in fact, until December 1992. In addition, the 1992
Copenhagen Meeting also decided that any resources remaining in the
interim mechanism shall be transferred to the new Multilateral Fund.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FINANCIAL MECHANISM OF
THEMONTREALOZONEPROTOCOL
A. General Legal Aspects
As a beginning, we shall examine the following three fundamental aspects
of the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund ('M.L.F.').
First, the Multilateral Fund shall meet agreed incremental costs for
Article 5 countries' treaty compliance, on a grant or concessional basis and
in accordance with criteria decided upon by the state parties.56 In this
respect, the 1990 London Meeting adopted a detailed 'Indicative List of
Categories of Incremental Cost' - which is utterly fundamental to project
55 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15: T. Gehring and S. Oberthiir, 'The Copenhagen Meeting',
23/1 E.P.L., (1993) p. 10. See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 209-12.
56 Article 10(3-a).
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eligibility for the M.L.F., although it cannot be considered as definitive or
exclusive since it allows for costs not on the list to be met by the Fund (i) if
they are identified/qualified, and (ii) if they are found by the Executive
Committee57 to be consistent with any criteria decided by the Parties.58
Requests for financing incremental costs of an implementation project
shall be considered in accordance with several general principles,
including the concept of 'cost effectiveness'.59 Defining the term
'incremental costs' is a difficult task and in the meetings of the Executive
Committee, some developing countries have tried to expand the list's
coverage.60
Second, the M.L.F. is to finance clearing-house functions
concerning (i) a assistance for industrialising countries by way of
country-specific studies and technical cooperation to identify their need
for cooperation, (ii) technical cooperation to meet these identified needs,
(iii) the distribution of information and relevant materials as provided for
in Article 9, and the conduct of workshops, training sessions and other
related activities, and; (iv) the promotion and monitoring of other
multilateral, bilateral and regional cooperation.61
Third, the M.L.F. finances the independent Fund Secretariat62 and
other related support costs.63 It is important that the Fund would operate
under the authority of the Meeting of the Parties and in accordance with
this supreme institution's overall policies.64 Furthermore, the Financial
Mechanism under Article 10 of the Montreal Protocol is 'without prejudice
to any future arrangements that may be developed with respect to other
environmental issues'.65
57 See Section B( 1) below.
58 Possible incremental costs include (i) cost of conversion of existing production
facilities and equipments, (ii) costs arising from premature retirement or enforced
idleness, (iii) cost of establishing new facilities for substitutes of capacity equivalent
to capacy lost when plants are converted or scrapped (see UNEP/OzL.Pro/2/3,
Appendix 1 of Decision 11/8; UNEP/OzL.Pro/4/15, Decision IV/18, Annex VIII). See
also U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) para. 214.
59 See further UNEP/OzL.Pro/2/3, Appendix 1 (Decision II/8) para. 1;
UNEP/OzL.Pro/4/15, Decision IV/18, Section 1(6).
60 See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 257-58.
61 Article 10(3-b).
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As we shall see later, major internal treaty institutions - i.e. the
Meeting of the Parties, the Executive Committee, and the Fund Secretariat -
and pre-existing international institutions - i.e. the World Bank, the
U.N.E.P., the U.N.D.P., and the U.N.I.D.O. - play important roles in the
operation of the M.L.F. (see section B(3) below).
With regard to fund financing, the M.L.F. would be financed by
contributions from all state parties not operating under Article 5(1) of the
Ozone Protocol, including Russia and other C.E.I.Ts.66 that do not have any
financial obligations in the Climate Change Convention regime, and funds
would be additional to other financial transfers to industrialising
countries such as existing bilateral or multilateral O.D.A. flows.
Contributions to the M.L.F. - which is in convertible currency or in kind
and/or in national currency - would be made based on the United Nations
scale of assessments,67 and on the scale of contributions decided by the
annual Meeting of the Parties. Yet there is no fixed date for making
contributions to the Fund.68
Until 1996 the total income of the Fund amounted to some U.S.$ 550
million; 1, 400 projects had been approved and U.S.$ 40 million remained
available for distribution to projects submitted to the Twentieth Meeting of
the Executive Committee.69 Yet, it is also important to note that only 25 per
cent of funds, allocated to the Implementing Agencies, had been disbursed
to Article 5 developing countries.70 The major donors from 1991 to 1995
were the United States ($136 million), Japan ($77 million), Germany ($ 57
million), France ($38 million), the United Kingdom ($31 million) and Italy
($27 million).71 More recently, the 1996 Eighth Meeting of Parties decided
66 See Chapter V(VII.A.l) above.
67 Article 10(5). The U.N. scale of assessment is an index system based on country
economic factors. See further Decision VII/37(4): U.N.E.P., Handbook for the
International Treaties for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 4th edn. (1996) pp. 236-
39.
68 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40, para. 102. As argued in Chapter V(III) above, it is
not clear - as in the cases of the financial mechanisms of the Climate Change
Convention and the Biodiversity Convention - whether non-payment of contributions
can be regarded as ozone treaty non-compliance. Taking this into account, in my view,
it is thus not possible to argue that - as in the case of O.D.A. funding - the duty of
financial (and technical) assistance has constituted parts of customary international
law of the environment. But see F. Biermann, Saving the Atmosphere: International
Law, Developing Countries and Air Pollution (1995) pp. 114-19.
69 UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/Bur. 1/3, para. 22.
70 UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/Bur.l/3, para. 23.
71 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 253.
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to allocate U.S. $540 million dollars for the period of 1997-1999 with a view
to assist Article 5 developing countries.72
Bilateral and regional cooperation with a low-volume-O.D.S.-
consuming state will be regarded as a contribution to the Multilateral Fund
up to a certain percentage,73 provided that such cooperation (i) strictly
relates to compliance with the provisions of the Ozone Protocol, (ii)
provides additional resources, and (iii) meets agreed incremental costs.74
The amount representing the annual bilateral cooperation would be
credited for the year designated by the non-Article 5 party as part of its
contribution.75 In its Seventh Meeting of 1995, the Executive Committee
adopted guidelines for cost assessment of bilateral and regional activities.7 6
Furthermore, it is important that contributions may be received by those
not party to the Montreal Protocol, and by other governmental,
intergovernmental, non-governmental and other sources.77
It is decided that the parties to the Protocol will decide upon the
programme budget of the Fund for each fiscal period and upon the
percentage of contributions of individual contracting parties. In addition,
resources under the Fund are to be disbursed with the concurrence of the
beneficiary party.78
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in order to clarify the nature
and legal status of the Fund as a treaty body under international law, the
1993 Sixth Meeting of the Parties adopted Decision VI/16.7^ Decision VI/16
provides, for instance, that the Fund enjoys 'legal capacity as is necessary
for the exercise of its functions and the protection of its interests, . . . , to
acquire and dispose of movable property and to institute legal proceedings
in defence of its interests'. The M.L.F. and the Fund Secretariat enjoy
72 Decision VIII/4 in UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/12; 27/2 E.P.L. (1997) pp. 86-87. See also R.
Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 302-03.
73 Terms of Reference for the Multilateral Fund clarifies that such contributions
would be counted up to a total of twenty per cent of the total contribution by that
party as decided by the annual Ozone Meeting of the Parties.
74 Article 10(6).
75 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/5/16: Annex IV, para. 12.
7,5 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/7/30, para. 82 and Annex IV.
77 Annex IX(8).
78 Article 10(7-8).
7<^ See UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/7, para. 103. Yet, Japan made reservation on this Decision.
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privileges and immunities in the host country, Canada (Decision
VI/16(b)).80
B. The Role of the International Institutions in the Financial Mechanism
(1) The Executive Committee
As with the Implementation Committee of the N.C.P. regime, the Executive
Committee is a newly established permanent internal treaty organ of the
international ozone regime.81 The Executive Committee is assigned to
'develop and monitor the implementation of specific operational policies,
guidelines and administrative arrangements for the purpose of achieving
the objectives of the Multilateral Fund'.82 The Executive Committee has
carried out the following five functions:88
(i) Review and approval of country programmes, project proposals and the work
programmes of the implementing agencies:
(ii) Monitoring and evaluating the performance of the Implementing Agencies through
a review of their work programmes and progress reports:
(iii) Development of policies, guidelines and administrative practices to facilitate and
clarify the process:
(iv) Managing the fund process:
(v) Reporting to the Parties about its activities on a regular basis and providing a
formal progress report to the Annual Meeting.
It is worth mentioning that the Executive Committee established at its
Ninth Meeting a 'Sub-Committee on Financial Matters' to review and assess
the existing financial arrangements and procedures, and recommend
modifications, where appropriate.84 The Executive Committee also
established a sessional 'Project Review Sub-Committee'.85
8^ W. Lang notes that several questions remain to be solved - e.g., whether the Meeting
of the Parties had a clear mandate to adopt such a decision: Does it constitute itself a
'valid source of international law?.W. Lang, 'Ozone Layer', 5 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1994) p. 163.
81 See Section 111(B) above.
82 Article 10(5). See also Annex IX(5).
88 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40: Annex 1, para. 27.
84 See further UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/9/20, para. 32: Annex II.
85 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/11/36, para. 156.8: UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/15/45, para. 173.
As for the Terms of Reference for the Sub-Committee, see,
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/15/45, para. 173. With regard to participation by N.G.Os., it
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Unlike the Implementation Committee,86 the Executive Committee
has its own Rules of Procedure.87 The Rules are to apply mutatis mutandis
to the proceedings of any meeting of the Executive Committee.
According to Rule 11, the Executive Committee will consist of both
seven parties from a group of industrialising countries operating under
Article 5(1) and seven parties from a group of industrially advanced
countries not operating under that article. Article 5 countries have
organised themselves into three regions (i.e. Asia, Africa and Latin
America and the Caribbean), and the donor countries into six groups (i.e.
the European Union, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand, the Nordic and E.F.T.A. countries and the Russian Federation).88
Each group selects its own members of the Executive Committee and they
must be formally endorsed by the Ozone Meeting of the Parties.89 Non¬
governmental organisations are allowed to participate in any meeting of
the Executive Committee as observers.^6
With regard to the voting procedure, decisions of the Committee are
to be taken by consensus whenever possible. However, in a case where all
efforts at consensus have been exhausted and no agreement reached, the
decisions shall be then taken by a two-thirds majority of the parties
representing both a majority of low-volume-O.D.S.-consuming parties and a
majority of industrialised state parties not operating under Article 5(1).91
This voting procedure based on a North-South harmonious balance is
say that 'Non-governmental organisations may nominate one representative to observe
the meeting of the Sub-Committee but may not participate'.
86 See Chapter V(B.2.a) above.
87 'Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Executive Committee for the Interim
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol' in
UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/11/Annex VI. The provisions of the Ozone Protocol prevails over the
Rules of Procedure, however (Rule 20).
88 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40: Annex I, para. 25.
89 The 1995 Ozone Meeting of the Parties endorsed the selection of seven industrised
state parties - i.e., Australia, Austria, Denmark, Japan, the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom (Vice-Chairman), and the United States, and seven Article 5
developing countries - Chile, Colombia, India, Egypt, Kenya (Chairman), the
Philippines, and Senegal (Decision VII/27).
90 Rules 6 & 7. See also Section V(D) below. See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy,
(1998) p. 223 (and endnote no. 3), noting that N.G.Os. supported by the U.S., Canada
and the Netherlands appealed to the Third Meeting of the Parties to overrule a more
restrictive proposal by the Executive Committee.
91 The Rules of Procedure of the Executive Committee, Rule 17. On the utility of
double majority see P. Szell, 'Decision-Making under Multilateral Environmental
Agreements', 26/5 E.P.L. (1996) p. 213. Unlike this Multilateral Fund procedures,
decisions by the G.E.F. Council are made by consensus, and if these is a disagreement
among members, then such decisions are to be taken based on a 'contribution-weighted
voting procedure', but representing sixty per cent of the votes of all states.
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particularly significant since the voting strength of developing states in
major international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the
I.M.F. is still less than one-third of the total, at its maximum. At the 1992
Copenhagen Meeting several government representatives mentioned that
the M.L.F. assumes a democratic character as reflected in its decision¬
making processes and a change in the structure of the Fund would be
merely counterproductive.92 To date, however, as with decision-making on
control measures of O.D.Ss., all fund decisions have been taken by
consensus, and in practice, this two-third majority voting system has not
been required yet.
However, the Executive Committee has encountered serious
difficulties in achieving consensus particularly when a member state of
the Committee has a 'direct interest' in a given M.L.F. project.93 It is also
suggested that some problems arising from the structure of the Executive
Committee in itself - i.e. the turnover of Committee members and the inter-
dependency of the Implementing Agencies in policy issue resolution -
have often made some policy issues even much more complicated.94
Finally, the Executive Committee is assisted by the U.N.E.P. Fund
Secretariat.
(2) The Multilateral Fund Secretariat
The Fund Secretariat of the Montreal Protocol, operating under the Chief
Officer, is located in Montreal, Canada.95 It consists of nine professional
staff and nine support staff, which is broadly representative of the parties
with two staff members from Asia, two from Africa, one from North
America, one from Latin America, and two from Europe.96
The tasks of the Fund Secretariat can be divided into seven
categories:97
92 See UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, para. 42.
93 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) para. 228.
94 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) paras. 28 and 283.
95 The officials of the Multilateral Fund Secretariat enjoy privileges and immunities
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions of the Fund (Decision
VI/16(b)). The Executive Committee thus accepted the offer of Canada to cover any
additional costs relative to costs associated with U.N.E.P. Headquarters. See,
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/8/29 (Annex III, para. 3.3)).
96 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40: Annex I, para. 5.
97 See further, UNEP/OzL.Pro/10/40: Annex 1, para. 29.
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(i) Preparation and documentation for the meetings of the Executive Committee:
(ii) Policy analysis and review:
(iii) Analysis and review of programmes and fund activities:
(iv) Monitoring the activities of the Implementing Agencies:
(v) Communications and public relations:
(vi) Administrative support, coordination and liaison for the Executive Committee:
and,
(vii) Financial management/monitoring of the Fund.
For example, the Fund Secretariat and the Implementing Agencies
shall co-operate with parties to provide information on funding available
for relevant projects to secure the necessary contacts and to co-ordinate
projects financed from other sources with activities financed under the
Montreal Protocol.98 The Fund Secretariat shall also make the necessary
arrangements for the meetings of the Committee and it also performs all
other functions the Executive Committee requires."
More specifically, the Secretariat assesses and offers
recommendations to the Executive Committee with regard to country
programmes and work programmes developed by the Implementing
Agencies.100 It is pointed out that 'Although almost all projects brought
before the ExCom [Executive Committee] are ultimately approved, many are
withdrawn, postponed, or modified at the suggestion of the secretariat
before they are brought forward'.101 Thus the Multilateral Fund
Secretariat also assumes, to some extent, control over institutional
oversight or supervisory mechanisms.
Finally, the Chief Officer is to submit to the Executive Committee
semi-annual reports covering budget and financial issues, and it shall also
report on activities, including those requiring actions by the Executive
Committee.102
98 Annex IX(22).
99 The Rules of Procedure of the Executive Committee, Rule 15.
100 See Section IV(D. 1-2) below.
101 E. DeSombre and J. Kauffman, 'The Montreal Protocol Fund: Partial Success Story',
in R. Keohane and M. Levy (eds.), Institutions for Environmental Aid, (1996) pp. 120-
21.
102 These tasks include, for example, the revision of current year's budget for the
Secretariat and three year plan and budget for the Fund. See further
UNEP/OzL.Pro.ExCom/121nf.6, p. 13.
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(3) The Implementing Agencies
The Terms of Reference for the M.L.F. provide that, under the supervision
of the Executive Committee (i) Implementing Agencies would be requested
by the Committee - in the context of country programmes103 - to co-operate
with and assist the parties within their respective area of expertise, and (ii)
they would also be invited by the Committee to develop an inter-agency
agreement and specific agreements with the Executive Committee acting on
behalf of the parties.104
The Executive Committee signed agreements with the U.N.E.P.,105 the
U.N.D.P.,100 the U.N.I.D.O.107 and the World Bank,108 respectively. These
Implementing Agencies, which are not ad hoc treaty organisations but
well established international institutions, are to consult with the Executive
Committee in fulfilling their responsibilities regarding the M.L.F.109 For a
reference, a share of the Implementing Agencies in 1996 is described in
Table IV below.
It is stated that '[I]mplementing Agencies shall apply only those
considerations relevant to effective and economically efficient
programmes and projects which are consistent with any criteria adopted
by the Parties'.110 In identifying and selecting projects, the World Bank,
the U.N.D.P. and the U.N.I.D.O. have heavily relied on the frequent use of
workshops and the contracts made by international experts.111 In
addition, it is pointed out that these Implementing Agencies are strongly
influenced not only by firms in industrialising countries but also by the
governments of Article 5 states. Not surprisingly, these Agencies properly
regard these enterprises and Article 5 parties as their primary 'clients' -




107 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/18/29, Annex IV.
108 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/5/lnf.2.
109 Annex 1X(6). Added to this, the heads of these agencies would meet at least once a
year to report on their activities and consult on cooperative arrangements. See ibid.
110 Annex IX(3).
111 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) para. 349.
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however, as the U.N.E.P.'s Study Team COWIconsult of Denmark112 says, it is
possible that this would come to contradict the root idea that Implementing
Agencies are invited to participate in the Multilateral Fund by/on behalf of
the Executive Committee as a higher decision-making institution.113
Finally, the Implementing agencies are entitled to receive support
costs for their activities, having reached specific agreements with the
Executive Committee.114
TABLE no. IV: The Implementing Agencies' Share in 1996115
Agency Percentage of Total
(%)
Level of Funds for Invest¬
ment Projects in 1996
U.N.D.P. 30 U.S. $29 million
U.N.I.D.O. 25 U.S. $24 million
World Bank 45 U.S. $44 million
(a) The World Bank
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ('I.B.R.D.' or,
more commonly, the World Bank)116 is to co-operate with and assist the
Executive Committee in administering and managing the programme to
finance the agreed incremental costs of Article 5 countries.117 Regional
development banks are also encouraged to participate in this process118
112 In accordance with Decision IV/18(11.4) by the Forth Meeting of the Parties, the
Team with support from Goss Gilroy Inc. of Canada was contracted by the U.N.E.P. to
review and evaluate the effectiveness of the Financial Mechanism.
113 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) para. 307 et seq. As for the competition among the Implementing Agencies, see
ibid., paras. 324-31.
114 Annex IX(7).
115 UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/13/3, para. 18.
116 On the I.B.R.D. see generally D. W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions,
4th edn. (1982) pp. 109-10. On the role of the World Bank in environmental
protection see J. Werksman, 'Greening Bretton Woods' in P. Sands (ed.), Greening
International Law, (1993) pp. 65-84; K. Horta, 'The World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund' in J. Werksman (ed.), Greening International Institutions, (1996) pp.
131-47; K. Paddington, 'The Role of the World Bank' in A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury
(eds.), International Politics of the Environment, (1992) pp. 212-27.
117 Annex IX 4(c) and 16. The President of the World Bank is the Administer of this
programme that operates under the authority of the Executive Committee. See, ibid.
118 Annex IX 4(d) and 17.
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and they are required to report as appropriate based on the nature of their
activities.119
The World Bank shall (i) report on activities relating to country
programmes and on project proposals or groups of project proposals,
including those which require the Executive Committee's approval, and (ii)
prepare a final report on operations financed by the Multilateral Fund.120
The World Bank deals principally with Article 5 industrialising countries
that are large consumers/producers of O.D.Ss., such as India and China.121
It is interesting that each Implementing Agency including the Bank
has taken a different approach to M.L.F. project implementation. In this
respect, the World Bank has advanced a rather slow process that
emphasises the importance of national execution through designated
financial intermediaries and agents. The World Bank says that 'There is no
single more important aspect of project implementation than the
establishment of local capacity to deal with the implementation of M.P.
[Montreal Protocol] and ODS phaseout activities'.122 Thus, under Bank
projects, developing countries in themselves are ultimately responsible for
M.L.F. project implementation.
It is suggested that a number of delays have been caused by various
disagreements between Article 5 countries and the World Bank on the flow
of funds mechanism and on taxation issues.123 Nevertheless, it is still
possible to argue that the national execution of the M.L.F. projects possesses
the advantage of potentially promoting greater ownership of activities by
the national government and of building national capacity for project
development and implementation.124
119 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/18/Rev.l: Annex III.
120 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/18/Rev.l: Annex III. As for World Bank project
preparation, see e.g. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40, Annex I, paras. 72-81.
121 See Section V(C) below.
122 The World Bank, 'Implementation Performance Review of Bank-Implemented
Montreal Protocol Investment Operations, (December 1994) para. 8.
123 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) para. 377.
1 24 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) para. 37; Global Environment Coordination, National Execution: Montreal
Protocol Ozone Investment Portfolio.
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(b) The United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.)
The U.N.D.P.125 is to co-operate with and assist the Executive Committee in
feasibility and pre-investment studies and in other technical assistance
measures.126 The U.N.D.P. is to:
(i) report on the status of activities related to country programmes including the
activities of field offices;
(ii) prepare periodic progress reports on projects;
(iii) prepare an annual report on income and expenditures of previous years; and
(iv) prepare a final report after completion and/or termination of each project.122
With regard to its approaches to project implementation under the
M.L.F., the U.N.D.P. and the U.N.I.D.O., unlike the World Bank, have
centralised project identification, development and procurement
operations - i.e. a so-called centralised execution. These two Implementing
Agencies thus avoid national execution systems the Bank has adopted.128
In other words, unlike the World Bank, the U.N.D.P. and the U.N.I.D.O. have
played more direct roles in the process of M.L.F. project implementation.
Consequently, Article 5 governments are in principle not involved except
to endorse the implementation projects.
As for project preparation and execution, since the U.N.D.P. is a
highly decentralised U.N. international institution and therefore has a
number of local field offices, unlike the World Bank, it does not necessarily
need financial intermediaries or local institutions.129 It is pointed out that
in many cases industrialising Article 5 states have preferred the U.N.D.P.
(or the U.N.I.D.O.) to the World Bank on investment projects.130
125 See generally H. G. Schemers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law,
3rd edn. (1995) p. 1084 & 1143-27.
126 Annex IX(4-b).
122 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/18/Rev.l/Annex III. As for U.N.D.P. procedures for
project development/implementation, see e.g., UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40, paras. 60-
65 and its figure 2.
128 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) paras. 38 and 322.
129 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40, Annex II, para. 32.
130 E. DeSombre and J. Kauffman, 'The Montreal Protocol Fund: Partial Success Story',
in R. Keohane (eds.), Institutions for Environmental Aid, (1996) p. 112.
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The U.N.D.P. assists possible clients only on their specific request,
and it focuses on developing local human resources and institutional
capabilities.131
Lastly, it must be added that the U.N.D.P. has established a 'Montreal
Protocol Unit' (M.P.U.) that is responsible for programme development and
technical project monitoring.132 The Implementation of actual M.L.F.
projects is, however, handled by one of the U.N.D.P. executing agencies,
namely, the United Nations Office of Projects Services (75 %),133 or is
directly executed by national governments (25 %).134
(c) The United Nations Environment Programme (U.N.E.P.)
As we have already seen, the U.N.E.P. and its technical experts, the Nairobi-
based Ozone Secretariat, have greatly contributed to the establishment and
maintenance of the international legal ozone regime (see Chapters II(II.B)
& III(II) above).
The U.N.E.P. - as per its agreement between the Executive Committee
of the interim M.L.F. - has been tasked with the following work:135
(i) Political promotion of the objectives of the Montreal Ozone Protocol;
(ii) Research and data-gathering, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol;
and
(iii) Clearing-house function comprising the following activities:
(a) assist developing countries through country-specific studies and other technical
cooperation, to identify their needs for cooperation;
(b) facilitate technical cooperation to meet these identified needs;
131 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40, Annex I, p. 38.
132 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40, para. 60.
133 The United Nations Office for Projects Services (U.N.O.P.S.) - which is designed as
an implementation organisation for and provider of services to all the U.N. organs - is
actively involved in U.N.D.P.-implemented projects. The U.N.O.P.S. often
subcontracted under the national execution modality. See U.N.O.P.S., 'Project
Information (Environment): Montreal Protocol - Fighting Ozone Depletion' under
<http://www.unops.org/5proin/5pi20011 .html>.
134 Ibid.
135 See UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40: Annex I, para. 83. The Paris-based Industry
and Environment Programme Activity Centre, in particular, takes on these
clearinghouse and promotional activities.
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(c) collect and disseminate information and relevant materials, hold workshops and
training sessions and other related activities for the benefit of developing country
parties;
(d) facilitate and monitor other multilateral regional/bilateral cooperation available
to developing countries.
In addition, the U.N.E.P., on the invitation of the Executive
Committee, also acts as Treasure for the Fund. The U.N.E.P. states that no
additional charge would be required for operating as Treasurer of the Fund
and that all associated costs would be covered by its overhead charge
assessed against the funds it receives in its role as one of the implementing
agencies.136
As to implementation 'philosophy', the U.N.E.P. follows a bottom-up
approach in identifying needs and in devising its programmes, and it
utilises the T.E.A.P. and its T.O.Cs. (Technical Options Committees), existing
industry and government networks in both Article 5 and non-Article 5
countries.137
(d) The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (U.N.I.D.O.)
The Executive Committee invites the U.N.I.D.O.138 to co-operate and assist in
project development and implementation comprising pre-investment
studies and other technical assistance matters.139
U.N.I.D.O. as an Implementing Agency of the M.L.F. - which deploys
technology experts to provide concrete technology assistance to Article 5
developing states - believes that the institution is 'best equipped' to work on
smaller projects.146 The U.N.I.D.O.'s programme consists of nearly 260
projects in 58 countries with a total value of U.S.$ 111 million.141
136 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/1/2, para. 13.
137 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol, (March
1995) paras. 322 and 374.
138 On the U.N.I.D.O. see generally N. D. White, The Law of International
Organisations, (1996) p. 152.
139 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/8/29, Annex IV. On U.N.I.D.O.'s project cycle, see e.g.
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40, paras. 66-70 and its figure 3.
140 UNEP/0zL.Pro/ExCom/10/40, Annex I, p. 40.
141 UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, para. 34.
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C. The Global Environmental Facility (G.E.F.)
The G.E.F., which is a World Bank financial mechanism, was originally
established in 1990 in order to help developing countries meet 'agreed
incremental costs' of activities on the protection of the global environment
in four major areas, namely, (i) global warming, (ii) pollution of
international waters, (iii) destruction of biodiversity, and (iv) the depletion
of the stratospheric ozone layer.142 In 1994 the G.E.F. was restructured and
replenished with over U.S.$ 2 billion ('G.E.F. II'), and presently 156
countries participate in the financial mechanism. The G.E.F. is jointly
implemented by the U.N.D.P., the U.N.E.P. and the World Bank as
Implementing Agencies under the G.E.F. In addition, the 'functionally
independent' G.E.F. Secretariat reports to and services the Council and
Assembly of the G.E.F. As with the case of the Multilateral Fund,
participating developing countries are not presently required to
contribute to the G.E.F. funding.
The essential difference between the G.E.F. and the Financial
Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol is that the G.E.F. utilises the Ozone
Project Trust Fund ('O.T.F.') administered by the World Bank.143 The
relationship between the Multilateral Fund of the Ozone Protocol and the
O.T.F. is this concise administrative procedure; once projects are approved
by the Executive Committee, the U.N.E.P. then transfers funds from the
Multilateral Fund to the O.T.F. of the World Bank.144
142 30 I.L.M. (1991) p. 1735; 33 I.L.M. (1994) p. 1273, reprinted in P. W. Birnie and
A. E. Boyle, Basic Documents on International Law and the Environment (1995) p. 666.
On the G.E.F. see among others J. Werksman, 'Consolidating Governance of the Global
Commons: Insights from the Global Environmental Facility', 6 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1995) pp.
27-63; H. Sjoberg, 'The Global Environmental Facility' in J. Werksman (ed.), Greening
International Institutions, (1996) pp. 148-62; L. Boisson de Chazournes, 'Le fonds por
l'environnment mondial: recherche et conquete de son identite' in 13 A.F.D.I. (1995)
pp. 612-32. However, currently activities on land degradation and deforestation are
also eligible for funding.
143 The World Bank, 'Establishment of the Global Environment Facility', (April 1991),
Annex D and Supplement. Yet the G.E.F. bears several similarities with the Financial
Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol - See U.N.E.P., The Study of the Financial
Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol, (March 1995), Section 7.9.2.
144 On the relationship between the G.E.F. and the 1992 Climate Change Convention
and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, see e.g., L. Boisson de Chazournes, 'Le fonds
pour l'environnement mondial: recherche et conquete de son identite', 13 A.F.D.I.
(1995) p. 15 et seq.
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Furthermore, it is important to note that financial assistance under
the G.E.F. would be limited to those state parties to the Montreal Protocol
that had ratified the 1990 London Amendment.145
Since the establishment of the Montreal Multilateral Fund, the
subsidiary role of G.E.F. within the ozone regime is largely limited to
middle-income countries and the C.E.I.Ts. - including the Russian
Federation - that are ineligible for the Montreal Protocol Multilateral
Fund.146
To take a plain example, a G.E.F.-funded project, which is the first
G.E.F. funding operation for O.D.Ss. phaseout in Russia, was structured as a
framework project for a total of G.E.F. grant amount of U.S. $60 million. It
consists of (i) an investment component to finance twenty-one sub-
projects for O.D.Ss. phaseout in the aerosol and refrigeration sectors, (ii) a
technical assistance component to strengthen project implementation and
institutional capacity, and (iii) a sub-grant processing component.147
Recently the G.E.F. Council has approved O.D.Ss. phase-out projects worth
$43. 6. million for the Russian Federation.148
In comparison to the 'Montreal model' of the Financial Mechanism,
the Study Team of the T.E.A.P. says that the G.E.F. has been more effective
than the Financial Mechanism of the Protocol in linking G.E.F. resources
not only to those of the regular programmes of the Implementing
Agencies, but also to those of bilateral development agencies, N.G.Os.,
national governments and the private sector.149
D. Strategies: Work Programmes, Country Programmes and Institutional
Strengthening
For effective and efficient implementation of M.L.F. projects designed to
phase out C.F.Cs. and other O.D.Ss., regime members in the Montreal
Protocol's Financial Mechanism - including Article 5 developing countries,
145 UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12, para. 51.
146 For a definition of the C.E.I.Ts., see Chapter V(VII.B) above. For an analysis of
O.D.Ss. projects in the C.E.I.T., see e.g. The World Bank, Bulgaria: ODSs Phaseout
Project, (October 1995); idem, Czech Republic: Technical Support and Investment
Project for the Phaseout of ODSs, (August 1994); idem, Poland: ODSs Phaseout Project,
(February 1997).
147 See further The World Bank, Russian Federation: Ozone Depleting Substance
Consumption Phase-out Project [Project Document], (May 1996).
148 UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/2, para. 16; Chapter IV(7.B) above.
149 See U.N.E.P., Study of the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol, (March
1995) paras. 659-60.
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developed state governments and four specialised international institutions
- make use of the following three key concepts, i.e. (i) work programmes,
(ii) country programmes, and (iii) institutional strengthening for project
implementation.
(1) Work Programmes
The Executive Committee has invited the Implementing Agencies and other
appropriate agencies, depending on their technical expertise, to develop
work programmes in cooperation with potential recipient countries.150
It is decided that the work programmes should specify, for example,
types of activities and projects on which agreement has been reached
between the Implementing Agency and the concerned party, and types of
activities and projects which must be defined to allow the Executive
Committee to review and monitor these Fund activities.151 In developing
these work programmes, there should be effective, result-oriented
coordination among the operational units of all the Implementing
Agencies.152 Work programmes are to be approved by the Executive
Committee on an annual basis and reviewed semi-annually - approval of
work programmes should be based on project eligibility criteria. 153
Each Implementing Agency is responsible for implementation and
supervision of projects within its work programmes.154 For instance, the
U.N.E.P.'s work programmes currently cover (i) information
clearinghouse, (ii) training, and (iii) workshops, networking and country
programmes for low-volume-O.D.Ss. consuming countries.155 These
activities are designed to contribute largely to capacity building in Article
5 industrialising countries.
(2) Country Programmes
The Executive Committee has invited each Article 5 industrialising country,
wishing to receive support from the Multilateral Fund, to develop a country
150 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/18/Rev.l: Annex III, Section II.2.1.
151 See further UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/18/Rev.l: Annex III, section II.2.2.
152 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/18/Rev.l, para. 66.
153 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/18/Rev.l: Annex III, Section II.2.3.
154 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/18/Rev.l: Annex III, Section II.2.5.
155 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40, para. 83.
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programme and projects, in accordance with paragraph 10(g) of the Terms
of Reference of the Committee.156
Country programmes can be prepared by the countries in
themselves, or in cooperation with an Implementing Agency or through
bilateral cooperation.157 In principle, the country programme is a
prerequisite for investment support from the Multilateral Fund, though
the Executive Committee often allows exceptions.158 In addition, it provides
a government and Implementing Agencies with a strategic plan for
phasing out O.D.Ss. based on an assessment of the country's O.D.Ss.
consumption and production patterns, identification of priority investment
projects, and so forth.159 The Study Team points out that the sense of
government ownership of the country programme is an important
contributing factor in the effectiveness of the country programme related
assistance.160
The Executive Committee decided that country programmes should be
viewed as flexible instruments which set out the framework for that
country's actions to meet the requirements of the Montreal Ozone
Protocol.161 The Executive Committee requested governments to present
annually to the Executive Committee information on progress being made
in the implementation of country programmes, in accordance with the
decision of the Executive Committee on implementation of country
programmes.168
(3) Institutional Strengthening for Project Implementation
Support for institutional strengthening within a developing country,
which formulates one of the basic concepts of capacity building,168 would
often be an essential element in achieving the objectives of the Montreal
Protocol regime and of the M.L.F. This is particularly true at the stage
when an Article 5 country has just become a party to the Protocol; in this
initial phase the stakeholders and the general public have to be aware of a
156 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/18/Rev.l: Annex III, Section II. 1.1.
157 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/10/40, para. 12.
158 U.N.E.P., Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol, (March
1995) para. 484.
159 Ibid. See also R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 256.
160 Ibid., paras 488-91 and 59 et seq..
161 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/5/16, para. 28a.
168 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/17/60, Decision 17/34 (para. 57).
168 See Section I above.
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number of fundamental ozone-related issues.164 In this regard, the so-
called 'national ozone units' that are 'local counterparts' to the Protocol's
institutions have been established in more than seventy developing
countries.165
It might be surprising, however, that issues on institutional capacity
building were not originally included in the Indicative List of Incremental
Cost Categories. It was in its 1992 Seventh Meeting that the Executive
Committee decided to allocate limited funding for institutional
strengthening related activities and assistance, in accordance with their
own merits, i.e. on case-by-case basis.166 Yet, it is said that a number of
non-Article 5 countries regard this kind of expenditure as an 'overhead
element', which will increase the administrative cost of the operation of
the Fund.167
The main objective of institutional strengthening is to provide
necessary resources to an eligible country to enable it to strengthen an
institutional mechanism within the Article 5 country to facilitate
expeditious implementation of projects for phase-out of C.F.Cs. and O.D.Ss. as
well as to ensure effective liaison between the country on the one hand,
and the Committee, the Fund Secretariat and Implementing Agencies on the
other.168
The concrete elements of institutional strengthening would include
(i) office equipment, (ii) personnel cost and (iii) operational cost (e.g.,
costs of post/telecommunication, stationery, maintenance of equipment
and creation of awareness).169 Until December 1995 a total of only about
U.S.$10 million had been approved for sixty-one countries for institutional
capacity building, including country programmes and workshops to
enhance data reporting capabilities of developing countries.170 The
U.N.E.P.'s Study Team has thus pointed out that shifting more emphasis on
164 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/5/16, para. 28d; UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/19/52, para. 36
165 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 255.
166 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) para. 62.
167 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) para. 74.
168 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/7/30, para. 74.2.
169 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/19/52, para. 6.
170 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/19/52, para. 9. For details of activities of the Implementing
Agencies in assisting data reporting, see e.g., UNEP/OzL.Pro/lmCom/8/3, Section 111;
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImCom/14/4, Section V; Chapter V(VIl.A.l) above.
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institutional strengthening would lead not only to a faster project
implementation but also to overall O.D.Ss. phase-out.171
(4) The Conditionality between the M.L.F. Funding and Compliance with the
Protocol
It seems that the relationship between the M.L.F. funding and compliance
with the Protocol's requirements is gradually strengthened. Just like
Article 4 trade restrictions considered in Chapter IV, loss of the M.L.F.
funding can be also regarded as a certain 'stick' within the ozone regime
(see Chapter I(III.B) above). Yet, as far as is known, the Executive
Committee has never formally brought non-compliance problems about
Fund operations to the meetings of the Implementation Committee of the
N.C.P. regime.172 In addition, Fund-related Decisions by the Executive
Committee (and the Meeting of the Parties) have been monitored almost
entirely by the Executive Committee and the Multilateral Fund Secretariat.
As D. C. Victor noted, 'the link between the M.L.F. and the Non-Compliance
Procedure remains surprisingly weak'.173
As described in Chapter V(VII.A.l) above, in the case of Mauritania,
the Implementation Committee of the N.C.P. decided to create conditionality
between the M.L.F. funding and the supply of baseline data.174 In this
regard the Meeting of the Parties adopted Decision VI/5, saying that an
Article 5 developing country would lose its status 'if it does not report base-
year data as required by the Protocol within one year of the approval of its
country programme and its institutional strengthening by the Executive
Committee'. In addition, the G.E.F. has made funding of ozone-related
projects in the C.E.I.T. parties conditional on compliance with the Montreal
Protocol and its 1990 London Amendment. The World Bank requires
recipient countries to be members of and in compliance with all relevant
environmental agreements.175
171 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) para. 58.
172 On the legal status of contributions to the Fund see Chapter V(III.A) above.
173 D. C. Victor, The Early Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's
Non-Compliance Procedure, (1996), p. 17 & p. 24. On the legal status of contributions
to the Fund see Chapter V(lll.A) above.
174 On the international base level see Chapter 111(111.B.2) above.
175 D. C. Victor, Early Operation of the Montreal Protocol's Non-Compliance
Procedure, (1996) p. 25.
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As noted in Chapter III above, by using the international financial
aid, Article 5 countries given a grace period176 could potentially build
industrial plants capable of producing or using C.F.Cs. other destructive
chemicals (e.g. India). It is pointed out that Indian firms are selling C.F.Cs.
to the Middle East.177 In this context, the Executive Committee decided in
1995 that it would prohibit any grants for India's conversion of factories
that had installed O.D.S. capacity after July 1995.178
IV. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF
OZONE-FRIENDLY TECHNOLOGY
We shall now confine our attention exclusively to the international
technology transfer under the ozone layer regime.
A. International Technology Transfer
To begin with, the term technology transfer 179 is defined in U.N.C.T.A.D.'s
'Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology' as the
transfer of systematic knowledge for 'the manufacture of a product, for the
application of a process or for the rendering of a service and does not
extend to the transactions involving merely the sale or mere lease of
goods'.180 Although technology covered by patent has territorial
protection, it is possible that environmentally-friendly technology can be
transferred to third parties - or developing countries in the present case -
through the transfer of the property rights on the technology, or by the
granting of a user's licence.
176 See Chapter 111(111.E) above.
177 'Holed Up: Chemicals Production/Controlling CFCs', 337 The Economist, (9
December 1995) p. 690.
178 Biermann, Financing Environmental Policies, pp. 44-45 cited in R. Benedick,
Ozone Diplomacy, (1998), p. 258. On M.L.F. projects in India see The World Bank,
Ozone Projects Trust Fund Grant: Technical Support and Investment Project (ODS
Phaseout 1), (July 1994); idem, Ozone Projects Trust Grant: Phaseout of Ozone
Depleting Substances (ODS Phaseout II), (February 1995).
179 On technology transfer in international environmental law see also Section 1(B)
above.
180 See TD/CODE TOT/41. In addition, The United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 36/192 adopted in 1981 states that: 'The General Assembly [recognise] that
environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of under-development pose
grave problems and can best be remedied by accelerated development through the
transfer of substantial quantities of financial and technical assistance'.
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More recently, according to Chapter 34 of Agenda 21,
environmentally sound technology is defined as being 'less polluting,
using all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycling more of their
wastes and products, and handling residual wastes in a more acceptable
manner than the technologies for which they were substitutes'.181 In
regard to this point, it is also important that Agenda 21 emphasises that
environmentally sound technologies are 'total systems which include
know-how, procedures, goods and services, and equipment as well as
organisational and managerial procedures'.182
Furthermore, Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration states that:
'States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable
development by improving scientific understanding through exchanges of scientific
and technological knowledge, and by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion
and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative technologies'.188
B. The International Technology Transfer of O.D.Ss. Reduction
It may be said that the cost of ozone-friendly technology will be
particularly expensive since it would require new or additional foreign
investment, additional supervision, re-training of personnel, and so
forth.184
Article 5 industrialising countries that need technology transfer of
O.D.Ss. can be generally divided into three categories, that is, (i) importers
of O.D.Ss.- related products and components (most of newly industrialising
states belong to this category); (ii) users of O.D.Ss. in the manufacturing
process (e.g. Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and Taiwan); and (iii) 'self-sufficient'
producers/users of O.D.Ss. (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,
Korea, Mexico and Venezuela).185 It is clear that the last category of
developing countries is not necessarily affected by Article 4 trade
restrictions under the Protocol, and therefore, they persistently demanded
181 Para, 34.1. See also para. 34.2.
182 Para. 34.3.
188 See also Chapter 34 of Agenda 21, para. 34.18 esp.
184 See e.g. UNEP/WG.78/6.
185 K. Hope, 'International Trade and International Technology to Eliminate ODSs',
I.E.A., (1996) p. 36.
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the establishment of new financial mechanisms and funding additional to
existing bilateral or multilateral aid programmes.186
The international transfer of technology, which is necessary to
enable developing countries in their compliance with the Montreal
Protocol, involves, inter alia: (i) identification of needs, (ii) acquisition of
patents, (iii) acquisition of designs, (iii) adaptation of technology for local
assimilation, (iv) identification and procurement of appropriate equipment
and materials, (v) training of personnel, and (vi) technical assistance.187
In the light of these lists, it must be emphasised that, as Chapter 34 of
Agenda 21 states, 'Environmentally sound technologies are not just
individual technologies, but total systems which include know-how,
procedures, goods and services, and equipments as well as organisational
and material procedures'.
New Article 10A of the Montreal Protocol as amended in 1990 now
requires state parties to take every practicable step, consistent with the
programmes supported by the financial mechanism to ensure the transfer
of the best available, environmentally safe substitutes and related
technologies under fair and most favourable conditions. Not only
developed country parties but also the C.E.I.Ts. currently assume the
obligation of providing technology transfer to Article 5 developing
countries.188 Yet, it is obvious that, in the light of the Protocol text itself
and its travaux preparatories, parties to the Protocol are not required to
compel their industries to transfer relevant technology under any
circumstances - for instance, industrialised state parties would not be
obliged to export environmentally sound technology of O.D.Ss. to
developing countries that do not provide 'adequate' intellectual property
protection.189 This is in line with the T.R.I.Ps. Agreement that requires
member states to respect the principle of the M.F.N, and of national
treatment, and to provide other intellectual-property-related
protections.190
However, it is still true that some other information would be
obtained through academic and government exchanges, scientific
186 gee Section 11(B) above.
187 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/18/63, para. 9.
188 In this respect, under the 1992 Climate Change Convention regimes the C.E.I.T. do
not have such a legal obligation to transfer environmentally sound technology.
189 See U.N.E.P. The Use of Trade Measures in Selected Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, (1995) p. 86.
190 On the T.R.I.Ps. see Chapter IV(III.B) above.
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publications and international (economic) institutions, including various
technical organisations.191
V. THE OPERATION OF THE FINANCIAL MECHANISM OF
THEMONTREALOZONE PROTOCOL REGIME
A. The Effectiveness of the Montreal Multilateral Fund
The Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund began its operations in January
1991. Since then, 781 projects have been approved for 79 Article 5
countries; these include (i) investment projects (275) and (ii) project
preparation activities (147) followed by technical assistance (120), (iii)
country programmes (89), (iv) training (85), (v) institutional
strengthening (49), and (vi) demonstration projects.192 Major recipient
countries include China (U.S.$95 million: see section B below), Egypt and
Argentina (U.S.$27 million), Brazil, India, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand and so
on.
A quick but objective judgement of the effectiveness of the Financial
Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol and its Multilateral Fund would depend
on the global phase-out of O.D.Ss., i.e. the amounts of controlled O.D.Ss.
phased out and the international transfer of environmentally sound
technologies of O.D.S. emission reductions.
However, it should not be forgotten that the M.F.L. is only one of the
important factors that will affect O.D.S. phase-out processes in Article 5
developing countries. Among others are, for example, existing
international market forces,193 issues of illegal foreign trade in O.D.Ss.,194
the grace period given to Article 5 developing countries in the Third
World,195 the effectiveness of the Montreal N.C.P. regime, political,
economic and social factors at national level,196 and so forth.
191 See e.g. E/CN.l 7/1993/10, Section II; Section IV(2). below.
192 U.N.E.P., Study on the FinancialMechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March 1995)
para. 20. As of February 1997 the Fund had approved 1,200 projects.
193 See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 266-67, noting that some members
of industries in developing countries consider that the M.L.F. as a new bureaucratic
mechanism may be of doubtful utility.
194 See Part A of Chapter III(IV.F) & Chapter V(V1I.A.2) above.
195 See Part A of Chapter III(III.E) above. For example, ten Article 5 countries -
namely, China, India, Mexico, Thailand, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia,
Malaysia and Argentina - account for an unconstrained consumption of approximately
150,000 O.D.P. tonnes, which is over seventy per cent of total estimated ODS
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(1) The Phase-out of Controlled O.D.Ss.
In early 1995 the U.N.E.P.'s Study Team suggested that since 1990 an
estimated 3,000 O.D.P.197 weighted tons of O.D.Ss. had been eliminated on a
yearly basis through Fund-supported implementation projects - however,
if approved projects have been carried out without delay, an estimated 2,500
O.D.P. tonnes could have been phased out.198 In practice, until the middle
of 1995, only 5,349 tons of controlled O.D.Ss. had been phased out - which is,
therefore, less than one-third of O.D.Ss. consumption in Article 5
developing countries.199
During 1995 in particular, the Executive Committee approved
U.S.$211 million worth of projects, 511 individual projects/activities,
including 289 investment projects.200 In 1994/1995 the Multilateral Fund
had thus achieved a total O.D.Ss. elimination of approximately 15,000 tonnes,
which is approximately equal to the annual consumption of Article 5
developing countries.201 The Executive Committee reported that since the
commencement of the M.L.F. a total of 12,611 O.D.P. tonnes had been phased
out.202 It was further reported at the Bureau of the 1995 Vienna Meeting
that projects implemented would result in the phase-out of 66,000 O.D.P.-
weighted tonnes of O.D.Ss.208
The considerable delays in implementation of M.L.F. projects, already
described above, are due mainly to the complexity of the administrative
process of the Financial Mechanism and the Fund, i.e. (i) long delays from
project approval to actual implementation start-up, which is caused by
ineffective procedures within implementing agencies, and (ii) lack of
effective implementation of projects designed for national execution.204
consumption in Article 5 countries. See U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial
Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March 1995) para. 796.
190 Obviously, India lacks the will to realise the Montreal Protocol's stated purposes.
See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 248-51.
197 On O.D.Ps. see Chapter 111(111.B.3) above.
198 U.N.E.P., Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March 1995)
paras. 16 and 17.
199 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/17/9.
200 UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12, para. 46.
201 UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/13/3, para. 8.
202 UNEP/OzL.Pro.8/12, para. 79.
203 UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/Bur. 1 /3, para. 22.
204 U.N.E.P., Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March 1995)
para. 17.
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In accordance with Decision VII/22, the 1995 Vienna Meeting
decided that the '21 Actions' set out in Annex V of its report should be taken
to improve the functioning of the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal
Protocol. On the second point in particular, as we have already seen, the
Executive Committee have carefully invested money on the matter of
institutional strengthening for Article 5 developing country parties.
As regards monitoring, reporting and supervision of projects
completed, the M.L.F. does not presently have monitoring guidelines for
reviewing implementation projects, including post-project technical and
safety monitoring and evaluation.205 However, based on Decisions of the
Executive Committee, a consultant group, 'Universalia', has prepared
several reports on a monitoring and evaluation system for the M.L.F.206
(2) The Transfer of Technology of O.D.Ss.
For example, the U.N.E.P.'s Study Team reported that it verified no evidence
of serious impediments in the international technology transfer supported
by the Fund or of systematic bias and inappropriate advice on technology
choice, though some enterprises located in Article 5 countries suggested
that licence fees for technology transfer are high and that production
licences for alternative substances are in reality difficult to obtain.207 Yet,
the Study Team says that the major current impediment to the international
technology transfer is the slow pace of M.L.F. project implementation.208
It is interesting to note here that in the Meeting of the W.T.O. Trade
and Environment Committee,209 India argued that although developing
countries adhered to the international consensus to phase out certain
environmentally injurious substances under M.E.As., 'substitute
technologies were not transferred by multilateral enterprises on "fair and
most favourable terms", as required in Article 16 of the Biodiversity
205 See U.N.E.P., The Study of the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol
(march 1995) paras. 427-32; E. DeSombre and J. Kauffman, 'The Montreal Protocol
Multilateral Fund: Partial Success Story', in R. Keohane (eds.), Institutions for
Environmental Aid (1996) p. 123.
206 See 'Monitoring and Evaluation System for the Multilateral Fund (revised draft),
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/21/30.
207 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol (March
1995) paras. 54, 106 and 551. See also UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/18/63, para. 13. But
see e.g. UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12, para. 79.
208 U.N.E.P., The Study on the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol, (March
1995) para. 107.
209 On the W.T.O.'s C.T.E. see Chapter IV(I.B) above.
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Convention and Article 10A of the Montreal Protocol'.210 India further
suggested that certain projects were not being cleared under the Financial
Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol due to their very high costs.211
The Industry Cooperative for Ozone Layer Protection ('I.C.O.L.P.'),212
which is a quasi-N.G.O. comprised of ten M.N.Cs. and twenty-two affiliate
members,213 provides non-C.F.Cs. technologies and information on C.F.Cs.
alternatives to both developing and developed countries. The members of
the I.C.O.L.P. have worked in sixteen countries, including China, India,
Korea, Russia and Vietnam, and they now provide firms in industrialising
states with technical assistance and information needed to achieve the
gradual transition to ozone-friendly technology.
In 1993 the I.C.O.L.P. joined an implementation project with the
World Bank to oversee technology cooperation projects to phase out O.D.Ss.
in seven Article 5 countries, including China, India and Mexico. The goals
of the I.C.O.L.P./World Bank Global Solvents Phaseout Project were to
increase awareness of ozone depletion and O.D.S. use, introduce companies
to O.D.Ss.-free environmental technology, and assist companies in their
phase-out efforts by helping them access funds through the M.L.F.214 In
addition, the I.C.O.L.P. received in 1994 a $150,000 grant from the U.S.
Environment Protection Agency to begin a technology cooperation project
in the Russian Federation.215
B. Case Study: The People's Republic of China
We shall now look more carefully into the operation of implementation
projects under the Multilateral Fund, focusing specifically on one Article 5
210 PRESS/TE009 (1 May 1996).
2^1 Ibid. But see R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 247-48, noting that such a
view is 'more negotiating rhetoric than reality'.
212 The I.C.O.L.P. was formerly known as the International Cooperative for Ozone
Layer Protection, which was established in 1989 to achieve the cost effective phase-
out of ozone-depleting solvents.
213 The corporate members include, for example, AT&T, British Aerospace Defence,
Ford Motor Company, and four Japanese companies such as Toshiba Corporation. The
U.N.E.P. (U.N.E.P./IE-France) participates in the I.C.O.L.P. as a affiliate. See I.C.E.L.,
The International Cooperative for Ozone Layer Protection 1990-1995: New Spirit of
Industry and Government Cooperation, Appendix I.
2^4 See ibid., p. 20.
21 5 Ibid., p. 20.
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developing country, the People's Republic of China. It is said that China's
participation in the M.L.F. demonstrated 'reasonableness and flexibility.216
China is the largest consumer and producer of O.D.Ss. among Article
5 developing countries. In 1991 China's consumption of O.D.Ss. was
approximately 50,000 tons and its production was about 30,000 tons. China's
consumption, in particular, has been increasing at an average rate of
eleven per cent every year - it is surprising that, if not controlled under
the ozone regime, by 2010 it would eventually amount to 250,000 tons. Yet,
unlike India, China is 'one of the most co-operative and conscientious
parties to the Protocol' and it has currently reduced its use of O.D.Ss.217
The Chinese government ratified the 1987 version of Montreal
Protocol in June 1991 and the state - as an Article 5 country - is now
eligible for M.L.F. funding.
Under the Multilateral Fund, as at November 1995, 155 projects have
been implemented exclusively for China, and it is estimated that 31,000
O.D.P. tons of O.D.Ss. would be eliminated (1,700 tons have already been
phased out).218 Out of these 155 projects, two main Implementing Agencies
under the current Fund Mechanism, i.e. the World Bank and the U.N.D.P.,
deal with about sixty projects, respectively.219 As a bilateral contributor,
the United States in particular launched about ten projects for O.D.Ss.
phase-out in China.
An O.D.Ss. Country Programme for China, which would last fifteen
years, was prepared by the Chinese government, the U.N.D.P. and the World
Bank, and it was then approved in March 1993 by the Executive
Committee.226 The Country Programme 'aims to cap and then reduce O.D.S.
consumption while introducing O.D.S. replacement technologies through a
strong regulatory framework', and it also includes 'policy, strategy, costs
and an action plan to achieve O.D.S. phaseout'.221
216 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 265. See also 'Presentation of Tokens of
Appreciation by the Government of China' in UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, para. 16.
217 Ibid., p. 264. China publicly announced that the country would reduce the 1996
C.F.C. production/consumption by 50 per cent by the end of 2000. See W. Xi, 'Country
Reports: China', 7 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1996) p. 333.
218 See also W. Xi, 'Country Report: China', 6 Y.bk.I.E.L. (1995) P. 488.
219 See U.N.E.P., Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol:
Inventory ofApproved Projects (As at November 1995), pp. 104-44. 94,557,338 U.S.
dollars are allocated for these 155 projects.
226 The World Bank, Ozone Projects Trust Fund Grant (ODS Phaseout III) (June 1995)
para. 3.
221 The World Bank, China: Ozone Projects Trust Fund Grant (ODS Phaseout III) (June
1995), paras. 3 and 5, and its Annex I.
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The World Bank approved the First Montreal Protocol O.D.Ss. Phaseout
Project ('O.D.Ss. I')222 in October 1993, the Second O.D.Ss. Phaseout Project
('O.D.Ss. II')223 in May 1994, and the Third O.D.Ss. Phaseout Project ('O.D.Ss.
Ill') in June 1995,224 respectively. In brief, the objectives of these O.D.Ss.
Programmes, those of the O.D.Ss. Ill in particular, have been to (i) support
China's total O.D.Ss. programme by establishing an efficient/flexible
institutional mechanism to prepare and implement many sub-projects (i.e.
institutional strengthening), (ii) implement cost-effective priority sub-
projects, and (iii) allow O.D.Ss. phaseout to proceed at/ahead of the schedule
(2010) under the Montreal Ozone Protocol.225 The Bank says that on the
completion of these O.D.Ss. I/II, 14,000 metric tons of O.D.Ss. will eventually
be eliminated.226
The Bank reports that it encountered several difficult problems
arising from O.D.Ss. I project process, and consequently these caused
serious delays in Fund project implementation. These problems include, for
example, 'inadequate technical review during the project preparation,
issues of institutional strengthening and a lack of coordination and support
within the World Bank.227 In order to remedy the acute situation,
necessary and immediate corresponding actions were then taken by the
World Bank and/or the Chinese government.228
One of the biggest Bank-implemented projects in China is the
conversion of C.F.C.-12 air conditioning compressor production to H.C.F.C.-
22 at Beijing Machinery Factory (G.M.R.I.), which is a technology transfer
related agreement negotiated with Arctic Circle in the United Kingdom.
The Fund project is expected to be completed in December 1997. Concerning
this project, the Executive Committee, which has been assigned the
politically delicate task of approving Fund projects, suggested that while
222 See The World Bank, Ozone Projects Trust Fund Grant (ODS Phaseout I) (October
1993). The O.D.Ss. I aimed to develop the sectors of aerosols, foams and halons and its
rant amount was about U.S. 7,000 million.
223 See The World Bank, Ozone Projects Trust Fund Grant (Ozone Projects Phaseout II)
(May 1994). The O.D.Ss. II focused on a sector of foams and its grant amount was about
U.S. 4.800 million.
224 The O.D.Ss. Ill is an umbrella agreement with U.S. 90 million dollars and it aims
to develop all sectors of O.D.Ss. phaseout strategies. See The World Bank, Ozone
Projects Trust Fund Grant (Ozone Projects Phaseout III) (June 1995).
225Ibid., para. 8.
226 Ibid., para. 6.
227 See The World Bank, Implementation Performance Review of Bank-Implemented
Montreal Protocol Investment Operations (December 1994) paras. 2-7.
228 See ibid., its Annex B (Attachment D), 'Implementation Performance Review:
Issues and Actions Worksheet', pp. 1 et seq.
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the use of H.C.F.Cs. - which has a long-term greenhouse effect229 - should
be avoided as much as possible, in the light of the advice provided by the
World Bank expert and so forth, it was 'appropriate' to proceed with the
technology in question (i.e. H.C.F.Cs.).230
In some other cases, United Nations Implementing Agencies (e.g. the
U.N.D.P.) provide technical assistance through institutional strengthening
of China's Project Management Office, and demonstration phaseout projects
in solvent cleaning, foams and other activities.231 Moreover, the
Environmental Agency of the United States has assisted in developing a
national halon recycling programme and ozone-friendly household
refrigerators for the Chinese market.232
(4) The Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund and N.G.Os.233
N.G.Os. are allowed to participate in Executive Committee meetings of the
M.L.F. (see Section III(B.l) above). N.G.Os. are generally critical about
M.L.F. projects, particularly ones implemented by the I.B.R.D., the World
Bank. They argue, for example, that the Bank is too slow to implement its
projects; the decision-making of the Executive Committee is largely
controlled by the World Bank;234 the Bank frequently uses chemicals that
still destroy C.F.Cs. or are significant green house gases;233 the Bank
heavily relies on the recommendations of the O.O.R.G. whose members have
links with multilateral O.D.S.-related companies.236 At least one M.L.F. Fund
229 The E.P.A. of the United States notes, for instance, that the Agency believes that
'the use of HCFCs should be limited to only those applications where other
environmentally acceptable alternatives do not exist'. See E.P.A., Federal Register:
Protection of Stratospheric Ozone - Final Rule vol. 58, No. 236 (December 10, 1993),
p. 65026. See also Chapter III above.
230 See U.N.E.P., Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol:
Inventory ofApproved Projects (As at November 1995), p. 130.
231 Ibid., para. 6.
232 Ibid., para. 6.
233 See in detail O. Yoshida and A. Sakota, The Role of N.G.Os. in the International
Legal Regime for the Protection of the Ozone Layer' in the Japanese Society of Human-
Environment Related Problems (ed.), NGOs and Global Environmental Problems,
(October 1998, Japan Environment Agency), Japanese.
234 Greenpeace, 'World Bank Gives More Excuses for Inaction on Ozone', (Press
Release, 10 October 1994).
233 Ibid. But see also The World Bank, 'World Bank Assistance to 25 countries for
Phasing out Harmful Ozone Depleting Substances Beginning to Produce Results', 7/4
Environment Bulletin, (Winter 1995/96).
236 E. DeSombre and J. Kauffman, 'The Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund: Partial
Success Story' in R. Koehane and M. Levy (eds.), Institutions for Environmental Aid,
(1996) p. 117.
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project (Bank-implemented project of H.C.F.C.-22 in Mexico) was cancelled
because of N.G.Os.' efforts.237
In the Fifteenth Meeting of the Executive Committee, the observers
for environmental N.G.Os., Greenpeace and Friends of Earth, and the
representative of Denmark expressed concern at the Executive Committee,
approving many projects that would employ H.C.F.Cs. or 'fifty per cent C.F.C.
reduced technology'.238 The observer for Greenpeace argued, for instance,
that the Committee 'should ask for a full analysis of the scientific aspects
and political considerations surrounding the use of C.F.Cs.'.239
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Now it should be briefly concluded, from what has been said above, that the
establishment of the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund, as an
expression of international solidarity of the ozone layer regime, was
indispensable for (i) universal and effective participation of hesitant
sovereign states - particularly developing countries in the Third World,
and for (ii) future build-up of Article 5 industrialising states' capabilities to
fully comply with technical and stringent ozone environmental treaty
obligations and rules, including control measures of C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss. and
reporting requirements under Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol. It can be
easily assumed that, without the Multilateral Fund, the precautionary
environmental 'principle'/approach for the protection of the ozone would
never be universally observed in the international community. Owing to
the participation by a number of Third World countries - including India
and China, the Vienna Ozone Convention and its 'dynamic' Montreal
Protocol could have transformed from a mere 'North-oriented regime' to a
real international legal regime in the field of global environmental
protection.
With regard to the two points just mentioned above, it is especially
important that the M.L.F. has been managed not only by the pre-existing
237 See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) pp. 260-61, reporting that the Friends
of Earth was invited to an O.O.R.G. meeting, and an O.O.R.G. adviser and a U.S.E.P.A.
representative corroborated an objection by the Friends of Earth to the Fund project.
238UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/15/45, para. 113. As was already explained in Introduction,
HCFCs have considerable greenhouse effect.
23<^ Ibid.
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international financial organisation, the World Bank - which is essentially
dominated by developed countries, namely, the O.E.C.D. countries - and
three United Nations specialised agencies (i.e. U.N.D.P., U.N.I.D.O., U.N.E.P.),
but also by new internal treaty institutions within the ozone regime,
namely, the Executive Committee, equally representing both developed and
developing state parties, and the independent Multilateral Fund Secretariat
that is carefully selected based on the principle of equitable geographic
distribution. In addition, it must not be forgotten that the 'democratic'
supreme body of the environmental regime, the Meeting of the Parties will
regularly exercise 'parental' control over the operation of the Financial
Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol, although the Meeting, unlike the
Executive Committee, does not necessarily formulate specific M.L.F. policies.
This structure of the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund thus encourages
the legitimate expectation that the direct or complete control of the
Northern regime members over the South is not necessarily probable in
the current operation of the Fund Mechanism.
Furthermore, it is also important to note that there now exists a
linkage between the 'effective implementation of the financial co¬
operation and transfer of technology' and gradual development of capacity
building in Third World countries.240 As was described, not only major
I.G.Os. but also various N.G.Os. that are interested in ozone-related activities
- such as M.N.Cs. and I.C.O.L.P. - directly participate in the process of
capacity building for Article 5 developing countries.
In spite of considerable delays in implementation of M.L.F. projects,
the Fund has contributed, to an appreciable extent, to the phase-out of
controlled O.D.Ss. and the international transfer of ozone-friendly
technology, and the institutional regime actors of the Mechanism - the
Executive Committee, the Implementing Agencies and the Multilateral Fund
Secretariat- continue their organised steady efforts in improving the
operations and effectiveness of the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal
Protocol.
Finally, only two points are particularly recommended here.
In the first place, the Executive Committee should put more emphasis
on an institutional strengthening aspect of capacity building for Article 5
240 Article 5(4) as amended in 1990. In this respect, Article 4(7) of the 1992
Climate Change Convention similarly states that 'The extent o which developing
country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention
will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their
commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of
technology
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developing countries - it is certain that this will help resolve the thorny
issues of treaty non-compliance with Article 7 data reporting
requirements, which is frequently observed in a number of developing
state parties to the Protocol.241
In the second place, since fragmentary official reports on projects
alone do not necessarily constitute effective and efficient international
supervision of Fund-supported projects, the Executive Committee should
therefore develop - as soon as possible - not only a systematic approach to
policy development, but also a monitoring and evaluation system for the
Multilateral Fund in achieving Ozone Protocol's established environmental
objectives.





THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME
FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER
Part I (i.e. Chapter I) analysed international legal regimes for the
environment, focusing upon their relationship with law-
making/developing, international environmental co-operation, soft
enforcement of treaty by international treaty bodies and, finally, non¬
governmental organisations. In the first Part, the international
regulatory regime for ozone was conceptually characterised as the 'self-
contained' environmental regime for international obligations erga omnes
in the sphere of general public international law.
Part II (composed of Chapters II & III) is devoted to the detailed legal
analysis of the international treaties for the protection of the stratospheric
ozone layer. Chapter III examined the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention
in the context of modern international law of the environment. Chapter
III dealt with the gradual internationalisation of O.D.S. regulatory measures
under the Montreal Protocol and national implementation and enforcement
of the ozone layer treaties.
Part III (i.e. Chapter IV) discussed extensively the relationship
between Article 4 T.R.E.Ms. of the Montreal Protocol and the G.A.T.T./W.T.O.
trade law regime. It was established that - viewed in its entirety - Article 4
trade restrictions seem to be compatible with the stringent trade rules of
the G.A.T.T./W.T.O. economic law.
Part IV (composed of Chapters V & VI) examined the compliance
system of the ozone layer regime. In Chapter V, the dispute
avoidance/settlement system of the Ozone Layer Protocol, i.e. the Non-
Compliance Procedure ('N.C.P.') and the functions of the internal treaty
organs were closely examined. Chapter VI then investigated the Financial
Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol, including the Multilateral Fund.
There is no intention here in this final Part V (i.e. Chapter VII) to
provide a detailed summary of the arguments contained in these preceding
chapters. This Chapter is primarily intended as a (provisional) evaluation
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of the dynamic international legal regime for the protection of the ozone
layer in the field of public international law.1
The basic role of international legal regimes has been to organise
'partly unorganised society'2 that still lacks a centralised supreme
authority, and their directly corresponding role is to legally regulate
previously unregulated areas of international relations. International
legal regimes are strictly not meant to be supranational law-
making/developing institutions or supranational enforcement
mechanisms, even though they might be contributory to the future
establishment of such organisations.3
Until the early 1980s, global protection of upper atmospheric ozone
in the stratosphere had been an 'unregulated area' of international
environmental relations. Nation states were free to deplete the ozone
shield. Apart from relevant customary principles/rules of international
environment protection law considered in Chapter II above (e.g. Stockholm
Principle 21/Rio Principle 2), states owed virtually no legal obligations to
protect ozone under international law.
However, the creation of the international legal regime for ozone
(i.e. the 1985 Vienna Ozone Layer Convention and the 1987 Montreal Ozone
Layer Protocol as amended/adjusted) dramatically changed this
challenging situation.
Faced with conflicting scientific evidence, ozone negotiators finally
decided to take the framework convention-implementing protocol
approach: the Convention laid down the legal basis for future international
environmental co-operation particularly in scientific research and
information exchange; the subsequent implementing Protocol then
introduced detailed O.D.S. regulations or standards within its international
legal instruments, which has been adjusted by the Meeting of the Parties
four times so far. At present the stratospheric ozone enjoys the
international legal status of the C.C.M. (common concern of mankind)
having erga omnes character. The rapid entry into force of the ozone
1 In order to deepen or facilitate the understanding of this final analysis on the ozone
layer regime, ideally, Part I of this doctoral thesis should be read first.
2 On this concept see G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, 5th edn.
(1967) pp. 8-15 esp.
3 Cf. H. J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,
(1962) Chapter 23, arguing that U.N. organs (e.g. the U.N.E.S.C.O.) would not help
establish the world government and that 'a world community must antedate a world




layer treaties indicated that multilateral treaty regimes could provide an
efficient legal means of global law-making.4 The ozone regime has been
widely regarded as a global precautionary regime for the protection of the
environment, although at present relevant scientific uncertainty has been
greatly reduced. The Protocol's concept of international environmental co¬
operation has been well translated into partnership at the national level:
parties - both Non-Article 5 and Article 5 countries - have dedicated
considerable efforts to meet the legal requirements of the Montreal
Protocol; many of those parties are in ahead of the Protocol's reduction
schedules, and only a few countries - such as the C.E.I.Ts. including the
Russian Federation - are currently not fully complying with Article 2
control provisions of the regulatory Protocol. The problem of illegal trade
in C.F.Cs. of which Russia and two Article 5 countries, i.e. China and India
are the main supply sources is now being tackled in earnest by the parties;
rising C.F.C. prices - which rocketed in the summer of 1996 with high
demand and low availability - suggests that black market trade has
gradually declined.5 In order to mitigate emerging illegal trade in
C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss., the Meeting of the Parties decided to further strengthen the
existing Montreal N.C.P. regime and to newly institute an import/export
licensing system for trade in O.D.Ss.
The strict trade restrictions on O.D.Ss. provided for in Article 4 of the
Protocol will continue to be valuable for the maintenance of the ozone
layer regime. During the negotiation leading up to the 1987 Montreal
Protocol, the United States strongly argued that 'Without restrictions on
imports of ozone-depleting chemicals from non-parties, there would be a
strong incentive for the development of "pollution havens'".6 This
proposition defended by the U.S. government was well established: when
trade controls over non-parties entered into force and became fully
effective (i.e. the period from 1990 to 1993), the number of Article 5
developing countries roughly doubled.7 The Montreal Protocol's T.R.E.Ms.
therefore helped accommodate universal participation by state parties
including L.V.Cs. and have prevented C.F.C.-producing countries and
potential producers staying outside the ozone layer regime to gain market
shares left behind.
4 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (1992), p. 12.
5 See R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 276.
® See discussion paper submitted by the United States, 'GATT Considerations and the
Ozone Protocol', 4 Spetember, 1987) p. 1.
7 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 243.
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Obviously, the question - 'to what extent may W.T.O. dispute
settlement panels take into account multilateral environmental agreements
and general international environmental law in the interpretation of
G.A.T.T./W.T.O. rules on trade-related environmental measures?'8 - is a very
interesting one. The Montreal Protocol's Article 4 trade controls are an
integral part of the international ozone layer regime that is based on
general public international law of the environment. In this respect, 'the
customary rules of interpretation of public international law' as codified in
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is to be welcomed.
The Montreal Protocol's compliance system should be also highly
acclaimed. The Montreal N.C.P. - as an internally instituted dispute
settlement system consistent with the 'consensus building of
communication within an international regime' 0 - can be regarded as an
unprecedented procedural regime that is designed to 'operate' erga omnes,
i.e. the global protection of the ozone layer.10 The Montreal N.C.P. is
therefore meant to overcome the recognised deficiencies of general public
international law of the environment. The standing Implementation
Committee within the N.C.P. (note: this is not an ad hoc organ) has taken up
many non-compliance issues in good time on the O.D.S. control measures,
reporting requirements and trade restrictions, and it effectively controlled
and/or resolved them (i.e. the dispute 'avoidance' function); tactfully
classified Non-Article 5 and Article 5 countries based on available O.D.S.
data submitted; created a tentative conditionality between treaty
compliance by developing countries (i.e. data reporting) and the M.L.F.
funding. The Implementation Committee of the N.C.P., the Meeting of the
Parties to the Protocol and the Implementing Agency of the World Bank -
dealing with the G.E.F. funding - currently make collaborative and
8 E. U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (1997) p. 120. As
Professor Petersmann indicated in his articles, this will include e.g. Stockholm
Principle 21/Rio Principle 2.
0 See T. Gehring, 'International Environmental Regimes', 1 Y.bk.l.E.L. (1990) p. 37;
Chapter V above.
10 See also T. Usuki, 'The Development of Dispute Settlement Procedures in Global
Environmental Conventions', in International Law for Dispute Settlement: Essays in
Celebration ofJudge Oda's Seventieth Birthday, (1997) pp. 182-83 (Japanese). Cf. Y.
Takamura, 'International Control over Compliance with International Environmental
Treaties', 119 Hitotsubashi Law Review (1998: Japanese), p. 72 & its endnotes 35-36,
discussing the Montreal N.C.P. in the context of a 'special regime' introduced by the
I.L.C.
Of course, as Dr. M. Ragazzi says, an risk of proliferation of candidates of
obligations erga omnes should be avoided carefully, since the use and abuse of this
concept is essentially a question of political nature. See The Concept of International
Obligations Erga Omnes, (1997) p. 217.
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organised efforts at solving the C.E.I.Ts.' non-compliance cases, including
those of Russia and the Czech Republic. Yet the Montreal N.C.P. is not
meant to readily 'supplant' or 'replace' traditional legal settlement
procedures. Giinther Handl acutely points out that 'Where basic constituent
principles and "hard" legal parameters are concerned, disputes should be
amended both technically and politically to formal third-party decision
making "in accordance with international law" narrowly defined'.11
Although often criticised as a 'slow implementation mechanism', the
Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol - particularly the
Multilateral Fund within the ozone regime and M.L.F. projects - has
contributed to a greater or lesser extent to enhancing Article 5 developing
countries' capacity building to comply with the ozone treaties. As R. E.
Benedick suggested, it is important to notice that the Multilateral Fund is
designed to fill a gap:12 the M.L.F. funding is indispensable not only for
key Article 5 countries such as China and India but also for the remaining
many L.V.C. parties and their industries whose access to initial investment
capital and ozone-friendly technologies would be severely restricted. The
international transfer of technologies cannot be fully made in the absence
of an 'equitable' global financial institution such as the Protocol's M.L.F.
As with the Implementation Committee of the N.C.P., the Executive
Committee of the M.L.F. now gives a sign of potential conditionality
between the implementation of the ozone treaties and the M.L.F. funding:
for instance, the Executive Committee decided in 1995 that it would prohibit
any grants for India's conversion of factories that had installed O.D.S.
capacity after July 1995.13
The Montreal Protocol's decision-making procedures may deserve
special notice by international law/relations scholars. Under Article 2(9)
adjustments of O.D.S. control measures are to bind all the parties; although
this two-thirds majority voting procedure - 'as a great novelty in
international environmental law'14 - has never been used so far, its
11 G. Handl, 'Controlling Implementation of and Compliance with International
Environmental Commitments: The Rocky Road from Rio', 5 Colorado J.E.P. (1994) p.
330.
12 R. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, (1998) p. 267.
13 By using the M.L.F funding, India has potentially built new industrial plants
capable of producing or using C.F.Cs. other destructive chemicals. See Chapter
VI(III.D.4) above.
14 J. G. Lammers, 'Second Report of the International Committee on Legal Aspects of
Long-Distance Air Pollution', the I.L.A. Warsaw Conference, (1988) p. 12, cited P.




political impact on 'the parameters of the expectations'15 shared by ozone
regime-members cannot be ignored. It is uncertain, however, whether
other environmental regimes should follow the precedent that was adopted
in the particular circumstances where the total elimination of C.F.Cs. was
widely anticipated among all prospective parties to the Protocol.16 Perhaps
such a revolutionary approach would be unacceptable in a majority of
M.E.As. Yet it is important to note at the same time that this new voting
system is designed to reflect the opinions of developing country parties by
requiring double majorities of both Non-Article 5 and Article 5 countries.
This new approach based on North-South balance is also adopted in the
Executive Committee's decision-making structure.
Attention should be also directed at the role of non-governmental
organisations in the ozone regime's establishment and maintenance.17
Environmental N.G.Os. actively participate in the meetings of the periodic
Meeting of the Parties, the Executive Committee of the M.L.F. and the Open-
Ended Working Group of the Parties to the Protocol. The functions of
environmental N.G.Os. in the context of compliance monitoring at the
international and national levels are particularly worth mentioning:
information regarding potential non-compliance derived from
environmental N.G.Os. might - without any governmental support - reach
the Montreal N.C.P. regime through the U.N.E.P. Ozone Secretariat; N.G.Os.
could organise community pressure to enforce non-binding ozone
recommendations and decisions by the Implementation Committee of the
N.C.P. and of the Meeting of the Parties; in the meetings of the Executive
Committee, N.G.Os. frequently criticise M.L.F. projects that might be
regarded as not necessarily visionary, from environmental perspectives.
As Alexandre-Charles Kiss puts, it will be true that 'the most powerful. . . .
tool for ensuring compliance with international environmental
obligations is public awareness and the will to impose upon governments
15 J. Werksman, 'The Conference of Parties to Environmental Treaties' in idem,
Greening International Institutions, (1996) p. 61.
16 P. Szell, 'Decision Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements', 26/5
E.P.L. (1996) p. 213. See also Chapter III(III.C) above.
17 See in detail O. Yoshida and A. Sakota, 'The Role of N.G.Os. in the International
Legal Regime for the Protection of the Ozone Layer' in the Japanese Society of Human-
Environment Related Problems (ed.), NGOs and Global Environmental Problems,
(October 1998, the Japan Environment Agency).
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the protection of the environment values which are essential for the
survival of humanity'.18
Certainly, there still exist many substantive issues concerning the
regulatory regime's maintenance: control measures on several O.D.Ss. (e.g.
H.C.F.Cs. and methyl bromide) must be further strengthened by the Meeting
of the Parties; probably two thirds of Article 5 developing countries will
have difficulties in achieving the 1999 freeze of C.F.C. consumption;
undeniably, the Montreal N.C.P. and the M.L.F. as new international
mechanisms have to be improved; only 67 countries have so far ratified the
1992 Copenhagen Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. Strictly speaking,
the implementation and enforcement of the international ozone layer
treaties has been only partially successful.
Yet the international ozone treaties as a highly technical treaty
regime tell us how Stockholm/Rio Principles - including the customary
international law of the environment - can be well maintained in the
international environmental community of over 190 nation states. The
Vienna Ozone Layer Convention claimed to implement Principle 21 of the
1972 Stockholm Declaration and, for the first time, referred to the term
'precautionary measures' in international environment protection law.
Now the Montreal Protocol as amended/adjusted contains stringent binding
controls of C.F.Cs./O.D.Ss, which will help avoid or mitigate adverse effects
caused by consequences of global ozone depletion. In addition, the ozone
layer regime would be regarded as the first M.E.A. that specifically
addressed the 'principle' or approach of common-but-differentiated
responsibility: the regime contains the ten years' grace period; created the
Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol including the M.L.F.;
includes the provisions for 'basic domestic needs' in Article 5. The ozone
layer regime also shows equity considerations for developing countries: as
noted, under the present ozone regime, decisions on O.D.S. adjustments are
to be taken by a two thirds majority vote of the parties representing a
majority of both Non-Article 5 developed and Article 5 developing
countries; the Executive Committee of the M.L.F. consists of both seven
parties from a group of Article 5 industrialising countries operating and
seven parties from a group of Non-Article 5 industrially advanced
countries. The ozone regime will be arguably the first international co¬
operation regime for the environment that successfully acquired the
18 A. Kiss, 'Compliance with International and European Environmental Obligations',
Hague Y.bk.I.L. (1996) p. 54.
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delicate global balance of economic/political interests of both Northern
and Southern nations. It will be this kind of international legal regimes
having 'equitable' institutional mechanisms that can contribute to the
achievement or maintenance of the globally recognised customary
principle of sustainable development,10 consisting of two constituent
elements, namely, 'development' and 'environmental protection'.
*
The ozone layer regime may be seen as a 'comparatively autonomous legal
system' or 'self-contained' regime in international law: as Thomas Gehring
indicated, the sectoral regime controlled by its supreme political organ
often seems separate from long-established traditional rules/principles of
public international law.20 Nevertheless, the legal regime for ozone has
been based on the partly changing system of these principles/rules of
international law we have considered: the interaction between the
international ozone layer regime and general public international law
should be correctly understood.
The impact of the ozone layer regime upon the general development
of international law should not be underestimated.
19 See separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry attached to the I.C.J.'s
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case, (Hungary/Slovakia) stating that 'The principle of
sustainable development is thus a part of modern international law by reason not only
of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general
acceptance by the global community.




THE 1985 VIENNA CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
THE OZONE LAYER
Preamble
The Parties to this Convention,
Aware of the potentially harmful impact on human health and the environment through
modification of the ozone layer,
Recalling the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment, and in particular principle 21, which provides that "States
have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environment policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction",
Taking into account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing
countries,
Mindful of the work and studies proceeding within both international and national
organizations and, in particular, of the World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer of the
United Nations Environment Programme,
Mindful also of the precautionary measures for the protection of the ozone layer which
have already been taken at the national and international levels,
Aware that measures to protect the ozone layer from modifications due to human
activities require international co-operation and action, and should be based on
relevant scientific and technical considerations,
Aware also of the need for further research and systematic observations to further
develop scientific knowledge of the ozone layer and possible adverse effects resulting
from its modification,
Determined to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects
resulting from modifications of the ozone layer,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1: Definitions
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. "The ozone layer" means the layer of atmospheric ozone above the planetary
boundary layer.
2. "Adverse effects" means changes in the physical environment or biota, including
changes in climate, which have significant deleterious effects on human health or on
the composition, resilience and productivity of natural and managed ecosystems, or on
materials useful to mankind.
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3. "Alternative technologies or equipment" means technologies or equipment the use
of which makes it possible to reduce or effectively eliminate emissions of substances
which have or are likely to have adverse effects on the ozone layer.
4. "Alternative substances" means substances which reduce, eliminate or avoid
adverse effects on the ozone layer.
5. "Parties" means, unless the text otherwise indicates, Parties to this Convention.
6. "Regional economic integration organizations" means an organization constituted by
sovereign States of a given region which has competence in respect of matters governed
by this Convention or its protocols and has been duly authorized, in accordance with
its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the instruments
concerned.
7. "Protocols" means protocols to this Convention.
Article 2: General obligations
1. The Parties shall take appropriate measures in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention and of those protocols in force to which they are party to protect
human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result
from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer.
2. To this end the Parties shall, in accordance with the means at their disposal and
their capabilities:
(a) Co-operate by means of systematic observations, research and information
exchange in order to better understand and assess the effects on human health and the
environment from modification of the ozone layer;
(b) Adopt appropriate legislative or administrative measures and co-operate in
harmonizing appropriate policies to control, limit, reduce or prevent human activities
under their jurisdiction or control should it be found that these activities have or are
likely to have adverse effects resulting from modification or likely modification of the
ozone layer;
(c) Co-operate in the formulation of agreed measures, procedures and standards for the
implementation of this Convention, with a view to the adoption of protocols and
annexes;
(d) Co-operate with competent international bodies to implement effectively this
Convention and protocols to which they are party.
3. The provisions of this Convention shall in no way affect the right of Parties to
adopt, in accordance with international law, domestic measures already taken by a
Party, provided that these measures are not incompatible with their obligations under
this Convention.
4. The application of this article shall be based on relevant scientific and technical
considerations.
Article 3: Research and systematic observations
1. The Parties undertake, as appropriate, to initiate and co-operate in, directly or




(a) The physical ad chemical processes that may affect the ozone layer;
(b) The human health and other biological effects deriving from any modifications of
the ozone layer, particularly those resulting from changes in ultra-violet solar
radiation having biological effects (UV-B);
(c) Climatic effects deriving from any modifications of the ozone layer;
(d) Effects deriving from any modifications of the ozone layer and any consequent
change in UV-B radiation on natural and synthetic materials useful to mankind;
(e) Substances, practices, processes and activities that may affect the ozone layer, and
their cumulative effects;
(f) Alternative substances and technologies;
(g) Related socio-economic matters;
and as further elaborated in annexes I and II.
2. The Parties undertake to promote or establish, s appropriate, directly or through
competent international bodies and taking fully into account national legislation and
relevant ongoing activities at both the national and international levels, joint or
complementary programmes for systematic observation of the state of the ozone layer
and other relevant parameters, as elaborated in annex I.
3. The Parties undertake to co-operate, directly or through competent international
bodies, in ensuring the collection, validation and transmission of research and
observational data through appropriate world data centers in a regular and timely
fashion.
Article 4: Co-operation in the legal, scientific and technical fields
1. The Parties shall facilitate and encourage the exchange of scientific, technical,
socio-economic, commercial and legal information relevant to this Convention as
further elaborated in annex II. Such information shall be supplied to bodies agreed
upon by the Parties. Any such body receiving information regarded as confidential by
the supplying Party shall ensure that such information is not disclosed and shall
aggregate it to protect confidentiality before it is made available to all Parties.
2. The Parties shall co-operate, consistent with their national laws, regulations and
practices and taking into account in particular the needs of the developing countries,
in promoting, directly or through competent international bodies, the development and
transfer of technology and knowledge. Such co-operation shall be carried out
particularly through:
(a) Facilitation of the acquisition of alternative technologies by other Parties;
(b) Provision of information on alternative technologies and equipment, and supply of
special manuals or guides to them;
(c) The supply of necessary equipment and facilities for research and systematic
observations;
(d) Appropriate training of scientific and technical personnel.
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Article 5: Transmission of Information
The Parties shall transmit, through the secretariat, to the Conference of the Parties
established under article 6 information on the measures adopted by them in
implementation of this Convention and of protocols to which they are party in such
form and at such intervals as the meetings of the parties to the relevant instruments
may determine.
Article 6: Conference of the Parties
1. A Conference of the Parties is hereby established. The first meeting of the
Conference of the Parties shall be convened by the secretariat designated on an
interim basis under article 7 not later than one year after entry into force of this
Convention. Thereafter, ordinary meetings of the Conference of the Parties shall be
held at regular intervals to be determined by the Conference at its first meeting.
2. Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of the Parties shall be held at such other
times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference, or at the written request of any
Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to them by
the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.
3. The Conference of the Parties shall by consensus agree upon and adopt rules of
procedures and financial rules for itself and for any subsidiary bodies it may
establish, as well as financial provisions governing the functioning of the secretariat.
4. The Conference of the Parties shall keep under continuous review the
implementation of this Convention, and in addition, shall:
(a) Establish the form and the intervals for transmitting the information to be
submitted in accordance with article 5 and consider such information as well as
reports submitted by any subsidiary body;
(b) Review the scientific information on the ozone layer, on its possible modification
and on possible effects of any such modifications;
(c) Promote, in accordance with article 2, the harmonization of appropriate policies,
strategies and measures for minimizing the release of substances causing or likely to
cause modification of the ozone layer, and make recommendations on any other
measures relating to this Convention.
(d) Adopt, in accordance with articles 3 and 4, programmes for research, systematic
observations, scientific and technological co-operation, the exchange of information
and the transfer of technology and knowledge.
(e) Consider and adopt, as required, in accordance with articles 9 and 19, amendments
to this Convention and its annexes;
(f) Consider amendments to any protocol, as well as to any annexes thereto, and, if so
decided, recommend their adoption to the parties to the protocol concerned;
(g) Consider and adopt, as required, in accordance with article 10, additional annexes
to this Convention;
(h) Consider and adopt, as required, protocols in accordance with article 8;




(j) Seek, where appropriate, the services of competent international bodies and
scientific committees, in particular the World Meteorological Organization and the
World Health Organization as well as the Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer,
in scientific research, systematic observations and other activities pertinent to the
objectives of this Convention, and make use as appropriate of information from these
bodies and committees;
(k) Consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for the
achievement of the purposes of this Convention.
5. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Agency,
as well as any State not party to this Convention, may be represented at meetings of the
Conference of the Parties by observers. Any body or agency, whether national or
international, governmental or non-governmental, qualified in fields relating to the
protection of the ozone layer which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be
represented at a meeting of the Conference of the Parties as an observers may be
admitted unless at least one-third of the Parties present object. The admission and
participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the
Conference of the Parties.
Article 7: Secretariat
1. The functions of the secretariat shall be:
(a) To arrange for and service meetings provided for in articles 6, 7, 8 and 10;
(b) To prepare and transmit reports based upon information received in accordance
with articles 4 and 5, as well as upon information derived from meetings of subsidiary
bodies established under article 6;
(c) To perform the functions assigned to it by any protocol;
(d) To prepare reports on its activities carried out in implementation of its functions
under this Convention and present them to the Conference of the Parties;
(e) To ensure the necessary co-ordination with other relevant international bodies,
and in particular to enter into such administrative and contractual arrangements as
may be required for the effective discharge of its functions;
(f) To perform such other functions a may be determined by the Conference of the
Parties.
2. The secretariat functions will be carried out on an interim basis by the United
nations Environment Programme until the completion of the first ordinary meeting of
the Conference of the Parties held pursuant to article 6. At its first ordinary meeting,
the Conference of the Parties shall designate the secretariat from amongst those
existing competent international organizations which have signified their willingness
to carry out the secretariat functions under this Convention.
Article 8: Adoption of protocols
1. The Conference of the Parties may at a meeting adopt protocols pursuant to Article
2.
2. The text of any proposed protocol shall be communicated to the parties by the
secretariat at six months before such a meeting.
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Article 9: Amendments of the Convention or protocols
1. Any party may propose amendments to this Convention or to any protocol. Such
amendments shall take due account, inter alia, of relevant scientific and technical
considerations.
2. Amendments to this Convention shall be adopted at a meeting of the Conference of
the Parties. Amendments to any protocol shall be adopted at a meeting of the Parties
to the protocol in question. The text of any proposed amendment to this Convention or
to any protocol, except as may otherwise be provided in such protocol, shall be
communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting
at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate proposed
amendments to the signatories to this Convention for information.
3.. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment
to this Convention by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and
no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-
fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting, and shall be
submitted by the Depositary to all Parties for ratification, approval or acceptance.
4. The procedure mentioned in paragraph 3 above shall apply to amendments to any
protocol, except that a two-thirds majority of the parties to that protocol present and
voting at the meeting shall suffice for their adoption.
5. Ratification, approval or acceptance of amendments shall be notified to the
Depositary in writing. Amendments adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4
above shall enter into force between parties having accepted them on the ninetieth day
after the receipt by the Depositary of notification of their ratification, approval or
acceptance by at least three-fourths of the Parties to this Convention or by at least to-
thirds of the parties to the protocol concerned, except as may otherwise be provided in
such protocol. Thereafter the amendments shall enter into force for any other Party on
the ninetieth day after that Party deposits its instrument of ratification, approval or
acceptance of the amendments.
6. For the purposes of this article, "Parties present and voting" means Parties present
and casting an affirmative or negative vote.
Article 10: Adoption and amendment of annexes
1. The annexes to this Convention or to any protocol shall form an integral part of this
Convention or of such protocol, as the case may be, and, unless expressly provided
otherwise, a reference to this Convention or its protocols constitutes at the same time a
reference to any annexes thereto. Such annexes shall be restricted to scientific,
technical and administrative matters.
2. Excepts as may be otherwise provided in any protocol with respect to its annexes,
the following procedure shall apply to the proposal, adoption and entry into force of
additional annexes to this Convention or of annexes to protocol:
(a) Annexes to this Convention shall be proposed and adopted according to the
procedure laid down in article 9, paragraph 2 and 3, while annexes to any protocol
shall be proposed and adopted according to the procedure laid down in article 9,
paragraphs 2 and 4;
(b) Any party that is unable to approve an additional annex to this Convention or
annex to any protocol to which it is party shall so notify the Depositary, in writing,
within six months from the date of the communication of the adoption by the
Depositary. The Depositary shall without delay notify all Parties of any such
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notification received. A Party may at any time substitute an acceptance for a previous
declaration of objection and the annexes shall thereupon enter into force for that
Party;
(c) On the expiry of six months from the date of the circulation of the communication
by the Depositary, the annex shall become effective for all Parties to this Convention
or to any protocol concerned which have not submitted a notification in accordance
with the provision of subparagraph (b) above.
3. The proposal, adoption and entry into force of amendments to annexes to this
Convention or to any protocol shall be subject to the same procedure as for the
proposal, adoption and entry into force of annexes to the Convention or annexes to a
protocol. Annexes and amendments thereto shall take due account, inter alia, of
relevant scientific and technical considerations.
4. If an additional annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amendment to this
Convention or to any protocol, the additional annex or a amendment shall not enter
into force until such time as the amendment to this Convention or to the protocol
concerned enters into force.
Article 11: Settlement of disputes
1. In the event of a dispute between Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall seek solution by
negotiation.
2. If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation, they may jointly
seek the good officers of, or request mediation by, a third party.
3. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, or at any time
thereafter, a State or regional economic integration organization may declare in
writing to the Depositary that for a dispute not resolved in accordance with paragraph
1 or 2 above, it accepts one or both of the following means of dispute settlement as
compulsory:
(a) Arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Conference of the
Parties at its first ordinary meeting;
(b) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
4. If the parties have not, in accordance with paragraph 3 above, accepted the same or
any procedure, the dispute shall be submitted to conciliation in accordance with
paragraph 5 below unless the parties otherwise agree.
5. A conciliation commission shall be created upon the request of one of the parties to
the dispute. The commission shall be composed of an equal number of members
appointed by each party concerned and a chairman chosen jointly by the members
appointed by each party. The commission shall render a final and recommendatory
award, which the parties shall consider in good faith.
6. The provisions of this Article shall apply with respect to any protocol except as
provided in the protocol concerned.
Article 12: Signature
The Convention shall be open for signature by States and by regional economic
integration organizations at the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic
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of Austria in Vienna from 22 March 1985 to 21 September 1985, and at the United
Nations Headquarters in New York from 22 September 1985 to 21 March 1986.
Article 13: Ratification, acceptance or approval
1. This Convention and any protocol shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by States and by regional economic integration organizations. Instruments of
ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Depositary.
2. Any organization referred to in paragraph 1 above which becomes a Party to this
Convention or any protocol without any of its member States being a Party shall be
bound by all the obligations under the Convention or the protocol, as the case may be.
In the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a Party to the
Convention or relevant protocol, the organizations and its member States shall decide
on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligation under the
Convention or protocol, as the case may be. In such cases, the organization and the
member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under the Convention or relevant
protocol concurrently.
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval, the organizations
referred to in paragraph 1 above shall declare the extent of their competence with
respect to the matters governed by the Convention or the relevant protocol. Those
organizations shall also inform the Depositary of any substantial modification in the
extent of their competence.
Article 14: Accession
1. This Convention and any protocol shall be open for accession by States and by
regional economic integration organizations from the date on which the Convention or
the protocol concerned is closed for signature. The instruments of accession shall be
deposited with the Depositary.
2. In their instruments of accession, the organizations referred to in paragraph 1
above shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed
by the Convention or the relevant protocol. Those organizations shall also inform the
Depositary of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.
3. The provisions of article 13, paragraph 2, shall apply to regional economic
integration organizations which accede to this Convention or any protocol.
Article 15: Right to vote
1. Each Party to this Convention or to any protocol shall have one vote.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 1 above, regional economic integration
organizations, in matters within their competence, shall exercise their right to vote
with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States which are Parties to
the Convention or the relevant protocol. Such organizations shall not exercise their
right to vote if their member States exercise theirs, and vice versa.
Article 16: Relationship between the Convention and its protocols
1. A State or a regional economic integration organization may not become a party to a
protocol unless it is, or become at the same time, a Party to the Convention.




Article 17: Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit
of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
2. Any protocol, except as otherwise provided in such protocol, shall enter into force
on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the eleventh instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval of such protocol or accession hereto.
3. For each Party which ratifies, accept or approves this Convention or accedes thereto
after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, it shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by
such Party of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
4. Any protocol, except as otherwise provided in such protocol, shall enter into force
for a party that ratifies, accepts or approves that protocol or accedes thereto after its
entry into force pursuant to paragraph 2 above, on the ninetieth day after the date on
which that party deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, or on the date which the Convention enters into force for that Party,
whichever shall be the later.
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, any instrument deposited by a
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those
deposited by member States of such organization.
Article 18: Reservations
No reservation may be made to this Convention.
Article 19: Withdrawal
1. At any time after four years from the date on which this Convention has entered
into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from the Convention by giving written
notification to the Depositary.
2. Except as may be provided in any protocol, at any time after four years from the
date on which such protocol has entered into force for a party, that party may
withdraw from the protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary.
3. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year after the date of its
receipt by the Depositary, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification
of the withdrawal.
4. Any Party which withdraws from this Convention shall be considered as also having
with drawn from any protocol to which it is party.
Article 20: Depositary
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall assume the functions of
depositary of this Convention and any protocols.
2. The Depositary shall inform the Parties, in particular, of:
(a) The signature of this Convention and of any protocol, and the deposit of
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession in accordance with
articles 13 and 14.
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(b) The date on which the Convention and any protocol will come into force in
accordance with article 17;
(c) Notification of withdrawal made in accordance with article 19;
(d) Amendments adopted with respect to the Convention and any protocol, their
acceptance by the parties and their date of entry into force in accordance with article
9.
(e) All communications relating to the adoption and approval of annexes and to the
amendment of annexes in accordance with article 10;
(f) Notification by regional economic integration organizations of the extent of their
competence with respect to matters governed by this Convention and any protocols, and
of any modifications thereof.
(g) Declarations made in accordance with article 11, paragraph 3.
Article 21: Authentic texts
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have
signed this Convention.
DONE AT VIENNA ON THE 22ND DAY OF MARCH 1985
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THE 1987 MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE
THE OZONE LAYER
as adjusted/amended by the Second Meeting of the Parties (London, 27-29 June 1990)
and by the Fourth Meeting of the Parties (Copenhagen, 23-25 November 1992) and
adjusted by the Seventh Meeting of the Parties (Vienna, 5-7 December 1995) and
further adjusted/amended by the Ninth Meeting of the Parties
(Montreal, 15-17 September 1997)
The Parties to this Protocol,
Being Parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
Mindful of their obligation under that Convention to take appropriate measures to
protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely
to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer,
Recognising that world-wide emissions of certain substances can significantly deplete
and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to result in adverse
effects on human health and the environment,
Conscious of the potential climatic effects of emissions of these substances,
Aware that measures taken to protect the ozone layer from depletion should be based
on relevant scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic
considerations,
Determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control
equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate
objective of their elimination on the basis of developments in scientific knowledge,
taking into account technical and economic considerations and bearing in mind the
developmental needs of developing countries,
Acknowledging that special provision is required to meet the needs of developing
countries, including the provision of additional financial resources and access to
relevant technologies, bearing in mind that the magnitude of funds necessary is
predictable, and the funds can be expected to make a substantial difference in the
world's ability to address the scientifically established problem of ozone depletion
and its harmful effects,
Noting the precautionary measures for controlling emissions of certain
chlorofluorocarbons that have already been taken at national and regional levels,
Considering the importance of promoting international co-operation in the research,
development and transfer of alternative technologies relating to the control and
reduction of emissions of substances that deplete the ozone layer, bearing in mind in
particular the needs of developing countries,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1: Definitions
For the purpose of this Protocol:
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1. "Convention" means the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
adopted on 22 March 1985.
2. "Parties" means, unless the text otherwise indicates, Parties to this Protocol.
3. "Secretariat" means the Secretariat of the Convention.
4. "Controlled substance" means a substance in Annex A, Annex B, Annex C or Annex
D to this Protocol, whether existing alone or in a mixture. It includes the isomers of
any such substance, except as specified in the relevant Annex, but excludes any
controlled substance or mixture which is in a manufactured product other than a
container used for the transportation or storage of that substance.
5. "Production" means the amount of controlled substances produced, minus the
amount destroyed by technologies to be approved by the Parties and minus the amount
entirely used as feedstock in the manufacture of other chemicals. The amount
recycled and reused is not to be considered as "production".
6. "Consumption" means production plus imports minus exports of controlled
substances.
7. "Calculated levels" of production, imports, exports and consumption means levels
determined in accordance with Article 3.
8. "Industrial realization" means the transfer of all or a portion of the calculated
level of production of one Party to another, for the purpose of achieving economic
efficiencies or responding to anticipated shortfalls in supply as a result of plant
closures.
Article 2: Control Measures
1. Incorporated in Article 2A.
2. Replaced by Article 2B.
3. Replaced by Article 2A.
4. Replaced by Article 2A.
5. Any Party may, for one or more control periods, transfer to another Party any
portion of its calculated level of production set out in Articles 2A to 2E, and Article
2H, provided that the total combined calculated levels of production of the Parties
concerned for any group of controlled substances do not exceed the production limits
set out in those Articles for that group. Such transfer of production shall be notified
to the Secretariat by each of the Parties concerned, stating the terms of such transfer
and the period for which it is to apply.
5 bis. Any Party not operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5 may, for one or more
control periods, transfer to another such Party any portion of its calculated level of
consumption set out in Article 2F, provided that the calculated level of consumption of
controlled substances in Group I of Annex A of the Party transferring the portion of
its calculated level of consumption did not exceed 0.25 kilograms per capita in 1989
and that the total combined calculated levels of consumption of the Parties concerned
do not exceed the consumption limits set out in Article 2F. Such transfer of
consumption shall be notified to the Secretariat by each of the Parties concerned,
stating the terms of such transfer and the period for which it is to apply.
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6. Any Party not operating under Article 5, that has facilities for the production of
Annex A or Annex B controlled substances under construction, or constructed for,
prior to 16 September 1987, and provided for in national legislation prior to 1
January 1987, may add the production from such activities to its 1986 production of
such substances for the purposes of determining its calculated level of production for
1986, provided that such facilities are completed by 31 December 1990 and that such
production does not raise that Party's annual calculated level of consumption of the
controlled substances above 0.5 kilograms per capita.
7. Any transfer of production pursuant to paragraph 5 or any additional of production
pursuant to paragraph 6 shall be notified to the Secretariat, no later than the time of
the transfer or addition.
8. (a) Any Party which are Member States of a regional economic integration
organization as defined in Article 1(6) of the Convention may agree that they shall
jointly fulfil their obligations respecting consumption under this Article and Articles
2A to 2H provided that their total combined calculated level of consumption does not
exceed the levels required by this Article and Articles 2A to 2H.
(b) The Parties to any such agreement shall inform the Secretariat of the terms of the
agreement before the date of the reduction in consumption with which the agreement is
concerned.
(c) Such agreement will become operative only if all Member States of the regional
economic integration organization and the organization concerned are Parties to the
Protocol and have notified the Secretariat of their manner of implementation.
9. (a) Based on the assessments made pursuant to Article 6, the Parties may decide
whether:
(i) Adjustments to the ozone depleting potentials specified in Annex A, Annex B,
Annex C and/or Annex E should be made and if so, what the adjustments should be;
and
(ii) Further adjustments and reductions of production or consumption of the
controlled substances should be undertaken and, if so, what the scope, amount and
timing of any such adjustments and reductions should be;
(b) Proposals for such adjustments shall be communicated to the Parties by the
Secretariat at least six months before the meeting of the Parties at which they are
proposed for adoption;
(c) In taking such decisions, the Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement by
consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached,
such decisions shall, as a last resort, be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the
Parties present and voting representing a majority of the Parties operating under
Paragraph 1 of Article 5 present and voting and a majority of the Parties not so
operating present and voting;
(d) The decisions, which shall be binding on all Parties, shall forthwith be
communicated to the Parties by the Depositary. Unless otherwise provided in the
decisions, they shall enter into force on the expiry of six months from the date of the
circulation of the communication by the Depositary.
10. Based on the assessments made pursuant to Article 6 of this Protocol and in




(a) whether any substances, and if so which, should be added to or removed from any
annex to this Protocol, and
(b) the mechanism, scope and timing of the control measures that should apply to those
substances;
11. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in this Article and Articles 2A to 2H
Parties may take more stringent measures than those required by this Article and
Articles 2A to 2H.
Article 2A: CFCs
1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on the first
day of the seventh month following the date of entry into force of this Protocol, and in
each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of the
controlled substances in Group 1 of Annex A does not exceed its calculated level of
consumption in 1986. By the end of the same period, each Party producing one or more
of these substances shall ensure that its calculated level of production of the
substances does not exceed its calculated level of production in 1986, except that such
level may have increased by no more than ten per cent based on the 1986 level. Such
increase shall be permitted only so as to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the
Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of industrial rationalization
between Parties.
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the period from July 1991 to 31 December 1992 its
calculated levels of consumption and production of the controlled substances in Group
I of Annex A do not exceed 150 per cent of its calculated levels of production and
consumption of those substances in 1986; with effect from 1 January 1993, the twelve¬
month control period for these controlled substances shall run from 1 January to 31
December each year.
3. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1994, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A does not exceed, annually, twenty-
five per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 1986. Each Party producing one
or more of these substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated
level of production of the substances does not exceed, annually, twenty-five per cent
of its calculated level of production in 1986. However, in order to satisfy the basic
domestic needs of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated
level of production may exceed that limit by up to ten per cent of its calculated level
of production in 1986.
4. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1996, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A does not exceed zero. Each Party
producing one or more of these substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that its
calculated level of production of the substances does not exceed zero. However, in
order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of
Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed that limit by up to fifteen per
cent of its calculated level of production in 1986. This paragraph will apply save to
the extent that the Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption
that is necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be essential.
Article 2B: Halons
1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing in 1 January
1992, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substances in Group II of Annex A does not exceed, annually, its
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calculated level of consumption in 1986. Each Party producing one or more of these
substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of production
of the substances does not exceed, annually, its calculated level of production in 1986.
However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under
paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed that limit by
up to ten per cent of its calculated level of production in 1986.
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1994, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substances in Group II of Annex A does not exceed zero. Each Party
producing one or more of these substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that its
calculated level of production of the substances does not exceed zero. However, in
order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of
Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed that limit by up to fifteen per
cent of its calculated level of production in 1986. This paragraph will apply save to
the extent that the Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption
that is necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be essential.
Article 2C: Other fully halogenated CFCs
1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1993, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances in Group I of
Annex B does not exceed, annually, eighty per cent of its calculated level of
consumption in 1989. Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for
the same period, ensure that its calculated level of production of the substances does
not exceed, annually, eighty per cent of its calculated level of production in 1989.
However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under
paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed that limit by
up to ten per cent of its calculated level of production in 1989.
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1994, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex B does not exceed, annually, twenty-
five per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 1989. Each Party producing one
or more of these substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated
level of production of the substances does not exceed, annually, twenty-five per cent
of its calculated level of production in 1989. However, in order to satisfy the basic
domestic needs of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated
level of production may exceed that limit by up to ten per cent of its calculated level
of production in 1989.
3. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1996, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substances in Group 1 of Annex B does not exceed zero. Each Party
producing one or more of these substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that its
calculated level of production of the substances does not exceed zero. However, in
order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of
Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed that limit by up to fifteen per
cent of its calculated level of production in 1989. This paragraph will apply save to
the extent that the Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption
that is necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be essential.
Article 2D: Carbon tetrachloride
1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1995, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substance in Group II of
Annex B does not exceed, annually, fifteen per cent of its calculated level of
consumption in 1989. Each Party producing the substances shall, for the same period,
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ensure that its calculated level of production of the substance does not exceed,
annually, fifteen per cent of its calculated level of production in 1989. However, in
order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of
Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed that limit by up to ten per
cent of its calculated level of production in 1989.
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1996, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substance in Group II of Annex B does not exceed zero. Each Party
producing the substance shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of
production of the substance does not exceed zero. However, in order to satisfy the
basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its
calculated level of production may exceed that limit by up to fifteen per cent of its
calculated level of production in 1989. This paragraph will apply save to the extent
that the Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption that is
necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be essential.
Article 2E: 1,1,1 -Trichloroethane (Methyl chloroform)
1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1993, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substance in Group III of
Annex B does not exceed, annually, its calculated level of consumption in 1989. Each
Party producing the substance shall, for the same period, ensure that its calculated
level of production of the substance does not exceed, annually, its calculated level of
production in 1989. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the
Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level of production
may exceed that limit by up to ten per cent of its calculated level of production in
1989.
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1994, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substance in Group III of Annex B does not exceed, annually, fifty
per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 1989. Each Party producing the
substance shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of production of
the substance does not exceed, annually, fifty per cent of its calculated level of
production in 1989. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the
Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level of production
may exceed that limit by up to ten per cent of its calculated level of production in
1989.
3.. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1996, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substance in Group 111 of Annex B does not exceed zero. Each Party
producing the substance shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of
production of the substance does not exceed zero. However, in order to satisfy the
basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its
calculated level of production may exceed that limit by up to fifteen per cent of its
calculated level of production in 1989. This paragraph will apply save to the extent
that the Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption that is
necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be essential.
Article 2F: Hydrochlorofluorocarbons
1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1996, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption




(a) Two point eight per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 1989 of the
controlled substances in Group 1 of Annex A; and
(b) Its calculated level of consumption in 1989 of the controlled substances in Group I
of Annex C.
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on January
2004, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the substances in Group I of Annex C does not exceed, annually, sixty-five per cent
of the sum referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
2010, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the substances in Group I of Annex C does not exceed, annually, thirty-five per cent
of the sum referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
4.. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
2015, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex C does not exceed, annually, ten per
cent of the sum referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
5. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
2020, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex C does not exceed, annually, zero
point five per cent of the sum referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. Such
consumption shall, however, be restricted to the servicing of refrigeration and air
conditioning equipment existing at that date.
6. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
2030, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex C does not exceed zero.
7. As of 1 January 1996, each Party shall endeavour to ensure that:
(a) The use of controlled substances in Group I of Annex C is limited to those
applications where other more environmentally suitable alternative substances or
technologies are not available;
(b) The use of controlled substances in Group I of Annex C is not outside the areas of
application currently met by controlled substances in Annexes A, B and C, except in
rare cases for the protection of human life or human health; and
(c) Controlled substances in Group I of Annex C are selected for use in a manner that
minimizes ozone depletion, in addition to meeting other environmental, safety and
economic considerations.
Article 2G; Hydrobromofluorocarbons
Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1996, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption
of the controlled substances in Group II of Annex C does not exceed zero. Each Party
producing the substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level
of production of the substances does not exceed zero. This paragraph will apply save
to the extent that the Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption




1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1995, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substance Annex E does not
exceed, annually, its calculated level of consumption in 1991. Each Party producing
the substance shall, for the same period, ensure that its calculated level of production
of the substance does not exceed, annually, its calculated level of production in 1991.
However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under
paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed that limit by
up to ten per cent of its calculated level of production in 1991.
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
1999, and in the twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of
the controlled substance in Annex E does not exceed, annually, seventy-five per cent
of its calculated level of consumption in 1991. Each Party producing the substance
shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of production of the
substance does not exceed, annually, seventy-five per cent of its calculated level of
production in 1991. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the
Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level of production
may exceed that limit by up to ten per cent of its calculated level of production in
1991.
3. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
2001, and the twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of
the controlled substance Annex E does not exceed, annually, fifty per cent of its
calculated level of consumption in 1991. Each Party producing the substance shall,
for the same period, ensure that its calculated level of production of the substance
does not exceed, annually, fifty per cent of its calculated level of production in 1991.
However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under
paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed that limit by
up to ten per cent of its calculated level of production in 1991.
4. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
2003, and in the twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of
the controlled substance in Annex E does not exceed, annually, thirty per cent of its
calculated level of consumption in 1991. Each Party producing the substance shall,
for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of production of the substance
does not exceed, annually, thirty per cent of its calculated level of production in
1991. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating
under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed that
limit by up to fifteen per cent of its calculated level of production in 1991. This
paragraph will apply save to the extent that the Parties decide to permit the level of
production or consumption that is necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be
critical agricultural uses.
5. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 1 January
2005, and in the twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of
the controlled substance in Annex E does not exceed zero. Each Party producing the
substance shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of production of
the substance does not exceed zero. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic
needs of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level of
production may exceed that limit by up to fifteen per cent of its calculated level of
production in 1991. This paragraph will apply save to the extent that the Parties
decide to permit the level of production or consumption that is necessary to satisfy
uses agreed by them to be critical agricultural uses.
6. The calculated levels of consumption and production under this Article shall not
include the amount used by the Party for quarantine and pre-shipment application.
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Article 3: Calculation of control levels
For the purposes of Articles 2, 2A to 2H and 5, each Party shall, for each group of
substances in Annex A, Annex B and Annex C or Annex E determine its calculated
levels of:
(a) Production by:
(i) multiplying its annual production of each controlled substance by the ozone
depleting potential specified in respect of it in Annex A, Annex B, Annex C or Annex
E;
(ii) adding together, for each such Group, the resulting figures;
(b) Imports and exports, respectively, by following, mutatis mutandis, the procedure
set out in subparagraph (a); and
(c) Consumption by adding together its calculated levels of production and imports
and subtracting its calculated level of exports as determined in accordance with
subparagraphs (a) and (b). However, beginning on 1 January 1993, any export of
controlled substances to non-Parties shall not be subtracted in calculating the
consumption level of the exporting Party.
Article 4: Control of trade with non-Parties
1. As of 1 January 1990, each party shall ban the import of the controlled substances
in Annex A from any State not party to this Protocol.
1 bis. Within one year of the date for the entry into force of this paragraph, each
Party shall ban the import of any controlled substances in Group 11 of Annex B from
any State not party to this Protocol.
1 ter. Within one year of the date for the entry into force of this paragraph, each
Party shall ban the import of any controlled substances in Group II of Annex C from
any State not party to this Protocol.
1 qua. Within one year of the date for the entry into force of this paragraph, each
Party shall ban the import of any controlled substances in Annex E from any State not
party to this Protocol.
2. As of 1 January 1993, each party shall ban the export of any controlled substances
in Annex A to any State not party to this Protocol.
2 bis. Commencing one year of the date for the entry into force of this paragraph, each
Party shall ban the export of any controlled substances in Annex B to any State not
party to this Protocol.
2 ter. Commencing one year of the date for the entry into force of this paragraph, each
Party shall ban the export of any controlled substances in Group II of Annex C to any
State not party to this Protocol.
2 qua. Commencing one year of the date for the entry into force of this paragraph, each
Party shall ban the export of any controlled substances in Annex E to any State not
party to this Protocol.
3. By 1 January 1992, the Parties shall, following the procedures in Article 10 of the
Convention, elaborate in an annex a list of products containing controlled substances
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in Annex A. Parties that have not objected to the annex in accordance with those
procedures shall ban, within one year of the annex having become effective, the import
of those products from any State not party to this Protocol.
3 bis. Within three years of the date of the entry into force of this paragraph, the
Parties shall, following the procedures in Article 10 of the Convention, elaborate in an
annex a list of products containing controlled substances in Annex B. Parties that
have not objected to the annex in accordance with those procedures shall ban, within
one year of the annex having become effective, the import of those products from any
State not party to this Protocol.
3 ter. Within three years of the date of the entry into force of this paragraph, the
Parties shall, following the procedures in Article 10 of the Convention, elaborate in an
annex a list of products containing controlled substances in Group II of Annex C.
Parties that have not objected to the annex in accordance with those procedures shall
ban, within one year of the annex having become effective, the import of those products
from any State not party to this Protocol.
4. By 1 January 1994, the Parties shall determine the feasibility of banning or
restricting, from States not party to this Protocol, the import of products produced
with, but not containing, controlled substances in Annex A. If determined feasible,
the Parties shall, following the procedures in Article 10 of the Convention, elaborate
in an annex a list of products containing controlled substances in Annex A. Parties
that have not objected to the annex in accordance with those procedures shall ban,
within one year of the annex having become effective, the import of those products
from any State not party to this Protocol.
4 bis. Within five years of the date of the entry into force of this paragraph, the
Parties shall determine the feasibility of banning or restricting, from States not party
to this Protocol, the import of products produced with, but not containing, controlled
substances in Annex B. If determined feasible, the Parties shall, following the
procedures in Article 10 of the Convention, elaborate in an annex a list of products
containing controlled substances in Annex A. Parties that have not objected to the
annex in accordance with those procedures shall ban, within one year of the annex
having become effective, the import of those products from any State not party to this
Protocol.
4 ter. Within five years of the date of the entry into force of this paragraph, the
Parties shall determine the feasibility of banning or restricting, from States not party
to this Protocol, the import of products produced with, but not containing, controlled
substances in Group II of Annex C. If determined feasible, the Parties shall, following
the procedures in Article 10 of the Convention, elaborate in an annex a list of
products containing controlled substances in Annex A. Parties that have not objected
to the annex in accordance with those procedures shall ban, within one year of the
annex having become effective, the import of those products from any State not party to
this Protocol.
5. Each Party undertakes to the fullest practicable extent to discourage the export to
any State not party to this Protocol of technology for producing and for utilizing
controlled substances in Annexes A and B and Group II of Annex C and Annex E.
6. Each Party shall refrain from providing new subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or
insurance programmes for the export to States not party to this Protocol of products,
equipment, plants or technology that would facilitate the production of controlled
substances in Annexes A and B and Group II of Annex C and Annex E.
7. Paragraphs 5 and 6 shall not apply to products, equipment, plants or technology
that improve the containment, recovery, recycling or destruction of controlled
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substances, promote the development of alternative substances, or otherwise
contribute to the reduction of emissions of controlled substances in Annexes A and B
and Group 11 of Annex C and Annex E.
8. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Article, imports and exports referred to in
paragraph 1 to 4 ter of this Article may be permitted from, or to, any State not party
to this Protocol, if that State is determined, by a meeting of the Parties, to be in full
compliance with Article 2, Articles 2A to 2E, Article 2G and 2H and this Article, and
have submitted data to that effect as specified in Article 7.
9. For the purposes of this Article, the term "State not party to this Protocol" shall
include, with respect to a particular controlled substance, a State or regional economic
integration organization that has not agreed to be bound by the control measures in
effect for that substance.
10. By 1 January 1996, the Parties shall consider whether to amend this Protocol in
order to extend the measures in this Article to trade in controlled substances in
Group I of Annex C and in Annex E with States not party to the Protocol.
Article 4A: Control of Trade with Parties
1. Where, after the phase-out date applicable to it for a controlled substances, a Party
is unable, despite having all practicable steps to comply with its obligation under the
Protocol, to cease production of that substance for domestic consumption, other than
for used, recycled and reclaimed quantities of that substance, other than for the
purpose of destruction.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply without prejudice to the operation of
Article 11 of the Convention and the non-compliance procedure developed under
Article 8 of the Protocol.
4B: Licensing
1. Each Party shall, by January 2000 or within three months of the date of entry into
force of this Article for it, whichever is the later, establish and implement a system
for licensing the import and export of new, recycled and reclaimed controlled
substances in Annexes A, B, C and E.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, any Party operating under paragraph
1 of Article 5 which decides it is not in a position to establish and implement a
system for licensing the import and export of controlled substances in Annexes C and
E, may delay taking those actions until 1 January 2005 and 1 January 2002,
respectively.
3. Each Party shall, within three months of the date of introducing its licensing
system, report to the Secretariat on the establishment and operation of that system.
4. The Secretariat shall periodically prepare and circulate to all Parties a list of the
Parties that have reported to it on their licensing systems and shall forward this
information to the Implementation Committee for consideration and appropriate
recommendations to the Parties.
Article 5: Special situation of developing countries
1. Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level of
consumption of the controlled substances in Annex A is less than 0.3 kilograms per
capita on the date of the entry into force of the Protocol for it, or any time thereafter
until 1 January 1999, shall, in order to meet its basic domestic needs, be entitled to
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delay for ten years its compliance with the control measures set out in Article 2A to
2E, provided that any further amendments to the adjustments or Amendment adopted
at the Second Meeting of the Parties in London, 29 June 1990, shall apply to the
Parties operating under this paragraph after the review provided for in paragraph 8 of
this Article has taken place and shall be based on the conclusions of that review.
1 bis. The Parties shall, taking into account the review referred to in paragraph 8 of
this Article, the assessments made pursuant to Article 6 and any other relevant
information, decide by 1 January 1996, through the procedure set forth in paragraph 9
of Article 2:
(a) With respect to paragraphs 1 to 6 of Article 2F, what base year, initial levels,
control schedules and phase-out date for consumption of the controlled substances in
Group 1 of Annex C will apply to Parties operating under paragraph 1 of this Article;
(b) With respect to Article 2G, what phase-out date for production and consumption of
the controlled substances in Group II of Annex C will apply to Parties operating under
paragraph 1 of this Article;
(c) With respect to Article 2H, what base year, initial levels and control schedules for
consumption and production of the controlled substances in Annex E will apply to
Parties operating under paragraph 1 of this Article.
2. However, any Party operating under paragraph 1 of this Article shall exceed
neither an annual calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances in
Annex A of 0.3 kilograms per capita nor an annual calculated level of consumption of
controlled substances of Annex B of 0.2 kilograms per capita.
3. When implementing the control measures set out in Articles 2A to 2E, any Party
operating under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be entitled to use:
(a) For controlled substances under Annex A, either the average of its annual
calculated level of consumption for the period 1995 to 1997 inclusive or a calculated
level of consumption of 0.3 kilograms per capita, whichever is the lower, as the basis
for determining its compliance with the control measures relating to consumption.
(b) For controlled substances under Article B, the average of its annual calculated
level of consumption for the period 1998 to 2000 inclusive or a calculated level of
consumption of 0.2 kilograms per capita, whichever is the lower, as the basis for
determining its compliance with the control measures relating to consumption.
(c) For controlled substances under Annex A, either the average of its annual
calculated level of production for the period 1995 to 1997 inclusive or a calculated
level of production of 0.3 kilograms per capita, whichever is the lower, as the basis for
determining its compliance with the control measures relating to production
(d) For controlled substances under Annex B, either the average of its annual
calculated level of production for the period 1998 to 2000 inclusive or a calculated
level of production of 0.2 kilograms per capita, whichever is the lower, as the basis for
determining its compliance with the control measures relating to production
4. If a Party operating under paragraph 1 of this Article, at any time before the
control measures obligations in Articles 2A to 2H become applicable to is, finds itself
unable to obtain an adequate supply of controlled substances, it may notify this to the
Secretariat. The Secretariat shall forthwith transmit a copy of such notification to the
Parties, which shall consider the matter at their next Meeting, and decide upon
appropriate action to be taken.
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5. Developing the capacity to fulfil the obligations of the Parties operating under
paragraph 1 of this Article to comply with the control measures set out in Articles 2A
to 2E, and any control measures in Articles 2F to 2H that are decided pursuant to
paragraph 1 bis of this Article, and their implementation by those same Parties will
depend upon the effective implementation of the financial co-operation as provided by
Article 10 and the transfer of technology as provided by Article 10A.
6. Any Party operating under paragraph 1 of this Article may, any time, notify the
Secretariat in waiting that, having all practical steps it is unable to implement any or
all of the obligations laid down in Articles 2A to 2E, or any or all obligations in
Articles 2F to 2H that are decided pursuant to paragraph 1 bis of this Article, due to
the inadequate implementation of Article 10 and 10A. The Secretariat shall forthwith
transmit a copy of the notification to the Parties, which shall consider the matter at
their next Meeting, giving due recognition to paragraph 5 of this Article and shall
decide appropriate action to be taken.
7. During the period between notification and the Meeting of the Parties at which the
appropriate action referred to in paragraph 6 above is to be decided, or for a further
period if the Meeting of the Parties so decides, the non-compliance procedures
referred to in Article 8 shall not be invoked against notifying Party.
8. A Meeting of the Parties shall review, not later than 1995, the situation of the
Parties operating under paragraph 1 of this Article, including the effective
implementation of financial co-operation and transfer of technology to them, and adopt
such revisions that may be deemed necessary regarding the schedule of control
measures applicable to those Parties.
8 bis. Based on the conclusions of the review referred to in paragraph 8 above:
(a) With respect to the controlled substances in Annex A, a Party operating under
paragraph 1 of this Article shall, in order to meet its domestic needs, be entitled to
delay for ten years its compliance with the control measures adopted by the Second
Meeting of the Parties in London, 29 June 1990, and reference by the Protocol to
Articles 2A to 2B shall be read accordingly;
(b) With respect to the controlled substances in Annex B, a Party operating under
paragraph 1 of this Article shall, in order to meet its domestic needs, be entitled to
delay for ten years its compliance with the control measures adopted by the Second
Meeting of the Parties in London, 29 June 1990, and reference by the Protocol to
Articles 2C to 2E shall be read accordingly.
8 ter. Pursuant to paragraph 1 bis above:
(a) Each Party operating under paragraph 1 of this Article shall ensure that for the
twelve-month period commencing on 1 January 2016, and in each twelve-month period
thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances in Group 1
of Annex C does not exceed, annually, its calculated level of consumption in 2015;
(b) Each Party operating under paragraph 1 of this Article shall ensure that for the
twelve-month period commencing on 1 January 2040, and in each twelve-month period
thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances in Group I
of Annex C does not exceed zero;
(c) Each Party operating under paragraph 1 of this Article shall comply with Article
2G;
(d) With regard to the controlled substance contained in Annex E:
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(i) As of 1 January 2002 each Party operating under paragraph 1 of this Article shall
comply with the control measures set out in paragraph 1 of Article 2H and, as the
basis for its compliance with these control measures, it shall use the average of its
annual calculated level of consumption and production, respectively, for the period of
995 to 1998 inclusive;
(ii) Each Party operating under paragraph 1 of this Article shall ensure that for the
twelve-month period commencing on 1 January 2005, and in each twelve-month period
thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances in Annex E
does not exceed, annually, eighty per cent of the average of its annual calculated level
of consumption and production, respectively, for the period of 1995 to 1998 inclusive;
(b) Each Party operating under paragraph 1 of this Article shall ensure that for the
twelve-month period commencing on 1 January 2015 and in each twelve-month period
thereafter, its calculated level of consumption and production of the controlled
substances in Annex E do not exceed zero. This paragraph will apply save to the
extent that the Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption that is
necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be critical uses;
(iv) The calculated levels of consumption and production under this subparagraph
shall not include the amounts used by the Party for quarantine and pre-shipment
applications.
9. Decisions of the Parties referred to in paragraph 4, 6 and 7 of this Article shall be
taken according to the same procedure applied to decision making under Article 10.
Article 6: Assessment and review of control measures
Beginning in 1990, and at least every four years thereafter, the Parties shall assess
the control measures provided for in Article 2 and Articles 2A to 2H on the basis of
available scientific, environmental, technical and economic information. At least one
year before each assessment, the Parties shall convene appropriate panels of experts
qualified in the fields mentioned and determine the composition and terms of
reference of any such panels. Within one year of being convened, the panels will
report their conclusions, through the Secretariat, to the Parties.
Article 7: Reporting of data
1. Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat, within three months of beginning a
Party, statistical data on its production, imports and exports of each of the controlled
substances in Annex A for the year 1986, or the best possible estimates of such data
are not available.
2. Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat statistical data on its production,
imports and exports of each of the controlled substances.
- in Annexes B and C, for the year 1989;
- in Annex E, for the year 1991,
or the best possible estimates of such data where actual data are not available, not
later than three months after the date when the provisions set out in the Protocol with
regard to the schedules in Annexes B, C and E respectively enter into force for that
Party.
3. Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat statistical data on its annual production
(as defined in paragraph 5 of Article 1) of each of the controlled substances listed in
Annexes A, B, C and E and, separately, for each substance,
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- Amounts used for feedstocks,
- Amounts destroyed by technologies approved by the Parties, and
- Imports from and exports to Parties and non-Parties respectively,
for the year during which provisions concerning the substances in Annexes A, B, C
and E respectively entered into force for that Party and for each year thereafter. Data
shall be forwarded not later than nine months after the end of the year to which the
data relate.
3 bis. Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat separate statistical data of its
annual imports and exports of each of the controlled substances listed in Group II of
Annex A and Group I of Annex C that have been recycled.
4. For Parties operating under the provisions of paragraph 8(a) of Article 2, the
requirements in paragraph 1, 2, 3 and 3 bis of this Article in respect of statistical
data on imports and exports shall be satisfied if the regional economic integration
organization concerned provides data on imports and exports between the organization
and States that are not members of that organization.
Article 8: Non-compliance
The Parties, at their first meeting, shall consider and approve procedures and
institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of this
Protocol and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance.
Article 9: Research, development, public awareness and exchange of
information
1. The Parties shall co-operate, consistent with their national laws, regulations and
practices and taking into account in particular the needs of developing countries, in
promoting, directly or through competent international bodies, research, development
and exchange of information on:
(a) best technologies for improving the containment, recovery, recycling, or
destruction of controlled substances or otherwise reducing their emissions;
(b) possible alternatives to controlled substances, to products containing such
substances, and to products manufactured with them; and
(c) costs and benefits of relevant control strategies.
2. The Parties, individually, jointly or through competent international bodies, shall
co-operate in promoting public awareness of the environment effects of the emissions
of controlled substances and other substances that deplete the ozone layer.
3. Within two years of the entry into force of this Protocol and every two years
thereafter, each Party shall submit to the Secretariat a summary of the activities it has
conducted pursuant to this Article.
Article 10: Financial Mechanism
1. The Parties shall establish a mechanism for the purposes of providing financial and
technical co-operation, including the transfer of technologies, to Parties operating
under paragraph 1 of Article 5 of this Protocol to enable their compliance with the
control measures set out in Articles 2A to 2E, and any control measures in Articles 2F
to 2H that are decoded pursuant to paragraph 1 bis of Article 5 of the Protocol. The
mechanism, contributions to which shall be additional to other financial transfers to
Parties operating under that paragraph , shall meet all agreed incremental costs of
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such Parties in order to enable their compliance with the control measures of the
Protocol. An indicative list of the categories of incremental costs shall be decided by
the meeting of the Parties.
2. The mechanism established under paragraph 1 shall include a Multilateral Fund.
It may also include other means of multilateral, regional and bilateral co-operation.
3. The Multilateral Fund shall:
(a) Meet, on a grant or concessional basis as appropriate, and according to criteria to
be decided upon by the Parties, the agreed incremental costs;
(b) Finance clearing-house functions to:
(i) Assist Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, through country specific
studies and other technical co-operation, to identify their needs for co-operation;
(ii) Facilitate technical co-operation to meet these identified needs;
(iii) Distribute, as provided for in Article 9, information and relevant materials, and
hold workshops, training sessions, and other related activities, for the benefit of
Parties that are developing countries; and
(iv) Facilitate and monitor other multilateral, regional and bilateral co-operation
available to Parties that are developing countries;
(v) Finance the secretariat services of the Multilateral Fund and related support costs.
4. The Multilateral Fund shall operate under the authority of the Parties who shall
decide on its overall policies.
5. The Parties shall establish an Executive Committee to develop and monitor the
implementation of specific operational policies, guidelines and administrative
arrangements, including the disbursement of resources, for the purpose of achieving
the objectives of the Multilateral Fund. The Executive Committee shall discharge its
tasks and responsibilities, specified in its terms of reference as agreed by the Parties,
with the co-operation and assistance of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), the United Nations Environment Programme, the United
Nations Development Programme or other appropriate agencies depending on their
respective area of expertise. The members of the Executive Committee, which shall be
selected on the basis of a balanced representation of the Parties operating under
paragraph 1 of Article 5 and of the Parties not so operating, shall be endorsed by the
Parties.
6. The Multilateral Fund shall be financed by contributions from Parties not
operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5 in convertible currency or, in certain
circumstances, in kind and/or in national currency, on the basis of the United Nations
scale of assessments. Contributions by other Parties shall be encouraged. Bilateral
and in particular cases agreed by a decision of the Parties, regional co-operation may,
up to percentage and consistent with any criteria to be specified by decision of the
Parties, be considered as a contribution to the Multilateral Fund, provided that such
co-operation, as a minimum:
(a) Strictly relates to compliance with the provisions of this Protocol;
(b) Provides additional resources; and
(c) Meets agreed incremental costs.
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7. The Parties shall decide upon the programme budget of the Multilateral Fund for
each fiscal period and upon the percentage of contributions of the individual Parties
thereto.
8. Resources under the Multilateral Fund shall be disbursed with the concurrence of
the beneficiary Party.
9. decisions by the Parties under this Article shall be taken by consensus whenever
possible. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted and no agreement reached,
decisions shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Parties present and
voting, representing a majority of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5
present and voting and a majority of the Parties not so operating present and voting.
10. The financial mechanism set out in this Article is without prejudice to any future
arrangements that may be developed with respect to other environmental issues.
Article 10A: Transfer of technology
Each Party shall take every practical step, consistent with the programmes supported
by the Financial mechanism, to ensure:
(a) that the best available, environmentally safe substitutes and related technologies
are expeditiously transferred to Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5; and
(b) that the transfers referred to in subparagraph!a) occur under fair and most
favourable conditions.
Article 11: Meetings of the Parties
1. The Parties shall hold meetings at regular intervals. The Secretariat shall convene
the first meeting of the Parties not later than one year after the date of the entry into
force of this Protocol and in conjunction with a meeting of the Conference of the
Parties to the Convention, if a meeting of the latter is scheduled within that period.
2. Subsequent ordinary meetings of the parties shall be held, unless the Parties
otherwise decide, in conjunction with meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the
Parties to the Convention. Extraordinary meetings of the Parties shall be held at such
other times as may be deemed necessary by a meeting of the Parties, or at the written
request of any Party, provided that within six months of such a request being
communicated to them by the Secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the
Parties.
3. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall:
(a) adopt by consensus rules of procedure for their meetings;
(b) adopt by consensus the financial rules referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 13;
(c) establish the panels and determine the terms of reference referred to in Article 6;
(d) consider and approve the procedures and institutional mechanisms specified in
Article 8; and
(e) begin preparation of workplans pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 10.
[Article 10 of the original 1987 Montreal Protocol].
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4. The functions of the meetings of the Parties shall be to:
(a) review the implementation of this Protocol;
(b) decide on any adjustments or reductions referred to in paragraph 9 of Article 2;
(c) decide on any addition to, insertion in or removal from any annex of substances
and on related control measures in accordance with paragraph 10 of Article 2;
(d) establish, where necessary, guidelines or procedures for reporting of information
as provided for in Article 7 and paragraph 3 of Article 9;
(e) review requests for technical assistance submitted pursuant t paragraph 2 of
Article 10;
(f) review reports prepared by the secretariat pursuant to subparagraph (c) of Article
12;
(g) assess, in accordance with Article 6, the control measures;
(h) consider and adopt, as required, proposals for amendments of this Protocol or any
annex and for any new annex;
(i) consider and adopt the budget for implementing this Protocol; and
(j) consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for the
achievement of the purposes of this Protocol.
5. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy
Agency, as well as any State not party to this Protocol, may be represented at meetings
of the Parties as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international,
governmental or non-governmental, qualified in fields relating to the protection of the
ozone layer which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a
meeting of the Parties as an observer may be admitted unless at least one third of the
Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject
to the rules of procedure adopted by the Parties.
Article 12: Secretariat
For the purposes of this Protocol, the Secretariat shall:
(a) arrange for and service meetings of the Parties as provided for in Article 11;
(b) receive and make available, upon request by a Party, data provided pursuant to
Article 7;
(c) prepare and distribute regularly to the Parties reports based on information
received pursuant to Articles 7 and 9;
(d) notify the Parties of any request for technical assistance received pursuant to
Article 10 so as to facilitate the provision of such assistance;
(e) encourage non-Parties to attend the meetings of the Parties as observers and to act
in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol;
(f) provide, as appropriate, the information and requests referred to in subparagraph
(c) and (d) to such non-party observers; and
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(g) perform such other functions for the achievement of the purposes of this Protocol
as may be assigned to it by the Parties.
Article 13: Financial provisions
1. The funds required for the operation of this Protocol, including those for the
functioning of the Secretariat related to this Protocol, shall be charged exclusively
against contributions from the Parties.
2. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall adopt by consensus financial rules for the
operation of this Protocol.
Article 14: Relationship of this Protocol to the Convention
Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the provisions of the Convention
relating to its protocols shall apply to this Protocol.
Article 15: Signature
The Protocol shall be open for signature by States and by regional economic
integration organizations in Montreal on 16 September 1987, in Ottawa from 17
September 1987 to 16 January 1988, and at United Nations Headquarters in New York
from January 1988 to 15 September 1988.
Article 16: Entry into force
1. The Protocol shall enter into force on 1 January 1989, provided that at least eleven
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval of the Protocol or accession thereto
have been deposited by States or regional economic integration organizations
representing at least two-thirds of 1986 estimated global consumption of the
controlled substances, and the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the
Convention have been fulfilled. In the event that these conditions have not been
fulfilled by that date, the Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following
the date on which the conditions have been fulfilled.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, any such instrument deposited by a regional
economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited
by member States of such organization.
3. After the entry into force of this Protocol, any State or regional economic
integration organization shall become a Party to it on the ninetieth day following the
date of its instrument of ratification.
Article 17: Parties not joining after entry into force
Subject to Article 5, any State or regional economic integration organization which
becomes a Party to this Protocol after the date of its entry into force, shall fulfil
forthwith the sum of the obligations under Article 2, as well as Articles 2A to 2 H and
Article 4, that apply at that date to the States and regional economic integration
organizations that become Parties on the date the Protocol entered into force.
Article 18: Reservations




Any Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving written notification to the
Depositary at any time after four years of assuming the obligations specified in
paragraph 1 of Article 2A. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one
year after the date of its receipt by the Depositary, or on such later date as may be
specified in the notification of the withdrawal.
Article 20: Authentic texts
The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall de deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF THE UNDERSIGNED, BEING DULY AUTHORIZED TO THAT
EFFECT, HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL
DONE AT MONTREAL THIS SIXTEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, ONE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED AND EIGHTY SEVEN
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Source: Information provided by the Depositary, the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, as of
15 May 1998.
<NOTES>
R=Ratification; Ac=Accession; At=Acceptance; Ap=Approval; Sc=Succession
*Entry into force is after ninety days of following date of ratification,
accession, acceptance and approval of those states which concluded the
treaty after it entered into force, i.e.:
Vienna Convention (22 September 1988)
Montreal Protocol (1 January 1989)
London Amendment (10 August 1992)
Copenhagen Amendment (14 June 1994)
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APPENDIX IV
THE LIST OF PARTIES CATEGORISED AS OPERATING UNDER ARTICLE
5 PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
1. Algeria










































































74. Republic of Korea
75. Romania
76. Saint Kitts and Nevis
77. Saint Lucia











89. Syrian Arab Republic
90. Tanzania, United Republic of
91. Thailand
92. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
93. Togo














*List of Parties Temporarily Categorised as Operating under Article 5





5. Federated States of Micronesia
6. Grenada
7. Kiribati
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